THINK TANKS AND INFORMAL DIPLOMACY IN A WORLD ORDER IN TRANSITION:

AN INTERPRETATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE "FORTE DE COPACABANA" PROCESS IN BRAZIL (2004-2018)

Dissertation

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„Darum beruht auf der Existenz Brasiliens, dessen Willen einzig auf friedlichen Aufbau gerichtet ist, eine unserer besten Hoffnungen auf eine zukünftige Zivilisierung und Befriedung unserer von Haß und Wahn verwüsteten Welt. Wo aber sittliche Kräfte am Werke sind, ist es unsere Aufgabe, diesen Willen zu bestärken. Wo wir in unserer verstörten Zeit noch Hoffnung auf neue Zukunft in neuen Zonen sehen, ist es unsere Pflicht, auf dieses Land, auf diese Möglichkeiten hinzuweisen.“

Stefan Zweig, *Brasilien: Ein Land der Zukunft* (1941).

“Rio, nome sussurrante,
Rio que te vais passando
a mar de estórias e sonhos
e em teu constante janeiro
corres pela nossa vida
como sangue, como seiva [...]

Rio novo a cada menino que nasce
a cada casamento
a cada namorado
que te descobre enquanto, rio-rindo,
assistes ao pobre fluir dos homens e de suas glórias pré-fabricadas.”

Carlos Drummond de Andrade, *Canto do Rio em sol*
(in *Lição de Coisas*, 1962).

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Contents

List of Abbreviations

ABED	Associação Brasileira de Estudos de Defesa/ Brazilian Association of Defence Studies
ALBA—TCP	Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América–Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos /Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America—People's Trade Agreement
APZ	Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASI	Asia Security Initiative
AU	African Union
BRASEUROPA	Missão do Brasil junto à União Europeia/ Brazilian Mission to the European Communities/Mission of Brazil to the European Union
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, and China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CAQDAS	Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software
CASA	Comunidade Sul-Americana de Nações/South American Community of Nations
CDS	Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano/South American Defence Council
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands/Christian Democratic Union of Germany
CEAs	Centro de Estudos das Américas/Centre for American Studies at Cândido Mendes University

CEBRI	Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais/Brazilian Center for International Relations
CEGOV	Centro de Estudos Internacionais sobre Governo/Center for International Studies on Government
CEIP	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
CELAC	Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos/Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CEPE-MB	Centro de Estudos Político-Estratégicos da Marinha/Political and Strategic Studies Center of Brazilian Navy
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CGEE	Centro de Geopolítica e Estudos Estratégicos/Center for Geopolitics and Strategic Studies
CMP	Comando Militar do Planalto/Planalto Military Command
COPPE	Instituto Alberto Luiz Coimbra de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Engenharia/Alberto Luiz Coimbra Institute for Graduate Studies and Research in Engineering
CRA	BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern/Christian Social Union in Bavaria
DASM	Diretoria de Assistência Social da Marinha
DI	Discursive institutionalism
EADS	European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community

EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EGN	Escola de Guerra Naval/Brazil's Naval War College
END	Estratégia Nacional de Defesa/Brazil's National Defence Strategy
ESG	Escola Superior de Guerra/Brazil's Superior War College
EU	European Union
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei/Free Democratic Party
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V./Friedrich Ebert Foundation
FGV	Fundação Getulio Vargas/Getulio Vargas Foundation
FNS	Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung für die Freiheit/Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom
FRS	Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique/Foundation for Strategic Research
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
G20	Group of Twenty
GDP	Gross domestic product
HBS	Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung e.V./Heinrich Böll Foundation
HISF	Halifax International Security Forum
HSS	Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung e.V./Hanns Seidel Foundation
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICG	International Crisis Group

IDN	Instituto de Defesa Nacional/National Defense Institute
IFRI	Institut français des relations internationales/French Institute of International Relations
IFSH	Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg/Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg
IIRSA	Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana/Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America
IIS	Institut für Internationale Solidarität/Institute for International Solidarity
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPC	Instituto Pandiá Calógeras/Pandiá Calógeras Institute
IPR	Institute of Pacific Relations
IPRA	International Peace Research Association
IPRI	Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais/Institute of Research on International Affairs
IPRI	Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais/Portuguese Institute of International Relations
IR	International relations
ISC	Istanbul Security Conference
ISIS	Institutes of Strategic and International Studies
IST Rio	Instituto Tecnologia e Sociedade/Institute for Technology & Society of Rio

IT	Information technology
KAS	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V./Konrad Adenauer Foundation
LBDN	Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional/Brazil's Defence White Paper
LEU	Low-enriched uranium
MCTR	Missile Technology Control Regime
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MNNA	Major non-NATO Ally
MSC	Munich Security Conference
MTF	Military Task Force
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDB	New Development Bank
NDC	NATO Defence College
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NTS	Non-traditional security
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OQ	Overarching question
OSF	Open Society Foundation
PAE	Politische Akademie Eichholz e.V./Eichholz Political Academy

PDN	Política de Defesa Nacional/Brazil's National Defence Policy
PDS	Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus/Party of Democratic Socialism
PND	Política Nacional de Defesa/Brazil's National Defence Policy
PRIF	Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
PRIO	International Peace Research Institute
PROSUB	Programa de Desenvolvimento de Submarinos/Submarine Development Programme
PSDB	Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira/Brazilian Social Democracy Party
PSIA	Paris School of International Affairs
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores/Workers' Party
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RDT&E	Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation
RLS	Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung – Gesellschaftsanalyse und Politische Bildung e.V./ Rosa Luxemburg Foundation
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies
RwP	Responsibility while Protecting
SACEUR	NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SisGAAz	Sistema de Gerenciamento da Amazônia Azul/Management System of the Blue Amazon
SLD	Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands/Social Democratic Party of Germany

SQ	Specific question
SVR	Stiftungsverband Regenbogen e.V./Regenbogen
SWP	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik/German Institute for International and Security Affairs
TT	Think tank
UFF	Universidade Federal Fluminense/Fluminense Federal University
UFRGS	Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul/Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations Organization
UNASUR/USAN	Unión de Naciones Suramericanas/Union of South American Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNESP	Universidade Estadual Paulista Júlio de Mesquita Filho/São Paulo State University
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States of America
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction
WTO	World Trade Organisation

ZOPACAS	Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul/South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone

List of Figures

List of Tables

1 Introduction

1.1 Think tanks, geopolitics, and a world order in transition

From a rather incipient research topic until the early 1990s, the think tank phenomenon has become an established field of studies among political scientists, sociologists, and international relations (IR) scholars. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, think tanks are in the broadest sense public policy research, advice, and engagement organisations interested in leaving a mark in domestic and/or foreign policymaking processes. With multiple institutional profiles, such organisations "populate the ecology of policy research and analysis" along with other knowledge actors like philanthropic foundations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and consultancy firms.[1]

Academics' growing interest in understanding the role played by these actors in contemporary societies has been accompanied by increasing levels of media and public attention to the issue—not least due to the "explosive" growth in the number of think tanks over the last three decades.[2] Nowadays more than 8,000 organisations that, according to the literature, typify the think tank phenomenon are active in all regions of the world. The very term *think tank*, which for many analysts did not "travel well across borders and cultures" in the past, is now "widely accepted around the globe."[3] In fact, scholars might well disagree when defining what a think tank is and explaining their different "pathways to influence," yet the growing salience these organisations have acquired over the years seems undisputed.[4]

[1] Diane Stone, *Knowledge actors and transnational governance: The private-public policy nexus in the global agora*, Non-governmental public action ([Basingstoke]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 182.

[2] James G. McGann and Elena Lazarou, "Think Tanks and the Foreign Policy Challenges Facing the Emerging Powers," in *Think tanks, foreign policy and the emerging powers*, ed. James G. McGann (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 6.

[3] James G. McGann, "2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report" (Think Tanks & Civil Societies Program (TTCSP), University of Pennsylvania, 2019), https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=think_tanks, 15. James McGann explains the origin of the term in popular parlance and associates it with its present acceptation as follows: "Though the term had been associated with human intelligence prior to this military-specific usage (in 1900 it was first coined as a flippant colloquialism for the brain), the immediate post–World War II period was the inaugural time the term was associated with institutionalized intelligence engaging in research activity and producing policy or strategy-primed advice." See James G. McGann, "Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and Emerging Powers," in *Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers*, ed. James G. McGann (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 20.

[4] Donald Abelson, Stephen Brooks and Xin Hua, eds., *Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and Geo-Politics: Pathways to Influence* (Abingdon, Oxon, New York, NY Routledge, 2017: Routledge, 2017).

In Europe and North America, where more than half of the world's policy institutes are located, a number of well-established organisations have evolved into truly "global" or "transnational think tanks," operating worldwide as major nodes of an intricate web of transnational networks.[5] To James McGann and Richard Sabatini, organisations as diverse as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), or the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Konrad Adenauer Foundation, KAS), among several others, represent transnational think tanks in that they have gone global in their attempt to influence policymaking processes domestically and abroad, thereby creating vast networks of operational centres, field offices, or outreach centres outside their headquarters country.[6] In a rather Western-centric view, these organisations are often portrayed as "a bridge between Western institutions and the rest of the world."[7]

Meanwhile, in Asia, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the phenomenon continues to expand, and a growing diversity in terms of affiliations, funding base, and areas of expertise has marked the recent proliferation of think tanks in the global South.[8] That is particularly evident among the so-called "emerging powers," countries whose presence and weight in regional and global affairs has substantially increased in recent decades.[9] According to data collected by James McGann and his associates at University of Pennsylvania's Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, for instance, China and India have surpassed the United Kingdom (UK) and are currently the home to the second and third largest think tank communities in the world behind the United States of America (US).[10] Similarly, the number of think tanks in Brazil has more than doubled in the past ten years, lifting the

[5] James G. McGann and Richard Sabatini, eds., *Global Think Tanks: Policy Networks and Governance*, Routledge Global Institutions Series 47 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011).

[6] McGann and Sabatini, *Global Think Tanks: Policy Networks and Governance*.

[7] McGann and Sabatini, *Global Think Tanks: Policy Networks and Governance*, 121.

[8] The notions of *global South* and *global North* are used throughout our study not as strictly geographical parameters, but rather as an (imperfect) conceptual device to refer to two contrasting stances on global power relations. While by *global North*, or *geopolitical North*, we mean the developed countries of Europe and North America, by global South, or geopolitical South, we mean countries traditionally associated with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the so-called emerging powers. Likewise, we use the notions *Western powers* and *the West* as equivalent to the *global North*. For a detailed account of the genesis and multiple trajectories of these phrases in common parlance as well as in the academic discourse, see Nour Dados and Raewyn Connell, "The Global South," *Contexts* 11, no. 1 (2012), https://doi.org/10.1177/1536504212436479; Andrea Hollington et al., "Concepts of the Global South," Voices from around the world 1 (Global South Studies Center Cologne, Cologne, 2015), https://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/6399/.

[9] McGann and Lazarou, "Think Tanks and the Foreign Policy Challenges Facing the Emerging Powers".

[10] McGann, "2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report".

country from the 24th position among the countries with the largest number of think tanks in 2008 up to number 11 in 2018.[11]

In sum, as McGann and Lazarou argue, "think tanks have become a permanent part of the political landscape and are now an integral part of the policy process in many countries."[12] According to the authors, two key conclusions permeate the current literature on the topic: firstly, that think tanks play a role in policymaking processes, not just in the global North—where such organisations first took root and their presence has been quite well documented—but with greater significance in the global South, too. And, secondly, that "moments of change or transformation" in the international system generate more complex demands for policymakers, thereby increasing the relevance of think tanks at different stages of the policymaking process.[13] As the authors point out, one of such moments of critical change has ensued from emerging countries' increasing capabilities and emboldened aspirations in the first decade of the 21st century, which was symbolised in particular by the rise of the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)—with far-reaching implications for the role and the influence of think tanks North and South of the globe.

The acronym BRIC, coined by former Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill in 2001, was initially conceived as an investment category to refer to Brazil, Russia, India, and China, countries with large territories and, at that moment, promising economic prospects in terms of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth.[14] The notion spread across larger audiences beyond the financial sphere only after a new report on the issue was published by the multinational investment bank in late 2003, soon becoming a major talking point among economic and political commentators across the world.[15] While acknowledging their regional weight, and noting the increasingly global ambitions voiced by the BRICs in the 2000s, observers often criticized the use of a term that encompassed, under the same label, non-nuclear Brazil and nuclear

[11] James G. McGann, "2008 Global Go To Think Tanks Index Report" (Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 2009), https://repository.upenn.edu/think_tanks/1/; McGann, "2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report".

[12] James G. McGann and Elena Lazarou, "Think Tanks and the Foreign Policy Challenges Facing the Emerging Powers," in *Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers*, ed. James G. McGann (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 7.

[13] McGann and Lazarou, "Think Tanks and the Foreign Policy Challenges Facing the Emerging Powers," 13.

[14] Jim O'Neill, "Building Better Global Economic BRICs: Global Economics Paper No: 66" (Goldman Sachs, 2001), https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf.'

[15] Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, "Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050: Global Economics Paper No: 99," https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/archive/archive-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf.

powers India, Russia and China; Indian and Brazilian multi-party liberal democracies and China's or Russia's authoritarian governments; permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Russia and China and aspiring candidates for permanent seats India and Brazil. Substantial differences among the BRIC countries were also reflected in their weak voting cohesion in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), denoting clear signs of dissension in terms of their respective interests and ambitions on the world stage.[16]

As Oliver Stuenkel notes, however, what critics of the concept often overlooked was its ability to capture the "spirit of a decade:"

> The BRICs grouping thus did not turn into a household name because of its conceptual novelty, but rather because it powerfully symbolized a narrative that seemed distant in the 1990s but appeared to make sense in the mid-2000s: a momentous shift of power was taking place away from the United States and Europe towards emerging powers such as China, India, and Brazil. This shift was taking place rapidly, making the world less Western and more ideologically diverse.[17]

That narrative was echoed not only by the leaders of the so-called emerging powers, but also by scholars and observers who described the contemporary world order as increasingly "multipolar," "inter-polar," "apolar," "post-hegemonic," "post-American" or "post-Western," among several other similar, and sometimes competing, terms.[18] Notwithstanding different conceptualisations, proponents of this view shared the assumption that a shift in global power relations was underway, whereby the dominant position enjoyed by the established powers during the 1990s, in particular by the United States, had progressively eroded since the turn of the century. The "high point of a general sense of crisis," according to this view, was marked by the immediate aftermath of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, which initiated in the US subprime mortgage market and soon developed into a global economic downturn.[19] While the BRICs' finance ministers stressed the "significant resilience" their countries' economies

[16] Stephan Keukeleire and Tom de Bruyn, "The European Union, the BRICS, and Other Emerging Powers: A New World Order?," in *International Relations and the European Union*, ed. Christopher Hill, Michael Smith and Sophie Vanhoonacker, Third edition, The new European Union series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 423–24.

[17] Oliver Stuenkel, *The BRICS and the future of global order* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2015), 5.

[18] The term "post-Western" is used by Oliver Stuenkel, *Post-western world: How emerging powers are remaking global order* (Cambridge, US, Malden, Mass.: Polity, 2016). Scholars advancing all other terms are quoted by McGann and Lazarou, "Think Tanks and the Foreign Policy Challenges Facing the Emerging Powers," 11.

[19] Stuenkel, *The BRICS and the future of global order*, 30.

demonstrated in the period, developed nations were hard hit by what turned out to be the greatest economic recession, until that point in time, since the 1930s.[20] In the meantime, growing alignment among Brazilian, Russian, Indian, and Chinese authorities on the sidelines of high-level meetings such as the UNGA as well as their concerted action to reform global financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the G8 would pave the way for the eventual institutionalisation of the group at the first BRIC Leaders' Summit, held in June 2009 in Yekaterinburg.[21] Shortly thereafter, the establishment of the Group of Twenty (G20) as the main platform for discussions on global economic issues not only reinforced the narrative of a "seismic shift" in world politics, but also materialised the impact of emerging economies on global governance institutions.[22]

And yet the ensuing decade would reveal how expectations about the speed of change, as Stuenkel points out, were "certainly somewhat exaggerated."[23] Long-term forecasts about emerging powers' ascent to a new status globally were mostly based on projections from a moment of unusually high rates of economic growth. In addition, the narrative of an inevitable rise of the BRICS to the upper echelons of world power was premised on the inaccurate notion that these countries were, at the same time, "domestically stable, ready and able to consistently project global influence."[24] Russia and China have no doubt gained considerable leverage on global power relations vis-à-vis their status at the turn of the century; in countries like Brazil

[20] Stuenkel, *The BRICS and the future of global order*, 14. The author quotes the expression "significant resilience" from The Economist, "Not just straw men: The biggest emerging economies are rebounding, even without recovery in the West," June 18, 2009, accessed April 14, 2020, https://www.economist.com/international/2009/06/18/not-just-straw-men. As discussed below, the resilience of the BRIC countries to the 2007-2008 global financial upheaval would not persist too long into the ensuing decade. See Ansgar Belke, Christian Dreger, and Irina Dubova, "On the exposure of the BRIC countries to global economic shocks," *The World Economy* 42, no. 1 (2018): 122, https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12674. According to the authors, "[t]he BRICs have been the primary source for global GDP growth before the financial crisis and the first years thereafter. The rebound from the crisis started earlier in many emerging markets, evolved much faster than in advanced economies and was often characterised by a V-shaped pattern of output growth […] However, despite the recovery in the industrial countries, GDP growth in the BRICs started to decline in the most recent years. Although differences across countries are striking, the slowdown is synchronised to some extent. While the acceleration of output is still high in India, the Chinese economy experienced lower growth, and countries such as Brazil and Russia entered into a recession."

[21] South Africa joined the group only in 2010. Since then, all five countries constitute the BRICS. See Stuenkel, *The BRICS and the future of global order*, 9–24 for a detailed account of the impact of the global financial crisis on the inception of intra-BRICS cooperation and the eventual institutionalisation of the group in 2009.

[22] McGann and Lazarou, "Think Tanks and the Foreign Policy Challenges Facing the Emerging Powers," 11.

[23] Stuenkel, *The BRICS and the future of global order*, 5.

[24] Suzanne Nossel, "The World's Rising Powers Have Fallen," *Foreign Policy*, July 6, 2016, accessed January 28, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/06/brics-brazil-india-russia-china-south-africa-economics-recession/.

and South Africa, on the other hand, optimism proved particularly short-lived, as a series of challenges of political, economic, and social nature has jeopardised prospects of stability and growth since the mid-2010s. As Suzanne Nossel argues, in sum, "[a]nalysts were right to draw attention to the rapid growth and expanded international profile of a new set of countries […] Yet the expectation that this group—as a group—would collectively remake global power relations has not materialized."[25]

Even if the "spirit" of the 2000s, epitomised by the BRICS, did not last long into the ensuing decade, the ebb and flow of global power relations in the early 21st century has compelled decision makers North and South of the globe to "reassess their power metrics relative to new and old allies and adversaries."[26]According to McGann and Lazarou, think tanks play a crucial role in this process, for they "can serve the incredibly useful function of aiding the transition and, most importantly, aiding the transformation of the nation's foreign policy to better reflect its changing status globally."[27] As different case studies discussed in McGann's edited volume illustrate, the ongoing shift in the distribution of power among states has considerably increased the visibility of international affairs think tanks in the global South, most notably within the BRICS. From India's Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA)[28] to Brazil's BRICS Policy Center (BPC),[29] the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)[30] to the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA),[31] the countries and organisations analysed in the volume illustrate how emerging powers' think tanks, in McGann's own words, "provide the necessary research and policy analysis to their respective countries to help them understand and

[25] Nossel, "The World's Rising Powers Have Fallen".

[26] McGann and Lazarou, "Think Tanks and the Foreign Policy Challenges Facing the Emerging Powers," 9. The term "post-Western" is used by Stuenkel, *Post-western world*. Scholars advancing all other terms are quoted by McGann and Lazarou, "Think Tanks and the Foreign Policy Challenges Facing the Emerging Powers," 11.

[27] McGann and Lazarou, "Think Tanks and the Foreign Policy Challenges Facing the Emerging Powers," 9–11.

[28] Arvind Gupta, "India's Strategic Think Tank: The Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses," in *Think tanks, foreign policy and the emerging powers*, ed. James G. McGann (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

[29] Adriana E. Abdenur, "Beyond "Backwater" and "Backyard"—Reframing Security in the South Atlantic: The BRICS Policy Center," in *Think tanks, foreign policy and the emerging powers*, ed. James G. McGann (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

[30] Longdi Xu, "Emergence of a Think Tank and a Rising Power on the World Stage: China Institute of International Studies," in *Think tanks, foreign policy and the emerging powers*, ed. James G. McGann (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

[31] Neuma Grobbelaar and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, "Foreign Policy and Security Challenges Facing South Africa: The South African Institute of International Affairs," in *Think tanks, foreign policy and the emerging powers*, ed. James G. McGann (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

respond to the new dynamics and the political, economic, and social challenges of a multipolar world."[32]

However, previous research on the subject has failed to address whether and, if so, how global or transnational think tanks participate in this process. As pointed out above, a number of well-established organisations from the global North operate nowadays as transnational think tanks in that they rely on multiple operational centres and field offices abroad, are part of different networks with other policy actors (often as major nodes), and attempt to wield influence on policymaking processes on a truly global scale. The question thus arises as to how global think tanks position themselves in policy debates about the rise of the BRICS and their evolving relationship with the established powers. Do BRICS' home-grown think tanks really "hold a pivotal role in shaping real policy discourse," as McGann affirms?[33] Or are think tanks from the global North, too, influential actors in setting the terms of the transition and shaping discourses on how established and "emerging powers" should rethink their mutual relations?

1.2 The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the "Forte de Copacabana" process in Brazil: a case study

Exploring how think tanks from the global North position themselves in policy debates about the rise of so-called emerging powers has interested me since I started my master's degree in Political Science at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, UFRGS) in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 2014. With a background in IR, I soon joined a group of fellow postgraduates at UFRGS who shared the same interest in exploring the role of think tanks in global affairs. In particular, my colleagues and I embarked on a joint research project on think tanks and their institutional environment in Western Europe and the US. Our aim was to investigate the ideas and policy recommendations advanced by think tank-affiliated researchers from the global North when assessing Brazil's foreign, defence, and security policy priorities under former presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and

[32] James G. McGann, "Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and National, Regional, and Global Politics," in *Think tanks, foreign policy and the emerging powers*, ed. James G. McGann (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 422.

[33] McGann, "Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and National, Regional, and Global Politics," 428.

Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). In doing so, our ambition was to bridge a gap in the Brazilian IR literature, where the topic was still barely discussed at the time.[34]

In this sense, underlying our research endeavour were the following assumptions:

(i) during the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) administrations, Brazil's foreign policy trajectory had a clear ambition for international prominence and autonomy vis-à-vis traditional partners in the global North—including the EU;

(ii) one of the main pathways adopted by Brazilian foreign policymakers in order to pursue that goal was the association with other so-called emerging powers within different networks or coalitions of states, most prominently the BRICS;

(iii) with the rising regional and global stature of the BRICS countries, decision makers in the developed world struggled to cope with the uncertainties of a world order in transition;

(iv) think tanks, among other knowledge actors, played an increasingly important role as providers of relevant information and policy advice on how decision makers should interpret, and respond to, emerging powers' ascent to a new status globally;

and (v) that exploring the world of think tanks, their ideas, and recommendations was, therefore, a relevant research endeavour, not only academically, but also for contexts of policy and practice.

Methodologically, our research was based on a qualitative textual analysis of hundreds of publications selected with pre-determined filters on online databases of some of the most influential foreign affairs think tanks operating in Belgium, France, Germany, the UK, and the US. To select which policy institutes would be included in our research, we relied on the scholarly literature dedicated to the think tank environment of each one of those countries as well as on think tank rankings such as the Global Go to Think Tank Index Reports, published by McGann and his associates at University of Pennsylvania's Think Tanks and Civil Societies

[34] Important exceptions to this were Tatiana Teixeira, one of the pioneers of think tank research in Brazil, and career diplomats Benoni Belli and Filipe Nasser, who authored a thought-provoking, policy-oriented article on the subject in 2014. See Tatiana Teixeira, *Think Tanks e a sua Influência na Política Externa dos EUA: A Arte de Pensar o Impensável* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Revan, 2007); Tatiana Teixeira, "Os BRICS na Visão dos Principais Think Tanks Norte-Americanos," *Carta Internacional* 2, no. 11 (2011), accessed July 28, 2020, https://cartainternacional.abri.org.br/Carta/article/view/43; Benoni Belli and Filipe Nasser, "Ideias de política e políticas das ideias: a paisagem dos think tanks nos EUA e as estratégias de inserção do Brasil no debate global," *Política Externa* 23, no. 2 (2014).

Program.[35] Whereas three other colleagues worked with institutes from the UK and the US, I concentrated my focus on foreign policy institutes from Belgium, France, and Germany.[36]

When proceeding with the analysis of how think tank-affiliated researchers from these three countries assessed Brazil's recent foreign policy trajectory, I found myself intrigued by the work of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Brazil. The office of the German party-affiliated political foundation in Rio de Janeiro, I would find out, not only had an extensive list of publications directly related to the topics of interest to my research, but also was the main driver, as the major node of a network of partner organisations, behind the annual Forte de Copacabana International Security Conferences—an unofficial space for dialogue on foreign, defence, and global security issues gathering, since 2004, European and South American representatives from politics, research, and the armed forces. The annual dialogue forum bears the name of a historic military fort built in 1914 at the west end of the famed tourist district and was held at the very Fort Copacabana army base until 2007, behind closed doors. In the ensuing years, the conference venue moved to spacious meeting rooms of upscale hotels in *Zona Sul*, Rio's affluent South Zone, opening its doors to registered participants from the general public from 2008 onwards.[37]

Defence ministers, legislators, diplomats, senior policy advisors, and military officials, among numerous other attendees from Brazil, from neighbouring South American countries, and from European Union (EU) member states have attended the annual security conferences as speakers, panellists, moderators, or members of the audience. Participants also include, for instance, members of the European Parliament and the European Commission; the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS); the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the NATO Defense College (NDC). In addition, IR scholars and think tank-affiliated researchers from South America, Europe, and the US have

[35] Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, "Global Go To Think Tanks Index Reports," University of Pennsylvania, accessed November 6, 2019, https://www.gotothinktank.com/global-goto-think-tank-index. For an account of critical views on the programme's ranking system, see Donal E. Abelson, "And the winner is… Why measuring think tank performance is inherently problematic.: lessons from Canada and beyond," in *Think tanks, foreign policy and geo-politics: Pathways to influence*, ed. Donald E. Abelson, Stephen Brooks and Hua Xin (London, New York: RoutledgeTaylor & Francis Group, 2017).

[36] The main results obtained for the cases of French, German, and US think tanks as well as a detailed account of the theoretical and methodological frameworks adopted in our research are available in Portuguese in Luciana Wietchikoski, Fernando Preusser de Mattos, and André França, "A Inserção Internacional do Brasil segundo os Think Tanks dos Estados Unidos, da Alemanha e da França (2003-2014)," *Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval* 25, no. 02 (2019), https://doi.org/10.21544/1809-3191.v25n2.p381-415.

[37] In 2019, the conference venue was once again a Brazilian military institution, the Naval War College (Escola de Guerra Naval, EGN). In September 2020, the conference was held online due to restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

not only joined the authorities in attendance at the forum, but also contributed articles to the annual conference publication—a bilingual, book-length edited volume prepared and distributed, both in English and Portuguese, by KAS foreign liaison office in Brazil.

Preceding a series of expert contributions on foreign policy and geopolitical issues affecting both regions, the conference publications include an introductory chapter in which successive representatives of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Brazil describe the purpose of the meetings and justify their relevance in light of contemporary global security challenges. In 2015, for instance, former KAS representative Felix Dane underscored in his Introduction to that year's conference publication the relevance of the meeting and its output material as a means to "reinforc[e] the link between North and South:"

> This annual event is dedicated to the exchange of ideas through academic and policy-oriented debate, as well as the promotion of key networks. The conference has become the largest in its field within Latin America; together with its annual publication, they form two examples of the Foundation's many dialogue fora, reinforcing the link between North and South. Brazil and Europe may be set in different geopolitical realities, yet both share a common interest in a secure and stable world order.[38]

To promote, on an annual basis, what has indeed become the largest security conference in Latin America, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation has cooperated with Brazil's leading foreign policy think tank, the Brazilian Center for International Relations (Centro Brasiliero de Relações Internacionais, CEBRI), since the first edition of "Forte." In addition, the Delegation of the EU to Brazil, based in the capital city Brasília, has supported the conference project from the outset, too. As we will explore in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.2), what the programme designers at KAS liaison office in Rio mostly benefit from by cooperating with these actors is their privileged access to influential individuals from the Brazilian and European foreign policy communities, respectively. Apart from the flagship event in Rio, what is more, KAS, CEBRI, and the EU Delegation to Brazil also network with a wide range of foreign and local organisations to promote complementary events dedicated to the mutual dialogue on foreign policy and geopolitical affairs. These include, for instance, the European-South American Regional Security Symposium or the biannual confidential preparatory meetings for the Forte de Copacabana Conferences, known as "Mini-Fortes," held since 2015 and 2016, respectively. The aggregate of such informal, think tank-organised spaces constitutes what we will henceforth refer to as the "Forte de Copacabana" process, a sustained unofficial dialogue mechanism through which

[38] Felix Dane, "Introduction," in *International Security: A European - South American Dialogue (2015): World Politics of Security,* ed. Felix Dane (Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2015), 11.

a global think tank and its partners have sought to influence how decision makers from the EU and the West and Brazil reflect on their respective "geopolitical realities" and thus reshape their mutual relationship in a world order in transition.

1.2.1 Research questions and research design

The informal dialogue mechanism conducted by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Brazil since the early 2000s illustrates well the multiple facets of the phenomenon we described above: the role of transnational think tanks in North-South dialogue, their networking and cooperation initiatives with partner organisations from the global South, and the engagement of these actors in policy debates about the rise of the BRICS. The case of the "Forte de Copacabana" process also provides us with rich and original empirical evidence to explore the overarching questions (OQs) that stimulate and will orient our enquiry:

- (OQ-1) How does the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung participate in the evolving dialogue between Brazil and the established powers?
- (OQ-2) How influential is KAS' work in the area of security policy in Brazil?

As we will explore below, the present study relies on a qualitative, interpretative methodology; consequently, our answers to these questions remain necessarily limited by the degree of insight obtained through such methodology as well as the authors' judgements and interpretations. Nonetheless, with the present thesis we hope to lay the conceptual and empirical foundations upon which future research might be based—and more conclusive answers obtained. While the conclusions drawn from our case study may not be generalisable, the final part of the thesis will explore how some of the key points discussed throughout the thesis might be relevant to researchers dealing with other cases (i.e. transferability).[39]

Due to its scale, high-level attendance, and unbroken continuity for over fifteen years, we would expect that IR scholars, think tank observers, or the literature on German political

[39] We draw here on Zina O'Leary's differentiation between *generalisability* and *transferability* as two indicators of the broader applicability of one's research findings. According to the author, transferability is a useful indicator of the applicability of qualitative, small-scale research projects, whilst generalisability is usually associated with large sample sizes and statistical probabilities obtained primarily via quantitative methodologies. As O'Leary notes, the credibility of a research project depends, at least in part, on the fulfilment of one of these two forms of applicability of one's results for other studies. "The indicator of transferability suggests that researchers have provided a highly detailed description of the research context and methods so that determinations regarding applicability can be made by those reading the research account." See Zina O'Leary, *The essential guide to doing research* (London: Sage, 2004), 62–63.

foundations would have a lot to say about the annual security conferences and KAS' long-standing security-related work in Brazil. And yet none of these fields nor the vast body of scholarship on EU-Brazil relations has yet included serious analytical work into the emergence, development, and potential influence of such unofficial political spaces.[40]

The present study is, therefore, a foray into uncharted territory. As such, it departs from a set of specific questions (SQs) that will help us proceed with our investigation, orienting not only the selection of an appropriate conceptual framework, but also the analytical part of our study. These questions will also guide the logical structure of the thesis and allow us to build our argument step by step, in a clear and coherent manner.

The first series of specific research questions concerns the concept that lies at the core of our study:

- (SQ-1) How do we define a think tank?
- (SQ-2) How can we assess the role and influence of think tanks in contemporary societies?
- (SQ-3) How does this concept apply to the organisations and processes under enquiry in our study?

Once we have discussed the conceptual framework of our study, we will look into the political, institutional, and formal diplomatic settings within which the Forte de Copacabana process has occurred by providing answers to the following specific research questions:

- (SQ-4) How has the EU-Brazil political dialogue evolved over the last few decades, in particular as far as peace and security issues are concerned?
- (SQ-5) How have Brazil's foreign and security policy trajectories evolved in the period?
- (SQ-6) What have been the main implications of these changes to the country's security dialogue with the European Union and, more broadly, with the West?

Engaging with these questions will help us situate the Forte de Copacabana process within the wider context of Brazil's recent foreign and security policy trajectories and account for the ebb and flow of mutual relations with the European bloc via official channels of communication. In addition, it will pave the way to the final part of our study, in which we will

[40] Literature reviews in Chapters 2 and 3 will account for the current debates within each one of these fields, discussing how the analysis we will conduct in Chapter 4, despite its originality, builds on the existing literature and provides it with invaluable insights.

bridge a gap in the literature by exploring the emergence, development, and potential influence of the unofficial dialogue mechanisms conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and its partner organisations in Brazil. In this part, the following set of questions will guide us through the analysis of our primary source material:

- (SQ-7) How do representatives of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and its partner organisations in Brazil make sense of the emergence of the Forte de Copacabana process and evaluate its development since then?
- (SQ-8) How do they justify the scope and the purpose of the conferences and complementary events?
- (SQ-9) How do dialogue organisers, observers, and participants make sense of the achievements and potential influence of the Forte de Copacabana process on Brazil' relationship with the European Union and, more broadly, with the West?

Relying on a qualitative-interpretative methodology, our approach to case study research shares the basic epistemological principle of qualitative research in general, namely to understand meanings and contexts that are jointly created through complex relationships in social interaction, rather than to explain social interaction by isolating a single (or multiple) cause-and-effect relationship(s).[41] In this sense, a qualitative case study design constitutes a methodological procedure with holistic claims, or an "umbrella of research techniques to analyse phenomena with multiple theoretical and empirical dimensions," as Ronaldo de Almeida puts it.[42] That is to say, by mobilising different methods, mostly qualitative in nature, researchers adopting a qualitative case study design are well-equipped to provide an in-depth description of a complex, not well-understood phenomenon and thereby to identify and interpret relationships, underlying mechanisms, and structural features that might also be present in other cases.

With this in mind, in the following section we detail the methods and procedures with which we obtained and interpreted data, in particular first-hand, process-related empirical data previously unaccounted for by the scholarly literature. Further details on the approach we used

[41] Uwe Flick, Ernst v. Kardorff, and Ines Steinke, "What is Qualitative Research? An Introduction to the Field," in *A companion to qualitative research*, ed. Uwe Flick, Ernst v. Kardorff and Ines Steinke (London: Sage, 2004).

[42] All sources quoted from any language other than English will have its original passage in the foreign language reproduced in the footnotes from this point forward. Ronaldo d. Almeida, "Estudo de Caso: foco temático e diversidade metodológica," in *Métodos e técnicas de pesquisa em Ciências Sociais: bloco qualitativo*, ed. Alexandre Abdal et al. (São Paulo: CEBRAP/CPF-Sesc-SP, 2017), 62. "*O estudo de caso pode ser considerado uma espécie de guarda-chuva de técnicas de pesquisa com a finalidade de analisar fenômenos com múltiplas dimensões teóricas e empíricas*."

to interpret our textual and textualised sources as well as a thorough discussion on the limitations of our methodology are laid out in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2).

1.2.2 Data collection and analysis: methods and procedures

To proceed with our case study, we relied on different secondary sources as well as on a wealth of think tank- and process-related primary source material. Firstly, the list of secondary sources includes not only scholarly journal articles, books, and doctoral dissertations, but also news agency reports, newspaper articles, dictionaries, and think tank ranking lists such as the Global Go to Think Tank Index Reports. The academic literature reviewed prior to field research covers a broad range of areas, including EU-Brazil relations, theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of think tanks, or the domestic and international work of German political foundations—especially, of course, of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. These sources were crucial for the discussion we advance in Chapters 2 and 3, in which we address SQs 1-6.

In addition to secondary sources, our primary source material includes different process-related documents published from 2004 to 2018—the period of analysis considered in our research. As we will explore in Chapter 4, that time frame starts with the first dialogue forum held by the global think tank and its partners at the Fort Copacabana army base and spans over the ensuing fifteen editions of the flagship event. Besides, it includes four editions of the European-South American Regional Security Symposium and six bi-annual preparatory meetings for the main conferences. The set of primary sources stemming from these events includes, among others, the detailed programme of the conferences and complementary mechanisms, the lists of attendees, internal documents with the overall design of the meetings as well as conference reports, edited volumes, and policy papers published alongside the process. In addition, the transcripts of interviews conducted with dialogue organisers and participants, as discussed below, is another core component of our textual corpus. Finally, government documents, transcriptions of selected speeches of Brazilian and EU representatives, and numerous joint statements issued within the framework of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership were additional sources of crucial importance to our research.

To obtain such a broad range of different data sources, we not only searched the website, social media, and online databases of the organisations involved in the process, but also did field research at the headquarters of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Berlin and its foreign offices in Madrid and Rio de Janeiro as well as at CEBRI, also in Rio de Janeiro. As discussed in Chapter 4, conducting fieldwork allowed us not only to obtain access to internal documents

and primary source material unavailable online, but also to acquire first-hand knowledge of the individuals, organisations, and dialogue mechanisms explored below. Moreover, from May 2017 to October 2019, we conducted twenty qualitative, semi-structured interviews with representatives of KAS and its partners as well as with selected political, diplomatic, and military actors involved in the process—including European and Brazilian diplomats in Brussels, German politicians and their advisors in Berlin, and high-ranking Brazilian defence officials in Rio. Appendix 4 provides a list of all interviews conducted during our research, informing the position and affiliation of all interviewees as well as the details of each one of our interview sessions (time, place, duration, whether the interview was conducted face-to-face or via video calling application, etc.). Appendix 5, in turn, shows sample interview guides prepared for different interview sessions.

Furthermore, participant observation of two editions of the Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference was an additional technique used to obtain first-hand understanding of the process and the organisations promoting it in Brazil. Attending the flagship event in Rio de Janeiro in September 2017 and September 2018 allowed us, for instance, to observe personal features, everyday practices, and other situational circumstances of the individuals and organisations described and analysed in our study. Moreover, it gave us access to high-level conferees and, thereby, allowed us to schedule, or even to conduct on site, some of the interviews with political actors and members of the organisations hosting the dialogue forum every year. Although not reported in the study, informal conversations with members of the audience and our own observation of the event on site add further nuance to the description and analysis of our case.

To analyse our textual and textualised (e.g. interview transcripts) sources, we relied on the insights of narrative interpretation. As pointed out above, a methodological section in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2) will engage with the literature on qualitative textual interpretation, explore how and why we use narrative analysis in our study, and discuss the various limitations of our method choice to both data collection and analysis. Chapter 4 also provides detailed information of how we scheduled, conducted, and managed data obtained from our qualitative interviews. As we discuss later in the thesis, to improve data validity and reduce bias we relied on the strategy of triangulation, understood here as the "observation of the research issue from (at least) two different points."[43] In this sense, interviews with dialogue organisers, for instance,

[43] Uwe Flick, "Triangulation in Qualitative Research," in *A companion to qualitative research*, ed. Uwe Flick, Ernst v. Kardorff and Ines Steinke (London: Sage, 2004), 178.

were triangulated with the testimony of participants and impressions collected during informal conversations with members of the audience. Likewise, think tank publications and promotional material advertising the flagship event were triangulated with our own participant observation of the conferences and with perspectives obtained through informal conversations with members of the audiences, among other similar procedures. Triangulation thus served not only as a validation strategy, but also as a "route to additional knowledge" of our case.[44]

To conclude the present Introduction, the final section provides an overview of the thesis and discusses how each of the following three chapters contributes with the overall argument we will advance below.

1.3 Thesis structure

Following the present Introduction, Chapter 2 assesses different conceptual definitions advanced by the literature and explores their strengths and limitations. In doing so, it helps us evaluate the extent to which the main approaches to conceptual definition in think tank research provide us with appropriate tools to address the empirical richness of our case. Moreover, in the next chapter we will also engage with different theoretical frameworks with which scholars have sought to explain whether—and, if so, how—organisations that typify the think tank phenomenon wield influence on domestic and transnational policy processes. Therefore, Chapter 2 accounts for the specific research questions SQ-1, 2, and 3.

In Chapter 3, in turn, we will provide an overview of the complex "set of consolidated multilevel institutional ties" through which Brazil and the EU interact.[45] The aim of this chapter will be to answer specific questions SQ-4, 5, and 6. To do so, in Chapter 3 we will engage with the academic literature and assess key developments in EU-Brazil relations over the course of the last three decades, situating them within the ebb and flow of Brazilian foreign policy. The panoramic view offered in this chapter will thus help us understand how Brazilian foreign policy changed in the period and how these changes affected the country's relationship with the global North—and with the EU in particular. In addition, it will help us understand the political,

[44] Flick, "Triangulation in Qualitative Research," 183.

[45] Arlo Poletti, "The EU for Brazil: A Partner Towards a 'Fairer' Globalization?," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 12, no. 3 (2007): 273, accessed March 24, 2019, https://www.kluwerlawonline.com/preview.php?id=EERR2007026.

institutional, and formal diplomatic backgrounds against which the think tank-organised process under analysis in our study has occurred.

Chapter 4, in turn, provides an in-depth account of the inception and evolution of the work of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in the area of security policy in Brazil. Drawing on a wide range of primary sources collected during our research, we will start by exploring how and why we use narrative analysis to interpret our primary source material, detailing as well what these sources are, how we obtained them, and what limitations exist as concerns our method choice to both data collection and analysis. In three subsequent sections, in turn, we will rely on the insights of narrative interpretation to investigate the reasons and rationales behind the international security conferences and complementary dialogue mechanisms created and conducted by the foundation and its partners. In doing so, we will answer specific questions SQ-7,8, and 9 and propose some tentative conclusions regarding the influence of think tanks on the evolving dialogue between Brazil and the established powers.

Finally, in the Conclusion we pull together all the key findings of our study and consider them in light of the relevant scholarly literature, highlighting open questions and pointing to possible avenues for future research. Whereas conclusions are tentative, the analysis we will conduct in the following chapters intends to lay the groundwork upon which future research might extend empirical knowledge about our topic and enhance the theoretical framework of discursive institutionalism (DI).

2 Think Tanks as Discursive Actors: Towards a Conceptual Framework

2.1 Introduction

Think tanks take on a number of forms, and the current usage of the term in scholarly and public debate can be best understood as "the amalgam of many different storylines."[46] Some think tanks constitute departments of larger public or private entities, while others are autonomous organisations; they are most often non-profit in nature, yet certain institutes sell their services at a price; some are financially independent, whereas others rely on donations or government grants; there are think tanks with thousands of affiliated experts and staff as well as a multimillion annual operating budget, while others are composed of few individuals and rely on very limited financial resources. In sum, *think tank* remains an ambiguous, elastic, opaque, murky, or slippery term—to mention but a few qualifiers that are generally used by the literature when referring to these actors. As Diane Stone wittily summarizes the problem, "if there is a consensus in the literature, it is that there is no consensus on definition."[47]

In the present study we advance the idea that organisations as disparate at first sight as the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) are both illustrations of the think tank phenomenon. But how do we define a think tank? How can we assess the role and influence of think tanks in contemporary societies? How does this concept apply to the organisations and processes under enquiry in our study? To answer these questions, the present chapter will engage with the literature and assess the strengths and limitations of traditional and contemporary approaches to the definition of the term *think tank*.[48] In doing so, we will be able to evaluate the extent to which the conceptual lenses offered by different streams of thought correspond with the empirical richness of the think tank phenomenon.

[46] Stone, *Knowledge actors and transnational governance*, 11.

[47] Stone, *Knowledge actors and transnational governance*, 64.

[48] Throughout the present chapter, different terms such as *policy research institutes*, *public policy institutes*, or simply *policy institutes* are interchangeably used in reference to the organisations discussed here, namely *think tanks*. We do so to avoid—or to lessen as much as possible—the overuse of the phrase *think tanks*. As the following discussion will show, these actors do get involved in public policy research, but their mandate, in most cases, extends far beyond that.

In addition, the chapter will explore different conceptual frameworks with which scholars have sought to explain whether—and, if so, how—public policy institutes wield influence on domestic and transnational policy processes.[49] We will argue that Thomas Medvetz's relational definition of think tanks as "blurring organisations" shows more accuracy and greater explanatory power than previous approaches advanced by the literature.[50] Although Medvetz's conceptualisation provides us with a more nuanced explanation for the workings of think tanks in contemporary societies, it fails to address the question of how think tanks actually translate the ability to claim for themselves a mediating role in the social structure into political influence.

To overcome this problem, we will draw on the notion of *discourse* as advanced by Vivien A. Schmidt's constructivist institutionalism, or discursive institutionalism (DI), and argue that the chief power of think tanks actually lies in their ability to leverage that role to their advantage and transform the resources and credentials acquired from surrounding actors into discourse, i.e. "the interactive process of conveying ideas."[51] In doing so, our study follows in the footsteps of a burgeoning community of think tank observers relying on DI to trace how ideas and discourses influence policy and institutional outcomes.[52] After conceptually addressing the role of think tanks in the present chapter, our aim in the ensuing part of this study will be to explore the political context as well as the emergence, development, and potential influence of the unofficial dialogue mechanisms conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and its partner organisations in Brazil. By so doing, we hope to lay the groundwork upon which future research might trace how think tank-promoted ideas have influenced—if at all—concrete

[49] The term *conceptual framework* is used here as equivalent to *theoretical framework,* even though we acknowledge, following Ridder, that there might be conceptual frameworks, i.e. "a construction of assumptions that tells us how we are investigating the research question," with no theoretically proposed relationships, but rather "some preliminary conceptual ideas or hunches." See Ridder, *Case study research*, 49–58.

[50] Thomas Medvetz, *Think tanks in America* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012); Thomas Medvetz, *Think Tanks as an Emergent Field* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2008), accessed July 26, 2019, https://www.ssrc.org/publications/view/A2A2BA10-B135-DE11-AFAC-001CC477EC70/.

[51] Vivien A. Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse," *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2008): 303, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060606.135342.

[52] See Stella Ladi, "Think Tanks, Discursive Institutionalism and Policy Change," in *Social Science and Policy Challenges: Democracy, values and capacities*, ed. Georgios Papanagnou, Research & policy series (Paris: UNESCO, 2011); Erin Zimmerman, *Think Tanks and Non-Traditional Security: Governance entrepreneurs in Asia*, Critical studies of the Asia-Pacific (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016). https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137488251; Erin Zimmerman and Diane Stone, "ASEAN think tanks, policy change and economic cooperation: From the Asian financial crisis to the global financial crisis," *Policy and Society* 13, no. 3 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2017.1397394 Stella Ladi, Elena Lazarou, and Juliana Hauck, "Brazilian think tanks and the rise of austerity discourse," *Policy and Society* 37, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2017.1397396.

policy and institutional outcomes in the evolving dialogue between the EU and the West and Brazil.

2.2 Traditional definitions and analytical frameworks

Just as the think tank phenomenon itself, so has the literature on this particular kind of knowledge organisation evolved significantly over time. While most scholars nowadays agree that traditional, US-dominated conceptions of what a think tank is have proven "insufficient to encompass the complexity acquired by the hybridizations imposed on the TTs [think tanks] in other national contexts," a number of dilemmas persist concerning both the definition and the operationalization of the concept as an analytical category.[53] Moreover, different theoretical frameworks have been used to explain the emergence and proliferation of think tanks, to investigate their interactions with other actors, and to ascertain how these organisations influence politics—if at all. The following two sections engage with the scholarly literature and account for the strengths and limitations of traditional conceptual approaches to the study of think tanks.

2.2.1 Minimalism vs parochialism: the pendular movement of conceptual definition

The most influential forefathers of think tank research resorted either to *minimalism* or to *parochialism* when attempting to define think tanks, according to McGann.[54] Whereas the "minimalist school of approach" advances a "broad definition that identifies core institutional characteristics on which there is a wide consensus," parochialist approaches provide a narrower definition, which, nonetheless, "can be too limited, ignoring the diversity of think tanks and excluding a number of institutions commonly accepted as such."[55] However, in both cases scholars developed their analytical categories and advanced their preferred definitions based almost exclusively on the observation of think tanks from the Anglo-American domain, hence

[53] Juliana C. R. Hauck, "What are 'Think Tanks'? Revisiting the Dilemma of the Definition," 2017, 3; Brazilian Political Science Review, 11(2), https://doi.org/10.1590/1981-3821201700020006.

[54] For an overview of the most influential forefathers of think tank research and their respective contribution to the field, see McGann, "Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and Emerging Powers," 22–25.

[55] McGann, "Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and Emerging Powers," 18.

the reason why traditional definitions would soon prove inadequate to account for an increasingly global phenomenon.

Despite varying degrees of generality, seminal conceptions of the term "converge significantly regarding their central attributes," according to Juliana Hauck.[56] In her essay, the author provides an encompassing review of the literature on this issue and addresses some of the main dilemmas that persist to date concerning the definition and the operationalization of the concept. In doing so, Hauck highlights two attributes that remained at the core of traditional, Anglo-American conceptions of think tanks for many years: "organizational and financial autonomy of the government and social interests (interest and pressure groups, political parties and businesses); and central and extensive engagement in the conduct of research/production of expertise."[57]

McGann refers to Harold Orlans' 1972 *The Nonprofit Research Institute: Its Origins, Operations, Problems and Prospects* as the "first comprehensive scholarly attempt to categorize and define 'think tank.'"[58] In his seminal work on the landscape of policy research institutes that emerged after the end of World War II, Orlans introduced one of the "field breaking" ideas that, according to McGann, have run through the literature on think tanks since then: the notion of *independence*.[59] To Orlans, think tanks were "independent, often separately incorporated, non-degree granting organizations that devote most of their annual expenditures to the development of new technology and to research in the natural and social sciences, engineering, humanities and professions."[60] Drawing on Orlans' work, scholars such as Paul Dickson and David Boorstin might also be credited, according to McGann, "for their inauguration of inquiry into the term think tank," as they not only advanced their own all-encompassing definitions of the term in the early 1970s, but also introduced core ideas associated to these organisations until today, such as the metaphor that depicts think tanks as a "bridge between knowledge and power."[61]

[56] Hauck, "What are 'Think Tanks'? Revisiting the Dilemma of the Definition," 3.

[57] Hauck, "What are 'Think Tanks'? Revisiting the Dilemma of the Definition," 4.

[58] McGann, "Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and Emerging Powers," 21. See Harold Orlans, *The Nonprofit Research Institute: Its Origin, Operation, Problems, and Prospects,* Series of profiles / Carnegie Commission on Higher Education 9 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972).

[59] McGann, "Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and Emerging Powers," 22.

[60] McGann, "Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and Emerging Powers," 22.

[61] McGann, "Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and Emerging Powers," 22–23. See also Paul Dickson, *Think Tanks* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972); David Boorstin, "Directions of Policy Research," *Congressional Quarterly* 2 (1975).

As Hauck notes, however, the continuous evolution of the think tank phenomenon throughout the years would not only render such early conceptions of the term obsolete, but also set in motion a "pendular movement:" "On the one hand," in her words,

> signs of conceptual stretching raise questions about the validity of the category as the versatility and breadth of the concept increase. On the other hand, excessive inflexibility of the concept makes it unable to encompass the intra and inter-contextual national phenomena, making it of little use for the exploratory state of the field.[62]

Likewise, McGann alludes to the same problem when accounting for the evolution of think tank definitions. To the author, as much as the early scholarship on the topic might be credited for inaugurating a new field of research and for coining some of the core conceptual tools still used to date, scholars like Dickson or Boorstin "are equally accountable," in McGann's words, "for setting in motion a trend that would inhibit the majority of scholars from seeking a definition that is at once narrow and universal, for decades to come."[63]

2.2.2 Pluralism, elite theory/Marxism, statism: traditional analytical frameworks

In addition to struggling to find a proper definition of the term, the first generation of think tank researchers also relied on different theoretical frameworks when explaining the emergence of these organisations in the US as well as their interactions with other actors in the policy environment. Scholars dealing with these issues in the late 1960s and early 1970s were essentially based on three streams of thought: pluralism, elite theory/Marxism, and statism.[64] In the 1980s, in turn, the remarkable spread of think tanks outside the US, Canada, and Britain as well as their concurrent evolution into multiple institutional profiles prompted researchers to question traditional definitions of the term and start investigating the singularities of think tanks operating outside the Anglo-American domain. Consequently, new perspectives have been progressively added to think tank observers' analytical toolkits since then, including different variants of institutionalism, network theory, and post-positivist approaches. Before moving on to assess

[62] Hauck, "What are 'Think Tanks'? Revisiting the Dilemma of the Definition," 10.

[63] McGann, "Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and Emerging Powers," 23.

[64] Donald E. Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the Impact of Public Policy Institutes*, Third Edition (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2018), 58–68.

such later approaches, it is worth exploring, first, how proponents of pluralism, elite theory/Marxism, and statism have variedly accounted for the think tank phenomenon.

According to the early literature assessing think tanks through the lenses of pluralism, policy institutes are an exclusive attribute of healthy democracies, in which a true "marketplace of ideas" can flourish, and neutral actors compete for the political resonance of their ideational input. Elite theorists and critical studies drawing on Marxist and Gramscian perspectives, on the other hand, regard think tanks as "instruments of the ruling class" or an "elite set of actors that enjoy unlimited and unfettered access to the corridors of power."[65] Proponents of state theory, for their part, emphasise the authority and autonomy enjoyed by elected officials and the state bureaucracy vis-à-vis the demands of non-state actors—think tanks included. Based on the assumption that sovereign states autonomously formulate their goals and implement them regardless of the pressures emanating from international and domestic actors, scholars relying on the statist approach generally conclude that think tanks play "a very modest role in shaping public policy."[66]

In his work, Donald Abelson provides a thorough overview of the strengths and limitations of all three approaches before advancing his own conceptual framework to the study of think tanks, which is affiliated, as we will discuss below, to one of the institutionalist streams of thought. To Abelson, one of the core differences between the three above-mentioned perspectives is that both pluralists and Marxists agree that think tanks might play a decisive role in public policy, thereby differing from proponents of state theory, who "look no further than the state to explain who makes policy decisions."[67] On the one hand, Marxists and advocates of elite theory regard the "close and interlocking ties between members of think tanks and leaders in business and government" as the key explanatory factor behind the influence of certain well-funded and well-connected institutes. Pluralists, on the other hand, regard think tanks as just one type of actor competing for decision-makers' attention on a level playing field. Assuming that policymakers are moderators in such a rules-based and essentially fair competition, pluralists attribute the ability to influence policymaking processes to the actors that best perform among all equally-competitive actors in the policy domain.[68] These might also include think

[65] Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter?*, 59; 61.

[66] Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter?*, 60.

[67] Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter?*, 65.

[68] Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter?*, 63.

tanks, but are not restricted to them, as they "constitute only one of many organizations intent on leaving a mark on public policy."[69]

In doing so, Marxists and pluralists alike put particular emphasis on the multiple societal and bureaucratic pressures that constrain these organisations and underpin their eventual success at influencing politics. For instance, how close a given think tank is from the ruling elite or what interests the "generous benefactors" who support a certain think tank have on the policy issue with which that particular organisation is involved are among the core aspects considered by proponents of the elite theory approach when discussing the problem of influence.[70] Pluralists, for their part, focus their attention on how much scholarly reputation and political credibility a given think tank has, how large its budget is, or how well it manages its marketing and communications strategies when advertising its policy ideas. To Abelson, in sum, among the major weaknesses of pluralists and the elite theory approach is that the latter might mislead us into believing that all think tanks are part of the policy elite and thus necessarily wield influence on public policymaking; by contrast, the former treat think tanks as "one voice among many" in the policymaking community and might, therefore, "overlook why, at times, some policy institutes have more opportunities to influence public policy than interest groups and other non-governmental organizations."[71]

Proponents of statist theory, on the other hand, direct attention to the individuals and organisations with privileged access to the "upper echelons of government" when looking for policy influence. Since the head of state/government and high-level officials at key state institutions are the most crucial policy actors, think tanks that get direct access to such actors are the only ones regarded as influential from a statist perspective. Abelson uses the US political system to illustrate this point as follows: "If it appears that members from think tanks have been advisers, or recruited to serve in the White House or in the State Department, we could assume that they have had direct access to the policy-making process."[72] Unlike pluralists and similar to proponents of elite theory, the statist approach is thus sceptical of the idea that the quest for influence in the policy domain takes place on a level-playing field, as individuals and organisations with privileged access to decision makers are better positioned and thus inevitably stand out.

[69] Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter?*, 64.

[70] Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter?*, 61.

[71] Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter?*, 65.

[72] Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter?*, 67.

Pluralism, elite theory/Marxism, and statism might well be regarded as *traditional* approaches to the study of think tanks, insofar as contemporary scholars in the field have increasingly acknowledged the limitations of their core assumptions. As we will explore in the following section, the recent literature on the topic has developed more elaborate analytical tools to investigate what has become a truly global and, consequently, increasingly multifaceted phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that such traditional perspectives still resonate in the scholarly debate as well as in the media and the general public. Indeed, analysts and commentators on television, in the print media, on web posts, or Tweets not rarely promote simplistic views when referring to think tanks, at times portraying them as a neutral and independent bridge between politics and academia or, conversely, as façades of fake scholarly credibility hiding vested partisan or business interests. Yet simplistic, if not entirely wrong, views like these are of little help to explain what think tanks are, what roles they play in contemporary societies, and how they interact with other actors in the policy domain.

Moreover, such readings of the think tank phenomenon usually misinterpret crucial aspects of how these organisations attempt to influence politics in today's world—e.g. by framing certain policy problems in a particular way and then placing them on the agenda of governments, international organisations or supranational entities such as the EU; by networking with a wide range of other actors, both state and non-state in nature; by creating and controlling informal political spaces; and, more importantly, by doing so in an increasingly transnational setting. Therefore, before we hone in on the empirical phenomenon described in the Introduction, we first need to engage with contemporary definitions and analytical frameworks to the study of think tanks and devise the conceptual tools that best equip us to proceed with the investigation of the "Forte de Copacabana" process in Brazil.

2.3 Contemporary definitions and analytical frameworks

In recent years, the scholarly literature has increasingly contested earlier conceptual frameworks used in the study of think tanks and accommodated new perspectives to account for contemporary developments in the field, such as the global spread of think tanks, their growing transnational activities, or the emergence of regional and global think tank networks. To overcome conceptual shortcomings unaddressed by previous research, the growing literature on think tanks that emerged since the late 1980s has developed new ways to deal with the dilemma

of the definition and offered fresher avenues of research to measure policy influence—or to determine whether it can be measured at all.

Although certain scholars have still not given up on their search for an all-encompassing definition of the term, essentially two alternative perspectives have been used to define think tanks. Most of the literature nowadays resorts to what McGann terms the "typologist school," which acknowledges the limitations of a single, catch-all definition for such multifaceted organisations and offers different categories to accommodate think tanks' multiple profiles.[73] In addition, the literature has paid increasing attention to the "relational conception" introduced by Thomas Medvetz.[74] The author approaches the issue of definition from a rather unique perspective and provides an elaborate, yet clear framework of analysis to the study of think tanks as "members of an *interstitial field*, or a semi-structured network of organizations that traverses, links, and overlaps the more established spheres of academic, political, business, and media production."[75] The following two sections account for the strengths and limitations of these two contemporary perspectives to the issue of conceptual definition in think tank research.

2.3.1 Think tanks as ideal types: the typologist school

Whereas minimalist and parochialist approaches base their definitions of the concept on think tanks' organisational and financial *independence* or *autonomy* towards other actors, Medvetz and typologists alike emphasize the *affiliative* or *relational* nature of think tanks as their key constitutive feature.[76] Therefore, a typological approach to the definition of think tanks is based upon different ideal types which, according to its proponents, capture contemporary think tanks' intrinsic heterogeneity in terms of affiliations, organisational forms, objectives, products, marketing strategies, and audiences more adequately. In this sense, Kent Weaver's threefold categorisation of think tanks as *university without students*, *contract researcher*, or *advocacy tanks* was a "path-breaking treatment" of the think tank phenomenon, laying the groundwork for later typological approaches.[77] Following the work of Weaver, the typological approach to the study

[73] McGann, "Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and Emerging Powers," 18.

[74] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*.

[75] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*, 25.

[76] Hauck, "What are 'Think Tanks'? Revisiting the Dilemma of the Definition," 5.

[77] McGann, "Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and Emerging Powers," 24. See R. K. Weaver, "The Changing World of Think Tanks," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 22, no. 3 (1989), https://doi.org/10.2307/419623.

of think tanks has been updated and disseminated in academic parlance most prominently by the work of James McGann and his associates at University of Pennsylvania's Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program.[78]

Published in 1989, Weaver's influential contribution addressed the thriving public policy research industry in the US at that time and sought to account for the increasing diversity found among those organisations. The author distinguished the three main think tank profiles operating in the country at that point as follows: first, institutes that resembled university without students were characterized by their "heavy reliance on academics as researchers, by funding primarily from the private sector (with varying mixtures of foundation, corporate and individual funding), and by book-length studies as the primary research product;" contract researchers, on the other hand, generally had close ties to a particular government agency, on which they relied for funding and towards which they directed their ideational output.[79] Unlike universities without students, what is more, contract researchers produced brief policy-oriented reports instead of books or monographs in a more academic fashion. Finally, advocacy tanks differed from both other types in that they "combine[d] a strong policy, partisan or ideological bent with aggressive salesmanship and an effort to influence current policy debates […] and put a distinctive 'spin' on existing research rather than carrying out original research."[80]

McGann, in turn, advocates the use of categories and ideal types to define policy research institutes by arguing that "[w]hile think tanks may perform many roles in their host societies, not all think tanks do the same things to the same extent;" moreover, the author continues, "distinctive organizational forms of think tanks have come into being that differ substantially in terms of their operating styles, their patterns of recruitment, and their aspirations to academic standards of objectivity and completeness in research."[81] Therefore, think tanks might well be autonomous institutes, whose financial and organisational structures are independent from government, partisan or corporate interests; alternatively, they might also be uni-

[78] McGann, "2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report" See also James G. McGann and Robert K. Weaver, eds., *Think tanks and civil societies: Catalysts for ideas and action*, 3. paperback print (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000).

[79] Weaver, "The Changing World of Think Tanks," 564.

[80] Weaver, "The Changing World of Think Tanks," 567.

[81] McGann, "Think Tanks, Foreign Policy, and Emerging Powers," 40.

versity-based or governmental organisations; a private company's in-house research department or a party-affiliated political foundation. Tables 1 and 2 show the categories of think tank affiliations and their different characteristics according to McGann and Sabatini.[82]

In this sense, from a typological perspective, organisations such as the McKinsey Global Institute or The Economist Intelligence Unit, for instance, fall under the ideal type of for profit think tanks affiliated to private firms, while the US Congressional Research Service enters the category of government-affiliated think tanks. The Brookings Institution fits into the category universities without students, whereas the Heritage Foundation, based in Washington D.C. since 1973, corresponds to the ideal-typical example of a policy enterprise think tank. The typological perspective also allows us to assess the organisations driving the Forte de Copacabana process as illustrations of different ideal types of think tanks, even though the approach eventually proves of limited explanatory power, as argued below.

Category	*Definition*
Autonomous and independent	A public policy research organization that has significant independence from any other interest group or donor and autonomous in its operations and funding from government.
Quasi-independent	A public policy research organization that is autonomous from government but controlled by an interest group, donor or contracting agency that provides a majority of the funding and has significant influence over operations of the think tank.
University affiliated	A public policy research center at a university.
Political-party affiliated	A public policy research organization that is formally affiliated with a political party.
Government affiliated	A public policy research organization that is part of the structure of government.
Quasi-governmental	A public policy research organization that is funded exclusively by government grants and contracts but not a part of the formal structure of government.
For profit	A public policy research organization that operates as a for profit business.

Table 1: Categories of think tank affiliations.
Source: McGann and Sabatini, *Global Think Tanks: Policy Networks and Governance*, 23, Table 1.1.

[82] McGann and Sabatini, *Global Think Tanks: Policy Networks and Governance*, 23–24, Tables 1.1 and 1.2.

Type of think tank	*Culture*	*Objective*	*Limitations*	*Interest served*	*Example institutions*
University based	Academic	Advance knowledge	Education and knowledge creation are top priorities not politics or public policy	Academia	Asia Pacific Research Center—Stanford University
"University without students"	Academic	Bring knowledge to bear on public policy	Theoretical approach to problems, not always directly conducive (relevant) to policymaking	Academics and policymakers	Brookings Institution
Contracting/consulting	Technocratic	Serve government	Systems and qualitative approach to policy analysis does not apply to all policy problems and client interest priorities	Government agencies and bureaucrat	Rand Corporation
Advocacy	Ideological	Promote ideology	Ideology restricts research topics and expression of opinions	Ideologues and narrow interest group	Institute for Policy Studies
Policy Enterprise	Marketing	Package and promote ideas for market and market segment	Orient their research toward the interest of the market (selected donors and policymakers)	Individual market segment	Heritage Foundation
Political Party	Political	Get party elected	Party Platform, members limit range of policy options	Party	Progressive Policy Institute
Governmental	Bureaucratic	Provide information for policy production	Bureaucratic culture, Agenda set by branches of the government. Bureaucratic politics and turf issues constrain analysis and policy choices	Executive and legislative branches of government	Congressional Research Service
For profit	Business	Expand Client base	Client's interest. Business approach to policy analysis may ignore political dimension of public policy	Private	Stanford Research Institute

Table 2: Characteristics of independent and affiliated think tanks.
Source: McGann and Sabatini, *Global Think Tanks: Policy Networks and Governance*, 24, Table 1.2.

Our attempt to situate CEBRI within one of typologists' ideal-typical categories, for instance, proves only partially successful, as no single type corresponds in full to the organisation's markedly hybrid profile. CEBRI was established in Rio de Janeiro in 1998 inspired by influential foreign policy research institutes from the Anglo-Saxon world and imbued with the mission to "[act] as a counterpart of strategic global institutions such as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in the United States, Chatham House in the United Kingdom, and several other international relations councils worldwide."[83] The incipient scholarly debate on the topic in Brazil has not only included CEBRI among other illustrations of the think tank phenomenon in the country, but also underscored its prominence as Brazil's leading international affairs think tank, without further clarifying the matter of definition, though.[84]

CEBRI defines itself as an "independent, non-partisan, and multidisciplinary" organisation, whose goal is to "[influence] the formation of the country's international agenda and [support] the formulation of public policies, generating actions that are both impactful and forward thinking."[85] That profile corresponds at least at first sight to the ideal types *autonomous and independent* and *universities without students*. Yet, as we will explore in the following chapter, the establishment of the Brazilian Center for International Relations is inextricably linked to the administration of former Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), himself the institute's honorary president to date.

In fact, from 1998 to 2002 CEBRI's association with the government guaranteed much of its relevance and prestige within Brazil's foreign policy community. The scope of activities carried out by CEBRI had direct connection with the areas that were considered top priorities by the Cardoso administration. Once former Brazilian president Lula da Silva defeated Cardoso's party PSDB (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira/Brazilian Social Democracy

[83] Brazilian Center for International Relations, "Who We Are: The leading international relations think tank in Brazil," accessed March 28, 2018, http://www.cebri.org/eng/portal/about-cebri/who-we-are;jsessionid=850CED83ACE38BF47FD2E35A89383431.

[84] See, for instance, Tatiana Teixeira, "Brazilian think tanks: between the past and the future," in *Policy Analysis in Brazil*, ed. Jeni Vaitsman, José M. Ribeiro and Lenaura d. V. C. Lobato, International Library of Policy Analysis (Bristol: Policy Press, 2013); Leonardo Secchi and Letícia E. Ito, "Think tanks e universidades no Brasil: Análise das relações na produção de conhecimento em política pública," *Planejamento e Políticas Públicas*, no. 46 (2016), accessed January 30, 2019, http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/handle/11058/6641; Leonardo Secchi, Ricardo A. Cavalheiro, and Letícia E. Ito, "Os think tanks na América Latina e a produção de conhecimento aplicado à política pública," *Revista Brasileira de Tecnologias Sociais* 4, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.14210/rbts.v4n2.p117-126; Ladi, Lazarou and Hauck, "Brazilian think tanks and the rise of austerity discourse" Juliana C. R. Hauck, "What are 'Think Tanks'? Revisiting the Dilemma of the Definition," *Brazilian Political Science Review* 11, no. 2 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1590/1981-3821201700020006.

[85] Brazilian Center for International Relations, "Who We Are".

Party) in the 2002 presidential elections, CEBRI's close association with the outgoing administration would engender financial and political difficulties and thus decisively affect its institutional profile.[86] In 2003, the "strong support" provided until then by the federal government and by multilateral institutions was interrupted by the recently inaugurated Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) administration.[87] Consequently, CEBRI had to remodel its activities and institutional profile, increasingly relying on funding provided by foreign organisations like the Konrad Adenauer Foundation while expanding its ties to the private sector as well—the number of corporate donors doubled from 2004 to 2005, illustrating that trend.[88]

Meanwhile, the institute in Rio de Janeiro also provided a revolving door to numerous high-level officials who served during Cardoso's eight-year administration, including both of his foreign ministers, Luiz Felipe Lampreia (1995-2001) and Celso Lafer (2001-2002), who took up prominent positions at CEBRI's administration and board of trustees after leaving their ministerial posts. Therefore, if we bear in mind the institute's close association with former president Cardoso, his political party PSDB, and most of his closest advisors, we eventually arrive in a rather confusing patchwork that juxtaposes those two ideal types with categories such as *policy enterprise*, *governmental*, and *political party*.

Similarly, the typological perspective has been widely adopted by scholars who investigate party-affiliated political foundations as unique *types* of think tanks. In fact, think tank observers generally consider the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the other German political foundations as a "monolithic bloc" of organisations that belong to the family of "politically and

[86] Ricardo dos Santos, himself a former intern at CEBRI, addressed the issue in a 2011 publication. Relying among other sources on an interview with former foreign minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia, Santos argues that "CEBRI counted on government funding until 2002 [and] its organizational structure privileged strategic sectors that sympathized with the presidential administration in question, thus following an ideological line that privileged a certain foreign policy segment to the detriment of others [...] In addition, the scope of activities carried out by CEBRI in its initial period had the purpose of legitimizing the actions carried out by the administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, thus adopting an ideological action style inclined toward the ideals of social democracy" [(...) *o CEBRI contava com financiamento governamental até 2002, sua estrutura organizacional privilegiava setores estratégicos que simpatizavam com a gestão presidencial em questão, seguindo assim uma linha ideológica que privilegiasse determinado segmento em detrimento de outro na política externa (...) Além disso, o escopo de atividades realizadas pelo CEBRI no seu período inicial tinha como objetivo legitimar as ações levadas a cabo pelo governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso, adotando assim um estilo de atuação ideológico tendendo para os ideais da social-democracia*.] See Ricardo O. d. Santos, "O CEBRI e o Governo FHC: Uma Abordagem da Influência dos Think Tanks na Política Externa Brasileira," in *Anais do 3º Encontro Nacional da ABRI: Governança Global e Novos Atores*, ed. ABRI (Belo Horizonte: 20-22 July 2011, 2011), accessed August 10, 2020, http://www.abri.org.br/anais/3_Encontro_Nacional_ABRI/Politica_Externa/.

[87] Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, "Relatório de Atividades 2004/2005" (Rio de Janeiro, 2005), http://docplayer.com.br/5511468-2004-2005-centro-brasileiro-de-relacoes-internacionais.html, 3.

[88] Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, "Relatório de Atividades 2004/2005," 3.

ideologically identifiable think tanks."[89] Part of the literature takes a step further and situates the German political foundations into an even more specific category. Alongside *advocacy think tanks*, the *Stiftungen* are at times regarded as quintessential examples of *party-affiliated think tanks*, *political party think tanks* or simply *party think tanks* within that family of politically and ideologically identifiable public policy institutes.[90] According to this view, their agenda, activities, and staff are all heavily influenced by the parent party and, unlike advocacy think tanks, the immediate policy impact and media appeal of their research, advice, and consulting activities do not stand in the foreground of their work. Instead, they provide comprehensive, well-researched political advice to party officials and affiliated members in order to guarantee electoral success. Their ultimate objective, in sum, is to get the parent party elected.

Adopting such a narrower typological perspective, McGann and Sabatini argue, for instance, that "[t]his sort of think tank is more prevalent in Western Europe, particularly in Germany, where institutions like the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung [sic] dominate the think tank landscape."[91] Accordingly, University of Pennsylvania's Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, directed by McGann, uses the above-mentioned categorisation and lists five of the six German party-affiliated political foundations among the top 10 organisations of its ranking "Best Think Tank with a Political Party Affiliation" in the 2018 edition of the Global Go To Think Tank Index Report: the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (1st), the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (2nd), the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom (3rd),

[89] Ulrich Heisterkamp, *Think Tanks der Parteien? Eine vergleichende Analyse der deutschen politischen Stiftungen*, Research (Wiesbaden: Springer VS), 145. "*Die Tendenz geht dahin, die Stiftungen als eine Art monolithischer Block aufzufassen und sie in die Familie der politisch und ideologisch identifizierbaren Think Tanks einzusortieren."*

[90] Martin Thunert, "Think tanks in Germany," in *Think tank traditions: Policy research and the politics of ideas*, ed. Diane Stone and Andrew Denham (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press [u.a.], 2004). Heisterkamp, *Think Tanks der Parteien?*; Josef Braml, "U.S. and German Think Tanks in Comparative Perspective," *German Policy Studies* 3, no. 2 (2006); Rudolf Speth, "Think Tanks as New Channels of Influence within the Political System of Germany," in *Think Tanks in Policy Making - Do They Matter?*, ed. Andrew Rich et al., Briefing Paper Shanghai Special Issue (Shanghai: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2011); Josef Braml, "Germany: The think and the tank," in *Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and Geo-Politics: Pathways to Influence*, ed. Donald Abelson, Stephen Brooks and Xin Hua (Abingdon, Oxon, New York, NY Routledge, 2017: Routledge, 2017).

[91] McGann and Sabatini, *Global Think Tanks: Policy Networks and Governance*, 20.

the Heinrich Böll Foundation (8th) and the Hanns Seidel Foundation (9th). The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, for its part, appears at the 22nd position on the same list, which includes 39 organisations from 18 different countries.[92]

German political foundations have their origins in the deeply traumatic experiences of the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the ensuing National Socialist dictatorship. According to Gerd Langguth, "[t]hey are unknown in other countries in this form. This is mainly due to historical reasons […] [t]he establishment of the foundations was associated with the hope of contributing to and consolidating the young German post-war democracy through political education work."[93] Table 3 shows a schematic overview of the establishment and successive development of all six foundations associated to each one of Germany's major political parties.

*Affiliated party**	*Foundation*	*Establishment/ Stages of development*
SPD	*Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V.* (FES)	▪ 1925 (Banned by the Nazis)
		▪ 1945 Reestablishment
CDU	*Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.* (KAS)	▪ 1956 *Gesellschaft für christlich-demokratische Bildungsarbeit e.V.*
		▪ 1958 *Politische Akademie Eichholz e.V.* (PAE)
		▪ 1964 Merger of PAE and *Institut für Internationale Solidarität* (IIS) to KAS.
FDP	*Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung* (FNS)	▪ 1958
		▪ 2007 Name extension: FNS "*für die Freiheit*"
CSU	*Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung e.V.* (HSS)	▪ 1967 (initially only *Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen*—APZ, and training institute [*Bildungswerk*])

[92] McGann, "2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report," 197. In fact, the German party-affiliated political foundations have been included in all editions of the Global Go To Think Tank Index Report among the "Best Think Tanks with a Political Party Affiliation" ever since this category was first introduced to the ranking lists in 2010. KAS was on top of the list in all editions except for 2010, when the Friedrich Ebert Foundation ranked first. See Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, "Global Go To Think Tanks Index Reports".

[93] Gerd Langguth, "Politische Stiftungen und politische Bildung in Deutschland," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 34 (1993): 39, **quoted in** Heisterkamp, *Think Tanks der Parteien?*, 24: "*Sie sind in anderen Ländern in dieser Form unbekannt. Dies hat vor allem historische Gründe* [...] *Mit den Stiftungsgründungen [verband] sich die Hoffnung, durch politische Bildungsarbeit zum Aufbau und Konsolidierung der jungen deutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie beizutragen und diese zu festigen.*"

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	*Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung e.V.* (HBS)	▪ 1988 *Stiftungsverband Regenbogen e.V.* (SVR): [former] HBS/ Buntstift/ Frauen-Anstiftung
Die Linke (formerly PDS)	*Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung — Gesellschaftsanalyse und Politische Bildung e.V.* (RLS)	▪ 1990 *Gesellschaftsanalyse und Politische Bildung e.V.*
		▪ 2000 Name change to RLS

Table 3: The sextet of German party-affiliated political foundations.
Source: Adapted from Ulrich Heisterkamp, *Think Tanks der Parteien? Eine vergleichende Analyse der deutschen politischen Stiftungen*, Research (Wiesbaden: Springer VS), 23–24, Tabelle 1: "Das Sextett der deutschen parteinahen politischen Stiftungen.".

*SPD: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany); CDU: Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany); FDP: Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party); CSU: Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian Social Union in Bavaria); Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/The Green); Die Linke (The Left); PDS: Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism).

Though political education lies at their historical root, Ulrich Heisterkamp argues that all six party-affiliated foundations have widened the scope of their work and developed a truly "multidimensional activity structure" over the years.[94] That structure far outreaches the immediate circle of party officials and affiliated members and includes, among numerous other features, in-house political research, analysis, and consulting divisions, communications departments, scholarship programmes for talented students, and a vast network of foreign liaison offices established all over the world. The author also demonstrates how political foundations in Germany have embraced the think tank-label, remodelled themselves accordingly, and sought to perform their think tank-strategy in different ways. In addition, Heisterkamp demonstrates why a rigidly typological approach lacks empirical substance and eventually raises more questions than answers to think tank observers who wish to investigate these actors as part of the think tank phenomenon.

To do so, Heisterkamp draws on a thorough review of the literature on think tanks and its reception in Germany as well as on in-depth case studies of all six party-affiliated foundations. In the ensuing part of his study, the author conducts a systematic case comparison and

[94] Heisterkamp, *Think Tanks der Parteien?*, 508. "*Der Sonderstatus der deutschen parteinahen Stiftungen als 'Think Tank-Unikate' ergibt sich in erster Linie aus ihrer mehrdimensionalen Tätigkeitsstruktur: anders als konventionelle Think Tanks, die sich ausschließlich der Erfüllung ihrer Think Tank-Mission widmen, bildet die Wahrnehmung von Think Tank-Funktionen im Falle der Stiftungen nur eine (Querschnitts-)Komponente innerhalb eines ungleich pluralen Aufgabenspektrums* [emphasis in original]."

assesses how the foundations' multiple working areas reflect four "elementary think tank functions:" the *production* of policy-relevant ideas and information; the *diffusion* of policy-relevant ideas and information; policy-relevant *networking* activities; and, finally, transfer and recruiting of policy-relevant elites, or *transformation*.[95] Table 4 reproduces the main conclusions from Heisterkamp's comparative empirical analysis.

Elementary think tank functions	*Relevant working area*
Generation of policy-relevant ideas and information (*Production*)	▪ Policy research, analysis and advice departments ▪ Policy dialogue departments (*Akademien, Gesprächskreise, Arbeitskreise* etc.) ▪ International department (including foreign offices)
Dissemination of policy-relevant ideas and information (*Diffusion*)	▪ Policy research, analysis and advice departments ▪ Policy dialogue departments (*Akademien, Gesprächskreise, Arbeitskreise* etc.) ▪ International department (including foreign offices)
Allocation and network function (*Networking*)	▪ Policy research, analysis and advice departments ▪ Policy dialogue departments (*Akademien, Gesprächskreise, Arbeitskreise* etc.) ▪ International department (including foreign offices)
Recruiting and transfer of policy-relevant elites (*Transformation*)	▪ Policy research, analysis and advice departments ▪ Scholarship programmes for talented students ▪ Political education departments (*Praxistraining für politische Kommunikation, Kommunalpolitik* etc.)

Table 4: Think tank-functional relevance of the foundations' activities.
Source: Adapted from Heisterkamp, *Think Tanks der Parteien?, 495, Tabelle 14: Think Tank-funktionale Relevanz der Stiftungs-Tätigkeitsbereiche.*

Getting the CDU, the SPD, or the Green Party elected might well be in the interest of KAS, FES and the HBS; yet in no way is their work limited to advising party officials on how to attract electoral support. On the contrary, through their multifaceted involvement in domestic

[95] According to the author, the "quartet of elementary think tank functions" was adapted from Winand Gellner, *Ideenagenturen für Politik und Öffentlichkeit: Think Tanks in den USA und in Deutschland,* Studien zur Sozialwissenschaft 157 (Wiesbaden, s.l.: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-95636-1. Think tank scholars converge, by and large, on this set of core activities when describing typical think tank-related work, even though the question as to what essentially defines a think tank, as we argue in the ensuing parts of this chapter, has been a contentious issue in the literature. "The quartet of elementary think tank functions is based on Winand Gellner's conception, but its conclusions are modified and supplemented to derive a systematic analysis scheme as a basis for the empirical case studies [*Das Quartett elementarer Think Tank-Funktionen geht auf eine Konzeption Winand Gellners zurück, dessen Ausführungen jedoch modifiziert und ergänzt werden, um ein systematisches Analyseschema als Grundlage für die empirischen Fallstudien zu erhalten.*]" Heisterkamp, *Think Tanks der Parteien?,* 107, footnote 355.

and transnational policy processes, German political foundations end up blurring the boundaries established by ideal-typical categories advanced in the literature. That applies not just to the narrower type *party think tanks*, but also to broader categories, such as *academic* and *advocacy think tanks*, with which political foundations share a set of characteristics without ever corresponding to either of them in full. As Heisterkamp rightly points out, "the theoretical construction of ideal types and their use as heuristic analytical instruments should bear in mind that the ideal-typical characteristics never occur at its purest form in empirical reality, but rather always as diluted mixed variants."[96]

Interestingly, the manner in which KAS describes its own institutional profile in the policy paper collection launched at the XV Forte de Copacabana Conference in 2018 is a telling indicator of how none of the ideal-typical categories entirely corresponds to the broad spectrum of activities performed, and ambitions harboured, by the organisation:

> The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) is a German political foundation. From our headquarters in Germany and 90 field offices around the globe, we manage over 200 projects covering over 120 countries. At home as well as abroad, our civic education programmes aim at promoting the values of freedom and liberty, peace and justice, as well as dialogue and cooperation. As a think tank and consulting agency we focus on the consolidation of democracy, the unification of Europe, the strengthening of transatlantic relations, as well as on international cooperation and dialogue. Our projects, debates and analyses aim to develop a strong democratic base for political action and cooperation. In Brazil our activities concentrate on international security dialogue, political education, the rule of law, the workings of public institutions and their agents, social market economy, environmental and energy policy, as well as the relations between Brazil, the European Union and Germany.[97]

In this regard, the analysis conducted by Heisterkamp also provides us with important insights into the role of the foundations' foreign liaison offices, as illustrated by KAS' representation in Rio de Janeiro. To the author, the international work of political foundations is part of a multidimensional structure that not only enables "the global export of the political expertise and interests of the foundations, but also, in return, the import of political information and ideas from everywhere to Germany as well as the sustainable cultivation of contacts with politically

[96] Heisterkamp, *Think Tanks der Parteien?*, 486–87. "*Generell sollte bei der theoretischen Konstruktion von Idealtypen und deren Nutzung als heuristisches Analyseinstrument im Hinterkopf behalten werden, dass die idealtypischen Charakteristika in der empirischen Realität nie ‚in Reinkultur,' sondern stets nur abgeschwächt in Mischvarianten vorkommen*."

[97] Jan Woischnik, ed., *Gestão Internacional de Crises/International Crisis Management*, Coleção de Policy Papers/The Policy Papers Collection (Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2018); 2/6, https://www.kas.de/web/brasilien/publikationen/einzeltitel/-/content/the-policy-papers-collection, accessed July 1, 2019, 5.

relevant elites on an international scale."[98] Whereas their policy dialogue, communications, and in-house research, analysis, and advice departments resemble core institutional components of most other policy institutes, their vast network of regional offices abroad sets these organisations apart from all other German think tanks—which lack a comparable transnational structure and the same level of contact to partner organisations all over the world. In addition, it allows them to complement, as truly *global* think tanks, the work of state and government officials by performing what Heisterkamp refers to as a "paradiplomatic function":

> Nevertheless, the involvement of the foundations in the field of *international politics*, for which they are best equipped with their worldwide liaison offices as resource bases, is no less intense. As think tanks, the foundations perform a party-politically coloured 'paradiplomatic function' and complement or relieve classical state diplomacy, for example by cooperating with opposition forces – which is denied to diplomats as official representatives of the German government on site. Networking with like-minded parties, party alliances and think tanks around the world has increasingly become a more important concern of the foundations, with KAS and FNS leading the way.[99]

Ideal types help us overcome the pendular movement set in motion by minimalist and parochialist approaches to the definition of think tanks in that they underscore the *affiliative* nature of these organisations as their constitutive feature. Furthermore, by acknowledging the multifaceted profile that think tanks have acquired over the years, the typological approach provides us with a more flexible conceptualization, which better corresponds with the empirical richness of such complex phenomenon. Nevertheless, ideal types remain ideal types only. Distinctions between types are less clear-cut than rigid categories would suggest, and the growing hybridisation of think tanks challenges rigorous classifications. As we will explore below,

[98] Heisterkamp, *Think Tanks der Parteien?*, 509. "*Diese Strukturgegebenheit ermöglicht nicht nur den globalen Export der politischen Expertise und Interessen der Stiftungen, sondern im Gegenzug auch den Import politischer Informationen und Ideen von überall her nach Deutschland und die nachhaltige Pflege von Kontakten zu politikrelevanten Eliten im internationalen Maßstab*."

[99] Heisterkamp, *Think Tanks der Parteien?*, 485. "*Ungleich intensiver fällt trotzdem das Engagement der Stiftungen auf dem Feld der internationalen Politik aus, für das sie mit ihren weltweiten Verbindungsbüros als Ressourcenbasen besten gerüstet sind. Als Think Tanks erfüllen die Stiftungen im Ausland eine parteipolitisch eingefärbte 'paradiplomatische Funktion' und ergänzen bzw. entlasten damit die klassische staatliche Diplomatie, indem sie etwa auch mit oppositionellen Kräften kooperieren (können) - was den Diplomaten als offiziellen Vertretern der deutschen Regierung vor Ort verwehrt ist. Die Vernetzung mit politisch gleichgesinnten Parteien, Parteienverbünden und Think Tanks in aller Welt wird denn auch zunehmend zu einem wichtigeren Anliegen der Stiftungen, wobei KAS und FNS als Pioniere vorangehen*." Braml advances a similar argument in this regard: "Accordingly, most of Germany's post-war foreign policy has been conducted though the means of 'soft power' and 'quiet diplomacy.' In this context, political party foundations were not only important means to promote the political 're-education' of Germans, these foundations also become an important pillar of German development policy abroad. As they were less constrained by historic, constitutional, political, or diplomatic considerations than the official bodies of the state, political party foundations were useful vehicles for conducting Germany's soft power in the realm of foreign policy." Braml, "Germany: The think and the tank," 115.

Medvetz's relational conception of think tanks, on the other hand, accords well with the markedly complex properties these organisations possess in contemporary societies. Besides, it shows more accuracy than previous definitions and greater explanatory power when it comes to the conceptualisation of the think tanks under investigation in the present study.

2.3.2 Think tanks as blurring organisations: the relational conception

As pointed out above, Medvetz agrees with typologists as concerns the multiplicity of forms and affiliations among think tanks. Based on the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, the author regards policy institutes as intrinsically hybrid organisations that occupy the most privileged portion of the social space, the *field of power*. Within this field, think tanks constantly seek to differentiate themselves from universities, lobbying firms, or political parties, among other actors, in "an elaborate symbolic balancing act that involves gathering multiple institutionalized resources from neighboring social spheres."[100] In fact, Medvetz argues that think tanks are "the offspring of more established institutions" that belong to each of these spheres, with which they share material and symbolic ties; therefore, the liminal position where think tanks are located is enmeshed in a web of relations among "more established" academic, political, business, and media actors.[101] In addition, surrounding institutions from different fields (e.g. political and bureaucratic fields, field of cultural production, media field, etc.) provide not only the financial support and personnel necessary for think tanks to exist, but also "the imaginary models from which policy experts fashion their hybrid self-understandings," including, for instance, the figures of the policymaker, the scholar, or the media pundit.[102] Figure 1 shows Medvetz's representation of think tanks in the social space.[103]

[100] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*, 16.

[101] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*, 214.

[102] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*, 214.

[103] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*, 37, Figure 1.1.



Figure 1: Think tanks in the social space.
Source: Medvetz, Think tanks in America, 37, Figure 1.1.

Entangled between fields and subject to the forces that emanate from surrounding actors, think tanks gather different samplings of academic, political, economic, social, and media capital, acquire multiple organisational forms, and establish relations of "antagonistic cooperation" with one another, whereby they develop "field-like properties of their own".[104] A *space between fields*, or an *interstitial field*, thus emerges, in which think tanks act as "blurring organizations."[105] To Medvetz, this is precisely what defines them: their indistinction as "fuzzy networks of organizations themselves divided by the opposing logics of academic, political, economic, and media production," whose "chief power lies in their ability to claim for themselves a kind of mediating role in the social structure."[106] In other words, instead of a distinctive *type* of organisation, the author asserts that a think tank is best understood as "an organizational device for gathering and assembling forms of authority conferred by the more established institutions of academics, politics, business, and the media."[107]

[104] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*, 25.

[105] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*, 176.

[106] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*, 16; 178.

[107] Medvetz, *Think Tanks as an Emergent Field*, 9–10.

Understood as such, think tanks' primary objective, according to the author, is to distinguish themselves from the parent institutions with which they share the most privileged portion of the social space, i.e. the field of power, while successfully performing the above-mentioned "balancing act" of obtaining the resources they need to influence politics (or different forms of *capital*) from these very same institutions. At last, their eventual success—whether in the form of direct policy influence, media exposure, academic credibility or simply their survival among other actors—depends on how well they combine these resources. Medvetz elaborates on the issue as follows:

> The think tank is thus caught in a never-ending cycle of separation and attachment. It can never fully detach itself from its parent institutions because each association supplies a form of authority that makes its putative separation from the other institutions appear credible. But nor can a think tank simply become a university, an advocacy group, a business, or a media organ, because to do so would be to nullify its distinctiveness as a think tank and subject itself to the criteria of judgment specific to those fields. Think tanks must therefore seek to occupy a liminal structural position by gathering and juggling various forms of capital acquired from different arenas: scholarly prestige and credentials, competence in specifically political forms of expression, money and fund-raising ability, quasi-entrepreneurial styles, and access to the means of publicity. This game is won, not just by gathering large amounts of capital, but by establishing the right mixture.[108]

Contrary to all previous attempts to define such actors, Medvetz's Bourdieusian sociological approach to think tank research is innovative in that it refrains from ascribing a distinctive organisational form to these actors and asserts, instead, their structural blurriness as vague networks of organisations caught in between different fields in the social space. In doing so, it overcomes researchers' generally frustrated attempt to come up with a tight definition of the term and regards "the properties and purposes of think tanks as empirical questions," not as distorted images of pure ideal types.[109]

In this sense, if we look at the organisations driving the "Forte de Copacabana" process through Medvetz's conceptual lenses, we realise that the limitations noted above as to how ideal types can only partially describe them are indeed telling indicators of the liminal structural position these actors occupy in the social space, from which derives their ability to act as blurring organisations. For instance, the confusing overlap between the ideal types *university without students*, *policy enterprise*, *governmental*, and *political party* that we noted when attempting

[108] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*, 45–46.

[109] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*, 12.

to define CEBRI testifies, in fact, to the liminal structural position the institute occupies among different actors from surrounding arenas—respectively academic, economic, bureaucratic and political. The same is true for the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. As a German party-affiliated political foundation, Germany's political and bureaucratic arena is the sphere to which it most closely relates. It is from this primary association that the foundation derives its raison d'être, its financial resources, and much of its political relevance in the form of privileged access to bureaucrats and decision makers from its parent party, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU).

Patrick Keller, former Coordinator for Foreign and Security Policy at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation's headquarters in Berlin, provided us with an interesting account in this regard during an interview in August 2017:

> So, that's important, because that's where most of the relevance stems from: it's the close affiliation, yet independence from the party, in our case the CDU, the governing party. So much of what we do abroad receives relevance because we are seen as an actor who is basically the chancellor's foundation, although it's more complicated than that, but that's how we are seen. So that works both ways. That's why some doors get opened for us, and on the other hand we get some information, or some insight, that we can then directly relate to the government, to the CDU, and to the broader public here. So that's where much of our relevance comes from, from this special structure and this affiliation.[110]

Notwithstanding their affiliation to a political party, political foundations also strive to differentiate themselves from the party structure, as Keller's remarks attest. "With their parent party," Heisterkamp points out in this regard, "they share general political guiding principles and the ideological value foundation. At the same time, the foundations emphasise their independence not only in terms of their legal status but also as 'de jure independent organizations separate from the parties'."[111] To translate it into Medvetz's words, a political foundation can neither fully detach itself from its main parent institution, the party, for that would undermine a decisive form of capital and a key source of authority it possesses, i.e. its privileged access to

[110] Patrick Keller, interview by author, August 21, 2017, Berlin. In July 2018, Dr. Patrick Keller was appointed Head of Unit Speeches and Texts (*Referatsleiter Reden und Texte*) at the German Federal Ministry of Defence.

[111] Heisterkamp, *Think Tanks der Parteien?*, 155. "*In der Rolle von Empfängern öffentlicher Zuwendungen, die zuvor direkt in die Budgets der Parteien kanalisiert wurden, manifestiert sich die Parteinähe als weiteres Identitätsmerkmal der Stiftungen. Mit ihren Mutterparteien teilen sie politische Leitvorstellungen und das ideologische Wertefundament. Zugleich betonen die Stiftungen ihre Unabhängigkeit nicht nur im Hinblick auf ihren Rechtsstatus als ‚de jure von den Parteien getrennte selbständige Organisationen*'" [emphasis in original].

the political and bureaucratic arena; nor can it simply merge with it and become indistinguishable from the party structure, for that would "nullify its distinctiveness as a think tank and subject itself to the criteria of judgment specific to those fields."[112] To succeed in such a "never-ending cycle of separation and attachment" to its main parent institution, in sum, the foundations "gather and juggle" different forms of capital from surrounding fields as well as from neighbouring organisations within the interstitial field they occupy.[113] Only by doing so can political foundations successfully exercise the "chief power" of think tanks according to Medvetz: "the ability to claim for themselves a kind of mediating role in the social structure."[114]

In this sense, departments such as Politics and Consulting, European and International Cooperation, or Scholarships and Cultural Activities might be regarded, from Medvetz's perspective, as indispensable devices within the organisational structure of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. It is through them that the foundation acquires scholarly authority from the field of cultural production, juggles it with the capital acquired from the political and bureaucratic field and thus increases its influence and prestige among a wide array of actors from different fields (e.g. the political news media, university scholars and students, public officials and government representatives from Germany and abroad, etc.). Likewise, through its Communications department the foundation does a similar balancing act by juggling the credentials and expertise acquired from the fields of politics and cultural production with the communication styles, marketing strategies, and reporting formats characteristic of the media field.[115] Through such an "elaborate symbolic balancing act that involves gathering multiple institutionalized resources from neighboring social spheres," in sum, KAS spans boundaries between fields and claims for itself a mediating role in the social structure.[116]

To refer back to our conversation with Patrick Keller, the notion of *platform* is key in this regard. Relying on a typological reading of the think tank phenomenon, Keller first notes the inadequacy of available categories to capture the foundation's unique structure and mandate in full; later in our conversation, the former foreign and security policy coordinator at KAS'

[112] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*, 46.

[113] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*, 45.

[114] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*, 178.

[115] The above-mentioned departments within KAS' organisational structure bear the following names in German: *Hauptabteilung Politik und Beratung*, *Hauptabteilung Europäische und Internationale Zusammenarbeit*, and *Hauptabteiung Begabtenförderung und Kultur*, and *Hauptabteilung Kommunikation*, respectively.

[116] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*, 16.

headquarters in Berlin uses the notion of *platform* to explain the mediating role played by the foundation—and the "constant tension" it entails, as he puts it:

> First off, I think we need to say… Or for me to be very clear about this, if we are a think tank, we are not one in a scholarly, scientific sense, but in a sense of advocacy, because we are closely identified to a Christian-democratic world view. There are certain ideas and solutions that we push because of that, so I think that distinguishes us form a university-based think tank or one that is neutral, or at least that pretends to be neutral or whatever that means in the end when it comes to policy advice. And the second thing is that most of our structure as a political foundation are (sic) not focused on giving policy advice or doing studies. For instance, we have whole divisions that are there to give scholarships to students or that do political education in a domestic, local context. Much of our money in personnel, structure, is devoted to that.
>
> […]
>
> Because of this unique structure I talked about, there is constant tension, if you will, a tension within the work of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, because we are mostly working… We are designed as a platform for others, we bring people together that's what we do: we build bridges, we provide money and facilities and ideas. And that's very good and helpful, but at the same time we have of course our own ideas that we want to, you know, present and made heard. There is tension in that, because you want to work with others, you want to work as a platform, but at the same time you want to be heard and to voice your thoughts. And this is something that you need to get into the working balance, and that shifts over time and locality.[117]

In Chapter 4 we will look at how that tension lies, in fact, at the core of the "Forte de Copacabana" process. Apart from merely providing platforms for discussion like the annual conference, its preparatory meetings, or the regional security symposium, the foundation and its partners in Brazil have actively sought to shape the course of discussions by networking selected individuals from politics, business, research, and civil society, by intermediating the exchange of ideas on selected policy issues identified as common security challenges, and, finally, by catalysing and promoting selected policy recommendations aimed at decision makers.

As Diane Stone rightly points out, "categorizing different types of think tank, or mapping their development, has become a scholarly fetish that has detracted attention from more sophisticated analysis of the sources of power of these organisations and how they garner and wield societal and policy influence."[118] The approach to definition advanced by Medvetz is certainly more sophisticated than the ideal-typical categories adopted by typologists in that it

[117] Patrick Keller, interview by author.

[118] Stone, *Knowledge actors and transnational governance*, 64.

offers a more nuanced explanation for the workings of think tanks in contemporary societies. Yet it fails to address the question of how think tanks actually translate the ability to claim for themselves a mediating role in the social structure into political influence. Does the chief power of think tanks lie in their ability to claim for themselves a mediating role in the social structure, or is it the ability to use that role to shape the course of discussions and move certain ideas across the political space their ultimate source of power? How, by spanning boundaries and working as mediators, do think tanks voice their thoughts and have their ideas heard, as Keller puts it?

2.3.3 Think tanks as institutionally embedded actors: institutionalist and network approaches

Scholars adopting different institutionalist and network frameworks to the study of think tanks seek to overcome the limitations of pluralism, elite theory, and statism when accounting for the think tank phenomenon. They do so by focusing on the structural environments within which these actors are embedded, on norms and rules followed by think tanks as well as on the "pathways to influence" along which these actors attempt to shape different institutional settings.[119] With Medvetz, proponents of these views share the assumption that "think tanks comprise a heterogeneous array of organizations with a wide range of possible effects," thereby avoiding pluralists' or elite theorists' prejudgments on the virtuous or vicious nature of such organisations.[120] Unlike the author, however, they refrain from subscribing to a "grand theory to explain what think tanks do and how they achieve influence."[121]

Instead, institutionalists condition their choice concerning the most appropriate framework of analysis to the particular feature or characteristic of think tank behaviour they intend to analyse. Consequently, among such a broad and multifaceted community of scholars we find, for instance, historical institutionalists, public policy or holistic institutionalists, advocates of a policy or epistemic community approach and, more recently, discursive or constructivist institutionalists. Notwithstanding their different epistemological and methodological standpoints,

[119] Abelson, Brooks and Hua, *Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and Geo-Politics*.

[120] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*, 13.

[121] Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter?*, 72.

they all depart from the underlying premise that think tanks "represent a diverse set of organizations that share a common desire to influence public policy" and—due to their multiple profiles—resort to multiple strategies when attempting to place issues on the political agenda.[122]

Whereas early historical approaches focused on the institutional history and on the evolution of think tanks in particular countries, mostly in the US and Britain, the holistic institutionalist approach advanced by scholars like Abelson draws on the literature on public policy and the policy cycle to look at think tanks' unique institutional characteristics and explain their multiple "strategic decisions about how and where in the policy cycle to make their presence felt."[123] In this sense, the pathways through which think tank influence is achieved vary considerably among different organisations and depend, among other factors, on "the particular institutional characteristics of the state; such features of the think tank marketplace as the number, size, prestige and influence strategies of those organizations competing for the attention of policy-makers; and the personal linkages between think tanks and the state and media elites."[124]

Institutionalists who draw on Peter Haas' epistemic community analysis, for their part, regard think tank-affiliated actors as members of "networks of politically engaged experts and professionals who share certain basic cognitive frames and assumptions."[125] In doing so, they cast light on the above-mentioned phenomenon of think tanks' growing transnational networked activities, highlighting shared scientific knowledge and a common policy enterprise as associative elements that underpin these communities. However, by focusing too much on a single attribute possessed by members of think tanks who form such networks or communities—namely, their expertise in a given issue area—proponents of an epistemic community approach show a proclivity to underestimate, or even entirely neglect, "[o]ther socially valued resources circulating in the space of think tanks," including, for instance, "network ties to political elites and journalists, media savvy, the ability to raise money, and specialized political skills," as Medvetz rightly points out.[126]

Elaborating on early network approaches to the study of think tanks, Diane Stone further refines the existing conceptual tools to investigate the plethora of network formats that populate

[122] Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter?*, 71.

[123] Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter?*, 71.

[124] Abelson, Brooks and Hua, *Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and Geo-Politics*, 2.

[125] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*, 13. See also Peter M. Haas, "Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization* 46, 1, Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination (Winter, 1992), accessed August 5, 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706951.

[126] Medvetz, *Think tanks in America*, 15.

different domains of global public space. In addition to the epistemic community approach, the author discusses post-positivist approaches of discourse coalitions or interpretative communities as well as Gramscian perspectives on ideological hegemony as alternative analytical frameworks in the study of knowledge networks.[127] Furthermore, Stone advances the idea that think tanks and the networks they are part of become intertwined in what she refers to as "a double devolution of governance:" "first, a sideways partial delegation of governance responsibilities to non-state or quasi-state actors, and second, there is an upward decentralisation of governance among transnational policy forums."[128]

Due to their dense interactions with other knowledge actors such as academics and universities, philanthropic foundations, or government research entities, think tanks play a pivotal role among other creators and distributors of policy knowledge. Networked with these actors in a mutually interdependent way, they co-create and exchange information, research findings, and policy recommendations; deliberate over policy problems, produce common understandings, and offer potential solutions. Assembled in networks, what is more, knowledge organisations also establish connections with governments, international organisations, supranational entities, or multilateral organisms, for instance through funding support or for provision of consultancy and analytical services. Stone brings empirical evidence of the mechanisms and processes through which networks have become, in her view, new modes of governance by conducting in-depth case studies of four so-called "transnational governance networks:" the Global Development Network, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), the Open Society Foundations network (OSF), and ASEAN-ISIS. Governance networks like these constitute, in her

[127] Stone summarizes as follows the main dividing line between the three main schools of network interpretation: "'Ideas do matter', and while these frameworks share the position that ideas, research and knowledge are endemic to the policy process, they do so from quite different epistemological standpoints. Respectively, the network models posit first, science, objectivity and rationalism as a compelling force that can drive policy; second, the influence of discourse and subjectivity; and third, the role of hegemony and material interests as the sources of power in the global agora." For a detailed discussion of each one of the three perspectives, see Stone, *Knowledge actors and transnational governance*, 47–53.

[128] Stone, *Knowledge actors and transnational governance*, 181. Acknowledging that both concepts, 'network' and 'governance,' have acquired multiple meanings in the literature, Stone eschews a detailed debate on definition and sticks to more traditional understandings of these terms. Therefore, the "network logic of organisation," according to the author, is defined as essentially "distinct from market modes of organisation in the private sector of exchange, competition and commodification, and the top-down chains of authority of hierarchical mode of bureaucratic organisation associated with the state." The concept of 'governance,' for its part, is broadly defined as "processes of governing, conditions of ordered rule or methods by which society is governed […] or the 'attempt to steer state and the economy through collective actions.'" "Governance network," one of the core concepts that Stone adopts in her study, is defined as "a horizontal articulation of interdependent, but operationally autonomous, actors from the public and/or private sector who interact with one another through ongoing negotiations that take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive, and imaginary framework; facilitate self-regulation in the shadow of hierarchy; and contribute to the production of public regulation in the broad sense of the term." Stone, *Knowledge actors and transnational governance*, 2–5.

words, "a few examples of pinions or gears in the machinery of transnational governance. Many more need yet investigation and analysis."[129]

In this vein, Erin Zimmerman's work on think tank networks and security governance in Asia provides a twofold contribution to contemporary research on the topic.[130] First, the author helps bridge the gap noted by Stone and shows how think tank networks have indeed become ideational entrepreneurs and advocates of new forms of security governance in the region. To do so, Zimmerman not only casts new light on the case of ASEAN-ISIS, but also explores three other think tank-organised dialogue forums and networks: the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), affiliated with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); the Asia Security Summit, or Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), established by the International Institute for Strategic Studies; and, finally, the Asia Security Initiative (ASI), a think tank network established by the US-based MacArthur Foundation. Secondly, Zimmerman advances discursive institutionalism (DI), or constructivist institutionalism, as the most appropriate theoretical framework to account for think tank influence on the political process "by identifying them as 'discursive actors', therefore recognising their source of political power and acknowledging their ability to use discourse to transform ideas into institutional change".[131] In doing so, the author also provides an important empirical contribution to the burgeoning community of researchers who have helped accommodate DI within the toolbox of analytical frameworks to the study of think tanks in recent years.[132]

2.3.4 Think tanks as discursive actors: the discursive institutionalist approach

As a concept, DI is inextricably linked to the work of US scholar Vivien A. Schmidt, who coined the term with the "desire to give a name to a very rich and diverse set of ways of explaining political and social reality that has long been pushed to the margins in political science by the growing domination of three older 'new institutionalisms'—rational choice, historical,

[129] Stone, *Knowledge actors and transnational governance*, 194.

[130] Zimmerman, *Think Tanks and Non-Traditional Security*.

[131] Zimmerman, *Think Tanks and Non-Traditional Security*, 22.

[132] Diane Stone, "The ASEAN-ISIS Network: Interpretive Communities, Informal Diplomacy and Discourses of Region," *Minerva* 49, no. 2 (2011), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11024-011-9171-5 Ladi, "Think Tanks, Discursive Institutionalism and Policy Change"; Ladi, Lazarou and Hauck, "Brazilian think tanks and the rise of austerity discourse"; Zimmerman and Stone, "ASEAN think tanks, policy change and economic cooperation".

and sociological."[133] In this sense, Schmidt defines DI as "an umbrella concept for the vast range of works in political science that take account of the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed and exchanged through discourse."[134] Think tank researchers, for their part, have relied on DI to explain how these organisations have acted as carriers of ideas and discourses across the political sphere and thus influenced politics.

When advancing DI, Schmidt departs from the premise that ideas and discourses matter to the study of politics. As pointed out above, to proponents of DI not only the substantive content of ideas and discourses matters, but also "[h]ow ideas are generated among policy actors and communicated to the public by political actors through discourse," or, alternatively, "how ideas go from individual thought to collective action."[135] Schmidt rightly acknowledges that the notion of *discourse* has "conjure[d] up exaggerated visions of postmodernists and poststructuralists who are assumed (often unfairly) to interpret 'texts' without contexts and to understand reality as all words, whatever the deeds."[136] To overcome conceptual hurdles like these, the author relies on a rather generic definition of the term, which is "stripped of postmodernist baggage:" to Schmidt, in this sense, "[d]iscourse is not just ideas or 'text' (what is said) but also context (where, when, how, and why it was said). The term refers not only to structure (what is said, or where and how) but also to agency (who said what to whom)."[137]

As an institutionalist framework of analysis, what is more, DI "underlines the importance of considering both ideas and discourse in institutional context," by which Schmidt means, in her own words, "the meaning context as much as the context of formal institutions,

[133] Vivien A. Schmidt, "Theorizing Ideas and Discourse in Political Science: Intersubjectivity, Neo-Institutionalisms, and the Power of Ideas," *Critical Review* 29, no. 2 (2017): 250, https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2017.1366665.

[134] Vivien A. Schmidt, "Taking ideas and discourse seriously: Explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth 'new institutionalism'," *European Political Science Review* 2, no. 01 (2010): 3, https://doi.org/10.1017/S175577390999021X.

[135] Schmidt, "Taking ideas and discourse seriously," 15.

[136] Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism," 304–5.

[137] Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism," 305. To explain her preference for a generic definition of discourse, "stripped of postmodernist baggage," the author makes an interesting comment on the hostile reception that her work initially got from mainstream political scientists: "As a side note, using the term *discourse* in articles and books directed at convincing mainstream political science of the value of explanations in terms of ideas and discourse has been tricky business, and was even more so when I first began making these arguments in the late 1990s and early to mid 2000s […] at a time when *discourse* was seen by the mainstream as a dangerous word. This should help explain my comment about using discourse as a generic term 'stripped of post-modernist baggage' […] This was not meant as a slight to post-modernism or post-structuralism but rather as an indication to political scientists of what I intended to do, which was to develop an application of the term in a manner different from the way in which it had been used heretofore. My own experience, in presentations since the mid-1990s, had also taught me that such a 'trigger warning' helped to ensure that political scientists might just stop long enough to listen." Schmidt, "Theorizing Ideas and Discourse in Political Science," 261–62.

informal rules, and everyday practices."[138] In this sense, to Schmidt, "[i]nstitutions […] frame the discourse. They define the institutional contexts within which repertoires of more or less acceptable (and expectable) ideas and discursive interactions develop."[139] Therefore, DI differs from previous institutionalist approaches in that, according to its proponents, "action in institutions is not seen as the product of agents' rationally calculated, path-dependent, or norm-appropriate rule-following."[140] Instead, as Schmidt argues, agents' "background ideational abilities" explain how institutions are created, changed or maintained—that is, agents' "human capacities, dispositions, and know-how related to how the world works and how to cope with it."[141]

Furthermore, Schmidt adds a communicative dimension into the analysis of institutional change and continuity and refers to agents' "foreground discursive abilities" as well; "[t]hese discursive abilities," she argues, "represent the logic of communication, which enables agents to think, speak, and act outside their institutions even as they are inside them, to deliberate about institutional rules even as they use them, and to persuade one another to change those institutions or to maintain them."[142] Table 5 reproduces Schmidt's overview of DI and the other three new institutionalisms in comparative perspective.

Therefore, according to the conceptual framework advanced by proponents of DI, ideas constitute the substantive content of discourse and exist at three different levels of generality. First, *policies* or policy solutions that policymakers propose; second, general *programmes* underpinning policy ideas and defining problems to be solved—which include frames of reference, programmatic beliefs, principles, paradigms, or problem definitions; finally, at the most general level, *philosophies* or world views that form the ideational background against which programmes and policies are discussed and "sit in the background as underlying assumptions that are rarely contested except in times of crisis."[143] In addition, Schmidt also subdivides policies, programmes and philosophies into two types of ideas: *cognitive*, or causal, ideas and *normative* ideas. Whereas cognitive ideas "elucidate 'what is and what to do,'" she argues, "normative ideas indicate 'what is good or bad about what is' in light of 'what one ought to do.'"[144]

[138] Schmidt, "Theorizing Ideas and Discourse in Political Science," 250.

[139] Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism," 314.

[140] Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism," 314.

[141] Schmidt, "Taking ideas and discourse seriously," 14.

[142] Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism," 314.

[143] Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism," 306.

[144] Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism," 306.

The author explains how these two types of ideas interrelate with the three levels of generality mentioned above as follows:

> Cognitive ideas speak to how (first level) policies offer solutions to the problems at hand, how (second level) programs define the problems to be solved and identify the methods by which to solve them, and how both policies and programs mesh with the deeper core of (third level) principles and norms of relevant scientific disciplines or technical practices. Normative ideas instead attach values to political action and serve to legitimate the policies in a program through reference to their appropriateness. Normative ideas speak to how (first level) policies meet the aspirations and ideals of the general public and how (second level) programs as well as (first level) policies resonate with a deeper core of (third level) principles and norms of public life, whether the newly emerging values of a society or the long-standing ones in the societal repertoire.[145]

DI's conceptual framework also proposes the distinction of two forms of discursive processes by which ideas are developed and through which they are communicated to broader audiences: on the one hand, *coordinative discourses* refer to the phase in which ideas (of all types and levels of generality) are constructed and coordinated by elite groups and influential individuals. These include high-ranking officials and civil servants, activists, members of interest groups, or think tank-affiliated experts and academics, who might be networked, or not, in epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions, or discourse coalitions. Besides, entrepreneurs, brokers or mediators interact with such actors during coordination, acting as catalysts for change. Here, too, think tanks play an important role as policy entrepreneurs or idea brokers "able to mobilise ideas between state/non-state and formal/informal political actors."[146] *Communicative discourses*, on the other hand, occur in the public sphere, when political leaders, government spokespeople, activists or other individuals involved in deliberation present and legitimise ideas to the public through events, publications, and other public strategies. In addition, communicative discourses also include actors who "communicate their responses to government policies, engendering debate, deliberation, and ideally, modification of the policies under discussion."[147] These include not only members of the opposition, interest groups, or the media, but also knowledge actors such as public intellectuals, scholars, and think tanks.

[145] Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism," 307.

[146] Zimmerman, *Think Tanks and Non-Traditional Security*, 22.

[147] Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism," 310.

	Rational choice institutionalism	Historical institutionalism	Sociological institution-alism	Discursive institutionalism
Object of explanation	Behavior of rational actors	Structures and practices	Norms and culture of social agents	Ideas and discourse of sentient agents
Logic of explanation	Calculation	Path-dependency	Appropriateness	Communication
Definition of institutions	Incentive structures	Macro-historical structures and regularities	Cultural norms and frames	Meaning structures and constructs
Approach to change	Static – continuity through fixed preferences, stable institutions	Static – continuity through path dependency interrupted by critical junc-tures	Static – continuity through cultural norms and rules	Dynamic – change (and continuity) through ideas and discursive interaction
Explanation of change	Exogenous shock	Exogenous shock	Exogenous shock	Endogenous process through background ideational and foreground discursive abilities
Recent innovations to ex-plain change	Endogenous ascription of interest shifts through RI political coalitions or HI self-reinforcing or self-undermining processes	Endogenous description of incremental change through layering, drift, conversion	Endogenous construc-tion (merge with DI)	Endogenous construction through reframing, recasting collective memories and narratives through epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions, communicative action, deliberative democracy

RI = rational choice institutionalism; HI = historical institutionalism; DI = discursive institutionalism.

Table 5: The four new institutionalisms.
Source: Schmidt, "Taking ideas and discourse seriously," 5, Table 1.

With that in mind, it is no surprise that scholars who investigate the role of ideas and discourses in politics through the lenses of discursive institutionalism have stressed the relevance of think tanks not only as ideational actors, but also as carriers of both coordinative and communicative discourses. What does surprise, however, is that "DI has only recently been applied to the study of think tanks," as Zimmerman rightly notes.[148] As pointed out in the introduction, these organisations detain expertise, know how to translate it into policy-relevant language, and are well equipped and well positioned to convene and engage a wide spectrum of state and non-state actors. Translating this into DI's vocabulary, they are "experts in constructing, maintaining and developing discourses and they use these skills to advance their ideational agendas."[149]

In one of the earliest studies to use DI as a framework to investigate the role and influence of think tanks, Stella Ladi illustrates how policy institutes produce and promote coordinative and communicative discourses and thus help shape public policy.[150] To the author, think tanks "neither act as neutral bridges between academia and politics nor always function having public good as a compass;" instead, she argues, policy institutes "transform knowledge to discourse and they then act as carriers of coordinative and communicative discourse."[151] Moreover, Ladi argues in her study that think tanks' visibility among other policy actors as well as their ability to influence policy shifts gain momentum during "critical junctures," i.e. "unexplainable moments in time when change is triggered, often as a result of exogenous factors."[152] Such "particular historical moments that have lasting consequences" can be "either 'big' events or less significant incidents that happen at the right time and have an impact across time."[153] As noted in our introductory chapter, McGann and Lazarou advance the same idea when they affirm that one of the key conclusions permeating the current literature on think tanks is that "moments of change or transformation" in the international system generate more complex demands for policymakers, thereby increasing the relevance of think tanks at different stages of the policymaking process.[154]

[148] Zimmerman, *Think Tanks and Non-Traditional Security*, 29.

[149] Zimmerman, *Think Tanks and Non-Traditional Security*, 16.

[150] Ladi, "Think Tanks, Discursive Institutionalism and Policy Change".

[151] Ladi, "Think Tanks, Discursive Institutionalism and Policy Change," 212.

[152] Ladi, "Think Tanks, Discursive Institutionalism and Policy Change," 207.

[153] Ladi, "Think Tanks, Discursive Institutionalism and Policy Change," 208.

[154] McGann and Lazarou, "Think Tanks and the Foreign Policy Challenges Facing the Emerging Powers," 13.

In this sense, some of the illustrations given by Ladi include catalytic events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the war in Kosovo in 1999, the 9/11 attacks in the US in 2001, or the 2007-2008 global financial crisis and the ensuing worldwide economic downturn—the associated emergence of the BRICS grouping in world politics being another one of such moments, as McGann and Lazarou point out.[155] These are moments in time when "policy-makers need to clarify and coordinate their discourse, and also to communicate it to the public" and, consequently, when think tanks "come to the fore and influence public discourse and thus public policy, by framing the arguments of policy-makers and politicians."[156] It is worth quoting the author at length to understand how this occurs in practice:

> To be a carrier of coordinative discourse means that think tanks participate in the creation, elaboration, and justification of policy and programmatic ideas, when these are negotiated between policy-makers. They can promote specific ideas, specific framing of policy issues, and provide arguments for the debate by participating in advocacy coalitions (for example, the activity of US think tanks in the coordination of a more interventionist US foreign policy after 9/11). To be a carrier of communicative discourse means that think tanks are central in the presentation, deliberation and legitimation of political ideas to the general public when decisions have been taken and the time is right (for example, the role of think tanks in European capitals for the communication of the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP).[157]

Zimmerman, for her part, further refines the adoption of DI as a theoretical framework to the study of think tanks by introducing the notion of *discursive spaces*. To justify the use of discursive institutionalism, the author affirms that "DI is well-suited to the study of think tanks because it can acknowledge their positions both within and external to existing governing structures […] and clarifies how, by operating in the 'middle' of formal and informal process, think tanks can wield political influence."[158] Zimmerman also shows in her study how think tanks in Asia have successfully promoted the non-traditional security (NTS) agenda among policymakers through the strategies of problem framing, agenda setting, networking, and the institutionalisation of discursive spaces—eventually altering security governance structures in the region. The empirical evidence of four case studies explored in her work also serves to illustrate how,

[155] Stella Ladi, Elena Lazarou and Juliana Hauck also apply the notion of "critical juncture" when writing about the role of think tanks in recent economic policy changes in Brazil. To the authors, there were at least two critical junctures for the country in the last two decades: "first, being labelled as a BRIC and a rising global power (2008–2009), and second, the economic recession eruption (2014–2015)." See Ladi, Lazarou and Hauck, "Brazilian think tanks and the rise of austerity discourse," 2.

[156] Ladi, "Think Tanks, Discursive Institutionalism and Policy Change," 206.

[157] Ladi, "Think Tanks, Discursive Institutionalism and Policy Change," 212.

[158] Zimmerman, *Think Tanks and Non-Traditional Security*, 23.

by providing key locations for coordinative and communicative discourses, think tank-organised discursive spaces become important venues for informal diplomacy in the form of Track Two dialogues.[159]

As the author explores in her study, think tanks "are not only providing political locations for discussion, as identified in earlier literature, but are also controlling these locations and the ideas introduced in order to alter regional security paradigms and elicit desired policy responses."[160] Dialogue mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum or the Asia Security Summit are some illustrations of the think tank-organised discursive spaces analysed by Zimmerman. These spaces, according to the author, "are most often located alongside formal governing structures but enjoy freedom from the strict political limitations imposed on formal venues."[161] For this reason, think tanks have used them as productive locations for new ideas, norms, and discourses they want to include in the policy debate in question as well as to network selected individuals and organisations.

2.4 Conclusion

Academics might well disagree when defining what a think tank is and explaining their role in contemporary societies, and yet the growing salience these organisations have acquired over the years seems undisputed. Within different socio-political settings and with multiple institutional profiles, think tanks have become increasingly influential not only because they detain expertise and know how to translate it into policy-relevant language, but also because they are well equipped and well positioned to convene and engage a wide spectrum of state and non-state actors. As pointed out in the Introduction, think tanks have indeed become "a permanent

[159] Whereas Track One/Track I diplomacy refers to official diplomatic mechanisms, Track Two/Track II is broadly understood as a "multifaceted and fluid field" that encompasses unofficial dialogues between two parties. Track II processes are normally facilitated by a third party, in which participants seek to resolve their differences and/or to come up with new approaches to relevant policy-issues. Most authors use the notion of *informal diplomacy* in this sense too. Adding to the spectrum and refining it even further, Track 1.5 processes are those in which all or most of the participants are officials acting in their "private capacities", in a format that, while resembling official conversations, is not referred to as such due to participants' sensitivities and recognition issues – particularly in the context of conflict resolution. See Peter L. Jones, *Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and Practice* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2015); Susan A. Nan, Daniel Druckman, and Jana E. Horr, "Unofficial international conflict resolution: Is there a Track 1½? Are there best practices?," *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2009), https://doi.org/10.1002/crq.248; Stone, "The ASEAN-ISIS Network".

[160] Zimmerman, *Think Tanks and Non-Traditional Security*, 4.

[161] Zimmerman, *Think Tanks and Non-Traditional Security*, 29.

part of the political landscape and are now an integral part of the policy process in many countries."[162]

The aim of the present chapter was to assess different conceptual definitions advanced by think tank observers and, in doing so, explore their strengths and limitations. Moreover, by engaging with the literature on the subject we were able to evaluate the extent to which the main approaches to conceptual definition in think tank research provide us with appropriate tools to address the empirical richness of the think tank phenomenon—illustrated, as noted above, by organisations as disparate at first sight as the Brazilian Center for International Relations and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Furthermore, the chapter has reviewed different theoretical frameworks with which scholars have dealt with the question of whether—and, if so, how—think tanks are able to influence politics and society, decision-makers, and the general public. As noted above, the answers offered by pluralism, statism, elite theory/Marxism, Medvetz's sociological approach, or, finally, by advocates of different variants of institutionalism and network analysis vary considerably. Likewise, the conclusions we draw from a critical review of all such different approaches is manifold as well.

Relying on Medvetz's relational conception, we have underscored how think tanks are intrinsically hybrid organisations, located at the interstices of multiple, intersecting loci of power. The liminal position occupied by think tanks is enmeshed in a web of relations among surrounding institutions from which these organisations gather their credentials and resources (e.g. scholarly authority and prestige, access to bureaucrats and decision makers, money and fund-raising ability, communication styles and marketing strategies). At the same time, think tanks constantly need to differentiate themselves from more established institutions from the spheres of politics, academia, business, and the media so that they can claim for themselves a mediating role in the social structure—their chief power according to Medvetz.

Based on the notion of *discourse* as advanced by discursive institutionalists, we have argued, instead, that the chief power of think tanks lies in their ability to leverage that role to their advantage and transform the resources and credentials acquired from surrounding actors into discourse, i.e. "the interactive process of conveying ideas."[163] Think tanks do so, as we saw, by acting as carriers of coordinative and communicative discourses, exercising their influence on institutions through discursive strategies such as problem framing, networking, agenda

[162] McGann and Lazarou, "Think Tanks and the Foreign Policy Challenges Facing the Emerging Powers," 7.

[163] Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism," 303.

setting and the creation of discursive spaces. The successful use of these strategies creates momentum for think tank-mobilised ideas to influence institutions (i.e. institutionalisation), which generally occurs in a gradual, context-contingent, and intangible manner. After all, as Zimmerman notes, "[i]nstitutionalisation is, by far, the most permanent and politically contested outcome of ideational promotion."[164]

In addition to the contentious issues of theorisation and conceptual definition, the present chapter has also acknowledged a "major methodological problem" in think tank research: our ability to measure influence—or to determine whether it can be measured at all.[165] To be sure, think tanks themselves devote entire sections of their websites and annual reports to advertising their own influence metrics. To produce evidence that substantiates their claims of impact, most institutes trumpet, for example, the amount of insertions in domestic and foreign media outlets, the number of conferences and high-level round-table discussions promoted in a year, the stature and reputation of its Board of Trustees, or the aggregate of followers on Twitter and Facebook. Furthermore, when reporting on the success of a specific event, documenting the achievements of the previous year, or participating in an interview with a researcher like myself, think tank staff members very often provide plenty of anecdotal evidence in order to claim influence: promoting a meeting behind closed doors between leaders X and Y equals influence; receiving laudatory remarks from influential policy advisor Z equals influence. And yet "claiming to have influence," as Abelson notes, "is far simpler than documenting how it was achieved."[166] Both for think tankers and for those who investigate them.

Despite a few exceptions, scholars who look for incontrovertible evidence of influence in think tank research risk encountering frustration or, worse still, obtaining spurious results. Stone rightly points out in this regard that "[p]roof of influence is elusive. There is no clear causal chain between policy research or an idea espoused by an institute, a political decision and policy change."[167] Similarly, one can hardly establish a causal relationship between a dialogue process like Forte de Copacabana, a political decision on the part of EU or Brazilian authorities and policy change—not least because the process under analysis here has so far remained uncharted territory. In fact, even in the case of more established and well-documented

[164] Zimmerman, *Think Tanks and Non-Traditional Security*, 39.

[165] Stone, *Knowledge actors and transnational governance*, 68.

[166] Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter?*, 104.

[167] Stone, *Knowledge actors and transnational governance*, 68.

think tank-organised dialogue mechanisms such as the ASEAN-ISIS network, conclusions regarding influence are generally tentative, and leading researchers in the area acknowledge that "impact is variable, quite often intangible and is time and context contingent;" "[i]nfluence has been a gradual process. And it has not been a constant one."[168]

As we will discuss in the following chapters, creating dedicated discursive spaces like "Forte" and playing a gate-keeping role within them has allowed KAS, CEBRI, and their partners in Brazil to play a mediating role in both coordinative and communicative discourses on pressing foreign policy and geopolitical issues. In fact, the confidential gathering launched at the Fort Copacabana army base in 2004 has grown over the years into a multi-layered unofficial dialogue process, comprising complementary discursive spaces situated alongside formal institutions in Brazil, each of which with a particular discursive purpose. What we have so far referred to as the "Forte de Copacabana" process is precisely the aggregate of these spaces, i.e. the annual flagship event and the confidential workshop with selected conferees occurring on the eve of the conference; the European-South American Regional Security Symposiums held since 2015 in Brasília; the preparatory meetings occurring twice a year since 2016, both in the capital city and in Rio de Janeiro, among other spaces.

In Chapter 4, we will unpack the creation of discursive spaces as part of a repertoire of strategies through which the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and its partners have sought to nudge the B in the BRICS to align itself with the West in the governance and support of the liberal world order. Whereas conclusions are provisional, tentative, or probabilistic at best, our analysis intends to lay the groundwork upon which future research might trace the ideas promoted by these actors and the implications thereof to policy and institutional outcomes. Yet, first, we need to explore the institutional setting and political circumstances within which such think tank-organised discursive spaces have taken place—the topic of the following chapter.

[168] Stone, "The ASEAN-ISIS Network," 242; 255. Zimmerman is a notable exception in this regard, as the author adopts a positivist research design based on four case studies using process-tracing methodology "to follow think tank ideas through political processes and analyse the intervening steps between cause and consequence." According to Zimmerman, "[p]rocess tracing allows a variety of evidence for the operation of causal mechanisms, some of which may be more important than others, none of which are directly comparable, and all of which taken together may allow analysts to draw conclusions about the adequacy or inadequacy of an explanation […] Using a broad variety of qualitative data, process tracing creates a narrative that encompasses and contextualises all the variables contributing to the observed outcomes and combines all available information to answer the core questions: how have think tanks promoted the NTS agenda in Asia and what have been the institutional consequences?" It is worth noting, however, that Zimmerman relies on a wealth of primary and secondary sources hardly available to other cases of think tank-organised dialogue mechanisms—let alone to an initiative not yet investigated by the literature like the Forte de Copacabana process. Moreover, the author acknowledges numerous limitations regarding the use of primary documents and semi-structured interviews, which, nonetheless, do not compromise her argument. Zimmerman, *Think Tanks and Non-Traditional Security*, 65–66.

3 Brazil and the European Union in a World Order in Transition

3.1 Introduction

Brazil and the European bloc share six decades of diplomatic ties, in addition to inextricable social, economic, and cultural relations that historically bind Latin America's largest country to Europe. Since the establishment of a permanent Brazilian mission to what was then the European Economic Community (EEC) in Brussels, in January 1961, the relationship evolved from a reduced level of mutual endeavours into a decisive moment in the 2000s, when a strategic partnership agreement was signed.[169] Despite a considerable diversification of areas of mutual exchange and the enthusiasm aroused by the new status, the EU-Brazil dialogue has experienced a series of setbacks and political limitations since the early 2010s, which have constrained formal diplomatic mechanisms and curtailed the impetus for a deepened cooperation. As most scholars assessing EU-Brazil relations point out, the partnership's strategic component is still limited, ad hoc, and feeble—if not missing at all.[170] Miriam Saraiva, a senior Brazilian IR scholar and a specialist in the topic, goes so far as to state that, given the current state of affairs, "[t]he strategic EU-Brazil partnership is deactivated."[171]

[169] Brazil was the first Latin American country to establish diplomatic relations with the EEC, on 24 May 1960. Initially based in Paris as an annex of the Brazilian Delegation to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Brazil's permanent mission to the ECC in Brussels was then enlarged on 22 May 1963, when it became the Brazilian Mission to the European Communities (BRASEUROPA, later renamed Mission of Brazil to the European Union), encompassing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community as well. An overview of the history of the Brazilian representation to the European Union is available at the following link: <http://braseuropa.itamaraty.gov.br/en-us/history_of_the_mission.xml>, accessed April 12, 2018.

[170] Richard G. Whitman and Annemarie P. Rodt, "EU-Brazil Relations: A Strategic Partnership?," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 17, no. 1 (2012), https://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?area=Journals&id=EERR2012002; Thomas Renard, "The Treachery of Strategies: A call for true EU Strategic Partnerships" Egmont Paper 45 (Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, Gent, Belgium, 2011), http://aei.pitt.edu/32321/1/ep45.pdf>, Miriam G. Saraiva, "Os limites da parceria estratégica Brasil-União Europeia nos planos inter-regional e multilateral," in *¿Atlántico vs. Pacífico? América Latina y el Caribe, los cambios regionales y los desafíos globales*, ed. Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (CRIES) (Buenos Aires: CRIES Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales, 2014), accessed April 10, 2018, http://www.cries.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/15-Saraiva.pdf>; Nicole d. P. Domingos, "Brazil as an EU Strategic Partner: A shared preference for multilateralism?" (PhD Thesis, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Po, 2014); Keukeleire and Bruyn, "The European Union, the BRICS, and Other Emerging Powers".

[171] Miriam G. Saraiva, "What next for EU-Brazil relations?," European Politics and Policy—EUROPP (Blog post), accessed July 23, 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2019/09/04/what-next-for-brazil-eu-relations/.

As pointed out in the Introduction, political interactions between Brazilian and European authorities have occurred not only via official diplomacy, but also through unofficial, think tank-organised spaces such as the Forte de Copacabana Conferences—an area that we will chart in the following chapter. And yet to understand the relevance of these spaces, we must, first, provide a brief overview of the complex "set of consolidated multilevel institutional ties" through which Brazil and the EU interact.[172] We will do so in the present chapter by engaging with the scholarly literature on the topic and assessing key developments in the mutual relationship over the last few decades. In particular, we will look at the foreign policy strategies adopted by successive Brazilian administrations since the 1990s to help situate the ebb and flow of EU-Brazil relations within the wider context of Brazil's growing participation in world affairs—ultimately as part of the BRICS and, at the same time, as one of the various so-called *strategic partners* of the European Union.[173] That will allow us to outline the domestic political circumstances and formal diplomatic settings within which the informal dialogue process conducted by KAS and its partners in Brazil has occurred. Moreover, the ensuing discussion will help us explore, in the following chapter, the interests, issues, and ambitions at stake at "Forte" as well as to investigate, even if only tentatively, the achievements of fifteen years of informal geopolitical dialogue.

3.2 From a relative indifference to the strategic partnership

Over the course of the last six decades, the EU and Brazil have faced numerous challenges and opportunities arising from a rather complex relationship. Indeed, mutual relations occur along multiple institutional levels, including Brazil's bilateral relations with single EU member states, the EU-Mercosur interregional dialogue, or the EU's bi-regional partnership with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). All these have been complementary

[172] Poletti, "The EU for Brazil: A Partner Towards a 'Fairer' Globalization?," 273.

[173] The list of countries with which the EU has upgraded its contractual and political relations to the level of a so-called "strategic partnership" includes Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Russia, and the US. The strategic partnership with the Russian Federation, launched in 2003, was suspended after Russia's annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine between February and March 2014; since 2015 the list of EU's strategic partners also includes an international organisation: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). See Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira and Alena V. G. Vieira, "Introduction: The European Union's strategic partnerships: conceptual approaches, debates and experiences," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29, no. 1 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2015.1130341; Keukeleire and Bruyn, "The European Union, the BRICS, and Other Emerging Powers"; Tom Casier, "Russia and the European Union," Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, accessed August 7, 2020.

settings within which the relationship has taken place over the years beyond Brazil's bilateral ties to the Union itself—our primary focus in the ensuing discussion.[174]

While in the early years a "relative indifference" prevailed, mutual relations experienced a shift when Portugal and Spain entered the European Community (EC) in 1986.[175] Until then, apart from an economic and commercial agreement that came into force in 1982 and the inauguration of a permanent mission of the European Community in Brasília in 1984, Brazil still "lingered at the margins of the EC's foreign policy interests."[176] Furthermore, the absence of a regional initiative in Latin America comparable to the European integration project hindered the establishment of any kind of interregional contact for most of the second half of the 20th century. However, that would gradually change from the late 1980s onward: the Iberian enlargement of the European bloc coincided not only with the re-democratisation of Brazil and its neighbouring countries after decades of civil-military dictatorial regimes, but also with the inception of a regional integration project that would later develop into Mercosur—the Southern Common Market founded by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in 1991 through the Asunción Treaty. Consequently, bilateral relations between the European bloc and Brazil, as well as the interregional dialogue with Mercosur, experienced significant achievements during the final decade of the 20th century, even though the level of political cooperation remained relatively low.

[174] Miriam G. Saraiva, "Parceria Brasil-União Europeia: diálogos bilaterais e multilaterais," in *Inserção internacional da Argentina e do Brasil: desafios da política externa e de defesa*, ed. Silva, André Luiz Reis da and Eduardo M. Svartman (Porto Alegre: Editora da UFRGS, 2018), 99. It is worth noting that, while the primary focus of our discussion lies on EU-Brazil relations, this is in no way to underestimate the relevance of Brazil's bilateral relationship with single EU member states—and with Germany in particular—as complementary institutional settings that constrain and thus help explain the phenomenon under investigation. The study by Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira (2011) offers probably the most comprehensive historiographical analysis of contemporary Brazil-Germany relations, especially with regard to its political dimension and to the evolving bilateral dialogue on matters of defence and security. Whilst the present study does not sufficiently address the topic, Bandeira's study certainly adds to our understanding of the informal dialogue process promoted by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Brazil since 2004. See Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *O 'milagre alemão' e o desenvolvimento do Brasil (1949-2011)*, 2a. ed. rev. e ampliada (São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2011).

[175] Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira, "The European Union's partnership policy towards Brazil: More than meets the eye," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29, no. 1 (2015): 57, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2015.1103973.

[176] Ferreira-Pereira, "The European Union's partnership policy towards Brazil," 57.

3.2.1 A "bloc-to-bloc formula": mutual relations at the unipolar moment

On 29 June 1992 Brazil and the European Economic Community signed a Framework Agreement for Cooperation, thereby widening existing channels of communication established by the 1982 agreement and expanding the work of joint committees in areas such as trade, health, intellectual property, and social matters.[177] Despite that, relations progressively changed their course towards interregionalism, as the European bloc and its member states signed a Framework Cooperation Agreement and launched a Joint Declaration on political dialogue with Mercosur in December 1995.[178] The agreement illustrates the "bloc-to-bloc formula" to the region that still prevailed in virtually all European attempts to enhance relations with Latin America at that time.[179]

Although the progressive institutionalisation of interregional relations was encouraged by former Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), his administration was fully aware of the obstacles to the successful conclusion of negotiations over an interregional free trade agreement. Therefore, Cardoso and his foreign ministers Luiz Felipe Lampreia (1995-2001) and Celso Lafer (2001-2002) sought, in many ways, to "detach" Brazil from Mercosur when dealing with European authorities and to pursue further foreign policy interests irrespective of the fate of trade negotiations. His administration did so, for instance, by deepening mutual relations with single member states such as Germany, Spain, and Portugal, by further exploring possibilities to increase bilateral cooperation in the field of science and technology as well as by aligning itself with the Europeans in defending multilateralism and international regimes.[180]

Cardoso had played a key role as former president Itamar Franco's finance minister (1993-1994), leading the efforts that culminated in the Real Plan, a set of stabilisation policies that finally tackled hyperinflation and introduced Brazil's official currency to date, the Brazilian

[177] The Framework Agreement for Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the Federal Republic of Brazil came into effect on 1 November 1995. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21995A1101(01):EN:HTML>. Accessed May 30, 2018.

[178] The Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Southern Common Market came into effect on 1 July 1999. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=405>. Accessed May 30, 2018.

[179] Ferreira-Pereira, "The European Union's partnership policy towards Brazil," 61.

[180] Silva, André Luiz Reis da, "O Brasil diante da globalização: a política externa do governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002)," *Carta Internacional* 7, no. 1 (2012): 27, accessed April 5, 2019, https://cartainternacional.abri.org.br/Carta/article/view/8.

real. At the time he took office in January 1995, thereby bringing the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB) to power, the world experienced the accelerated process of globalisation ensuing from the end of the Cold War. In that context, Cardoso's administration rejected developmentalism and Third-Worldism—both traditional features of Brazilian foreign policy in previous decades; instead, Brazil's foreign policy strategy under the leadership of the PSDB was marked by the adherence to the plethora of global regimes brought about by the demise of the East-West divide.[181] These included, for instance, the Treaty for the Complete Prohibition of Nuclear Tests, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR), among others. By adopting this course of action, the Cardoso administration eventually mended Brazil's frayed relations with the US on strategic issues, which had been severely compromised during the final stages of the military regime due to the decision of former Brazilian president Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) to expand Brazil's "parallel" nuclear programme.[182] At the same time, and especially during his first term in office, Cardoso followed in the footsteps of his predecessors Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992) and Itamar Franco (1992-1994) and accepted the "legitimacy of the USA in hemispheric defence."[183] As Érico Duarte puts it, "[u]ntil 1998, Brazil's political leadership was mesmerised by perceptions of a US unipolar moment."[184]

Yet from 1999 to 2002, Cardoso's second term in office, Brazilian foreign policy changed course to re-embrace the idea that "the world system is conditioned by asymmetries that lead to an unequal distribution of power," setting in motion a progressive re-orientation of

[181] Silva, André Luiz Reis da, "O Brasil diante da globalização: a política externa do governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002)".

[182] Silva, André Luiz Reis da, "O Brasil diante da globalização: a política externa do governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002)," 30. Rivalries between the US and Brazil over military cooperation affairs intensified during the government of former US president James Carter (1977-1981). Facing increased pressures from the US administration due to flagrant human rights violations committed by the Brazilian civil-military dictatorship, former president Geisel decided, in 1977, to break the 1952 Military Agreement and extinguish the Joint Military Commission, the Naval Mission, and the Cartographic Agreement in force with the US since the 1950s, interpreting Carter's growing criticism as a way to respond to Brazil's 1975 nuclear treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany and the regime's nuclear power programme. See José Goldemberg, Carlos Feu Alvim, and Olga Y. Mafra, "The Denuclearization of Brazil and Argentina," *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 1, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2018.1479129; Moniz Bandeira, *Brasil-Estados Unidos: A rivalidade emergente, 1950-1988*, 3a. ed. rev., e ampliada (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2011).

[183] Érico Duarte, "Brazil, the Blue Economy and the maritime security of the South Atlantic," *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* 12, no. 1 (2016): 104, https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2015.1067384.

[184] Duarte, "Brazil, the Blue Economy and the maritime security of the South Atlantic," 104.

Brazil's foreign policy goals away from a strictly "neoliberal matrix."[185] The economic vulnerability ensuing from the 1999 financial crisis, coupled with a growing resistance to the US proposal of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), are some of the key factors that explain Cardoso's gradual foreign policy shift. In opposition to the FTAA, the Brazilian government invested renewed efforts at that moment to strengthen Mercosur and to widen regional integration throughout the entire South American continent. A remarkable development in that regard was the Brasília Summit, held between August and September 2000. At the unprecedented meeting, the presidents of all 12 countries of South America launched the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA)—which paved the way for future regional governance institutions such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).[186]

Furthermore, it was during Cardoso's administration that Brazil's first National Defence Policy (Política de Defesa Nacional, renamed Política Nacional de Defesa in 2016, PDN/PND) was issued. The new piece of legislation introduced in 1996 not only publicized the country's main defence policy goals, but also marked an important step towards public transparency, accountability, and civilian control over defence issues. Likewise, the establishment of a civilian-led Ministry of Defence three years later, in 1999, and the proposal to issue a National Defence White Paper (Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional, LBDN) the same year were crucial steps to enhance Brazil's post-authoritarian defence institutions.[187] Brazil's Defence White Paper was eventually published only in 2012, whereas the National Defence Policy would be updated three times in the following years, in 2005, 2012, and 2016. Finally, the National Defence Strategy (Estratégia Nacional de Defesa, END), issued in 2008 and updated both in 2012 and 2016, translates the goals envisioned by the National Defence Policy into practical terms. Together with the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, the PDN, the END and the LBDN constitute the basic legal framework of Brazil's defence and security policies.[188] The successive evolution of a legal framework in the field since the 1990s, as we explore in more detail below, has marked the

[185] Silva, André Luiz Reis da, "O Brasil diante da globalização: a política externa do governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002)," 31–32.

[186] Silva, André Luiz Reis da, "O Brasil diante da globalização: a política externa do governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002)".

[187] Lima, Maria Regina Soares de et al., eds., *Atlas da Política Brasileira de Defesa* (Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro: CLACSO; Latitude Sul, 2017), 30.

[188] Lima, Maria Regina Soares de et al., *Atlas da Política Brasileira de Defesa*; Carlos W. d. Almeida, "Política de defesa no Brasil: Considerações do ponto de vista das políticas públicas," *Opinião Pública* 16, no. 1 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1590/S0104-62762010000100009.

country's gradual departure from the "reactive defence policy" that prevailed throughout the twentieth century.[189]

3.2.2 A "win-win formula": multipolarity, global ambitions, and the strategic partnership agreement

Unlike the pathway adopted by Cardoso, during the administrations of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and his anointed successor, Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), Brazil's foreign policy trajectory had a clear ambition for international prominence and autonomy vis-à-vis traditional partners in the global North—including the EU. Universalism might well have remained one of the core principles orienting Brazil's international relations in the period, yet the European bloc was clearly not among the highest priorities on the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) foreign policy agenda. As Saraiva argues, "[i]n its efforts to have international institutions reviewed, Brazil found that its most natural bedfellows were not Europeans, but other emerging countries."[190]

In fact, cooperating with other countries from the global South and prioritising multilateralism on the world stage had been key features of Brazil's foreign policy since the 1970s. And yet over the course of the PT administrations a new form of South-South cooperation gained prominence in Brazil's external agenda, focused in particular on what the then Brazilian foreign minister, Celso Amorim, referred to as "the new kids on the block."[191] To Amorim, the group of newcomers to global decision-making included regional powers such as India, China, and South Africa, among other countries with which Brasília shared the willingness to "redefine world governance" and play a greater role in multilateral institutions.[192] Promoting a wide range of foreign policy networks, or flexible coalitions, with these countries was, therefore, the main pathway through which Brazil sought to amplify its demands for a more inclusive multilateral system at that moment. Some of the most prominent examples of Brazilian initiatives in this

[189] Duarte, "Brazil, the Blue Economy and the maritime security of the South Atlantic".

[190] Miriam G. Saraiva, "The Brazil-European Union strategic partnership, from Lula to Dilma Rousseff: A shift of focus," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 60, no. 1 (2017): 6, accessed May 30, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201600117, http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292017000100208&lng=en&tlng=en.

[191] Celso Amorim, "Let's Hear From the New Kids on the Block," June 14, 2010, accessed October 26, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/opinion/15iht-edamorim.html.

[192] Amorim, "Let's Hear From the New Kids on the Block".

area were the founding of the IBSA Dialogue Forum/G3 together with India and South Africa in 2003, the leading role within the World Trade Organization (WTO) to form the G20 during the Doha Round, and the concerted action with Russian, Indian, and Chinese officials to eventually institutionalise the BRICs grouping in 2009.

As Daniel Flemes argues, the "vision of the future global order" dominating the imaginary of Brazilian decision makers throughout most of that period was based on the assumption that, by joining diplomatic coalitions such as IBSA and BRICS, Brazil would have ample room for manoeuvre to de-legitimise hierarchy structures ensuing from the post-war order.[193] Moreover, such a foreign policy strategy would allow the country to constrain the influence of the established powers in global governance mechanisms while increasing its own status within the system; in so doing, Brazil would benefit the most from the ongoing global power shift towards multipolarity—at that point a seemingly inexorable transformation in global politics which, as Stuenkel puts it, "was taking place rapidly, making the world less Western and more ideologically diverse."[194]

As noted in the Introduction, however, the narrative of an inevitable rise of the BRICS to the upper echelons of world power was premised on the inaccurate notion that these countries were, at the same time, "domestically stable, ready and able to consistently project global influence."[195] Long-term forecasts about emerging powers' ascent to a new status globally were based on projections from a moment of unusually high rates of economic growth—an exceptional moment that eroded with the end of the 2000s commodities and credit booms. While Russia and China have managed to build on the geopolitical momentum gained since the start of the 21st century, the "emerging power" narrative seems particularly distant from the reality of countries like Brazil and South Africa, which not only failed the promise of stability and growth, but also experienced a remarkable foreign policy retreat in the 2010s.[196] Therefore, the decline of the idea of a multipolar world with the BRICS collectively assuming a dominant position in world affairs undermines any uncritical acceptance of the notions of "rising" or

[193] Daniel Flemes, "A visão brasileira da futura ordem global," *Contexto Internacional* 32, no. 2 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-85292010000200005.

[194] Stuenkel, *The BRICS and the future of global order*, 5.

[195] Nossel, "The World's Rising Powers Have Fallen".

[196] For an overview of the key domestic and external constraints that explain Brazil's international "decline" or "rollback" in recent years, see Amado L. Cervo and Antônio C. Lessa, "O declínio: Inserção internacional do Brasil (2011-2014)," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 57, no. 2 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201400308; Andrés Malamud, "Foreign Policy Retreat: Domestic and Systemic Causes of Brazil's International Rollback," *Rising Powers Quarterly* 2, no. 2 (2017).

"emerging powers" to describe the foreign policy trajectory of these countries indiscriminately, particularly if applied to second tier non-nuclear states like Brazil and South Africa.[197]

To overcome the conceptual limitations of the "emerging power" narrative when applied to these cases, Carlos Milani, Letícia Pinheiro, and Maria Regina Soares de Lima propose the notion of *graduation*.[198] Borrowed from the development literature, the concept was reframed by the authors to provide a conceptual framework for the study of the pathways through which second-tier non-nuclear states seek to redefine their international position given domestic and systemic permissiveness. "Our concept of graduation," Milani and his colleagues emphasise, "presumes a gradual process, a non-linear course of indeterminate speed and direction—a country may remain stationary at a certain level or even go backwards."[199] In its analytical reach, the notion of graduation is, therefore, "broader than the concepts of emerging power and rising state, since these assume the existence of two conditions only: emerging/rising and fading/declining."[200]

According to the authors, what is more, graduation not only implies "an ambition to move upwards in international hierarchy, but also a political willingness to change global governance rules without making use of military power and without being an anti-systemic power."[201] For countries with minor systemic impact but aspiring to change their international status, successfully graduating to a higher position depends on systemic permissiveness, on sufficient economic and military capabilities, on the recognition by the major powers, and on a

[197] Whilst a detailed account of the literature investigating Brazil's role as an "emerging" or "rising power" goes beyond the scope of this study, it is worth mentioning a few publications that address the issue at length. Apart from Domingos, "Brazil as an EU Strategic Partner" and Keukeleire and Bruyn, "The European Union, the BRICS, and Other Emerging Powers", who fully incorporate this discussion in their accounts of EU-Brazil/EU-BRICS relations, see Andrew Hurrell, "Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers?," *International Affairs* 82, no. 1 (2006), accessed March 19, 2019; Flemes, "A visão brasileira da futura ordem global"; Daniel Flemes, "Network Powers: Strategies of change in the multipolar system," *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 6 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.802504; Sean W. Burges, "Brazil as a bridge between old and new powers?," *International Affairs* 89, no. 3 (2013), accessed March 19, 2019; Daniel Flemes and Miriam G. Saraiva, "Potências emergentes na ordem de redes: o caso do Brasil," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 57, no. 2 (2014); Kai Michael Kenkel and Philip Cunliffe, *Brazil as a Rising Power: Intervention Norms and the Contestation of Global Order,* Global Institutions (s.l.: Taylor and Francis, 2016).

[198] Carlos R. S. Milani, Leticia Pinheiro, and Lima, Maria Regina Soares de, "Brazil's foreign policy and the 'graduation dilemma'," *International Affairs* 93, no. 3 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix078. See also Ana Margheritis, "Introduction: The 'graduation dilemma' in foreign policy: Brazil at a watershed," *International Affairs* 93, no. 3 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix075.

[199] Milani, Pinheiro and Lima, Maria Regina Soares de, "Brazil's foreign policy and the 'graduation dilemma'," 590.

[200] Milani, Pinheiro and Lima, Maria Regina Soares de, "Brazil's foreign policy and the 'graduation dilemma'," 590–91.

[201] Milani, Pinheiro and Lima, Maria Regina Soares de, "Brazil's foreign policy and the 'graduation dilemma'," 591.

series of domestic constraints (e.g. political will to graduate, cohesion among government and strategic elites, societal backing for the graduation process, etc.). How decision makers react when confronted with a "graduation dilemma" is key to determine the speed and direction of a country's graduation process:

> In their respective foreign policy trajectories, these states face a graduation dilemma whenever their key decision-makers have the opportunity to choose and the intention of choosing between different international strategies: between a more autonomous type of development or a more dependent one; in security terms, between bandwagoning and balancing; when building a multilateral policy, between traditional alliances and innovative, flexible coalitions; in geopolitical terms and in the field of development cooperation, between an emphasis on North–South or an emphasis on South–South relations. Naturally, these ideal binaries offer several other options which decision-makers may perceive and select, given the political grey areas between the extremes of such dichotomies.[202]

In this sense, according to Milani and his colleagues, Brazil had a "straightforward ambition for graduation" throughout the Workers' Party thirteen-year administration, particularly during Lula da Silva's second term in office, from 2007 to 2010.[203] Whilst during Cardoso's presidency there was neither the will, nor the domestic or systemic conditions for graduation, under the PT governments Brazilian foreign policymakers pursued a graduation strategy within different domains of global politics—inevitably facing the associated graduation dilemmas. As discussed below, the association with other rising actors on the world stage was an integral part of Brazil's graduation strategy in the period. Likewise, relations with the EU and the West also reflected the policy options with which Brazilian decision makers responded to the series of graduation dilemmas faced within all such different domains.

Firstly, within global multilateral institutions, Brazil's graduation strategy in the period was marked by the attempt to transition the country from a rule-taker to a rule-maker and, thereby, to occupy veto positions in an increasingly contested world order. In this regard, Lula's substantial commitment to Brazil's long-standing campaign for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) illustrates well how the ambition to occupy veto positions within global institutions played out at that time.[204] Moreover, the status-seeking foreign policy

[202] Milani, Pinheiro and Lima, Maria Regina Soares de, "Brazil's foreign policy and the 'graduation dilemma'," 585.

[203] Milani, Pinheiro and Lima, Maria Regina Soares de, "Brazil's foreign policy and the 'graduation dilemma'," 586.

[204] Eugenio V. Garcia and Natalia B. R. Coelho, "A Seat at the Top? A Historical Appraisal of Brazil's Case for the UN Security Council," *SAGE Open* 8, no. 3 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244018801098.

pursued in the period was also translated into a stronger, albeit selective, political willingness to tackle global security challenges. Illustrating this was, for instance, the increased participation in UN peacekeeping operations, most prominently in the leadership of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the Military task Force (MTF) of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).[205] Associated with this is yet another domain in which Brazilian foreign policymakers pursued a graduation strategy in the period, namely in the socialization with other states. In addition to a more prominent role within the UN, the search for recognition by the major powers was also evident in Brazil's concerted action with the other BRIC countries. Particularly relevant in this regard were not only the joint efforts to establish the G20 as the main platform for discussions on global economic issues in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, but also the institutionalisation, later into the 2010s, of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA).[206] Besides, as we will explore below, obtaining the status of strategic partner of the EU in 2007 attested, in the eyes of Brazilian decision makers, the recognition of the country's international prestige by the developed world—another crucial component of the graduation strategy pursued in the period.

A primary focus on the geopolitical South and a renewed commitment to regional integration were two additional aspects of pivotal importance for Brazil's graduation strategy in the period. In South America, Brasília played a leading role in advancing regional governance institutions beyond Mercosur and IIRSA, as illustrated by the establishment of the South American Community of Nations (CASA), in 2004, and the founding of UNASUR and its South American Defence Council (CDS) in 2008. Similarly, cooperation with the African continent experienced an exceptional increase in the period, most notably with Portuguese-speaking and West African countries. Technical assistance and cooperation projects with the continent encompassed areas such as agriculture, education, defence, public health, logistics, social development, and poverty eradication. South-South cooperation projects in all of these areas became

[205] Two further illustrations are the diplomatic efforts that culminated in the signing of the Tehran Declaration in 2010 and the proposal of an alternative interpretation to the debate on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) with the concept of Responsibility while Protecting (RwP), introduced in 2011. We will address below the main repercussions of foreign policy moves like these on the EU-Brazil relationship.

[206] Stuenkel, *The BRICS and the future of global order*, 9–24; 97;120.

"the cornerstone of foreign policy" in the period, and relations with other Southern countries were thus "*the* policy priority" under Lula.[207]

The initiative to revive the South Atlantic Zone of Peace and Cooperation (ZOPACAS), established in 1986 in cooperation with South American and African countries, marked the "rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy," another crucial aspect of the country's international trajectory under former president Lula da Silva.[208] Diplomatic efforts intended to bridge the gap between both sides of the South Atlantic Ocean were coupled with massive investment plans in naval defence capabilities to protect and develop Brazil's on- and offshore resources in the so-called "Blue Amazon," especially the large reserves of oil and gas discovered in its pre-salt layers.[209] These included not only new systems of surveillance and control of the coastline, such as the Management System of the Blue Amazon (Sistema de Gerenciamento da Amazônia Azul, SisGAAz), but also the Submarine Development Program (Programa de Desenvolvimento de Submarinos, PROSUB), with which the Lula administration rehabilitated Brazilian Navy's decade-long ambition to possess nuclear-powered submarines.[210] Such a "comprehensive maritime security policy," according to Duarte, was the core component of Brazil's "new security policy[,] in which the South Atlantic stands at the apex of an autonomous South American region and sanctuary for Brazilian development."[211]

[207] Cristina Y. A. Inoue and Alcides C. Vaz, "Brazil as 'Southern donor': Beyond hierarchy and national interests in development cooperation?," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 25, no. 4 (2012), https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2012.734779; Danilo Marcondes and Emma Mawdsley, "South–South in retreat? The transitions from Lula to Rousseff to Temer and Brazilian development cooperation," *International Affairs* 93, no. 3 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix076.

[208] José F. S. Saraiva, "The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: The rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 53, spe (2010), https://doi.org/10.1590/S0034-73292010000300010.

[209] Marianne Wiesebron, "Amazônia Azul: Pensando a Defesa do Território Marítimo Brasileiro," *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* 2, no. 3 (2013), accessed April 7, 2019, https://seer.ufrgs.br/austral/article/view/35039/23930; Nathan Thompson and Robert Muggah, "The Blue Amazon: Brazil Asserts its Influence accros the Atlantic," *Foreign Affairs*, 2015, accessed April 7, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2015-06-11/blue-amazon.

[210] Duarte, "Brazil, the Blue Economy and the maritime security of the South Atlantic". PROSUB was established within the framework of a cooperation agreement with France and envisioned the construction of one nuclear-powered and four diesel-electric attack submarines. A joint venture of the French Naval Group (formerly DCNS) and the Brazilian conglomerate Odebrecht was formed to develop the non-nuclear part of the submarine, while the nuclear propulsion technology would be entirely homegrown at the uranium enrichment plant and Navy research centre of Iperó, in the state of São Paulo. See Leonardo Bandarra, "Brazilian nuclear policy under Bolsonaro: no nuclear weapons, but a nuclear submarine," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, April 12, 2019, accessed April 13, 2019, https://thebulletin.org/2019/04/brazilian-nuclear-policy-under-bolsonaro/?fbclid=IwAR1zmGRm_yXWkspTFhEvlIHRXuxWaiZR2QysnU3JFMP2C2GwS49jKYLQFHE.

[211] Duarte, "Brazil, the Blue Economy and the maritime security of the South Atlantic," 98–99.

Furthermore, the "geopolitical vision at the heart of Brazil's 'assertive foreign policy,'" as Milani et al. put it, was laid out explicitly in the 2005 National Defence Policy, the 2008 National Defence Strategy, and the 2012 National Defence White Paper.[212] As noted above, the updated defence legislation constituted a step forward in the country's gradual departure from the "reactive defence policy" adopted throughout the 20th century, a trend that had begun under Cardoso's presidency in the late 1990s.[213] However, it was only with the 2005 National Defence Policy that the notion of a "*Brazilian strategic surrounding area*" (in Portuguese, entorno estratégico brasileiro) appeared in official discourse. Comprising the South American continent, the South Atlantic Ocean, Africa's western coast, and Antarctica, such a "strategic surrounding area" was regarded by government representatives and the armed forces alike as the top priority as far as defence and security policy issues were concerned.[214] The conceptual innovation enshrined in law thus helped cement the idea that Brazil's global ambitions would only be achieved if the country had a "vigilant posture" in its immediate geopolitical area.[215] At the same time, it disclosed the areas over which Brasília wished to exert its own diplomatic, economic, and military influence in the years to come.[216]

It was within this context that European decision makers decided that it was time to develop a new strategy to deal with the country, for "[t]he EU–Brazil relationship became both outdated and unsatisfactory as Brazil grew into a more significant economic and political actor on the world stage."[217] At first, a "more introspective approach" persisted on the European side, as an unprecedented enlargement process incorporated 12 new member states with two expansions in 2004 and 2007, and successive institutional developments ensuing from the treaties of Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001) shaped the evolution of the Economic

[212] Milani, Pinheiro and Lima, Maria Regina Soares de, "Brazil's foreign policy and the 'graduation dilemma'," 601. Ministério da Defesa, "Política Nacional de Defesa / Estratégia Nacional de Defesa," accessed April 20, 2020, https://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/estado_e_defesa/END-PND_Optimized.pdf; Ministério da Defesa, "Defense White Paper: Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional," accessed April 20, 2020, https://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/estado_e_defesa/livro_branco/lbdn_2013_ing_net.pdf.

[213] Duarte, "Brazil, the Blue Economy and the maritime security of the South Atlantic".

[214] The alternative notion "immediate geopolitical surrounding area" (in Portuguese, entorno geopolítico imediato) appears in the 2008 National Defence Strategy and the 2012 Defence White Paper, comprising nonetheless the same geographical scope.

[215] Duarte, "Brazil, the Blue Economy and the maritime security of the South Atlantic," 105.

[216] Fiori, José Luis da Costa, "O Brasil e seu 'entorno estratégico' na primeira década do século XXI," in *10 anos de governos pós-neoliberais no Brasil: Lula e Dilma*, ed. Emir Sader and Ana M. Costa, 1a edição (São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro: Boitempo Editorial; FLACSO Brasil, 2013).

[217] Ferreira-Pereira, "The European Union's partnership policy towards Brazil," 59.

Community into the new European Union.[218] Negotiations over an EU-Mercosur trade agreement, what is more, remained unresolved and, despite the initial enthusiasm, came to a standstill in 2003-2004 due to intricate disputes and lack of compromise on sensitive issues for both sides, especially as concerns agricultural subsidies and industrial tariffs.[219]

In a 2005 report titled "A stronger partnership between the European Union and Latin America," in turn, the European Commission singled out Brazil and Mexico for special treatment as "major players" and "big countries." The document also pointed to a fragile political cooperation between the European bloc and Brazil, "with which the EU has only the bare bones of bilateral dialogue with no political dimension."[220] In the following year, José Manuel Durão Barroso, then President of the European Commission (2004-2014), visited Brazil to discuss the state of bilateral relations with the country and the progress of interregional cooperation with Mercosur. In May 2006, former president Lula da Silva highlighted the importance of Barroso's trip to Brazil and hinted at the move towards an updated relationship with the EU, which would soon materialise:

> Relations between Brazil and the European Union demonstrate an exceptional level of maturity and dynamism. We are now working to achieve the status of "strategic partnership." Without a doubt, this visit is the best expression of mutual interest in reaching a higher level of interaction and coordination between the European Union, Brazil, Mercosur and South America.[221]

Finally, in May 2007, the European Commission issued two documents that would pave the way for the establishment of a strategic partnership agreement later that year in Lisbon: the

[218] Such an "introspective approach" that prevailed in the EU's partnership dynamics with Brazil until the mid-2000s resulted, according to the author, from a series of "multidimensional challenges" facing European decision makers at that moment. In addition to the union's enlargement process and the institutional developments noted above, the author also highlights, for instance, "the necessity of tackling the effects produced by the by Cold War's demise, notably [the] German reunification and the breakup of the Soviet Union, which came to fundamentally challenge the traditional course of reflection on and practice of the role and identity of the European project." Ferreira-Pereira, "The European Union's partnership policy towards Brazil," 58–59.

[219] Whitman and Rodt, "EU-Brazil Relations," 35.

[220] European Commission, *A stronger partnership between the European Union and Latin America: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament COM(2005)636 final* (Luxembourg: EUR-OP, 2006), accessed June 6, 2018, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/la/docs/com05_636_en.pdf, 18.

[221] Presidência da República, "Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, por ocasião da visita do presidente da Comissão Européia, José Manuel Durão Barroso," news release, May 31, 2006, accessed June 6, 2018, http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/discursos/1o-mandato/2006/31-05-2006-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-por-ocasiao-da-visita-do-presidente-da-comissao-europeia-jose-manuel-durao-barroso/view, 3–4. "*As relações entre o Brasil e a União Européia demonstram um nível excepcional de maturidade e dinamismo. Estamos agora trabalhando para que elas venham a atingir a condição de 'parceria estratégica'. Certamente, esta visita é a melhor expressão do interesse mútuo em alcançar um patamar superior de interação e coordenação entre a União Européia, Brasil, Mercosul e América do Sul*."

report "Brazil: Country Strategy Paper (2007-2013)" and a communiqué to the European Parliament and the European Council titled "Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership."[222] Brazil had become "too internationally significant to be ignored," not only due to its growing activism within multilateral institutions, but also because of its unrivalled position in South America—economically as well as politically.[223] In fact, the Workers' Party administration was perceived by EU authorities as a "positive leadership" in the region, especially vis-à-vis the more radical approach to regional integration advocated by the Cuban regime and by former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) via the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America—People's Trade Agreement (ALBA-TCP).[224] In the eyes of EU decision makers, what is more, Brazil followed Western patterns domestically and shared a normative agenda based on the values of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, international law, and peaceful resolution of disputes—in stark contrast to other rising actors on the global stage, such as Russia or China.[225] To decision makers in Brasília, on the other hand, a strategic partnership with the EU not only held the promise of increasing levels of trade, investment, and technology transfers, but also attested the recognition of Brazil's international prestige by the developed world—a crucial component of the graduation strategy pursued in the period. In short, the partnership was an important signal in the eyes of Brazilian authorities under the PT administrations that the country should be—and would be—taken seriously on the global stage.[226]

[222] European Commission, "Brazil: Country Strategy Paper (2007-2013)" ((E/2007/889), Brussels, 2007), https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/csp-brazil-2007-2013_en.pdf>; European Commission, "Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council" (COM(2007) 281 final, Brussels, 2007), https://eulacfoundation.org/en/system/files/TOWARDS%20AN%20EU-BRAZIL%20STRATEGIC%20PARTNERSHIP.pdf>.

[223] Ferreira-Pereira, "The European Union's partnership policy towards Brazil," 66.

[224] Ferreira-Pereira, "The European Union's partnership policy towards Brazil," 65; Saraiva, "Parceria Brasil-União Europeia: diálogos bilaterais e multilaterais," 114. ALBA—TCP was founded in 2004 by the Republic of Cuba and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and later incorporated as full members Antigua and Barbuda, the Commonwealth of Dominica, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the Republic of Ecuador, the Republic of Honduras, the Republic of Nicaragua, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Lucia. Suriname was admitted as guest country in 2012. Ecuador and Bolivia withdrew the group in August 2018 and November 2019, respectively. See Thomas Muhr, "The Politics of Space in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America–Peoples' Trade Agreement (ALBA–TCP): Transnationalism, the Organized Society, and Counter-Hegemonic Governance," *Globalizations* 9, no. 6 (2012), https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2012.739339.

[225] Ferreira-Pereira, "The European Union's partnership policy towards Brazil," 64–66; Saraiva, "The Brazil-European Union strategic partnership, from Lula to Dilma Rousseff," 7.

[226] Saraiva, "The Brazil-European Union strategic partnership, from Lula to Dilma Rousseff," 2.

The agreement eventually signed in 2007 resulted, in sum, from "the perception of a win-win formula."[227] That is to say, enhancing relations to the status of strategic partners satisfied not only "the EU's Lisbon Treaty global ambitions, but also Brazil's 21st century evolution as a BRIC."[228] As Stephan Keukeleire and Tom De Bruyn point out, the decision to upgrade the label of its relationship with Brazil and the other BRICS countries to a declaratory strategic partnership reflects the EU's relentless search for "settled, stable, and predictable frameworks within which to define and pursue its international relationships and activities."[229] In fact, the use of comprehensive contractual and political frameworks as an "instrument to exert structural power" vis-à-vis other regions or competing actors on the world stage has become a "standard operation procedure" in EU foreign policymaking since the mid-1990s.[230] Confronted with the growing relevance of the so-called emerging powers in the mid-2000s, their competing interests, ambitions, and multilateral constellations (IBSA, BASIC, etc.), the European bloc followed the exact same pattern and opted for the development of bilateral policies towards each of the BRICS countries separately, thereby refraining from an all-encompassing "BRICS policy" approach.[231] And yet, despite occasional cases of coordination and cooperation and a common choice for multilateralism, the EU's partnership strategy towards the BRICS has suffered, according to Keukeleire and De Bruyn, from an innate vulnerability—evidenced, as we will explore in the following section, by the case of Brazil:

> The contents of the political declarations and agreements between the EU and these countries [the BRICS and the other so-called emerging powers] could indeed give the impression that they are indeed genuine 'partnerships for effective multilateralism' […] However the experience in the various multilateral settings demonstrates that they have a quite different view on exactly what multilateralism means and what the policy goals are that have to be achieved through multilateralism […] it is a choice for multilateralism based on fundamentally different principles.[232]

[227] Ferreira-Pereira, "The European Union's partnership policy towards Brazil," 66.

[228] Elena Lazarou, "Brazil and the European Union: Strategic Partners in a Changing World?" Working Paper Nr 24/2011 (Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens, Greece, 2011), http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/24_2011_-WORKING-PAPER-_-Elena-Lazarou.pdf, 10.

[229] Keukeleire and Bruyn, "The European Union, the BRICS, and Other Emerging Powers," 424.

[230] Keukeleire and Bruyn, "The European Union, the BRICS, and Other Emerging Powers," 428; 431.

[231] Keukeleire and Bruyn, "The European Union, the BRICS, and Other Emerging Powers," 424; 428.

[232] Keukeleire and Bruyn, "The European Union, the BRICS, and Other Emerging Powers," 434–36.

3.3 Strategic partners in a world order in transition

With the establishment of a strategic partnership agreement between Brazil and the EU, relations increased in pace and tempo as more than 30 sectoral dialogues were set up involving multiple actors and a wide range of bilateral and multilateral issues.[233] More than 100 projects were established, with an annual budget of € 8,4 million.[234] Joint efforts have mostly focused on bilateral projects in areas such as science and technology, environmental protection and climate change, human rights, governance and public administration, and regional integration. In addition, Joint Statements stemming from seven annual summits (2007-2014) reinforce the promotion of international peace and security as one of the core components upon which the partnership is based.[235] In fact, the Joint Action Plan launched during the 2nd Brazil-European Union Summit in 2008 refers to the promotion of "peace and comprehensive security through an effective multilateral system" as the first topic to have motivated the construction of a "comprehensive strategic partnership" the year before at the 1st EU-Brazil Summit in Lisbon.[236] And yet, despite an enthusiastic official discourse, mutual mistrust and diverging, or even competing, interests have brought to surface the various fault lines in the EU-Brazil dialogue, especially on matters of peace and security.

3.3.1 Fault lines in a "declaratory strategic partnership": security dialogue

Based on more than 100 interviews with EU and government officials, diplomats, and researchers, Nicole Domingos argues that Brazilian representatives were particularly sensitive to the EU's "tone of moral superiority", its "patronizing" approach during negotiations as well as its

[233] Following Saraiva, bilateral dialogues are those in which results are associated to Brazil and the European Union individually, whereas multilateral dialogues refer to global political issues and to EU's and Brazil's actions, interactions, and impact within multilateral institutions. See Saraiva, "Parceria Brasil-União Europeia: diálogos bilaterais e multilaterais," 98.

[234] Delegação da União Europeia no Brasil, "Cooperação União Europeia-Brasil 2018-2020" (Delegação da União Europeia no Brasil, Brasília, 2018), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/e-book_-_cooperacao_uniao_europeia_-_brasil_2018-2020.pdf>.

[235] Whereas in previous editions the annual summits had taken place on an annual basis, the 5th and 6th summits occurred on 4 October 2011 in Brussels and 24 January 2013, respectively. As discussed below, on 24 February 2014 took place, in Brussels, the latest edition of the series of EU-Brazil Summits that had initiated on 4 July 2007 in Lisbon.

[236] European External Action Service, "Brazil-European Union Strategic Partnership: Joint Action Plan," news release, December 22, 2008, accessed April 10, 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2008_joint_action_plan_en.pdf>, 1.

self-image as a "force for good" and a "normative power" during the Workers' Party administration.[237] Ferreira-Pereira makes a similar point and highlights a widespread perception among Brazilian authorities at that moment, according to which the EU represented an "indefectible collaborator with Washington, rather than a 'promoter of stances' that could make a difference in world affairs."[238] To observers in Brasília, the lack of support for the country's bid for permanent membership of the UNSC and, particularly, the resistance and scepticism shown by Europeans with respect to Brazil's greater ambitions in global security affairs reflected that attitude—the case in point being the EU's eventual alignment with the US in rejecting the Iran nuclear fuel swap deal brokered by Brazil and Turkey in 2010 and opting, instead, for the implementation of sanctions.[239] In sum, the European Union was perceived as "continuing to be strongly conditioned and influenced by American vested interests"[240] and a "proponent of the status quo,"[241] which not only fuelled mistrust but also hampered any meaningful progress in mutual cooperation in matters of peace and security.

European concerns, on the other hand, revolved not only around particular foreign policy initiatives, such as the diplomatic efforts that culminated in the signing of the Tehran Declaration in 2010, but also around Brazil's "inflexible views on non-intervention and a traditional notion of sovereignty" as well as its "detachment from the West" as a BRICS member state.[242] As Domingos argues in her study, Brazil's growing ties with China as well as its membership of the BRICS grouping even "led some foreign analysts to express doubt about whether Brazil is a rival or an ally of the US and the EU."[243] The upgrade in mutual contractual and political relations with all the BRICS countries in the 2000s did little to assuage these views, nor was it followed by any meaningful "strategic diplomacy" on the part of the EU towards its now so-

[237] Domingos, "Brazil as an EU Strategic Partner," 319.

[238] Ferreira-Pereira, "The European Union's partnership policy towards Brazil," 71.

[239] Brazil and Turkey, then non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, signed a declaration with the Islamic Republic of Iran that expressed the commitment of Iranian authorities to deposit 1.200 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) in Turkey for a later exchange, negotiated with the Vienna Group (US, Russia, France and the IAEA), of 120 kg fuel allegedly needed for Iran's medical nuclear reactor. The agreement was eventually rejected by the UN Security Council's five permanent members. Domingos offers a thorough account of the issue and explores in detail both the Brazilian and the European perspectives on the Iran nuclear deal. See Domingos, "Brazil as an EU Strategic Partner," 271–83.

[240] Ferreira-Pereira, "The European Union's partnership policy towards Brazil," 71.

[241] Domingos, "Brazil as an EU Strategic Partner," 283–85.

[242] Domingos, "Brazil as an EU Strategic Partner," 313.

[243] Domingos, "Brazil as an EU Strategic Partner," 313.

called strategic partners from the global South.[244] In fact, as Keukeleire and De Bruyn point out, "the proliferation of declaratory 'strategic partnerships' conceals that for many EU countries the only genuine strategic partnership is the one with the USA—with Washington having the structural and relational power to assure that the Europeans, even if they intended to do so, do not move into strategic partner-swapping."[245]

Moreover, Brazil's traditional diplomatic belief that humanitarian interventions may jeopardize the principles of sovereignty, national autonomy, and stability was particularly criticised by authorities and scholars in the US and Europe in the period.[246] Certain positions adopted by the country during discussions on these matters at the United Nations illustrate this point. These include, for instance, Brazil's abstaining on the 2011 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 on Libya, its critical interpretation of the notion of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), or the rather critical reaction to the French intervention in Mali in 2013—all of which occurred during former president Dilma Rousseff's administration (2011-2016).[247] For numerous observers in the West, Brazil not only acted as an "irresponsible stakeholder" or a "rising spoiler", but also expressed its lack of commitment to multilateralism by raising objections to the notion of R2P and following other BRICS countries' behaviour with regard to sovereignty and humanitarian intervention.[248]

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[244] Keukeleire and Bruyn, "The European Union, the BRICS, and Other Emerging Powers," 428. The EU and all of the BRICS member countries agreed to upgrade their relationship to the status of a strategic partnership within a four-year time span, from 2003 to 2007: the strategic partnerships with Russia and China were launched in 2003, with India in 2004, and, finally, with Brazil and South Africa in 2007. As noted above, the strategic partnership agreement signed with the Russian Federation—which is but one among several other layers in the EU's and its single EU member states' ambivalent, uneasy relationship with Moscow—was suspended in 2014 after Russia's annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine.

[245] Keukeleire and Bruyn, "The European Union, the BRICS, and Other Emerging Powers," 428.

[246] Some of the ideas advanced in this paragraph were introduced in the following publication and are reproduced in part here with my co-authors' consent: Eduardo Gonçalves Gresse, Daniel Peters, and Fernando Preusser de Mattos, "A Brazilian Perspective on Development and R2P: Analysing the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies under Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff," in *Southern democracies and the responsibility to protect: Perspectives from India, Brazil and South Africa*, ed. Daniel Peters and Dan Krause, 1st edition, Studien zur Friedensethik Volume 60 (Baden-Baden, Münster: Nomos; Aschendorff Verlag, 2017).

[247] Saraiva, "Parceria Brasil-União Europeia: diálogos bilaterais e multilaterais".

[248] Matias Spektor, "Humanitarian Interventionism Brazilian Style?," Americas Quarterly, accessed April 10, 2018, http://www.americasquarterly.org/humanitarian-interventionism-brazilian-style>. Spektor quotes the expression "irresponsible stakeholder" from Stewart Patrick, "Irresponsible Stakeholders? The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 6 (2010), accessed April 10, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-africa/2010-11-01/irresponsible-stakeholders>; "rising spoiler" appears in Randall Schweller, "Emerging Powers in an Age of Disorder," *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 17, no. 3 (July-Sptember 2011), accessed April 10, 2018, http://journals.rienner.com/doi/abs/10.5555/1075-2846-17.3.285>. It is worth noting that Germany joined the BRIC countries in a vote of abstention in UNSCR 1973. For a detailed discussion of the rationale behind Germany's decision to abstain, see Sarah Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya," *Survival* 55, no. 6 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2013.862937.

On the other hand, decision makers in Brazil and the other BRICS countries decried the NATO-led intervention in Libya as "breach" in the mandate of the UNSC resolution, centred on the protection of Libyan civilians, as soon as the military campaign started in March 2011. Though the attitudes towards sovereignty, intervention, and R2P were and continue to be markedly complex within the group itself, the BRICS saw the unfolding of UNSC resolution 1973 in Libya as a "dangerous precedent,"[249] their leaders consequently becoming "increasingly suspicious about the European countries using or abusing transformation processes or humanitarian crises in the Middle East or Africa as a pretext for military intervention and regime change."[250] In this regard, the Responsibility while Protecting (RwP) concept note introduced by Brazilian representatives to the UN in November 2011 represented the country's main diplomatic reaction to such developments at that moment. The proposal submitted to the then UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, echoed Brazil's traditional aversion to the use of force in foreign affairs by advancing a restrictive approach to the principle of R2P and prioritising structural conflict prevention over mass atrocity prevention. Although Brazilian diplomats have frequently touched upon the notion in the years following its introduction to the debate, the country eventually failed to deliver a follow-up note on RwP and has since then done little effort to further advance its alternative approach to the issue.[251]

Under former president Rousseff and her foreign ministers Antonio Patriota (2011-2013), Luiz Alberto Figueiredo (2013-2014), and Mauro Vieira (2015-2016), the above-mentioned Brazilian ambition for international prominence waned, and the diplomatic standing acquired by the country during the Lula years progressively eroded. Among the key aspects that explain the country's gradual retreat from the global stage during Rousseff's five-and-a-half-year administration are the end of the 2000s commodities and credit booms as well as the president's lethargic disposition towards international affairs.[252] In addition, the fact that the Rousseff administration ended up engulfed by severe economic and political adversities played a decisive role as well, culminating in the eight-month impeachment process that eventually interrupted her second term in office in August 2016.

[249] Stuenkel, *The BRICS and the future of global order*, 134. The author provides a thorough discussion of BRICS' countries nuanced behaviour regarding sovereignty and humanitarian intervention in Chapter 7, 125-146.

[250] Keukeleire and Bruyn, "The European Union, the BRICS, and Other Emerging Powers," 433.

[251] Gonçalves Gresse, Peters and Preusser de Mattos, "A Brazilian Perspective on Development and R2P".

[252] See Cervo and Lessa, "O declínio"; Saraiva, "The Brazil-European Union strategic partnership, from Lula to Dilma Rousseff".

As in other areas of Brazil's international relations, discontinuity and retreat also marked the relationship with the EU in the period. According to Saraiva, "[t]he strategic partnership with the EU did not bear any significant fruit in the international multilateral arena during the Rousseff years."[253] The author's description of the circumstances in which EU-Brazil high-level summits occurred in those years is illustrative of how mutual relations fell short of what both sides had hoped for just some years before at the signing of the strategic partnership agreement, especially concerning global security affairs:

> The shift away from the strategies to boost Brazil's global projection under the Rousseff administration exerted an impact on the strategic partnership. No summit was held in 2012; then, the sixth and seventh summits were held in 2013 and 2014. The statements from the last two summits focused primarily on economic issues – short-term gains – and sustainable development. Multilateral security issues like the Syrian war and security problems in Africa were no longer remarked in the statements. In 2014, IT [information technology] was highlighted and mention was made of the 3rd Joint Action Plan, to be executed between 2015 and 2017. The political and institutional crisis in 2015 took up much of the government's time and energy, so whatever was not a priority in foreign policy terms was put on hold. There was no 2015 summit and the 3rd Joint Action Plan has not yet been confirmed.[254]

Indeed, no EU-Brazil Summit has taken place since 2014, and mutual conversations on global security issues have not been added any real depth and complexity in the meantime. The only exception to this was the establishment of a High-Level Dialogue on International Peace and Security in 2013, with the purpose of building bridges on matters of peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions.[255] The Joint Statement issued at the last EU-Brazil Summit, held in February 2014 in Brussels, welcomes the creation of a high-level dialogue especially dedicated to the field and remarks that representatives of both sides were instructed "to explore further complementarities and possible areas of co-operation on security and defence matters including in the context of the United Nations by drawing on each other's vast experiences and best practices."[256] That instruction notwithstanding, the mechanism has not produced any concrete output, not least due to Brazil's progressive retreat from the global stage and to the various fault lines in the mutual dialogue on global security issues, as emphasised above.

[253] Saraiva, "The Brazil-European Union strategic partnership, from Lula to Dilma Rousseff," 10.

[254] Saraiva, "The Brazil-European Union strategic partnership, from Lula to Dilma Rousseff," 11.

[255] Ferreira-Pereira, "The European Union's partnership policy towards Brazil," 72.

[256] Council of the European Union, "7th EU-Brazil Summit, Brussels, 24 February 2014, Joint Statement," news release, February 24, 2014, accessed May 25, 2018, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23829/141145.pdf, 5–6.

3.3.2 "Permanent tensions and increasing uncertainties": a partnership adrift

European and Brazilian authorities have occasionally met in Brussels and Brasília to confirm their mutual interest in enhancing the strategic partnership in recent years. In July 2017, for instance, a short note was issued in celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Lisbon Declaration, which established the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership in 2007. The statement reaffirms that "Brazil and the European Union are traditional allies in protecting multilateralism and democratic values, promoting international peace and security, expanding trade and removing trade barriers, creating jobs and fostering competitiveness and innovation."[257] In August 2017, in turn, then Brazilian foreign minister Aloysio Nunes met with Federica Mogherini, former High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, who reiterated the importance of close cooperation "in responding to today's global challenges, including climate change and peace and security."[258]

Earlier that year, addressing an audience of European ambassadors at the EU Delegation in Brasília, former Brazilian defence minister Raul Jungmann referred to what he regarded as a "broad convergence between European and Brazilian visions" when commenting on the then recently published Global Strategy for the EU's foreign and security policy.[259] According to the minister, South America, the South Atlantic, Africa's western coast, and Antarctica remained Brazil's top priority regions. Nonetheless, Jungmann assured that "privileged relations with traditional partners" were an integral part of Brazil's National Defence Policy as well:

[257] Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Brazil-European Union Joint Statement: Ten Years of the Strategic Partnership," Nota 212, accessed March 6, 2020, http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/press-releases/16749-brazil-european-union-joint-statement-ten-years-of-the-strategic-partnership.

[258] European Union External Action Service, "Federica Mogherini met today with Aloysio Nunes Ferreira, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil," news release, August 30, 2017, accessed May 25, 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/31495/federica-mogherini-met-today-aloysio-nunes-ferreira-minister-foreign-affairs-brazil_en>.

[259] Raul Jungmann served as Brazilian Minister of Defence from May 2016 to February 2018, when he was appointed to head the newly created Extraordinary Ministry of Public Security amid an upsurge in urban violence in Rio de Janeiro. As former president Michel Temer (2016-2018) appointed Army General Walter Souza Braga Netto to take control of security apparatuses in the state of Rio de Janeiro, another army general was appointed to take over as the head of the Ministry of Defence, General Joaquim Silva e Luna—the first time Brazil's Ministry of Defence was not headed by a civilian ever since it was created in 1999. See BBC, "Rio de Janeiro violence: Brazil army to take control of security," February 16, 2018, accessed May 23, 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-43088817>, Reuters staff, "Brazil defense minister to take over public security post," February 26, 2018, accessed May 23, 2018, https://uk.reuters.com/article/brazil-securty/brazil-defense-minister-to-take-over-public-security-post-idUKL2N1QG0P8>.

> EU's member states are traditional allies, with whom we share historic ties, cultural affinities, [and] fundamental values such as pacifism and the promotion of democracy and human rights. Expanding cooperation with partner countries and the emphasis on regional cooperation as a deterrent factor are elements that bring together Europe's new Global Strategy and Brazil's new defence policy. South America and Europe are guarantors of global strategic stability in a world of permanent tensions and increasing uncertainties[260].

Indeed, "permanent tensions and increasing uncertainties," to borrow Jungmann's own words, have loomed large in both sides in recent years. On the European side, the agenda has been mostly dominated by concerns over Europe's immediately bordering regions—both South and East of the EU—, European countries' relations with the United States and the future of NATO under US president Donald Trump, and, finally, over the Union's internal cohesion itself following Brexit—the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union decided by a referendum in June 2016 and eventually materialised on 31 January 2020.[261]

In Brazil, former president Michel Temer (2016-2018) took office after Rousseff's suspension and ruled the country amid widespread corruption investigations, recessive economic figures, and an ever-increasing institutional crisis. Under Temer and his foreign ministers José Serra (2016-2017) and Aloysio Nunes (2017-2018), Brazilian foreign policymakers virtually abandoned both the North-South rhetoric and the reformist stance to multilateral institutions. Instead, the Temer administration invested renewed efforts in resuming negotiations over an EU-Mercosur Association Agreement as well as in Brazil's candidacy for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)—in both cases without success.[262] Moreover, the country relinquished its leading role in regional integration initiatives in South America such as Mercosur and UNASUR—ultimately suspending its membership in the latter in April 2018. After remaining stationary during Rousseff's presidency, the ambition for graduation that

[260] Raul Jungmann, "Cooperação entre Brasil e União Europeia em Matéria de Defesa: Palavras do Ministro de Estado da Defesa, Raul Jungmann, no almoço com os Embaixadores dos Estados Membros da União Europeia," news release, February 23, 2017, accessed March 11, 2018, http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2017/pronunciamento/fevereiro/brasil_e_uniao_europeia.pdf>. Jungmann issued his statement originally in Portuguese: "*Países membros da União Europeia são aliados tradicionais, com quem compartilhamos laços históricos, afinidades culturais [e] valores fundamentais, como o pacifismo e a promoção da democracia e dos direitos humanos. A ampliação da cooperação com países parceiros e a ênfase na cooperação regional como fator dissuasório são elementos que aproximam a nova Estratégia Global europeia e a nova política de defesa brasileira. A América do Sul e a Europa são fatores de estabilidade estratégica global, em um mundo de permanentes tensões e crescentes incertezas"*.

[261] BBC News, "Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU," February 17, 2020, accessed March 6, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887.

[262] The European Union and Mercosur eventually reached an agreement on a new trade framework on 28 June 2019. European Commission, "EU and Mercosur reach agreement on trade," news release, June 28, 2019, accessed March 7, 2020, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2039.

distinguished Brazil's foreign policy trajectory under Lula da Silva was finally discarded by former president Temer.

On 28 October 2018, retired military officer and far-right politician Jair Messias Bolsonaro was elected Brazil's 38th president in the run-off against Fernando Haddad, a former mayor of São Paulo and a protégé of ex-president Lula da Silva. Under president Bolsonaro and his foreign minister Ernesto Araújo, Brazil has undergone its most abrupt foreign policy shift in decades, pursuing a course of action essentially based on the automatic alignment to Washington (i.e. to the administration of US president Donald Trump) in regional and global affairs. Under Bolsonaro, Brazil voted for the first time with the United States and Israel against the annual United Nations resolution condemning the US embargo on Cuba and abandoned Brazil's "decade-long position" of supporting a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict—to give but two illustrations of such an unprecedented alignment policy.[263] As Guilherme Casarões and Daniel Flemes put it, "the bilateral relationship with Washington became the linchpin of Bolsonaro's global strategy."[264] The designation of Brazil as a Major non-NATO Ally (MNNA) of the United States in May 2019 and the unprecedented Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) agreement signed during Bolsonaro's visit to the US Southern Command in Florida in March 2020 are two milestones in such a radically new approach to mutual relations.[265]

The erosion of traditional principles of Brazil's international relations (e.g. universalism, non-interference, non-alignment, the peaceful resolution of international conflicts, and the support for universal human rights and environmental protection) has decisively affected the country's political dialogue with the European bloc since then. Despite the enthusiasm with which both sides celebrated the eventual signing of the EU-Mercosur trade liberalisation agreement in June 2019, prospects for cooperation between Brazil and the EU on bilateral and mul-

[263] Michelle Nichols, "Brazil for first time votes against U.N. call for end to U.S. embargo on Cuba," November 7, 2019, accessed March 9, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cuba-un/brazil-for-first-time-votes-against-u-n-call-for-end-to-u-s-embargo-on-cuba-idUSKBN1XH2DV; Guilherme Casarões and Daniel Flemes, "Brazil First, Climate Last: Bolsonaro's Foreign Policy," GIGA Fokus Lateinamerika 5 (Hamburg, 2019), https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-64011-4, 4.

[264] Casarões and Flemes, "Brazil First, Climate Last," 2.

[265] Graça Adjuto and Augusto Queiroz, "Brazil accepted as non-NATO ally by US," June 17, 2019, accessed March 9, 2020, https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/politica/noticia/2019-06/brazil-accepted-non-nato-ally-us; Igor Gielow, "Brazil and United States Sign Unprecedented Military Agreement," March 4, 2020, accessed March 9, 2020, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/world/2020/03/brazil-and-united-states-sign-unprecedented-military-agreement.shtml.

tilateral issues seem to be at an all-time low at the time of this writing. "Bolsonaro's presidency," as Saraiva points out, "has thrown a spanner in the works of the Brazil-EU partnership […] He has gone against principles historically espoused by Brazilian diplomacy such as a concern for the environment and a preference for multilateral solutions for global problems […] These are obstacles on murky ground. The strategic EU-Brazil partnership is deactivated." [266]

3.4 Conclusion

The present chapter has adopted a chronological framework to assess some of the key developments in EU-Brazil relations while outlining the diplomatic and domestic political contexts within which the "Forte de Copacabana" process has occurred. We began by briefly assessing the evolution of mutual relations from a moment in which Brazil still "lingered at the margins" of European interests to the "bloc-to-bloc formula" orienting the European approach to Latin America until the mid-2000s.[267] Our focus then moved to the domestic and international circumstances that shaped EU-Brazil relations at two moments of particular importance for our discussion in the ensuing chapter: the eight-year presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), from the centre-right Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), and the administrations of former presidents Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), both from the centre-left Workers' Party (PT).

When looking at these two moments, we broadened our discussion to encompass the overall framework of Brazil's foreign and security policy trajectories in the period, noting how the relationship with traditional partners from the global North, and the EU in particular, was underpinned by two contrasting international strategies. During most of Cardoso's presidency, as noted above, Brazilian foreign policymakers rejected the North-South rhetoric and embraced the rules and principles of the world order that ensued from the end of the Cold War. Notwithstanding the re-orientation witnessed during Cardoso's second term in office, the overall course of action adopted by the PSDB governments was based on the strategy of participation in and acceptance of the US-led international order. With regard to EU-Brazil relations, we have seen how the scope for cooperation in bilateral and multilateral affairs was limited throughout the entire Cardoso administration, due in large part to the series of challenges with which European

[266] Saraiva, "What next for EU-Brazil relations?".

[267] Ferreira-Pereira, "The European Union's partnership policy towards Brazil," 57; 61.

decision makers were confronted within the EU itself—hence the "more introspective approach" that would persist in the EU's partnership dynamics with the country until the following decade.[268] Also, inter-regionalism (or the "bloc-to-bloc formula") remained the EU's preferred course of action when dealing with Latin America at that point, which helps us understand why bilateral ties to Brazil came to a standstill while EU-Mercosur relations experienced significant achievements in the period (e.g. the 1995 EU-Mercosur Cooperation Framework Agreement).

The overview of Cardoso' presidency outlined above will also help us understand the role of the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) at the inception and later development of the "Forte de Copacabana" process. CEBRI, as pointed out in the previous chapter, was established by senior diplomats, businessmen, and intellectuals close to the Cardoso administration in 1998 in the city of Rio de Janeiro. In its early years, the think tank relied on its association with the federal government for much of its funding—a situation that would dramatically change after former president Lula da Silva defeated José Serra, Cardoso's health minister and the candidate running for the incumbent PSDB in the 2002 presidential elections. Without the support of the newly inaugurated administration, CEBRI would increasingly rely on corporate donors and on institutional partners such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation to carry out its projects—an issue that came up during the interviews with dialogue organisers which will be discussed in the following chapter. Consequently, from 2003 onwards the institute absorbed numerous high-level officials who had served the outgoing administration, including foreign ministers Luiz Felipe Lampreia and Celso Lafer. Cardoso himself, as we noted in Chapter 2, became the institute's honorary president—a position he continues to hold at the time of this writing. We leave it to the next chapter to explore this issue more carefully.

Under Workers' Party rule, in turn, Brazilian foreign policy reinstated the North-South rhetoric and made it one of the core components of its "straightforward ambition for graduation," i.e. "an ambition to move upwards in international hierarchy, but also a political willingness to change global governance rules."[269] That ambition, as pointed out above, was particularly evident during Lula's second term in office, from 2007 to 2010—the high point of Brazil's concerted action with other so-called emerging powers, most prominently as part of the BRICS. By partaking in coalitions with other rising actors on the world stage, the country was able to

[268] Ferreira-Pereira, "The European Union's partnership policy towards Brazil," 58.

[269] Milani, Pinheiro and Lima, Maria Regina Soares de, "Brazil's foreign policy and the 'graduation dilemma'," 586; 591.

amplify its assertive, status-seeking foreign policy in a joint effort to de-legitimise hierarchy structures ensuing from the post-war order. In so doing, it sought to gain leverage on its bid to reform multilateral institutions, assume veto positions, and thus transition from a rule-taker to a rule-maker in a seemingly inexorable shift towards multipolarity. And yet not only by intensifying relations with other Southern countries did Brazil attempt to achieve a graduated status: recognition by the established powers was a core component of the country's graduation strategy as well.

Among other means to achieve this, the declaratory upgraded status of a strategic partnership with the EU was regarded by former president Lula and his foreign policy advisors as a crucial step in that direction—adding to it the glowing prospects for increased trade, investment, and transfer of new technology. Viewed from Brussels, Brazil's growing aspirations, economic dynamism as well as political relevance in the region and beyond also encouraged EU decision makers to put flesh on the "bare bones of bilateral dialogue with no political dimension" and proceed with the agreement.[270] The new status, as Ferreira-Pereira argues, was therefore a result of the "symmetric evolution of the EU and Brazil as emergent political and security actors on the world stage […] in their process of (re)defining their international personae in a globalized multilateral world."[271]

Although both sides had the ambition to play a more prominent role on the global stage, mistrust of each other's goals and intentions in a world order in transition would prove to be a major obstacle to common understanding in matters of international peace and security. In fact, a key conclusion of our discussion in the present chapter is that the new level of relations represented by the status of "strategic partners" did not translate into a closer alignment in global geopolitical issues—quite the contrary. As Saraiva points out, "the global aspirations of the EU and Brazil were essentially different: while the European nations made every effort to maintain their traditional pre-eminence in multilateral organizations, Brazil wanted to boost its global presence and influence so as to challenge the positions defended by the USA."[272] Under different circumstances (both domestically and abroad), the ambition to play a prominent role on the global stage gradually waned throughout Rousseff's presidency and eventually disappeared under former president Temer—being replaced under Bolsonaro by a "nearly conspiratorial" foreign policy platform based on "a combination of anti-communism, anti-globalism, and of mere

[270] European Commission, *A stronger partnership between the European Union and Latin America*, 18.

[271] Ferreira-Pereira, "The European Union's partnership policy towards Brazil," 73.

[272] Saraiva, "The Brazil-European Union strategic partnership, from Lula to Dilma Rousseff," 6.

reproductions of [US president Donald] Trump's own strategies and interests."[273] While until recently the major obstacles to mutual understanding on global security affairs arose from Brazil's rising international profile as the B in the BRICS, the third decade of the 21st century foreshadows even more complex challenges in the mutual political dialogue, with the country "on the brink of becoming an illiberal democracy" in a fast-changing, crisis-ridden world order.[274]

[273] Casarões and Flemes, "Brazil First, Climate Last," 2. Representatives of five different former administrations jointly condemned Bolsonaro's foreign policy as "irrational," "a shame," "a disaster," "lunatic," and "blindly subservient" to US interests on a live-stream promoted by the Brazil Conference at Harvard & MIT on 27 April 2020. Patrícia C. Mello, "Ministros de 5 governos diferentes condenam política externa 'lunática' de Bolsonaro: 'Alinhamento subserviente' com Estados Unidos foi alvo de críticas durante debate online," *Folha de S. Paulo*, April 28, 2020, accessed April 30, 2020, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2020/04/ministros-de-5-governos-diferentes-condenam-politica-externa-brasileira-atual.shtml.

[274] Casarões and Flemes, "Brazil First, Climate Last," 9.

4 Geopolitical Dialogue Beyond Official Diplomacy: the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the "Forte de Copacabana" process in Brazil (2004 – 2018)

4.1 Introduction

Over the past two decades Brazilian and European bureaucrats and decision makers have found at the Forte de Copacabana International Security Conferences a sustained, unofficial space to exchange views on matters of peace and security beyond the confines of formal diplomatic processes. Defence and foreign affairs ministers, legislators, policy advisers, diplomats, and military officials, among several other actors, have attended the meeting since its first edition in 2004 accompanied by a large community of scholars and think tank-affiliated researchers from both sides of the Atlantic.[275] As pointed out in the Introduction, the annual security conferences and the series of complementary spaces for dialogue organised by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and its partners in Brazil provide us with rich and original empirical evidence to explore how global think tanks participate in the evolving geopolitical dialogue between the BRICS and the established powers. And yet neither think tank observers nor the scholarly literature on EU-Brazil relations has yet accounted for the emergence, development, and potential influence of such unofficial political spaces. Bridging this gap is the aim of the present chapter.

To do so, the following sections will offer an in-depth account of the inception and the evolution of the "Forte de Copacabana" process throughout fifteen years, from 2004 to 2018. Drawing on a wide range of primary sources and based on narrative interpretation, the present chapter will answer the following specific research questions: How do representatives of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and its partner organisations in Brazil justify the scope and the

[275] Both in common parlance and in the academic discourse, the notions of *transatlantic relations* or *both sides of the Atlantic* generally refer to the relationship between Europe—and, in particular, Britain—and the US. Oxford lexicographers offer, for instance, three definitions for the adjective *transatlantic* in Oxford University Press's free online English dictionary: while the first one relates to the connotation "crossing the Atlantic" (as in "a transatlantic flight" or "[s]ince very early age, Columbus was determined to make a transatlantic voyage"), the other two definitions illustrate how the above-mentioned connotation is prevalent in common parlance. "Concerning countries on both sides of the Atlantic, typically Britain and the US," is the second definition and "[r]elating to or situated on the other side of the Atlantic; American (from a British point of view); British or European (from an American point of view)" the third one. Oxford University Press, "Transatlantic," [Definition of transatlantic in English], accessed November 4, 2019, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/transatlantic. Even though we acknowledge the traditional, narrowly focused usage of these terms, in the present study we use *transatlantic* and *on both sides of the Atlantic* to refer to the relationship between Europe and the Americas as a whole, thus including Latin American countries in the geographical scope of such phrases.

purpose of the process? What are the stories they tell about the early years of the process and how do they describe and evaluate its development since then? How do organisers, observers, and participants of the conference and complementary mechanisms make sense of the achievements and potential influence of the Forte de Copacabana process on Brazil' relationship with the European Union and, more broadly, with the West?

By addressing these questions, the ensuing discussion will allow us to inquire into the reasons and rationales behind KAS' security-related work in Brazil—epitomised by, though not restricted to, the annual dialogue forum promoted by the foundation's foreign liaison office in Rio. Furthermore, it will allow us to propose some tentative conclusions regarding the influence of think tank-organised discursive spaces on the evolving dialogue between the EU and the West and Brazil, and thus to shed light on the overarching questions that stimulate our research: How does the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung participate in the evolving dialogue between Brazil and the established powers? How influential is KAS' work in the area of security policy in Brazil?

Before proceeding to examine these questions in the Conclusion, the present chapter is structured as follows: first, a methodological section (4.2) explores how and why we use narrative analysis to interpret our primary source material, detailing as well what these sources are, how we obtained them, and what limitations exist as concerns our method choice to both data collection and analysis. In the subsequent sections (4.3, 4.4, and 4.5), in turn, we move on to engage with our textual corpus and address each of the above-mentioned specific research questions, relying to that end on the insights of narrative interpretation.

4.2 Data collection and analysis

In order to make sense of the phenomenon under enquiry in this study, it was imperative that we gained access to a wealth of primary source material. Doing that implied, in practice, not only accessing, managing, and analysing different types of written, oral, and visual material publicised by the host organisations, but also interviewing key stakeholders and listening to the stories they had to tell about their work. Data obtained from primary sources stemming from the dialogue process itself as well as from the organisations promoting it every year permitted us, for instance, to reconstruct the sequence of events leading up to the establishment of "Forte" in the early 2000s. Likewise, based on the narratives we find in these sources, we were able to

account for the ensuing development of the dialogue forum in Brazil, its scope and stated purposes, as well as for the claims of influence (or lack thereof) made by dialogue organisers and participants alike. Dealing with these sources, in sum, allowed us to capture individual and organisational narratives from those responsible for establishing the dialogue forum in Rio de Janeiro over fifteen years ago as well as for conducting it since then. And yet more than simply transmitting stories about past events, these narratives are revealing in that they convey actors' manifold interests, ideas, and justifications, thus helping us make sense of the phenomenon under investigation. As discussed in the following section, some conceptual, epistemological, and methodological considerations concerning qualitative research and narrative interpretation are necessary so that we can elucidate what we mean by *narrative* and explain how the use of that notion relates to our discussion in the ensuing sections.

4.2.1 Defining and identifying narratives

Different conceptions of the term *narrative* exist in the literature, and multiple approaches to narrative analysis have coexisted in the research landscape of the social sciences and beyond. Defining what narratives are, where they manifest themselves, and how one can analyse or interpret them has, indeed, occupied generations of linguists, literary theorists, and semiologists. Scholarly attention to the study and interpretation of narratives has proliferated since the early 1960s, when the seminal work of Russian formalist Vladimir Propp, *Morphology of the Folktale*, originally published in 1928, was translated into French and English. Spreading beyond language and literary studies, narrative research was later incorporated into the humanities and the social sciences as well, where scholars from a wide array of disciplines have engaged with the concept, reframed it according to their research interests, and thus helped proliferate its use over the years. Consequently, with growing reception among sociologists, economists, and political scientists in the 1980s and 1990s, the final decades of the 20th century witnessed—among several other relevant developments in the field—what has been termed the "literary" or "narrative turn" in the humanities and social sciences.[276]

[276] See Barbara Czarniawska, "The Uses of Narrative in Social Science Research," in *Handbook of Data Analysis*, ed. Melissa Hardy and Alan Bryman (London: Sage, 2004), 649–50, for a detailed account of the origins, development and multiple subdivisions of narrative research throughout the past decades. For a thorough discussion of the various definitions of the term *narrative*, the commonalities and the main conceptual divides among narratologists see Marie-Laure Ryan, "Toward a definition of narrative," in *The Cambridge Companion to Narrative*, ed. David Herman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

According to Barbara Czarniawska, narratives might be broadly understood as "a spoken or written text giving an account of an event or series of events, chronologically connected."[277] Sheer chronology, however, does not suffice for a certain account of events to be a narrative. Narratives, following the author, also need characters and a plot, which contains chains of actions and events, oscillating states of affairs, explanations, and justifications. As such, narratives might be encountered in a wide array of human forms of expression, e.g. fable and myth, painting and cinema, presidential speeches or, in today's world, in a tweet. To Czarniawska, in sum, "[n]arratives mix together human with non-humans, causes with reasons, explanations with interpretations;" as the author concludes: "[t]his makes them difficult but also interesting to interpret."[278]

Based on William Labov's and Joshua Waletzky's seminal work on narrative structure,[279] and incorporating Seymour Chatman's distinction of *stories* and *discourses* in narrative construction,[280] Alexa Robertson provides a definition of the term according to which a narrative is "an account comprised of an *histoire* or story (or a 'what – the events and orientation referred to by Labov) and a *discours* or discourse (a 'how' – with a focus on the way a story is communicated, and not just its structure)."[281] Narratives, according to Robertson, are thus "a form of discourse in the sense that the way the story is communicated is influenced by social practices and generic conventions."[282] In the study of power and other social phenomena, the author points out, interpreting narratives "gives us a point of entry into the distribution of power in society, particularly in affording insights into phenomena that are constructed as 'natural'; it helps us see what is not always visible and to hear 'that which goes without saying.'"[283] Similarly, as Marie-Laure Ryan concludes after assessing different definitions of narrative encountered in the literature, "[m]ost narratologists agree that narrative consists of material signs, the

[277] Czarniawska, "The Uses of Narrative in Social Science Research," 652.

[278] Czarniawska, "The Uses of Narrative in Social Science Research," 657.

[279] William Labov and Joshua Waletzky, "Narrative Analysis: Oral Versions of Personal Experience," in *Essays on the Verbal and Visual Arts*, ed. J. Helm (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967).

[280] Seymour Chatman, *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film* (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1978).

[281] Alexa Robertson, "Narrative Analysis," in *Analyzing text and discourse: Eight approaches for the social sciences*, ed. Kristina Boréus and Göran Bergström (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, 2017), 127.

[282] Robertson, "Narrative Analysis," 127.

[283] Robertson, "Narrative Analysis," 143.

discourse, which convey a certain meaning (or content), the story, and fulfil a certain social function."[284]

Whereas the story contained in a narrative comprises the chain of events, the characters, and other components pertaining to the setting of these events (for instance, time and place), the discourse, to Robertson, refers to the evaluative function of a narrative, i.e. the sense made of the story, the meaning of the actions according to those who narrate them, and the way in which the content is communicated. Moreover, making sense of the discourse in a narrative implies "drilling down from the surface information or 'denotative content' of the text to examine its connotative content."[285] To the author, it is therefore crucial for narrative interpretation that both aspects are taken into account—the sequence of events narrated and the meaning, or evaluation, that those telling the stories make thereof. Table 6 reproduces a schematic view of the "ingredients of a narrative" according to Robertson.[286]

story (*histoire*)		
referential clause		
the 'what'		
	Abstract	▪ summary of events; ▪ announces that the narrator has a story to tell; ▪ makes a claim that the narrator has a right to tell the story.
	Orientation	▪ sets out time, situation, setting, participants.
	Complicating Action	▪ moves the story from equilibrium to disequilibrium.
	Resolution	▪ tells what finally happened.
	Coda	▪ returns to the present.

[284] Ryan, "Toward a definition of narrative," 24.

[285] Robertson, "Narrative Analysis," 136.

[286] Robertson, "Narrative Analysis," 126, Table 5.1.

discourse (*discours*)		
evaluative clause		
the 'how'		
	Evaluation	▪ the way in which the content is communicated; ▪ the meaning of the action is commented on; ▪ sense is made of the story.

Table 6: The ingredients of a narrative.
Source: Adapted from Robertson, "Narrative Analysis," 126, Table 5.1.

Before moving on to examine our textual corpus in detail, it is important to preface the ensuing discussion with a note of caution and clarification regarding narratologists' and discursive institutionalists' different, yet partially overlapping conceptualisations of the terms *narrative*, *story*, and *discourse*. With the proliferation of these terms within the humanities and the social sciences, conceptual definitions have increasingly varied, and succeeding generations of narratologists, discourse analysts, and researchers variously utilising those three notions within a myriad of disciplines have come up with either narrower or broader conceptual definitions to suit their respective analytical purposes. Acknowledging the plurality of different meanings attributed to these terms interests us here only to the extent that each conceptual framework built upon them entails a different standpoint on the appropriate research design, epistemology, and methodological procedures. Providing an account of how we define these concepts, understand their relationship, and utilise them in our study is, therefore, crucial to proceed with the analysis of our primary source material. An exhaustive account of the matter goes far beyond the scope of our investigation, though.[287]

Having said that, it is worth noting that, for DI, the key to unpacking the meanings of both *narrative* and *discourse* lies in another concept, namely *idea*. Schmidt clarifies the issue of conceptual definition in her work as follows:

[287] In addition to Ryan, "Toward a definition of narrative", see Göran Bergström, Linda Ekström, and Kristina Boréus, "Discourse Analysis," in *Analyzing text and discourse: Eight approaches for the social sciences*, ed. Kristina Boréus and Göran Bergström (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, 2017) for an overview of different meanings attributed to the notion of *discourse* by succeeding generations of scholars utilising the concept in the social sciences.

> Ideas are the substantive content of discourse […] Discourse is the interactive process of conveying ideas […] Discourse is a more versatile and overarching concept than ideas. By using the term discourse, we can simultaneously indicate the ideas represented in the discourse (which may come in a variety of forms as well as content) and the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed (which may be carried by different agents in different spheres) […] In the representation of ideas, any given discourse may serve to articulate not only different levels of ideas (policy, programmatic, and philosophical; see Hajer 2003) and different types of ideas (cognitive and normative) but also different *forms of ideas*—narratives, myths, frames, collective memories, stories, scripts, scenarios, images, and more.[288]

Therefore, whereas in Robertson's conceptualisation narratives include both stories and discourses, in DI's vocabulary discourses include both narratives and stories, in that the latter are understood as *forms* in which ideas are represented via discourse—defined by proponents of DI, as noted in Chapter 2, as the "interactive process of conveying ideas."[289]

With this in mind, it is important to distinguish two contiguous levels of discursive interaction—and, consequently, two levels of ideational exchange and narrative construction—dealt with in the ensuing discussion. At one level are the ideas communicated by different policy actors within think tank-created discursive spaces like the annual conference and its complementary mechanisms as well as through other means of discourse stemming from these spaces (e.g. process-related textual or textualised material like policy papers, edited volumes, conference reports, transcripts of speeches held at the event, etc.). At this level, the ideational exchange revolves mainly around the issues under consideration at each one of the meetings held by KAS and its partners in Brazil—foreign policy and geopolitical issues as diverse as disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, the consequences of increased cross-border migration and the climate emergency to global security, or the challenges and opportunities for Brazil and NATO to engage in cooperation, among several other topics.

At another level, in turn, are the ideas *about* such discursive spaces themselves as well as *about* the ideas produced, re-produced, and acted upon within them, which are communicated by dialogue organisers, participants, and observers. Unlike the previous one, such a *meta-level* of ideational exchange and narrative construction occurs not only within think tank-created discursive spaces and other means of discourse, but also within the boundaries created by our own research (e.g. via interviews conducted with dialogue organisers and participants, informal

[288] Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism," 303; 309 (emphasis added).

[289] Robertson, "Narrative Analysis"; Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism," 303.

conversations with the attendees during participant observation, etc.) and elsewhere.[290] As discussed below, this is one of the reasons why, in our effort to interpret narratives, we inevitably create a separate narrative ourselves: "the narrative of the researcher," as Robertson puts it.[291] Yet before we move on to address issues related to transparency, reliability, and credibility in narrative research, let us now turn to the primary source material in which both of these levels, however partially and fragmentarily, are registered and thus accessible to textual analysis and interpretation.

At the core of our textual corpus are documental sources such annual reports, informational leaflets, and promotional material of different forms published by the organisations driving the "Forte de Copacabana" process; so are various types of process-related material, such as event reports, policy paper collections, and edited volumes with scholarly and policy-oriented contributions addressing each year's conference programme. Event reports issued by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation provide an overview of the meetings, essentially describing when, where, and how the conference and complementary mechanisms proceeded as well as highlighting the participation of prominent officials. The book-length edited volumes published by KAS and CEBRI since 2004, on the other hand, are considerably thicker publications, intended to play a supplementary role, as pointed out by the organisers on the front flap of the 2015 conference publication: "[h]ighlighting some of the key issues raised during the conference itself, the organising parties annually publish what has by now become an International Security staple, thereby providing a supplementary forum for discussion and debate."[292]

Moreover, the introductory chapter of each one of edited volumes launched over the years, generally authored by the foundation's representative in Brazil, situates the conferences

[290] To give but one illustration of how the above-mentioned meta-level ideational exchange might occur within think tank-created discursive spaces themselves, suffice to say that the representatives of the host organisations have generally used their opening and closing remarks at the Forte de Copacabana Conferences to highlight the relevance of the forum, underscore the uniqueness of its format in Latin America, or communicate the interests, values, and worldviews of their respective organisations. As discussed below, such a meta-level exchange occurs with an even higher intensity in complementary venues such as the Mini-Fortes or the workshop with selected conferees held on the eve of the flagship event—both of which take place behind closed doors. The idea that discourse works at two levels is introduced and further developed by Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism," 316: "discourse as an interactive process is what enables agents to change institutions, because the deliberative nature of discourse allows them to conceive of and talk about institutions as objects at a distance, and to dissociate themselves from them even as they continue to use them. This is because discourse works at two levels: at the everyday level of generating and communicating about institutions, and at a meta-level, as a second-order critical communication among agents about what goes on in institutions, enabling them to deliberate and persuade as a prelude to action."

[291] Robertson, "Narrative Analysis," 140.

[292] Felix Dane, ed., *International Security: a European - South American Dialogue (2015): World Politics of Security* (Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2015); XII Forte de Copacabana Conference, Rio de Janeiro, 8 October 2015.

within their respective domestic, regional, interregional and global contexts; likewise, the introductory chapter states the goals the organisations promoting the event aim to achieve with the dialogue forum, and thus provide substantial input to our analysis.[293] A new format has been adopted since 2017, when conferees and participants alike received, for the first time, a policy paper collection addressing some of the central themes along which the conference was structured. As discussed below, these publications result from the Mini-Fortes and reflect the issues discussed as well as the policy recommendations devised during each one of the two preparatory meetings for the conferences.[294]

The agenda discussed at the meetings as well as the lists of speakers, panellists, and moderators in attendance at the multi-layered venues for dialogue promoted by KAS and its partners in Brazil provide us with a closer look into the actors and ideas circulating within and across these spaces. Appendices 1-3 compile that information chronologically, including not only conferees' name, affiliation, and position, but also the topics which they addressed at the meetings. Whereas in the case of the flagship event that information was easily accessible in the conference publications, which include the programme details since 2004, tracing the network of actors who have attended the biannual preparatory meetings and regional security symposiums in recent years implied recurring to a much more intricate and intuitive data collection process. Due to the confidential nature of these spaces, we were only partially successful in the attempt to document the programme details of the side events held in Rio and Brasília since 2015, which we did by scanning different types of material containing information made public by the host organisations on their website and social media. Therefore, the lists of names and contributions reproduced in the appendices derive exclusively from publicly available documents and do not disclose confidential information obtained from non-public sources.

In addition, data collection also involved selecting relevant interview partners, successfully obtaining access to them, and, once in the interview setting, productively conversing about the topics of interest to our research. We did so based on the premise that talking to representatives of the host organisations would allow us not only to reconstruct the development of the

[293] The leitmotif of each one of the volumes published so far directly relates to that year's conference theme, except for the conferences from 2004 to 2007, when the edited books bore the same title, "*International Security: a European-South American Dialogue*". The volumes from 2009 onward have the following titles: *South American and European Reflections on International Security* (2009), *Current Challenges for Disarmament and Peace Operations on the Political Agenda* (2010), *Security and Responsibility in a Multipolar World (2012), Brazil Emerging in the Global Security Order* (2013), *Multilateral Security Governance* (2014), *World Politics of Security* (2015), and *Might and Right in World Politics* (2016).

[294] Woischnik, *Gestão Internacional de Crises/International Crisis Management*.

"Forte de Copacabana" process through the narratives of those directly involved in it, but also to understand how key individuals behind Forte make sense of its scope and purpose. Therefore, we conducted qualitative, semi-structured interviews with four former directors of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation's liaison office in Brazil, with two former coordinators for international relations projects at KAS and one at CEBRI as well as with three senior consultants of the German foundation based in Berlin and Munich. In addition, we interviewed the former director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, a senior Brazilian IR scholar long based in Paris, who, as we will discuss below, was one of the architects of the Forte de Copacabana process.

Complementing the series of interviews with dialogue organisers, from May 2017 to October 2019 we scheduled, prepared, and successfully conducted nine face-to-face interviews with selected actors from the fields of politics, diplomacy, and the armed forces from Brazil, Germany, and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The list of interviewees within this group includes two senior diplomats from the Brazilian Representation to the European Union and the former Deputy Manager of the Americas Department at the EEAS in Brussels; two members of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) parliamentary group at the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) in Berlin and one of their research assistants; the former Head of the Delegation of the European Union to Brazil, based in the capital city Brasília; and, finally, two Brazilian army generals, including the former commandant of Brazil's Superior War College in Rio de Janeiro (see Appendix 4 for a list of all interviews conducted during our research).

All interviews were semi-structured and built upon an interview guide with a series of topics to be systematically covered during the conversation. Topics originated not only from our main research interests, but also from specific circumstances of each respondent's profile, activities, and degree of involvement with the dialogue process. In fact, most of our interviewees had attended the flagship event as keynote speakers, panellists, or moderators prior to the conversation. Only in two cases, which will be singled out below when we report on these interviews, the individuals had only had indirect contact with the process and spoke, on condition of anonymity, on behalf of an institution. Consequently, the questioning plan prepared for each interview session provided a general structure for the conversation, while offering both flexibility and space for the expression of interviewees' experiences with and impressions of the process. Despite such respondent-dependent variations, all questioning plans shared the

same basic structure: three overarching topics, each with three to five questions, covering background information and general issues first and then gradually moving on to cover more specific research interests (see Appendix 5 for sample interview guides).

In addition, visiting the offices of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and CEBRI in Rio de Janeiro and participating in two editions of the Forte de Copacabana International Security Conferences proved crucial to observe the main dialogue forum and its organisers more closely, gain access to internal documents and primary source material unavailable online as well as to acquire first-hand knowledge of the individuals, organisations, and dialogue mechanisms discussed below. Likewise, attending the flagship event in 2017 and 2018 allowed us to gain access to high-level conferees and, thereby, to schedule, or even to conduct on site, some of the interviews referred to above. Similarly, field research was also crucial to observe personal features, everyday practices, and other situational circumstances of the process, its organisers, and participants. Moreover, it allowed us to engage in numerous unrecorded conversations with members of the audience, which, though not explicitly reported in the chapter, add further nuance to the analysis that unfolds.

In sum, the primary source material collected during our research comprises different textual or textualised sources, including publications, interview transcripts, and field notes. The body of narratives that run through our primary source material includes written and oral accounts of multiple actors who, based on their individual understandings, meanings, and interpretations of reality, recollected their memories, expressed their judgements, and drew their conclusions with regard to the issues addressed by their account as they saw fit. Such multivoiced narratives stem from the two contiguous levels of discursive interaction referred to above and were communicated within different contexts: by the authoring of a preface in an edited volume published after the event; during a keynote address at the opening panel of the conference; in a face-to-face interview, a remote interview, or, finally, during interviews recorded by the organisations themselves for promotional purposes.[295] The intrinsic inter-subjective character of an interpretative account of these sources raises a series of questions concern-

[295] Illustrating this are, for instance, promotional videos of the Forte de Copacabana Conferences uploaded to the YouTube channels of the office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Brazil and CEBRI. The videos contain excerpts from interviews with representatives of the host organisations and with conferees expressing their views on the initiative, hence the reason for considering them as relevant primary sources. See Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Brazil Office, *XV International Security Conference "Forte de Copacabana"*, 2:58 (KAS Brasil, 2019), YouTube video, accessed June 26, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dy0z7eyBpqM and Brazilian Center for International Relations, *Conferência de Segurança Internacional do Forte de Copacabana - 2008*, 6:29 (CEBRI, 2017), YouTube video, accessed June 26, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ekDoASliCqY.

ing the limitations of our methodology as well as the steps we will take to ensure that the ensuing analysis is as transparent, reliable, and credible as possible. In the following subsection, we will conclude our methodological reflection by addressing these questions in detail.

4.2.2 Transparency, reliability, and credibility in narrative research

As pointed out above, any research endeavour based on narrative interpretation inevitably contains a separate narrative in itself: "the narrative of the researcher," as Robertson puts it.[296] To understand this, it is worth noting that the textual analysis process necessary to interpret the narratives that run through our primary sources was qualitative in nature. As Hans-Gerd Ridder rightly acknowledges, "[t]he emphasis in qualitative research is more on interpretation and understanding of actions and interactions of people in their natural environment than in artificial experiments or surveys aggregating and analysing numbers."[297] In this sense, qualitative approaches allow researchers to investigate complex real-life phenomena in depth, identify underlying mechanisms and perceptions of participants in different social processes, and account for the unique circumstances (or the context) in which such processes occur. One of the key strengths of qualitative research is thus to allow the researcher to capture the richness of complex situations and decipher, even if only tentatively, multi-faceted real-world situations—for instance via narrative analysis.

However, due to the intrinsic interpretative character of qualitative research, and of textual interpretation approaches like narrative analysis in particular, researchers who rely on qualitative methods often fall prey to lack of transparency, poor reliability, lack of credibility and few generalisable results. Even when collecting data—for example during a face-to-face interview—researchers approach their sources with certain theoretical assumptions and research questions in mind, with a given social background, a political orientation, his or her ethnicity and gender, among several other features. The same holds true for data analysis. In sum, as "no reading is free of interpretation," a critical reflection on how to proceed with qualitative (textual) research and a permanent strive for transparency and reliability are of utmost importance for research endeavours like the present one.[298]

[296] Robertson, "Narrative Analysis," 140.

[297] Ridder, *Case study research*, 78.

[298] Robertson, "Narrative Analysis," 141.

Therefore, a number of limitations must be noted both with our use of semi-structured interviews and with participant observation of the conferences. First, it is worth noting that the list of individuals successfully interviewed during our research constitutes a small part of a larger sample of potential interview partners whose testimony was deemed relevant for the purposes of this study. In most cases, attempts to interview Brazilian and European governmental actors, policymakers, and members of the armed forces eventually proved unsuccessful. Although it is hard to assess with certainty the exact reasons for this, potential respondents' lack of time for an interview was certainly a relevant factor. In some cases, what is more, potential respondents' lack of interest in a conversation on the topic might have played a role too, considering their indifference to our email correspondence and/or phone calls. Our success in obtaining access to political actors was also constrained by practical issues such as time, distance, and resources. Finally, our limited ability to transcribe and analyse in due course the interview material collected during field research led us to settle on a maximum number of twenty interviews altogether.

Despite that, most of the interview sessions that were successfully conducted allowed us enough time to engage in a deep conversation on a vast array of issues with high-ranking military officials, diplomats, and politicians—in itself an extremely valuable experience for the purposes of our research. Except in a few cases, most of our interviewees also gave their consent for us to record the audio of the entire interview and to quote them by name. However well-intended this might have been, there are at least two main risks entailed by that. First, knowing that the interview is being recorded might compromise respondents' willingness to make candid comments on particular issues. The conversation thus risks remaining on the surface without ever gaining any real depth. Second, the permission to record the interview and to quote respondents by name is often accompanied by an increased likelihood that the opportunity to engage in conversation will be used as a platform for self-laudatory comments and statements aimed at raising the profile of one's own organisation, career, and achievements.

Indeed, situations like these, in which interviewees engage in "protective behaviour" towards themselves, are but one illustration of how interviewing in qualitative research is essentially an "obstacle course" race, as Harry Hermanns points out.[299] Throughout the course of an interview, the interviewer has a special task of shaping the ongoing interaction in a fair, yet productive way, without falling prey to the numerous pitfalls and dilemmas involved in the

[299] Harry Hermanns, "Interviewing as an activity," in *A companion to qualitative research*, ed. Uwe Flick, Ernst v. Kardorff and Ines Steinke (London: Sage, 2004), 211.

"interpersonal drama" that unfolds during the exchange.[300] Aside from the interviewer's ability to ask clever questions, some further steps to ensure the relevance and the reliability of the information obtained in a face-to-face, qualitative interview include, for instance, providing a transparent briefing about the purpose of the conversation beforehand; thoroughly explaining the framework of the subject to be discussed; creating a productive atmosphere; and trying to understand the counterpart's life-world as good as possible.[301] Acquiring appropriate methodological training before proceeding with the interview sessions was therefore crucial to endure and to make the most productive use of each one of the "obstacle course" races that we will refer to in the ensuing sections.[302]

Likewise, manually transcribing the interview-generated audio recordings by ourselves, albeit time-consuming and physically demanding, allowed us to enhance the rigour and complexity of our data collection process by preserving, in the transcription, particular forms of expression used by our interviewees (e.g. emphasis on certain words, ellipses and omissions that might be understood from contextual clues, or rhetorical devices such as irony, sarcasm, and humour, verbally or non-verbally communicated). Managing the resulting textual material with the support of a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), in turn, permitted a better overview of the extensive primary source material collected during field research and facilitated the identification of key points and emerging themes in the data.[303] Analytical categorisation (e.g. coding) was used sparingly and with the sole purpose of facilitating the sampling of thematically related passages and the quick retrieval of interrelated interview segments, with no quantifying or statistical purposes (e.g. word count, word map, code frequencies, etc.). The use of a data analysis software has thus allowed us to organise our textual corpus in a systematic manner as well as to document both our data collection and analysis processes

[300] Hermanns, "Interviewing as an activity," 209.

[301] Hermanns, "Interviewing as an activity," 212.

[302] In this regard, two training opportunities in particular proved essential to the eventual success of our interviewing activities and are worth mentioning here: firstly, a two-day seminar on "Qualitative Interviews," offered by Dr. Alenka Jelen-Sanchez at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) Doctoral Programme in April 2017; and, secondly, the "Research Seminar in International Relations – Research Design and Qualitative Approach," offered by Prof. Dr. Cord Jakobeit and Dr. Jörg Meyer at the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences of the University of Hamburg during the summer term of 2017. Attending both of these activities at an early stage of my doctoral research allowed me to develop crucial skills to proceed with field research and data analysis in the subsequent years (e.g. designing an insightful questioning plan, using effective data generation techniques, using efficient data management tools, etc.).

[303] MAXQDA 2018 and MAXQDA 2020 were the CAQDAS used throughout our data analysis process. VERBI Software - Consult - Sozialforschung GmbH, *MAXQDA 2018* (Berlin: VERBI Software - Consult - Sozialforschung GmbH, 2017), maxqda.com; VERBI Software - Consult - Sozialforschung GmbH, *MAXQDA 2020* (Berlin: VERBI Software - Consult - Sozialforschung GmbH, 2019), maxqda.com.

by producing a transparent reservoir of the sources, and their relevant segments, on which our interpretation is based. Besides increasing the efficiency of data analysis, relying on a CAQDAS has therefore strengthened the rigour and transparency of our interpretation.[304]

Moreover, the strategy of triangulation allowed us to obtain a more comprehensive and valid picture of disputable issues or statements we encountered in the primary source material. That was particularly relevant for our case, as we were dealing with anecdotal accounts of and impressionistic insights into think tanks' pathways to influence. The strategy of triangulation, as we briefly pointed out in the Introduction, might be understood as the "observation of the research issue from (at least) two different points."[305] By triangulating information obtained from the interviews with dialogue organisers, for instance, with the testimony of participants and impressions collected during informal conversations with members of the audience, we were able to improve data validity and reduce possible biases. Likewise, think tank publications and promotional material describing the flagship event in Rio and assessing its achievements and contributions to EU-Brazil relations were triangulated with our own participant observation of the conferences.

According to Robertson, striving for transparency and reliability in narrative analysis implies a constant struggle by the researcher to ensure what Lieblich et al. refer to as "consensual validation" among his or her peers. That is, "the sharing of results and interpretations with the relevant research community" informed by thoughtful reflections on whether other researchers see the same patterns, make sense of the narratives differently, find the argument compelling, and are able to distinguish our own voice from the narrator's in the primary sources.[306] What is more, Lieblich et al. suggest four quality criteria in narrative research that should be taken into consideration, namely a) comprehensiveness of evidence, which requires that numerous quotations are provided and alternative explanations are considered; b) internal coherence to the analysis and coherence in terms of how the argument fits existing theories and

[304] For a detailed discussion of the strengths and limitations of the use of CAQDAS in qualitative social research and insights into alternative tools other than MAXQDA, see Alexander Bogner, Beate Littig and Wolfgang Menz, *Interviews mit Experten: Eine praxisorientierte Einführung*, Springer eBook Collection (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-19416-5, 83–86; Rudolf R. Sinkovics and Eva A. Alfoldi, "Facilitating the Interaction Between Theory and Data in Qualitative Research Using CAQDAS," in *Qualitative organizational research: Core methods and current challenges*, ed. Gillian Symon and Catherine Cassell, 1. publ (Los Angeles, Calif.: Sage, 2012); Marian Carcary, "Evidence Analysis Using CAQDAS: Insights From a Qualitative Researcher," *The Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods* 9, no. 1 (2011), accessed October 29, 2020, http://www.ejbrm.com/main.html.

[305] Flick, "Triangulation in Qualitative Research," 178.

[306] Robertson, "Narrative Analysis," 142.

previous research; c) insightfulness of the analysis, which must have original or innovative aspects; and, finally, d) parsimony in the use of concepts and jargon.[307] In this sense, to avoid the most common pitfalls in qualitative research and textual analysis, a transparent and reliable dialogue must, therefore, exist between the researcher, his sources, and the audience addressed.

In light of the critical considerations on narrative interpretation pointed out above, we will proceed with the analysis of our textual sources conscious of the importance of transparency and reliability. Therefore, to substantiate our argument, we will provide extensive quotations situating the narratives under analysis within their particular context. In the following section, we will start our empirical discussion by interpreting the narratives that account for the establishment and subsequent development of the conference project in Brazil. In the next section, in turn, we will move on to examine the reasons and the rationales behind the informal dialogue process according to its designers, promoters, and sponsors—representatives of KAS and CEBRI, foreign and security policy consultants assisting both organisations, and high-ranking officials from the EU Delegation to Brazil, which has supported "Forte" from the start. Finally, section 4.5 will examine how dialogue organisers, observers, and participants make sense of the achievements and potential influence of the "Forte de Copacabana" process on Brazil' relationship with the European Union and, more broadly, with the West.

4.3 Building the foundation: the early years of the "Forte de Copacabana" process

Although CEBRI and the office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Brazil have been at the forefront of the planning, organisation, and management of the event throughout all its editions, the early years of the Forte de Copacabana Conferences are inextricably linked with three senior Brazilian IR scholars: Clóvis Brigagão, Domício Proença Júnior, and Alfredo Valladão. Based at prestigious institutions in Brazil and abroad, all three played a key role at the inception of the conferences and helped shape the emergence of what we have referred to as the "Forte de Copacabana" process. The input given by them, and the catalyst role played by Wilhelm Hofmeister, director of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung liaison office in Brazil from 1999 to 2009, laid the basis upon which the dialogue mechanism would thrive in the following years. Together, as

[307] Robertson, "Narrative Analysis," 142. See A. Lieblich, R. Tuval-Mashiach and T. Zilber, *Narrative Research: Reading, Analysis and Interpretation* (London: Sage, 1998).

confirmed by the narratives constructed not only by Hofmeister and Valladão themselves, but also by multiple other interview partners, the former representative of KAS in Brazil and the three Brazilian IR scholars were the chief architects of the Forte de Copacabana Conferences.

4.3.1 "We should call it 'Forte de Copacabana'": partnering for dialogue

Clóvis Brigagão is a pioneer in the field of peace and security studies in Brazil. In the late 1970s, after completing his doctoral studies at the Political Science Department of the University of Chicago, Brigagão was a visiting scholar at the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) in Oslo, Norway. His participation in the annual conferences of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) date from that time as well; in the late 1980s, in turn, Brigagão would become IPRA's secretary-general.[308] From 1994 until his retirement in recent years, the scholar was the head of the Centre for American Studies (Centro de Estudos das Américas, CEAs) at Cândido Mendes University in Rio de Janeiro.[309]

Domício Proença Júnior, a research associate at Cândido Mendes University from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, is one of the leading Brazilian scholars in the field of strategic studies. In fact, Proença Júnior was one of the founders of the discipline in the country, as his entire academic career at the Alberto Luiz Coimbra Institute for Graduate Studies and Research in Engineering of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (Instituto Alberto Luiz Coimbra de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Engenharia, COPPE) has been dedicated to establishing a "Clausewitzian scientific research programme" as the foundation of strategic studies.[310] Moreover, Proença has been a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) for several years, which recognised him as one of the "new faces" in the field in 1987. The scholar was also awarded Brazil's Order of Defence Merit in 2002, a distinction that honours individuals who render relevant services to the Brazilian Armed Forces.[311]

[308] Jorge R. Beruff, J. P. Figueroa and J. E. Greene, eds., *Conflict, Peace and Development in the Caribbean*, Macmillan International Political Economy Series (London, s.l.: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991), xxi.

[309] Clóvis Brigagão, "Currículo Lattes: Clovis Eugenio Georges Brigagao," Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico, accessed April 16, 2019, http://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4780231H4.

[310] Domício Proença Júnior, "Currículo Lattes: Domicio Proenca Junior," Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico, accessed April 16, 2019, http://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4786601P7.

[311] Proença Júnior, "Currículo Lattes: Domicio Proenca Junior".

Whereas Clóvis Brigagão and Domício Proença Júnior have pursued their career paths at Brazilian institutions, Alfredo Valladão has been based in France for over thirty years. Lecturing since the early 1990s at the Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po PSIA), Valladão was the director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po from 1999 to 2010, within which he coordinated a Working Group on EU-Mercosur Negotiations. In Paris, Valladão established a permanent group of Brazilian and European experts, business executives, and decision makers involved in the negotiations over a bi-regional association agreement in the late 1990s. Under his direction, the Working Group on EU-Mercosur Negotiations held regular closed-door workshops in which participants discussed the various aspects concerning the negotiation process and published more than a dozen edited volumes with policy-oriented contributions to the topic.[312]

Wilhelm Hofmeister was a long-time director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Brazil, representing the German organisation in the country from 1999 to 2009. He started his activities as the head of KAS in Brazil based in São Paulo, where the foundation's headquarters had moved to in the early 1990s after decades in Rio de Janeiro. In 2001, the office was once again relocated to Rio, where it is still located to date. Even before moving to Rio de Janeiro, as the former director recollects it, Hofmeister decided that the foundation should work more closely with Brazil's armed sector in order to integrate it to the political dialogue programme that KAS had been conducting with different stakeholders in the country:

> [...] while I was still working in São Paulo, I started to work a little bit on the topic of security policy, because the interest was to ask what role the military actually played in the political process in Brazil [...] On the other hand, however, there was also the question that security policy issues were not really on the agenda in Brazil. Brazil began to open itself to the world in the time of [former Brazilian president] Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Brazil, like many large countries, was focused on itself [...] And that's why the topic—among other foreign policy issues—of security policy, [that's] where you could see that the Brazilians were not used to dealing with that at all.[313]

[312] Alfredo Valladão, interview by author, July 12, 2018, Video Conference Interview. Valladão is currently professor at Sciences Po PSIAS, senior research fellow at the Moroccan think tank OCP Policy Center and member of CEBRI's International Advisory Board. Since 2010 he is also the President of the Advisory Board of EUBrasil Association in Brussels, "dedicated to encouraging business and political decision-makers dialogue between Brazil and the Brussels institutions of the European Union." SciencesPo - Paris School of International Affairs, "Alfredo Valladao," accessed July 6, 2019, https://www.sciencespo.fr/psia/content/alfredo-valladao. Brazilian Center for International Relations, "Gestão e Conselhos," accessed July 6, 2019, http://www.cebri.org/portal/sobre-o-cebri/gestao-e-conselhos.

[313] Wilhelm Hofmeister, interview by author, April 9, 2019, Madrid. „[…] *noch in der Phase der Arbeit in São Paulo habe ich angefangen, das Thema Sicherheitspolitik so ein bisschen zu bearbeiten, weil das Interesse war zu fragen, wie ist eigentlich die Rolle der Militärs gegenüber dem politischen Prozess in Brasilien* […] *Auf*

Hofmeister's initial interest in dealing with civil-military relations and security policy in Brazil led him to contact Clóvis Brigagão and Domício Proença Júnior, who, as pointed out above, were prominent academics in the field by then. As early as 2001, the office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation would provide funding for a research project on Brazil's stance towards international security, coordinated by Brigagão, and promote a series of publications on the topic in the following years.[314] By cooperating with them, Hofmeister also sought to gain access to military officials in the country, with whom both Brigagão and Proença had good relations.[315] Shortly thereafter, the three would meet Alfredo Valladão, who at that time had just hosted a confidential meeting at Sciences Po—similar to the meetings on EU-Mercosur trade negotiations—in which Brazilian and French defence officials discussed military cooperation and international security issues of mutual interest. Following the bilateral event in Paris, Valladão shared a report on the meeting with Wilhelm Hofmeister and Clóvis Brigagão. The success of the event hosted by Valladão in Paris and the increasing cooperation between Brigagão, Proença, and Hofmeister in Rio would spark the process through which "Forte" came into being.[316]

A forerunner of what would later become the Forte de Copacabana Conference was convened in Rio de Janeiro shortly thereafter. Neither Hofmeister nor Valladão can recall the event in detail: according to Hofmeister, the confidential meeting occurred at the Cândido Mendes University in 2002 or 2003. Valladão, on the other hand, affirmed that the precursor of the annual conferences took place at the Itamaraty Palace, the historic headquarters of Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro. Both agree, nonetheless, that the event gathered approximately one hundred participants behind closed doors, including several high-ranking civil and military officials from Europe and Brazil. According to Wilhelm Hofmeister, what is more, among the conferees at the pilot event were General Klaus Naumann, former Chief of Staff of the German Federal Armed Forces (1991-1996) and Chairman of the NATO Military

der anderen Seite aber auch war durchaus die Frage, dass dann das Thema Sicherheitspolitik auf der Agenda in Brasilien im Grunde genommen gar nicht vorhanden war. Brasilien fing an, sich international zu öffnen, in der Zeit von Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Brasilien war, wie vielen großen Länder, war er auf sich selbst konzentriert […] *Und von daher war auch das Thema, neben anderen außenpolitischen Themen, war das Thema Sicherheitspolitik, wo man gesehen hat, die Brasilianer haben sich gar nicht damit befasst*." Hofmeister currently directs the KAS Spain and Portugal office in Madrid. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, "Kontakt: Auslandsbüro für Spanien und Portugal," Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, accessed July 5, 2019, https://www.kas.de/web/spanien/kontakt.

[314] Brigagão, "Currículo Lattes: Clovis Eugenio Georges Brigagao".

[315] Wilhelm Hofmeister, interview by author.

[316] Alfredo Valladão, interview by author.

Committee (1996-1999), as well as Karl-Heinz Kamp, then head of the Security Policy and Planning Department of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.[317]

Both Hofmeister and Valladão recall that, on the Brazilian side, on the other hand, it was still a rather difficult task to get access to and ensure the participation of civil and military officials from the defence and foreign affairs ministries. To Hofmeister, "that was still a time in which you couldn't talk to the military in such an uncomplicated way," as Brazil's defence ministry, he pointed out, had just been established in 1999 during Cardoso's second term in office.[318] Likewise, Valladão also noticed a high level of suspicion among Brazilian diplomats in that context:

> Brazilian diplomacy, more than the military, is much more suspicious of every discussion with the outside world on these issues... I call this the *matuto* mentality, saying "Hum, we're going to talk to the gringos and they're going to fool us." […] And [there is] also a certain lack of confidence in themselves, "We're going to discuss these issues with these guys and they're going to influence us."[319]

The beginning of KAS' institutional partnership with CEBRI dates back to those days as well. Inspired by long-established, influential foreign policy think tanks such as the Washington-based Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) or the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), the Brazilian institute was created in 1998 by senior diplomats, businessmen, and intellectuals close to the administration of former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Among its founding members were prominent representatives of Brazil's diplomatic and financial elites: among others, former foreign ministers Luiz Felipe Lampreia and Celso Lafer; ambassadors Gelson Fonseca Junior, João Clemente Baenna Soares, Sebastião do Rêgo Barros Netto and Luciano Martins de

[317] Wilhelm Hofmeister, interview by author; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Organisation: Who is who at NATO? General Klaus Naumann," accessed April 16, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cv/milcom/naumane.htm; Federal Academy for Security Policy, "Curriculum vitae: Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp. President," accessed April 16, 2019, https://www.baks.bund.de/sites/baks010/files/kamp-dr._karl-heinz_eng_0.pdf. Karl-Heinz Kamp would later be appointed as Security Policy Coordinator at KAS (2003-2007), Research Director at the NATO Defense College (2007-2013) and President of the Federal Academy for Security Policy (since 2015).

[318] Wilhelm Hofmeister, interview by author. „[…] *das war noch eine Zeit, wo man mit dem Militär gar nicht so unkompliziert sprechen konnte*."

[319] Alfredo Valladão, interview by author. "[...] *a diplomacia brasileira, mais do que os militares, é muito mais desconfiada de tudo que é discussão com o exterior sobre essas questões. Eu chamo isso de mentalidade de matuto, dizer 'Hum, a gente vai discutir com os gringos, eles vão passar a perna na gente* [...] *E também um pouco de falta de confiança em si, 'A gente vai discutir essas questões com esses caras e eles vão nos influenciar*.'" In Brazilian Portuguese, the word "*matuto*" refers to a rustic individual living in seclusion in the rural countryside, whose personality usually reveals lack of social skills, naivety, and distrust.

Almeida; and members of some of the most eminent banking and business families in the country, such as Walther Moreira Salles, Eliezer Batista da Silva, Maria do Carmo Nabuco de Almeida Braga and Daniel Miguel Klabin.[320]

As pointed out in previous chapters, whereas in its early years CEBRI had counted on a "strong support" from Cardoso's government, the organisation had to be remodelled once former president Lula da Silva took office and Cardoso's party PSDB entered the opposition.[321] According to Wilhelm Hofmeister, a first meeting with Luiz Felipe Lampreia, then Chairman of CEBRI's Board of Trustees, took place in early 2003, when both discussed their mutual interest in an institutional partnership to cooperate in international relations projects. At that time, CEBRI went through a difficult moment due to the lack of governmental support; partnering up with the German foundation—apart from their converging worldviews—was promptly welcomed not least for financial reasons. To KAS, in turn, the Brazilian organisation was not only a reservoir of prominent members of the country's foreign policy establishment, but also a nascent homegrown policy research institute with great potential in Brazil's still narrow think tank environment at the time. Consequently, it was therefore crucial to the foundation to bring CEBRI on board the incipient "Forte de Copacabana" project.[322]

After successfully organising the first confidential meeting with Brazilian and European officials, Hofmeister, Valladão, and Brigagão were determined to establish the dialogue forum as a permanent event.[323] The partnership with CEBRI, in addition, provided not only an important doorway to Brazil's foreign policy community, to which they had had a rather limited access until then, but also to prominent members of Brazil's private sector. In the meantime, the office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in the country gathered the support of the EU Delegation to Brazil, located in the capital city Brasília, for whom the project had an appealing interregional approach. The backing of the EU, what is more, not only amplified the impact of the initiative among European ambassadors in the country, but also secured "anchorage in European politics," as KAS consultant for Latin America Annette Schwarzbauer points out.[324]

[320] Brazilian Center for International Relations, "Institutional Profile" (Rio de Janeiro, 2017), http://midias.cebri.org/arquivo/Institucional_English_2017_.pdf, 12.

[321] Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, "Relatório de Atividades 2004/2005," 3.

[322] Wilhelm Hofmeister, interview by author.

[323] Hofmeister recalls that Domício Proença had a rather strict interest in military issues, which differed from the foundation's conception of the event; what is more, personal issues would arise, prompting him to abandon the initiative shortly thereafter.

[324] Annette Schwarzbauer, interview by author, September 6, 2018, Berlin.

Titled "International Security: Public Policy and Biregional Cooperation – European-South American Dialogue," the first edition of the Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference would eventually take place on 11-12 November 2004, after Clóvis Brigagão had gained the Army's approval to host the event at the Fort Copacabana army base. Alfredo Valladão recollected as follows how the idea to name the then inceptive dialogue forum "Forte de Copacabana Conference" came into being:

> After that [the pilot security conference], we had a meeting the three of us, Clovis, "Willy" [Wilhelm Hofmeister] and I. And I had this idea to say, "We should do something more permanent," and I had this idea to say, "We should call it 'Forte de Copacabana.'" That also came from my personal history, because I have an uncle who was captain at the Fort Leme and knew that issue well, and I also thought that the Fort Copacabana carried a very strong symbolic weight in security and defence issues and it would be a good idea, also to attract the Europeans, because of Copacabana. And so we did that.[325]

4.3.2 "It might be a very big challenge": the partnership at work

Working in partnership with local organisations is an intrinsic feature of KAS' international work, as emphasised by all members of staff and former representatives to Brazil interviewed during our research. Felix Dane, former director of KAS liaison office in Rio de Janeiro from 2012 to 2015, asserted that "[w]herever we are active, anywhere, not only in Brazil, but wherever we are we always do things in cooperation […] We always work in partnership with local organisations. It helps to understand better, to make the seminars more appropriate to what is needed, and it helps also the acceptance, the ownership of the people who go [to the events]."[326] That applies to the "Forte de Copacabana" project as well: KAS' collaboration with CEBRI, the CEAs at Cândido Mendes University, and with Valladão's Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po

[325] Alfredo Valladão, interview by author. "*A partir daí, tivemos uma discussão nós três, o Clóvis, o 'Willy' e eu. E eu tive essa ideia de dizer, 'Nós devíamos fazer uma coisa mais permanente,' e eu tive essa ideia de dizer, 'Deveríamos chamar isso de Forte de Copacabana.' Isso também veio da minha história pessoal, porque eu tenho um tio que foi capitão do Forte do Leme, conhecia bem esse negócio, e eu achei também que o Forte de Copacabana tinha também uma carga simbólica sobre questões de segurança e defesa muito forte, e seria uma boa ideia, inclusive também para atrair os europeus, porque Copacabana também é... Então se criou esse tipo de coisa*."

[326] Felix Dane, interview by author, August 22, 2017, Berlin. Dane currently directs the KAS U.K. and Ireland office in London. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, "Felix Dane: Leiter des Auslandsbüros Großbritannien," Mitarbeiter Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, accessed July 5, 2019, https://www.kas.de/mitarbeiter/detail/-/content/dane-felix.

would remain the organisational backbone of the dialogue forum through six consecutive editions. While the partnership with CEBRI, as noted above, persists to date, both the Chaire Mercosur and the CEAs withdrew their institutional support as co-hosts of the conference project in 2009; nonetheless, Alfredo Valladão and Clóvis Brigagão continued attending the event and participating in the programme as panellists or moderators in the years that followed.

Designing each year's conference programme, lining up key speakers, finding a venue for the event, taking care of the on-site planning, and selecting pre-registered participants are all tasks which have been performed, first and foremost, by KAS' foreign liaison office in Brazil. As stressed by different interviewees, however, that has always been done in consultation with the think tank network established between KAS, CEBRI, the CEAs, and the Chair Mercosur at Sciences Po. Recalling the early years of the conferences, Hofmeister affirmed, for instance, that "the programme was always essentially defined by KAS, then it was agreed upon with Valladão. Clóvis [Brigagão] would also give his contribution. Then CEBRI would increasingly participate in the programme discussion."[327] To Peter Fischer-Bollin, who followed Hofmeister as head of the foundation's office in Brazil from 2009 to 2010, managing the division of labour was "the most important and most difficult part of our work," for "[i]f you have enough money to organise conferences, it's relatively easy, to pay the hotel and flight tickets […] To design a nice programme, it's relatively easy, but to stay in contact and to stay in communication with all these different actors and bring them together in one conference for many years […] it might be a very big challenge."[328] Felix Dane, in turn, affirmed that he experienced "a very fruitful division of labour" when he was in charge of the office in Rio from 2012 to 2015. According to Dane, the preparation for each year's Forte de Copacabana Conference is, in fact, a "lengthy process," which takes an entire year to plan and to execute.[329]

Supporting the head of office, the role of the Coordinator for International Relations Projects at KAS liaison office in Rio is also crucial to understand that process. Jan Woischnik, KAS representative to Brazil from 2015 to 2019, provided an overview of how the programme design process has unfolded in recent years in an interview conducted with him and with Diogo

[327] Wilhelm Hofmeister, interview by author. "*Das Programm war immer im wesentlichen KAS-definiert, dann mit Valladão abgesprochen, Clovis hat auch seinen Senf dazu gegeben. Das CEBRI hat dann auch zunehmend an der Programmdiskussion teilgenommen*."

[328] Peter Fischer-Bollin, interview by author, August 21, 2017, Berlin. Dr. Peter Fischer-Bollin is currently Deputy Department Head at the foundation's Department European and International Cooperation in Berlin. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, "Dr. Peter Fischer-Bollin: Stellv. Leiter Hauptabteilung Europäische und Internationale Zusammenarbeit," Mitarbeiter Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, accessed July 5, 2019, https://www.kas.de/mitarbeiter/detail/-/content/peter-fischer-bollin.

[329] Felix Dane, interview by author.

Winnikes, the Coordinator for International Relations Projects who assisted Woischnik in developing the Forte de Copacabana project throughout the period:

> The truth is, we have a rhythm […] The Coordinator for International Relations Projects drafts a concept note, *ein Konzept*, a proposal for the next Forte [de Copacabana Conference] […] And then we always invite to this table—that's why I referred to a routine—CEBRI, CEBRI's presidency, the European Union, the EU representative, and his team. Here we discuss the foundation's proposal, which we wrote. And it's usually accepted. [There are] few criticisms, few complementary ideas, but normally the concept materialises. After the meeting in February we decide, "Let's do this," and then I would say that CEBRI and the European Union help us a lot in identifying speakers, attendees, authors for the policy papers.[330]

Consequently, the main conference theme reflects what the programme designers at the office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Rio feel is "in the air," as former director Woischnik puts it.[331] The insight into what themes the conferees will discuss each year comes either from the office director himself, or from academics and policy advisors close to the foundation. These include, for instance, scholars like Valladão and Brigagão in the early years, or security policy consultants in Germany, such as former security policy coordinator Karl-Heinz Kamp and Carlo Masala, professor at the Bundeswehr University Munich and security policy consultant at KAS.[332] Table 7 shows a list of themes covered by all fifteen editions of the conference held since 2004. (For a detailed list of all keynote speeches, panels, and workshops of the Forte de Copacabana Conferences, see Appendix 1).

[330] Jan Woischnik and Diogo Winnikes, interview by author, October 3, 2017, Rio de Janeiro. "*A verdade é que, assim, temos um ritmo* [...] *O Coordenador para Relações Internacionais prepara um conceito, Konzept, uma proposta para o próximo Forte* [...] *E depois, sempre, por isso eu falo de uma rotina* [...] *convidamos a essa mesa aqui CEBRI, a presidência do CEBRI e a União Europeia, o embaixador europeu e a sua equipe. Aqui, discutimos a proposta da Fundação, escrita por nós. E normalmente é aceita. Pequenas críticas, pequenas ideias complementares, mas normalmente esse conceito se realiza. Depois da reunião de fevereiro é decidido, 'Vamos fazer isso,' e depois eu diria que o CEBRI e a União Europeia ajudam muito na identificação de palestrantes, de visitantes, autores para policy papers*."

[331] Jan Woischnik and Diogo Winnikes, interview by author.

[332] Prof. Dr. Carlo Masala has worked for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation for 25 years. Meanwhile, from 2006 to 2007 Masala was deputy director of the research division of the NATO Defense College (NDC) in Rom, Italy, where he had previously worked as research advisor (2004-2006). In 2007 he was appointed to the professorship in International Politics at the Bundeswehr University Munich; the same year, Karl-Heinz Kamp, by then Security Policy Coordinator at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, followed him as head of NDC's research division. Carlo Masala, interview by author, July 18, 2018, Video Conference Interview. See also Universität der Bundeswehr München, "Prof. Dr. Carlo Masala. Professur für Internationale Politik," accessed April 22, 2019, https://www.unibw.de/politikwissenschaft/professuren/lehrstuhl-ip/masala/prof-dr-carlo-masala.

Year	*Conference theme*
2004	International Security: Public Policy and Biregional Cooperation – European-South American Dialogue
2005	International Security: European-South American Dialogue
2006	Renewed Missions for the Armed Forces: a European-South American Dialogue
2007	International Security: a European-South American Dialogue
2008	After the Presidential Elections in the USA: the future of hemispheric and international security
2009	Cooperation Europe-South America in International Security Affairs
2010	Current Challenges for Disarmament and Peace Operations on the Political Agenda
2011	New Issues on the International Security Agenda
2012	Security and Responsibility in a Multipolar World
2013	Brazil Emerging in the Global Security Order
2014	Multilateral Security Governance
2015	World Politics of Security
2016	Might and Right in World Politics
2017	Security Architecture: An Exchange between South America and Europe
2018	International Crisis Management

Table 7: Conference theme – Forte de Copacabana International Security Conferences (2004-2018). Source: Author's elaboration.

Former office director Woischnik elaborated on the issue of selecting the main conference theme during our interview in October 2017. As reproduced at length below, the then representative of the foundation in Rio de Janeiro used the preparation processes for the 2016, 2017, and 2018 editions of Forte as an illustration to explain how particular foreign and geopolitical issues are selected as the main conference theme and where the ideas on how to frame these issues in the conference agenda come from:

> I would say that it's somehow like this, I suggest the title, the main theme, which in 2016 was "Might and Right in World Politics." That was simply my idea. And then the Coordinator [for International Relations Projects] elaborates the concept. Last year I think it was an idea from Carlo Masala, a professor closely associated with us. He said, "Security Architecture!," he said, "That would be great!" I liked it, Diogo [Winnikes] elaborated the entire concept, with panels on drug trafficking. And next year I want to do "climate change and security." How climate change puts security in the world at risk, like migration flows and everything. I want that and I hope that Diogo [Winnikes], in the next twelve or thirteen weeks, will elaborate this concept with his ideas. Because it's important that we have topics that convince, that are in the air. "Might and Right in World Politics," that was in the air, *es lag in der Luft*, after the Russian action in Crimea, the return of might, of power, of violence, instead of the United Nations, discussions, rule of law.[333]

Whilst the selection of each year's conference theme and decisions related to framing are primarily made by KAS and its consultants, the key contribution provided by CEBRI and the representation of the EU in the country relates to networking: as stated by Woischnik and confirmed by different staff members, what the programme designers at KAS liaison office in Rio mostly benefit from by cooperating with these actors is their privileged access to influential individuals from the Brazilian and European foreign policy communities, respectively. Indeed, the preparation process for the annual conferences would remain essentially unchanged from the early editions until 2016, involving regular consultations among the host organisations and the flow and rhythm of activities described by Woischnik in the statement reproduced above. Since 2010, when the Chaire Mercosur—dissolved that year by Alfredo Valladão—and the CEAs discontinued their involvement as co-hosts, the global think tank has led the organisation of the conferences together with CEBRI, relying on the continued support from the EU Delegation to engage high-ranking European actors in the process as well. In this regard, ambassador João Gomes Cravinho, former head of the EU Delegation in Brasília, commented as follows on the long-standing collaboration with the dialogue organisers in an interview conducted in September 2018 on the sidelines of the 15th edition of the conference:

[333] Jan Woischnik and Diogo Winnikes, interview by author. Woischnik responded part of our questions, including the above-mentioned comments, in Portuguese: "*Eu diria que também é um pouco assim, que eu nomeio o título, o tema principal, que foi* '*Might and Right in World Politics*,' *em 2016. Isso foi simplesmente uma ideia minha e, depois, o coordenador elaborou o conceito. Ano passado, acho, foi uma ideia do Carlo Masala, um professor muito vinculado a nós, que ele disse,* '*Security Architecture*'*, ele disse,* '*Seria ótimo*'*, eu gostei, o Diogo elaborou todo o conceito com os painéis, com tráfico de drogas. E para o ano que vem eu quero fazer 'climate change and security.' Como o câmbio climático põe em risco a segurança no mundo, como os fluxos migratórios e tudo. Eu quero isso e espero que o Diogo, nas próximas doze ou trezes semanas, vá elaborar com as suas ideias esse conceito. Porque é importante ter assim temas que convencem que estão no ar.* Might and Right in World Politics *isso foi no ar, es lag in der Luft, depois da ação russa na Crimeia, a volta do 'might,' do poder, da violência e já não nações unidas, discussão, lei."*

> The world is more disordered, and we feel that there is a greater need to work, to think about what we can do together. So that's where we are. I think it's an important work that we do with the Konrad Adenauer [Foundation], I think it's an essential work, it's a work that corresponds to our European interests and also to Brazilian interests, and that also fills a void that, I think, would otherwise be felt.[334]

As shown in Appendix 1, EU representatives like ambassador Cravinho and his predecessors in the country have been traditionally invited by the organisers to join the opening and closing panels of the conference and issue a statement on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In addition, the special representatives in Brazil have often been accompanied, among other speakers, by high-level diplomats and policy advisors from the EEAS. Among these are, for instance, German ambassador Roland Schäfer, former Director for the Americas at the EEAS and a keynote speaker at the 2013 and 2014 editions of the event. Ambassador Schäfer joined us for an interview in Brussels in August 2017 and shared his perspective on the dialogue forum in Brazil as well as on the collaboration with both KAS and CEBRI to promote the event. While emphasising that he did not consider himself to be "entirely qualified to judge the whole history of the [Forte de] Copacabana Conference," the EU diplomat acknowledged that the security conference in Brazil "has always, very early on, taken a very close relationship to the European Union delegation:"

> Especially when I was there in 2013 and 2014 it was the case, the European Union speaker was a very important speaker and was co-organising the situation, so it is a very close relationship and I certainly welcome this. Both from Germany's interest… it's in the German interest to be seen as a European country, but also from the European side to be involved in such a prestigious and well-organised debate.[335]

In 2016 the dialogue organisers introduced a major innovation to the lengthy process of designing each year's conference programme: the so-called "Mini-Fortes." Preceding the main

[334] João Gomes Cravinho, interview by author, September 21, 2018, Rio de Janeiro. "*O mundo está mais desordenado e sentimos a maior necessidade de trabalho, de pensamento, sobre o que podemos fazer juntos. Então é aí que estamos, acho que é um trabalho importante que fazemos com a Konrad Adenauer, acho que é um trabalho imprescindível, é um trabalho que corresponde aos nossos interesses europeus e também brasileiros, e que preenche também um vazio, que de outra forma acho que se faria sentir*." Since October 2018, Cravinho is Portugal's Minister of National Defence.

[335] Roland Schäfer, interview by author, 1st August 2017, Brussels. Roland Schäfer is currently the German ambassador in Kathmandu, Nepal. Before joining the EEAS in February 2013, Schäfer occupied several different positions as part of the German Foreign Office in Tel Aviv, Buenos Aires, Berlin, Mumbai, Algiers and New York. See Deutsche Botschaft Kathmandu, "Botschafter Roland Schäfer," accessed September 29, 2019, https://kathmandu.diplo.de/np-de/botschaft/-/1618022; European Parliament, "Biographical Note: Roland Schäfer," accessed September 29, 2019, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/d-us/dv/cvrolandschaefer_/cvrolandschaefer_en.pdf.

event, generally held between late September and early November, KAS, CEBRI, and the EU Delegation in Brazil have convened two preparatory meetings for the conferences in recent years. At the Mini-Fortes, the programme of the upcoming Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference is subject to deliberation not only among the organisers themselves, but also among researchers and practitioners from relevant Brazilian institutions. In one of the policy papers issued for the 2018 edition of the conference, the host organisations explain as follows the purpose of such preparatory meetings as well as of the policy-oriented publications resulting thereof:

> Known as Mini-Fortes, these events precede the International Security Conference, which will take place for the fifteenth consecutive year in September. Each of these events resulted in the development of a policy-oriented document reporting the discussions and, mainly, presenting the recommendations that accrued from the debate, while securing the rules of Chatham House. At the same time, the two meetings serve to maintain the dialogue and high-level exchanges on the topics covered at the annual conference throughout the year.[336]

Ambassador João Cravinho stressed during our conversation how the new format with two preparatory meetings for the open conferences has increased, in his view, the relevance of the "Forte de Copacabana" process as "one of the few, very few, rare spaces for a common reflection on international governance, peace, and security issues" between European and Brazilian authorities:

> I believe in these last three or four years we have been able to make a very significant upgrade. Today, we use to say that the Forte de Copacabana Conference is the biggest conference, but it's not only the biggest, it's the best, the most important one. And my expectation is that there will be some snowball effect here and that the importance, the significance of the conferences will continue. KAS, of course, has been a key partner with us and with CEBRI. From the very beginning we have had this tripod on which [the conference project] is based. And, contrary to what happened before, when the Forte de Copacabana [Conference] was an annual thing, we now have discussions throughout the year. We have two other mini-conferences, and before the mini-conferences we have meetings, conversations, debates, discussions. And so, there is a density in the relationship with KAS and CEBRI that there was

[336] Woischnik, *Gestão Internacional de Crises/International Crisis Management*, 9.

> not in the past and that, I think, contributed to the significance, the improvement of the quality of these conferences.[337]

Together with the Mini-Fortes, the "European-South American Regional Security Symposium" is another illustration of such complementary platforms for discussion occurring throughout the year referred to by ambassador Cravinho. Convened in Brasília since 2015, the meetings result from a cooperative endeavour between the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the EU Delegation to Brazil, the Embassy of Belgium in Brasília, Brazil's Central Military Command, the Brazilian Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs as well as their in-house think tanks—Instituto Pandiá Calógeras (IPC) and Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais (IPRI). CEBRI and the Embassy of France in Brazil joined the organisation in 2017 and 2018 as well, and the Belgian think tank Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations has been an additional partner supporting the event since 2016. Compared to the Forte de Copacabana Conferences and the Mini-Fortes, the event has a rather narrower focus on regional defence and security institutions. According to the organisers, the purpose of the regional security symposium is "to provide a permanent space for dialogue between Europe and South America on defence and security issues, with an emphasis on possibilities and prospects for cooperation between the two regions."[338] Table 8 shows the list of topics discussed at all preliminary meetings for the conferences from 2016 to 2018. (For a list of participants in the Mini-Fortes from 2016 to 2018, see Appendix 2. Appendix 3 provides a list of speakers, panellists, and moderators at the European-South American Regional Security Symposiums from 2015 to 2018).

[337] João Gomes Cravinho, interview by author. "*Eu creio que nestes últimos três quatro anos conseguimos fazer um upgrade muito significativo, e hoje nós dizemos, costumamos dizer, que a Conferência do Forte de Copacabana é a maior conferência. Mas não só a maior, é a melhor, a mais importante. E minha expectativa é que de haja aqui algum efeito bola de neve e que esta importância, esse significado das conferências continue. A KAS, obviamente, um parceiro fundamental, conosco e com o CEBRI, desde o princípio que temos esse tripé, sobre o qual assenta. E, ao contrário daquilo que acontecia antes, que o Forte de Copacabana era uma coisa anual, nós hoje em dia temos discussões ao longo do ano. Temos duas outras miniconferências, e antes das miniconferências temos reuniões, conversas, debates, discussões. E, então, há aqui uma densidade no relacionamento com a KAS e com o CEBRI que não havia no passado e que eu acho que contribuiu para o significado, a melhoria da qualidade dessas conferências*."

[338] "Relatório do 3º Simpósio sobre Segurança Regional Europa-América do Sul" (Ministério da Defesa do Brasil/Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos de Defesa Pandiá Calógeras, Brasília, 2017), https://pandia.defesa.gov.br/pt/acervo-digital/11-entorno-estrategico/838-relat%C3%B3rio-do-3%C2%BA-simp%C3%B3sio-sobre-seguran%C3%A7a-regional-europa-am%C3%A9rica-do-sul, 5. "*O propósito do Simpósio é constituir um espaço permanente de diálogo entre Europa e América do Sul em matéria de defesa e da segurança, com ênfase em possibilidades e perspectivas de cooperação entre as duas regiões*."

Month/Year	*Meeting theme*
May 2016	--*
August 2016	Brazilian and European Defense Strategies, Restoring Peace to Nations in Conflict: views from Europe and South America
April 2017	Drug trafficking
June 2017	Cyber threats
April 2018	Cybersecurity and National Interest during Campaign Period
July 2018	International Crisis Management

Table 8: Meeting theme – Biannual preparatory meetings for the Forte de Copacabana International Security Conferences (2016-2018).
Source: Author's elaboration.

*Although the first preparatory meeting for the 2016 edition of the conference did not have an overarching theme, participants assessed the Forte de Copacabana project itself and discussed the future format of the event. According to the event report issued by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, at the first Mini-Forte the organisers presented "[t]he dynamics of the organisation of the conference, its results, the title of all past conferences, and the topics dealt with over the past 13 years." Moreover, as in the following preparatory meetings, the programme envisioned for that year's conference was subject to discussion among the organisers and invited guests.

Asymmetries among the organisers exist not only as far as the division of labour is concerned, though. In fact, the necessary funding for the Forte de Copacabana Conferences is shared in a "totally unequal way," as former KAS representative Dane puts it.[339] Until 2009 the French Ministry of the Armed Forces provided some additional funding as well, channelled through the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po; as Hofmeister and Valladão acknowledge, however, the French contribution was considerably smaller than the amount invested by the German foundation.[340] Moreover, the EU Delegation has mostly covered travel and accommodation expenses of guest speakers from EU institutions, while different organisations have made smaller contributions in certain editions of the conference. In 2008, for instance, the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS, since 2014 Airbus Group) co-sponsored the event together with the EU, while the Canadian and British embassies in Brasília appear on the list of

[339] Felix Dane, interview by author.

[340] Wilhelm Hofmeister, interview by author; Alfredo Valladão, interview by author.

supporters in the 2010 edition. Finally, DefesaNet, a Brazilian news agency especially dedicated to covering military issues, provided editorial support to the organisers in 2008 and 2010. Nevertheless, when questioned about the division of costs, different interviewees confirmed that the Konrad Adenauer Foundation has generally covered more than 90% of the necessary funding for the conferences.[341]

Commenting on the issue of funding for the event until 2009, Valladão stressed the autonomy that the organisers enjoyed when designing the programme, inviting the conferees, and developing the conference-related publications. According to the Brazilian IR scholar and think tanker, "funding [for the conferences] came from the Konrad Adenauer [Foundation] and the Chaire Mercosur through a contract with the French Ministry of Defence. We had full autonomy; they wouldn't interfere. It has always been like this, and our publications have always been totally independent. I also believe that 'Willy' [Wilhelm Hofmeister] made publications that were totally independent from CDU's party line and from the German government."[342] Yet Valladão also recalls an additional source of funding considered by the organisers in the beginning of the conferences: the arms industry. It is worth reproducing his words on this issue in full:

> Now, of course, to build something of this kind [the conference], we needed money, so in the beginning we also tried to bring in the defence industry. That was essential. [It was] too complicated to bring in the defence industry! First, because the Brazilians…in Latin America, in South America there's little defence industry, isn't there? And the industry always has this kind of problem, it never wants to partake in anything. Brazilian businessmen, in general, they think that it is the state who should take care of this, not them. Some [arms

[341] The unequal cost division was confirmed by all interviewees at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Whereas Felix Dane affirms that "We share the costs in a totally unequal way because we bear a major part of that conference. I don't know what the split-up is now for this year, but usually it was 80% for KAS or maybe even 90%," former representative Jan Woischnik (2015-2019) and Diogo Winnikes, former Coordinator for International Relations Projects at the office in Rio de Janeiro, claim that the foundation covers 95-98% of the costs involved in the conference. Felix Dane, interview by author; Jan Woischnik and Diogo Winnikes, interview by author, September 24, 2018, Rio de Janeiro.

[342] Alfredo Valladão, interview by author. "*O financiamento era a [Fundação] Konrad Adenauer e a Cátedra Mercosul através de um contrato com o Ministério da Defesa francês. Tinha total autonomia, não apitavam... Sempre foi assim, inclusive nossas publicações sempre foram totalmente independentes. Eu acho também que o 'Willy' fazia publicações totalmente independentes da linha política da CDU e do governo alemão*."

> industry executives] came from Europe, only a few… Those who had the interest in selling arms, equipment, this kind of things. They were there, at least that. So, that is what happened.[343]

According to Wilhelm Hofmeister, French arms industry executives were among those who had the interest in lobbying participants on the sidelines of the conferences to promote arms sales. During our conversation, the head of the German foundation's liaison office in Rio de Janeiro until 2009 referred to what he regarded as "vested interests" when narrating how the French defence ministry allegedly attempted to seize the opportunity provided by the conferences to gain access to Brazil's defence policy establishment and promote its arms industry.[344] The main reason for this, Hofmeister believes, were Brazil's military build-up project and increased procurement spending during the 2000s. As discussed in the previous chapter, a massive investment plan to increase the country's naval defence capabilities was launched in 2008, the stated purpose being the acquisition of the necessary means to protect Brazil's on- and offshore resources in the so-called Blue Amazon, i.e. the South Atlantic Ocean. Established within the framework of a cooperation agreement with France, the Submarine Development Program, which envisioned the construction of one nuclear-powered and four diesel-electric attack submarines, was a core component of that plan. Nonetheless, neither Hofmeister nor Valladão constructed a causal narrative between the signing of the cooperation agreement with France and the latter's attempts to "open doors" to its arms industry in Brazil during the conferences, in Hofmeister's words. It is worth quoting the former representative of KAS liaison office in Rio de Janeiro at length on this particular matter:

> The French contribution ... they made a certain financial contribution, which was smaller than what we did, but it didn't matter to me, the initiative as such was important. The French contribution came from the French Ministry of Defence. And I believe, of course I cannot... the French Ministry of Defence had not only academic interests [in providing funding for the conferences], but also… they are… as far as the defence industry is concerned… the Germans are also interested in the arms industry, that's quite clear, but not in Brazil. And the French did have, and still have, some interest in the arms industry [in Brazil]. They were selling that strange aircraft carrier [inaudible] and then there was the question of this nuclear-powered submarine and other things to defend the oil wells and everything. Nonsense. And there, I believe

[343] Alfredo Valladão, interview by author. "*Agora, é claro que para montar um troço desse tipo, tinha que ter dinheiro, então a gente tentou também no início trazer as indústrias de defesa. Isso era fundamental. Muito complicado trazer as indústrias de defesa! Primeiro porque os brasileiros... na América Latina tem...na América do Sul tem pouca indústria de defesa, não é? E indústria sempre teve esse tipo de problema de não querer participar de nada... Os empresários brasileiros, no geral, eles acham que é o Estado quem tem que se ocupar disso, não eles. Alguns vieram da Europa, poucos, era quem tinha interesse mesmo...vender armamento, vender equipamento, esse tipo de coisa, que estavam aí, pelo menos isso. Então é isso que aconteceu*."

[344] Wilhelm Hofmeister, interview by author.

> [inaudible] the French did try to open doors. And that was probably the case that, in the context of the conference, the French did have sometimes private conversations at the [Brazilian] defence ministry. But I made sure that the conference wouldn't have the character for clumsy interest-driven politics. To Germany, I can really rule it out. We have never had an industry representative or anything like that. And we as a foundation are usually very cautious, holding ourselves back [inaudible]. So, that is what makes us credible internationally, because we're not selling German products, neither in the armaments field nor otherwise, not even the German car industry. The French did have a bit of vested interests there, but anyway.[345]

A similar evaluation permeates the narrative constructed by Fischer-Bollin when pondering the question of how strong the pressure of German and French economic interests was in decisions regarding funding for the event. "For us," he stressed, "[that was] not very strong."[346] According to the foundation's representative in Brazil from 2009 to 2010, the reason for this is the fact that, as all other German political foundations, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung is "financed by our government, but we're not acting on [its] behalf;" the financial contribution provided by the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po until 2009, on the other hand, was obtained through funding from the French defence ministry. "There," Fischer-Bollin concluded "the interest was clearly present. If we had been financed by the German Ministry of Economic Development or Economic Cooperation, I think it would have been also a bit different."[347]

[345] Wilhelm Hofmeister, interview by author. „*Der französische Beitrag... die haben da einen gewissen finanziellen Beitrag geleistet, der geringer war, als das was wir bezahlt haben, aber das war mir auch egal, die Maßnahme als solche wichtig war. Der französische Beitrag kam aus dem französischen Verteidigungsministerium. Und ich glaube, ich kann das natürlich nicht... das französische Verteidigungsministerium hatte nicht nur jetzt akademische Interesse, sondern die sind ja, was die Rüstungsindustrie angeht, da… Die Deutschen haben auch Interesse an die Rüstungsindustrie, das ist ganz klar, aber nicht in Richtung Brasilien. Und die Franzosen hatten da, und haben immer noch, ein gewisses Interesse an der Rüstungsindustrie. Die haben damals diesen komischen Flugzeugträger da verkauft und dann war die Frage wegen diesen Atomgetriebenen-U-Boot und andere zur Verteidigung der Erdöl Quellen und alles und… Blödsinn. Und da haben die Franzosen, glaube ich [inaudible] haben da sich versucht, Türen zu öffnen. Und das war wohl auch so, dass im Kontext der Konferenz die Franzosen dann auch durchaus dann mal private Gespräche im Verteidigungsministerium geführt haben. Aber ich hatte schon darauf geachtet, dass auch die Konferenz nicht eben den Charakter hat, dass wir hier da plumpe Interessenpolitik machen. Für Deutschland kann ich es wirklich ausschließen. Wir hatten nie einen Industrievertretern oder dergleichen da... Und wir als Stiftung sind da in der Regel sehr vorsichtig, halten uns zurück [inaudible]. Also, das macht uns glaubwürdig international, weil wir weder im Rüstungsbereich noch sonst jetzt darauf sind, dass deutsche Produkte zu verkaufen oder so, nicht mal die deutsche Autoindustrie. Die Franzosen hatten da immer noch so ein bisschen noch ‚vested interests', aber gut.*"

[346] Peter Fischer-Bollin, interview by author.

[347] Peter Fischer-Bollin, interview by author.

4.4 Sustaining dialogue: reasons and rationales behind the "Forte de Copacabana" process

Based on the narratives of key actors interviewed during our research, the previous section helped us reconstruct the early years of KAS' security-related work in Brazil and account for the chain of events leading to the establishment of the partnership between the German foundation, CEBRI, and the EU Delegation in Brasília. In the ensuing sections, in turn, we will concentrate our focus on the reasons and rationales behind KAS' security-related work in Brazil and address the following research question: How do representatives of the global think tank and its partners in Brazil justify the scope and the purpose of the international security conference and its complementary events?

4.4.1 "Diplomacy is just one possible channel": making sense of the context

"The stability and security of the international system demands new forms of cooperation and dialogue between the many regions of the world. This is the initial premise of the Forte de Copacabana Conference," stated Wilhelm Hofmeister in the introductory chapters of the edited volumes published after the first two conferences, in 2004 and 2005.[348] The former head of the foundation's liaison office in Brazil also pointed out in his opening remarks that the recently-established meetings in Rio de Janeiro had shown "the necessity for cooperation to strengthen the multilateral path and that both regions have a lot to learn from each other in the way they deal with questions of security and defense;" the conferences had made it clear, moreover, that "it is very important to open spaces for interregional dialogue, as a way to enhance the relationship and the integration between Europe and South America."[349] In fact, the essays authored by Hofmeister at that moment provide a more detailed account of how the organisers made sense of the context within which the dialogue forum was created, transmitting as well additional goals envisioned for the conferences in the following years.

[348] Wilhelm Hofmeister, ed., *International security: public policy and biregional cooperation: European - South American dialogue* (Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2005); Forte Copacabana - Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 11 th. and 12th. November 2004, 9; Wilhelm Hofmeister, ed., *International security: European - South American Dialogue* (Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2006); II Forte Copacabana conference, [Rio de Janeiro - Brazil, November 3rd and 4th, 2005], 11.

[349] Hofmeister, *International security: public policy and biregional cooperation*, 10; Hofmeister, *International security*, 11.

Permeating the narratives constructed to explain the reasons and rationales behind the event is the idea that the increasing level of complexity, the growing number of actors, and the widening array of topics in today's international system justify new forms of dialogue, an increasing specialisation in defence issues, and the formulation of common policies between South American and European states. In 2006, for instance, Hofmeister argues that "[w]hile during the Cold War the two superpowers dominated the international system, nowadays the processes and facts of the international system are determined by a greater number of actors and complex conflict structures;" "[t]he current international security context," he concludes, "demands new forms of international dialogue to approach security issues," and the Forte de Copacabana Conference "is an extraordinary occasion for this dialogue to emerge." Finally, his contribution in the edited volumes list the goals of the conference: "to resume the debates about security and defense from a bi-regional perspective, to promote cooperation and the inter-regional exchange of ideas and to allow the formation and intensification of networks among experts and decision-makers." [350] In the following year, Hofmeister's introduction to the conference publication contains the same idea: "New actors and issues emerge, relationships become more complex, and the interdependence involving local, regional and global dynamics becomes even more intense;" even though it is "an ambitious challenge to try to comprehend and to cope with this framework and search for solutions," the narrative goes,

> it is a necessary initiative for those who are involved and have a direct influence on issues of security and defence. As a consequence, representatives from governments, parliaments, armed forces, governmental and non-governmental organizations, entrepreneurs, students and journalists met on November 15 and 16, 2007 in an already consolidated cooperation and dialogue initiative between South America and Europe. [351]

Similarly, the opening chapter of the 2008 conference publication states that "[t]he new challenges confronting international security demand an increasing specialization with regard to defense studies and greater transparency of the policies applied by decision takers (sic);" "dialogue," the narrative goes, "presents itself as an essential element in the formulation of common policies and in the peaceful understanding among States. With this in mind […] the

[350] Wilhelm Hofmeister, "Presentation," in *International Security: A European-South American Dialogue 2006*, ed. Wilhelm Hofmeister (Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2007), 8–9.

[351] Wilhelm Hofmeister, "Preface," in *International Security: A European-South American dialogue 2007*, ed. Wilhelm Hofmeister (Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2008), 8.

5th Conference on International Security of the Copacabana Fort: a European-South-American dialogue took place in Rio de Janeiro on November 19th and 20th."[352]

Fischer-Bollin's introductory essay in the 2009 conference publication adds a key element to understand how the organisers make sense of the initiative and explain the rationale behind it. According to the former office director in Brazil, "[i]n a time when the global architecture is becoming increasingly complex and in which the State loses its predominant capacity of agency within the international system, the multilateral dialogue transforms itself into an inescapable practice of diplomacies in the sphere of defense, becoming a fundamental path for the construction of institutional mechanisms capable of ensuring peace."[353] In fact, one of the core components of the rationale behind the "Forte de Copacabana" process is the idea that states have gradually lost their "predominant capacity of agency within the international system" and, consequently, that non-state actors are well-positioned to support state institutions in creating spaces where diplomats can engage with such inescapable practices. Elaborating on this idea during our interview, Alfredo Valladão explained how, in his view, diplomats' capacity of agency has substantially decreased in the contemporary world:

> […] nowadays, in the world of today, diplomacy is just one possible channel […] That's a problem for old diplomatic institutions that have a hard time adapting to a world in which the diplomat no longer has a monopoly of international relations. They don't have the monopoly on the bottom because scholars, entrepreneurs, etc., and NGOs are doing that, and they don't have the monopoly from above because the governments themselves, the executives, are meeting without consulting the diplomats.[354]

Felix Dane situated the work of the German political foundations, and of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in particular, against the same background. Addressing the relevance of these organisations in contemporary foreign and security policy challenges, the former director of KAS liaison office in Rio stressed the "vital role" that German political foundations can play

[352] Wilhelm Hofmeister, "Introduction," in *International Security: A European-South American Dialogue (2008)*, ed. Peter Fischer-Bollin (Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2009), 3.

[353] Peter Fischer-Bollin, "Introduction," in *International Security: a European - South American Dialogue (2009): South American and European Reflections on International Security*, ed. Peter Fischer-Bollin (Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2010), 3.

[354] Alfredo Valladão, interview by author. "[...] *hoje em dia, no mundo de hoje, diplomacia é só um canal possível* [...] *Isso é um problema inclusive para as velhas diplomacias que têm muita dificuldade em se adaptar a um mundo onde o diplomata não tem mais o monopólio da relação internacional. Não tem o monopólio por baixo porque os acadêmicos, os empresários, etc., e as ONGS estão fazendo isso, e não tem o monopólio por cima porque os próprios governos, os executivos, estão se encontrando sem passar pelos diplomatas*."

in creating new channels of communication in a context in which "the scope for diplomacy has decreased":

> I think the scope for diplomacy has decreased nowadays, given all "Wikileaks" and all that is happening and, therefore, it is very useful to have other channels of communication—so-called Track Two diplomacy or second track diplomacy. I think the German political foundations, all of them, can play a vital role there in providing those communication channels. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation has focused a bit more on economic and on security aspects than others. I think those aspects are vital and we can provide these channels or discussing platforms which others can't.[355]

Another recurrent idea we find running through the narratives analysed here is the one according to which South America and Europe enjoyed, until recently, a somewhat privileged position within the international system. Despite the increasing levels of complexity and uncertainty that have shaped contemporary international relations, both regions remained, at least until 2014, distant from "a global arc of instability" spanning from Western Africa to South East Asia, according to the conference organisers.[356] "In this sea of peril," argues for instance former KAS representative in Brazil Thomas Knirsch (2011-2012) in the introductory chapter of the 2010 conference publication, "South America and Europe remain islands of stability, with no hot conflicts in sight. As such, South America and Europe must work together to guarantee that conflict doesn't re-emerge in their vicinities as well as to promote peace and prosperity around the world."[357] Knirsch concludes: "To achieve this goal each partner must comprehend the interests and priorities, as well as the domestic considerations of his counterpart to avoid misunderstanding and to accelerate further cooperation on the global stage."[358]

Likewise, the opening chapter of the 2011-2012 conference publication also acknowledged both regions' "fortunate situation" in security terms. Although "no hot conflict" existed in either side of the Atlantic, the organisers noted that security in both regions "depends on the security of others," hence the reason why spaces such as the Forte de Copacabana Conferences assumed particular importance:

> South America and Europe find themselves in relative fortunate situations, with no hot conflicts on their territories. But their security also depends on

[355] Felix Dane, interview by author.

[356] Thomas Knirsch, "Introduction," in *International Security: A European - South American Dialogue (2010): Current Challenges for Disarmament and Peace Operations on the Political Agenda*, ed. Peter Fischer-Bollin and Thomas Knirsch (Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011), 5.

[357] Knirsch, "Introduction," 5.

[358] Knirsch, "Introduction," 5–7.

> the security of others. The resolution of the above described challenges (sic) also depends on their continued commitment. It is under this premise that the International Security Conference Forte de Copacabana opens its doors each year, to provide a forum for specialists as well as the interested public from both sides of the Atlantic, to identify challenges and to discuss possible solutions.[359]

Adding to this, the title of the 2013 edition of the annual conference, "Brazil Emerging in the Global Security Order," captures another core idea underlying the initiative to promote such a dialogue forum for most of the time frame under analysis here: the fact that Brazil's emerging economy, growing involvement in global security affairs and, in particular, its membership of the BRICS grouping increased its relevance to decision makers in the West. To the dialogue organisers, plans and decisions made in Brasília seemed to have a growing influence not only on European interests in Latin America, but also on the stability of multilateral institutions and the future of global governance mechanisms. At the same time, the narrative goes, certain positions advocated by the country did not find immediate support among audiences in Europe and the US, sometimes fuelling resentment among more conservative sectors of Western policymaking elites. Consequently, lack of mutual trust, misunderstanding, and misperceptions persisted on both sides, while the scope for official diplomacy, as pointed out above, seemed to have decreased.

Patrick Keller, former Coordinator for Foreign and Security Policy at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation's headquarters in Berlin and a frequent participant of the conferences at that point in time, narrated his perceptions in this regard as follows:

> For a long time, especially during the Lula years, especially during the high point when they had this deal with Turkey and Iran and other moments, I won't say glory, but when they were very present in the world stage, but… With the new oil resources being found directly off the coast and all the signs looking good, there was a sense of "We've got something figured out here, we're going to present to you a new model, we can teach you something" […] That was the essence that was there and sometimes, especially for the more conservative Americans and Europeans, it was sometimes galling.[360]

Conscious of this situation, the conference organisers would steer the meetings so as to achieve what Fischer-Bollin regards as the foundation's "main objective" with the Forte de Copacabana process: "to provide a space of informal diplomacy or informal exchange of ideas,

[359] Felix Dane and Gregory J. Ryan, "Introduction," in *International Security: a European - South American Dialogue (2011-2012): Security and Responsibility in a Multipolar World*, ed. Felix Dane (Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2012), 7.

[360] Patrick Keller, interview by author.

points of views, interests, including analyses of the world, of our common relationship." As the former head of the foundation's office in Rio de Janeiro explained during our interview,

> […] we had in those years […] all over the world, the impression that Brazil was getting more democratic, richer, more developed, more fair, more socially developed, I think, than ever and that Brazil is not stoppable and, of course, it's our partner because it's a democracy, it's part of the Western world […] in those years we saw that Brazil has its own interests and it defines for himself its interests, they are not to be defined in Washington or in Europe. And I think that to support this process of understanding the European and the German side was one of the most important roles we could play. For example, to learn that you can be a democracy but not agree with everything what [sic] Europe does. And you are not a not-democracy when you have a BRICS format with non-democratic countries like China and Russia.[361]

From 2014 onwards, however, the narratives under analysis convey a quite different picture of the global context within which the "Forte de Copacabana" process has taken place—and the position occupied by Brazil and the EU within that context. In a "worrisome loop" of events, Europe, South America and the world at large are suddenly subject to different sources of tension and to the looming prospects of lawlessness, aggression and, in extremis, full-blown war.[362] The driving forces of globalisation and redistribution of power among states—now shaped by more complex and diffuse actors and interconnections—push towards a "fast-paced and so easily mutable international security arena."[363] An "apparent shift towards disengagement on the part of once vigorously active members of the international arena" entails a "diminished sense of global spirit and leadership."[364] At the same time, Brazil enters a different situation as well: "something else changed dramatically", affirmed Keller during our interview, "and that was the political context of these conferences." Comparing the country's situation from that moment onwards to the time when "all the signs [were] looking good" for Brazil, the foundation's foreign and security policy coordinator affirmed: "that changed quickly and, in fact, it was not satisfying to see […] And that limits then, again, their [the Brazilian] ambition

[361] Peter Fischer-Bollin, interview by author.

[362] Felix Dane, Gregory J. Ryan, and Leonardo Paz, "Introduction," in *International Security: a European - South American Dialogue (2014): Multilateral Security Governance*, ed. Felix Dane (Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2014), 11.

[363] Dane, "Introduction," 10.

[364] Dane, Ryan and Paz, "Introduction," 10.

and capacity to do something for the rest of the world. And that has changed dramatically over the course of the Fortes [the Forte de Copacabana Conferences] that I have been attending."[365]

Meanwhile, "the return to 'Realpolitik'" in Europe and "[i]ssues such as cyberattacks and drones" cast doubts on the current legal framework and require new thinking on "might and right in world politics"—the title adopted in the 2016 edition of the conference.[366] More recently, the narrative goes, a "chaotic scenario" unfolds as the current US administration "is marked by a confrontational tone and strong threats," whereas leaders across the world, "from Russia to Turkey," leave aside "basic democratic principles" and increase the "radicalization and militarization of their foreign policies."[367] Finally, global challenges such as "climate change and its consequences" for countries' security and the "waves of refugees" caused by crises and conflicts in countries like Venezuela and Syria add to the series of "[n]ew events that destabilize whole regions [arising] at an ever increasing speed" and "show how much South America and Europe can exchange experiences in this field"—hence the organisation's decision to adopt the topic "International Crisis Management" as the conference theme in 2018.[368]

The following excerpts from the introductory chapter of the 2015 conference publication are worth quoting at length due to the vivid account they contain, illustrative as they are of how the conference organisers have made sense of the global context in recent years. What is more, the passages reproduced below also convey the idea with which the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and its partners have justified the relevance of the "Forte de Copacabana" process in light of contemporary global security challenges. In the words of former KAS director Felix Dane,

> [t]he international security order has found itself suffering beneath the strain of significant tensions these past years. With every publication of this series the problems analysed seem to have worsened: From the rise of ISIS to the situation in the Ukraine; from the refugee crisis in Europe to maritime tensions in East and South China Seas; from hybrid warfare to climate change; from a seemingly never-ending economic crisis to drug trafficking networks;

[365] Patrick Keller, interview by author.

[366] Jan Woischnik, "Introduction," in *International Security: a European - South American Dialogue (2016): Might and Right in World Politics*, ed. Jan Woischnik (Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2016), 8.

[367] Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Brazil Office, "International Crisis Management: Challenges and Perspectives for Latin America and Europe: Overall design for security policy in 2018" (Internal report accessed with the permission of the office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Berlin, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Brazil Office, 2018), 3.

[368] Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Brazil Office, "International Crisis Management: Challenges and Perspectives for Latin America and Europe," 4.

> from renewed nuclear threats to cyber warfare. The list appears endless and the international system, in turmoil.
>
> […] Here, both NATO and the European Union; both Brazil and Latin America as a whole – will need to engage with strategic neighbours as well as with key international partners to bolster their security and capacities. Future challenges may bring democracies together. In particular a partnership between Brazil and Europe – in many fields but also in defence – has much potential to be explored.
>
> To this end, a decisive political investment towards strengthening bilateral relations will be required. In the near future, there might be more convergence between Brazil and Europe on global security issues and governance mechanisms.
>
> […] This annual event is dedicated to the exchange of ideas through academic and policy-oriented debate, as well as the promotion of key networks. The conference has become the largest in its field within Latin America; together with its annual publication, they form two examples of the Foundation's many dialogue fora, reinforcing the link between North and South. Brazil and Europe may be set in different geopolitical realities, yet both share a common interest in a secure and stable world order."[369]

4.4.2 "Many strategic and tactical discussions": defining the scope

At this point, it is worth noting that a permanent tension is palpable throughout the textual corpus analysed here regarding the scope of the think tank-organised informal dialogue process in Brazil. On the one hand, the organisations driving the Forte de Copacabana process state, as in Dane's above-mentioned introductory chapter, that they aim at "reinforcing the link between North and South" by "strengthening bilateral relations" between Brazil and Europe. Yet that aim has coexisted with the ambition to include other South American countries, or even the entire Latin American region, in the programme, as referred to in some of the passages reproduced above. In this regard, the subtitle adopted for the conferences since 2004, "a European-South American Dialogue," is illustrative of the organisers' desire to promote the meetings, first and foremost, as a space for interregional dialogue.

Apart from the textual sources analysed here, such ambivalence also permeates the narratives of different stakeholders interviewed during our research. Alfredo Valladão recalls, for instance, that "[t]he idea was Europe-South America […] not just Brazil-Europe: Europe-South

[369] Dane, "Introduction," 9–11.

America. And that's why in the first conferences we invited several participants from South America, ministers and so on. That was the fundamental line, doing [the conference] not just with Brazilians. And, also, because the Europeans had an interest in that, too."[370] Wilhelm Hofmeister, on the other hand, stated on this matter that "[t]he idea was to contribute by putting the topic of security policy on the agenda in Brazil and to discuss it internationally, not only with Brazilians, but also with other Latin Americans. That's why I insisted—and I can rightfully take the credit for this—that we should also have high-ranking *latinos* with us whenever possible."[371]

"Many strategic and tactical discussions" lie behind the foundation's designing and redesigning of the conferences according to Patrick Keller, former Coordinator for Foreign and Security Policy at KAS. Among such discussions, the question of how encompassing the forum should be—both thematically and geographically—has always played a significant role. Although Keller admits, for instance, that "we want to incorporate the other countries of the region as well," he underlines that "Brazil is of key importance for the Adenauer Foundation" and has "a pole position anyway for us," not least because it is "the largest, the economically strongest, and most vital country, if you will, the most relevant" country in Latin America.[372] The same idea was advanced by Carlo Masala, a German IR scholar and long-time KAS security policy consultant, whom we talked to in July 2018. Discussing his assessment of the foundation's foreign and security policy-related work in the region, Masala pointed out that, among other foreign liaison offices in Latin America, "the office in Brazil has a special importance, because it's located in the biggest and most important country in terms of capabilities, power capabilities and, therefore, has a kind of special role in setting up all these meetings with officials, with the army, or the armed forces, and the think tankers, and let's say, in general the broader public who is interested in foreign, security policy."[373]

[370] Alfredo Valladão, interview by author. "*A ideia era uma conferência que seria Europa-América do Sul* [...] *não era Brasil-Europa: Europa-América do Sul. Por isso é que nas primeiras conferências a gente convidou bastantes participantes da América do Sul, ministros, esse tipo de coisa. Essa era a linha fundamental, não é só fazer só Brasil. E isso também porque os europeus estavam interessados*."

[371] Wilhelm Hofmeister, interview by author. "*Die Idee war dazu beizutragen, in Brasilien das Thema Sicherheitspolitik ein bisschen auf die Agenda zu setzen und halt international zu diskutieren und dann eben auch nicht nur mit Brasilianern, sondern auch mit anderen Lateinamerikanern. Deswegen habe ich, das kann ich für mich schon ganz in Anspruch nehmen, darauf gedrungen, dass wir nach Möglichkeit auch hochrangige Latinos dabei hatten*."

[372] Patrick Keller, interview by author.

[373] Carlo Masala, interview by author.

Brazil's increasing profile in global affairs during the 2000s, as pointed out above, was a decisive development in that regard and reinforced that perception among the dialogue organisers. "When the BRICs formed and other developments happened", the foundation's security policy coordinator recalls, "we wanted to learn more about it, because we wanted to make sure that Brazil was, if it continued to rise as a power in international affairs, contributing to the international system, to the stability of the institutions that we have, rather than stand outside of that or oppose that." "One of the reasons we do this conference", Keller concluded, "is that we want to, you know, do something with Brazil for international institutions, for international stability. We need such actors for the credibility, legitimacy of the world order, basically. And, of course, we, especially at the Adenauer Foundation, have tried to nudge them to do it in a way we find it appropriate."[374]

Former KAS representatives Felix Dane and Jan Woischnik provided us with some further illustrations of the rationale behind the foundation's commitment to invest in security-related projects in Brazil. Woischnik, for instance, explained during our interview why the foundation's core stated mission abroad, democracy promotion, is inextricably linked to the "Forte de Copacabana" project. After providing us with an overview of the five main areas on which the organisation focuses its activities in the country (political education, rule of law, social market economy, decentralisation and, finally, foreign and security policy), he singled out Brazil's relevance as a "large, strong democracy" vis-à-vis the majority of countries in the world:

> And then the fifth main topic here in Brazil is foreign and security policy. For example, this is the Forte de Copacabana, this is promoting relations between German, European, and Brazilian foreign and security policymakers. This is perhaps the area that develops the least rapidly. When I say that our mission is to promote democracy, 'Mission: Democracy'... But of course, this area [foreign and security policy] also involves promoting large, strong democracies such as Brazil and establishing or intensifying contact with such countries, because for us in Germany it is important that we have major democracies as allies, something that can no longer be taken for granted in the world

[374] Patrick Keller, interview by author.

> today. The majority of countries is not, or is no longer, democratic. Take Turkey, for example, or Russia, or China. That is why we invest so much effort and time and money in a conference like Forte de Copacabana.[375]

Similarly, Dane emphasized Brazil's soft power and ethnic pluralism as valuable assets to global governance mechanisms—assets which, in his view, the country has so far failed to exploit. Commenting on the role of Latin American troops in UN peace operations, for instance, the former director of the foundation's foreign liaison office in Rio associated Brazil's tradition of non-intervention to a "surprisingly little" interest in global security affairs and, in particular, to a reduced willingness, in his view, to contribute larger contingents of uniformed UN peacekeepers:

> Some countries of Latin America are security providers, by providing a lot of troops to UN missions […] But Brazil is… Given its size and its importance internationally and given its power, especially its soft power, and given its vital interest to thrive in the world, it's surprisingly little interested in security and in international security. And international security is about governance, internationally. I mean, how do you cooperate? R2P [Responsibility to Protect] and all these questions. When do you intervene, and don't you intervene? Brazil has a bit of a problem with, on the one hand, non-intervention […] And Brazil, at the same time, I think, has a lot to offer. Brazil is such a mixed country. You have Asians, you have Europeans, you have the Middle East, you have everyone… And Africans, of course, that Brazil is very much accepted around the world. So, you could provide a very good… Brazil could provide a very good platform for more exchange and for seeing more what needs to be done, and that's what I would like to see.[376]

In fact, although numerous participants from other Latin American countries have attended the event throughout all its editions, over the years the "Forte de Copacabana" process has cemented its primary focus on Brazil—not least because the foundation's main partners in the conference project are precisely CEBRI, a Brazilian international affairs think tank, and the EU Delegation in Brasília. As shown in Appendix 1, the high-level attendance of Brazilian officials at the main conference—including four acting defence ministers, specials advisors to

[375] Jan Woischnik and Diogo Winnikes, interview by author. "*Und dann der fünfte Themenschwerpunkt, der ist hier in Brasilien die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Das ist da zum Beispiel das Forte de Copacabana, das ist dann die Pflege der Beziehungen zwischen deutschen und europäischen Außenpolitikern, Sicherheitspolitikern, mit den brasilianischen. Das ist vielleicht der Themenbereich, der sich am wenigsten schnell erschließt. Wenn ich sage, unser Auftrag ist Demokratieförderung, ‚Mission: Democracy'… Aber es geht natürlich auch bei dem Themenbereich darum, dass wir große, starke Demokratien wie Brasilien fördern und den Kontakt zu solchen Ländern herstellen bzw. intensivieren, weil für uns Deutschland es ist wichtig, dass wir verbündete große Demokratien haben, was heute auf der Welt nicht mehr selbstverständlich ist. Die Mehrheit der Länder ist nicht oder nicht mehr demokratisch. Beispiel: Türkei, oder Russland, oder China. Deswegen investieren wir so viel Mühe und Zeit und Geld in so eine Konferenz wie das Forte de Copacabana*."

[376] Felix Dane, interview by author.

the president, and numerous senior diplomats, among several others—attests that as well. Since the Mini-Fortes started in 2016, what is more, the imbalance has become even more evident, as the confidential preparatory workshops for the open conferences have often taken place within the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs in Brasília and Rio de Janeiro. Besides, as shown in Appendix 2, the lists of attendees invited to the Mini-Fortes include mostly Brazilian scholars and think tank-affiliated researchers as well as high-ranking civil and military officials from the defence and foreign affairs ministries. The same determination to engage, first and foremost, Brazilian policy actors in the conversations is manifest in another layer of the dialogue process promoted by the global think tank and its partners in the country, namely the European-South American Regional Security Symposium. Whilst high-ranking defence and foreign policy officials from Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru have often joined the Brazilian and European authorities in attendance at the meeting, the imbalance towards a larger number and a higher level of seniority among the officials from Brazil is evidenced by the lists of attendees compiled in Appendix 3.

An additional concern among the dialogue organisers interviewed during our research was to reaffirm the fact that, although the leading organisation behind "Forte" is a German political foundation, the purpose of the meetings goes far beyond merely promoting Germany's interests in Brazil and Latin America. On that matter, Wilhelm Hofmeister, who is currently director of the foundation's liaison office in Madrid, stated the following: "my goal in Brazil, and here in Spain, was not Germany-Brazil, but Europe-Brazil [...] That's why I was grateful from the outset that we were able to make this project a European project and I always recommend it to my colleagues, when they want to hear it, to make sure, as much as possible, that Europeans go there too, not only Germans."[377] Likewise, Peter Fischer-Bollin affirmed in that regard that during his time as office director in Rio de Janeiro the foundation's objective with the conferences was "to focus not just on a German-Brazilian perspective, but also, or mainly, on a European-Brazilian perspective, in order to explain or to make clear for the Brazilians that we are not just…or the European Union is not just a block of common economic interests but also of common political interests."[378]

[377] Wilhelm Hofmeister, interview by author. „[…] *mein Ziel war in Brasilien, sowie hier in Spanien, nicht Deutschland-Brasilien, sondern Europa-Brasilien* […] *Deswegen war ich von Anfang an dankbar, dass wir dieses Projekt als europäisches Projekt da machen konnten und empfehle immer den Kollegen, wenn sie es hören wollen, möglichst zu gucken, dass Europäer da auch kommen, nicht nur Deutsche*."

[378] Peter Fischer-Bollin, interview by author.

One idea in particular permeates the "strategic and tactical discussions" the organisers have had over the years when defining the purpose of the Forte de Copacabana Conferences, which seems to elucidate the question of scope: the ambition to model the meetings in Rio after the Munich Security Conference, "the world's leading forum for debating international security policy," held in Germany since 1963.[379] As Valladão recalls it, "the analogy existed from the beginning," yet "the reference to Munich, I think, was something much more related to the Konrad Adenauer [Foundation], to the Germans […] this idea that it [the Forte de Copacabana Conference] is kind of a Munich Security Conference in Latin America, in South America. For them that's very important."[380] Hofmeister also confirmed that shaping the initiative in Brazil along the lines of the prestigious security dialogue in Germany was, indeed, an ambition: "[y]es, at that time we talked about it, that the ambition was to make a 'Munich', in quotation marks, 'Security Conference' in Latin America. That was a bit of a role model," he affirmed.[381] As early as 2008, the same idea was verbalised on the sidelines of the conference by ambassador Heinrich Kreft, then senior assistant for foreign and security policy of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the German Bundestag. One of the European panellists of that year's edition of the event, ambassador Kreft made the following statement in an interview with DefesaNet, a media partner of the host organisations in 2008 and 2010:

> A few years ago, the European Union signed a strategic partnership with Latin America. Unfortunately, there is a lack of concrete projects within this strategic partnership, and, in my opinion, this conference, Forte de Copacabana, has helped intensify this dialogue in the field of security, which we started a long time ago with Latin America. As you might know, the Munich Security Conference, the *Wehrkundetagung*, is the dialogue forum between the US and

[379] Munich Security Conference, "Annual Report 2018" (Munich Security Conference, 2019), https://www.securityconference.de/fileadmin/MSC_/2019/Dokumente/190211_MSC_AnnualReport2018.pdf, 10.

[380] Alfredo Valladão, interview by author. "*É claro que analogia existia desde o princípio* [...] *essa referência de Munique eu acho muito mais uma coisa da Konrad Adenauer, dos alemães* [...] *essa ideia de que é uma espécie de Conferência de Munique na América Latina, na América do Sul. Isso para eles é muito importante*."

[381] Wilhelm Hofmeister, interview by author. „*Ja, wir haben schon damals darüber gesprochen, dass der Ehrgeiz wäre, also, in Lateinamerika eine ‚Münchner', in Anführungszeichnen, ‚Sicherheitskonferenz' zu machen. Das war schon ein bisschen Vorbild*."

> Europe, and I could imagine that the Forte de Copacabana Security Conference could play a similar role in the security policy dialogue between Europe and Latin America.[382]

Felix Dane, former head of the foundation's office in Brazil from 2012 to 2015, also acknowledged having the Munich Security Conference in mind when he managed the conference project. According to him, essentially two reasons justify the ambition to shape the meetings in Rio along the lines of the long-established global security conference in Munich. The first one is the lack of "a comparative format of a standing security conference" in Latin America: whereas other regions of the world experience different forms of high-level dialogue forums on security issues, such as the Herzliya Conferences in Israel or the Shangri-La Dialogue in Southeast Asia, according to Dane, "[i]n Latin America we were still lacking that."[383] Therefore, he concluded, "I think the aim should be to establish the Forte de Copacabana as *the* conference in Latin America like you have Boston, or Herzliya or the MSC in Europe, in Germany […] If we are able to create that, I think it would be very helpful for a dialogue, because it's always better to have security conference *dialogues* rather than going through conflict."[384] The second reason why the MSC has served as an inspiration, according to Dane, is the small number of Brazilian and other Latin American high-level representatives at the annual conferences in Munich. Commenting on this during our conversation, the former office director in Rio stated the following: "[I]f you look then at the Munich Security Conference, it's striking how few

[382] Heinrich Kreft, "Interview on: V Conferência Forte de Copacabana 2008. News coverage by DefesaNet [YouTube]," accessed March 11, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vxBiJ4f9-eo. "*Vor einigen Jahren bereits hat die Europäische Union zusammen mit Lateinamerika eine strategische Partnerschaft vereinbart. Leider fehlt es allerdings an konkreten Projekten innerhalb dieser strategischen Partnerschaft, und meines Achtens trägt diese Konferenz, Forte de Copacabana, dazu bei, im Bereich Sicherheitspolitik hier dieser Dialog, den wir schon lange mit Lateinamerika begonnen haben, zu intensivieren. Wie Sie vielleicht wissen, ist die Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz, die Wehrkundetagung, das Dialogforum zwischen den USA und Europa, und ich könnte mir vorstellen, dass hier die Sicherheitskonferenz Forte de Copacabana eine ähnliche Funktion übernehmen könnte für den sicherheitspolitischen Dialog zwischen Europa und Lateinamerika*." Dr. Heinrich Kreft is Germany's current ambassador to the Grand Dutchy of Luxembourg (since July 2016).

[383] Felix Dane, interview by author.

[384] Felix Dane, interview by author. Emphasis in original.

Brazilians are there, it's striking how few Latin Americans are there. The whole world is there, where is Latin America? Where is Brazil?"[385]

Upon arriving in Rio de Janeiro after three years in charge of the foundation's liaison office for the Palestinian Territories in Ramallah, Dane recalls being surprised by the ongoing Forte de Copacabana Conferences, which led him to retool the dialogue forum in Brazil inspired by the Munich Security Conferences. It is worth quoting Dane at length at this point, as his account of that particular moment helps elucidate the reasoning behind the decision to expand the dialogue process beyond the annual conferences as well as to associate it to the famed international security gathering in Bavaria:

> Of course I heard in my preparation time here in Berlin a lot about the conference […] but I was overwhelmed when I saw that conference unfolding in front of my eyes […] So, I saw the potential of what we could make out of this. So, I said, 'Okay, we are at a threshold here, the conference is already so well-established, we need to lift it further up. If we continue simply like this, it will stagnate and, at some point, it will decrease. Or we take off and the sky is the limit.' So, I tried to link it to the Munich Security Conference [MSC], I went to the Munich Security Conference, I invited someone from the Munich Security Conference to come to the Forte de Copacabana, my last one which I did there […] And we also realized: it's not good to only have one conference, we need more, we need to have pre-conferences. So, we modelled it a bit like the Munich Security Conference, which has also closed-door workshops in a smaller scale and then accumulates everything in the MSC in February in Munich. And we tried to simply create the same.[386]

To Patrick Keller, that ambition is correct, but there are several reasons why, in his view, "it might be misleading to aim for a Munich Security Conference in Brazil."[387] As Keller explained during our interview in August 2017, the global dialogue forum in Munich "developed because of a specific historic situation:" starting as the *Wehrkundetagung*, "a defence-related

[385] Felix Dane, interview by author. The participation of South American countries, and particularly of Brazilian authorities, in the MSC has indeed been limited over the years. As Oliver Stuenkel points out, Brazil was the only country among the world's top ten economies "without a single policy maker in Munich" in February 2020. Although South America's absence from the meetings has been the general rule, there were a few exceptions in the past. According to Stuenkel, "South America has not always been entirely absent. In 2016, Brazil's then-Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira traveled to Munich, where he faced questions about the country's capacity to deal with the Zika virus. Three years earlier, Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota was on the cover of the 2013 post-conference's online report, and was — along with Joe Biden, Sergey Lavrov and José Manuel Barroso — one of the few mentioned specifically in the executive summary of the discussions. Mexico, meanwhile, represented Latin America by sending a delegation to Munich this year and has been present more frequently during past conferences." See Oliver Stuenkel, "Wanted: South America's Participation in Global Geopolitics," *Americas Quarterly*, February 26, 2020, accessed March 13, 2020, https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/wanted-south-americas-participation-global-geopolitics.

[386] Felix Dane, interview by author.

[387] Patrick Keller, interview by author.

conference where European and American defence officials and defence intellectuals in a rather narrow setting came together to discuss strategy in the Cold War," the dialogue forum only came about due to a "circumstantial core" of "very immediate threats, a very immediate connection and a very immediate group of people concerned." That core, Keller highlights, "cannot be invented by an organiser in order to make it such a success;" nonetheless, aiming to model the "Forte de Copacabana" process on the Munich Security Conferences, he continues, "[is] not misleading if you want to have a very visible format where you have high-level government and think tank people from various countries and various regions talk about many issues that pertain to their security or to the international order. That's legitimate and I think the right goal for the Forte de Copacabana." After all, Keller concludes, the meetings have already established a certain "symbolism" over the years: "it's Brazil talking to the West, if you will. That's the one forum we have for that, there aren't that many."[388]

In fact, different primary sources analysed here contain a similar evaluation of the status of the Munich Security Conference as a role model to the many dialogue fora promoted by KAS in Brazil. The idea is generally advanced with a note of caution and restraint as in Keller's account of the subject, with which dialogue organisers and participants alike acknowledge the uniqueness of the MSC, its particular historical development, and unmatched scale. And yet the importance of having the format and achievements of Munich in mind and, most importantly, of attempting to replicate them in a region hitherto distant from the geopolitical debate with the West was widely recognized by our interview partners. That is the case, for instance, of Roderich Kiesewetter and Andreas Nick, members of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group at the German Federal Parliament and former guest speakers at the event in Rio de Janeiro.

To Kiesewetter, who attended the flagship conference as a panellist in 2010 and 2017, adopting the MSC as a role model might be useful in order to increase the perception of Forte among decision makers in Europe, which he regards as "very limited:" "To win this area [perception among decision makers in Europe], one should upgrade Copacabana like Halifax [the Halifax International Security Forum (HISF)] or like the Munich Security Conference […] Such conferences are very rare in the southern hemisphere. There would be a real added value for the

[388] Patrick Keller, interview by author.

BRICS, for the G-20, perhaps also for the Non-Aligned countries."[389] The security summit in Nova Scotia, Canada, was also mentioned by congressman Nick as he talked us through his impressions of the strengths and limitations of a conference format like Forte's. Whilst Nick recognises the MSC as a "major success story," the breadth and scale of the event in Bavaria as well as the implications they have to the course of the annual meetings are the main reasons why, according to him, such an analogy is not entirely appropriate or desirable today.[390]

To the German politician, who was a panellist at the 2018 edition of Forte, the comparison was more appropriate at the time when KAS launched its conference project in Brazil, especially considering the changes the dialogue forum in Germany has gone through in recent years: "Munich [the MSC] has grown so much and has become so complex, both in terms of geographic coverage, but also in terms of thematic coverage with zillions side events and co-sponsors;" consequently, he concluded, "looking where Munich is today, I'm not sure I would recommend to anyone to make that the main point of reference or the main comparison, because the value-added of a conference like Copacabana is, I think, [that] it's focused, as I mentioned, [that] there is always a closed-door workshop the day before, to have this closer interaction also behind closed-doors."[391] Hence the importance, in his view, of avoiding an overstretch and maintaining, instead, "a certain focus, not trying to be everything for everyone, which is part, I think, of the problem that Munich is going on right now."[392] To Nick, smaller-scale events such as the Halifax International Security Forum or KAS' Istanbul Security Conference® (ISC), held in cooperation with the Center for Strategic Research of Başkent University in Ankara, Turkey,

[389] Roderich Kiesewetter, interview by author, October 17, 2019, Berlin. "*Die Wahrnehmung [der Internationalen Sicherheitskonferenz ‚Forte de Copacabana'] in Europa ist aus meiner Sicht sehr gering. Es gibt vielleicht weltweit nur eine weitere Konferenz, die ein bisschen in den Fokus geriet. Das ist Halifax, die Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz. Und ich glaube umgekehrt… man sollte Copacabana aufwerten wie Halifax oder wie die Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz, um diesen Bereich zu gewinnen. Also, auch schauen, dass man Staats- und Regierungschefs findet, dass man ein regionales Forum für Sicherheitspolitik bildet und so eine Art Brücke zwischen Asien, Afrika und Europa leitest. Das wäre, glaube ich, etwas… Auf der Südhalbkugel sind solche Konferenzen sehr selten. Da wäre ein echter Mehrwert für BRICS, für G-20 vielleicht auch für die Blockfreien [Bewegung der Blockfreien Staaten, Non-Aligned-Movement]*. Kiesewetter is a member of the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) since 2009 as part of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group. Among other posts, he is the current Chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group at the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

[390] Andreas Nick, interview by author, October 15, 2019, Berlin. Dr. Andreas Nick is a member of the Bundestag since 2013 as part of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group. Among other posts, he is currently a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group at the Subcommittee on the United Nations, International Organisations and Globalisation.

[391] Andreas Nick, interview by author.

[392] Andreas Nick, interview by author.

since 2008, have more in common with Forte and, therefore, can offer more relevant points of reference to the dialogue organisers in Rio de Janeiro.[393]

An additional facet of the same idea was brought up in the conversations we had with KAS consultant for Latin America, Annette Schwarzbauer, and with Carlo Masala, IR scholar and a long-time security policy adviser to the foundation: the importance of associating Forte with the MSC so that Brazil and its neighbouring countries feature on the Western radar also when global security issues are under discussion. In this regard, their assessment of the issue reflects a similar concern as the one expressed by ambassador Heinrich Kreft, whose 2008 statement was reproduced above. Schwarzbauer affirmed, for instance, that "what we are currently working on is a link between this European-Latin American security conference and the Munich Security Conference. In other words, we are trying to build a bridge there and to raise awareness to the fact that, well, Latin America is also an important region that we should take a look at."[394] Whilst he acknowledged the same limitations noted by congressman Nick, Masala explained, in turn, why modelling Forte along the lines of MSC's predecessor, the *Münchner Wehrkundetagung*, might be even more appropriate to "raise awareness that there is something going on in Latin America in terms of security and defence policies:"

> The Munich Security Conference is global in its reach, yes? So, I would rather go back to the old *Wehrkundetagung*, which is the predecessor of the security conference, which was mostly a NATO-only conference. So, what we have with the Forte [de Copacabana Conference] is a Brazilian/Latin American conference, yes? So, and in that respect, it resembles a bit the Munich Security Conference, because, if you look at the Brazilian representation, it's pretty high-level, and it's not so high-level for other Latin American countries. That's where I would like to see it going. I also said that, and here there is a difference that between the big meetings, there should be a kind of core group

[393] Nick's Research Assistant Jan Fuhrmann also made a comparison between the ISC and Forte in the interview conducted with him in October 2019 in Berlin. Assisting congressman Nick as a rapporteur on security policy as well as on Turkey, Hungary, and South America, Fuhrmann took part in the 2019 edition of the ISC, held in April, and was one of the moderators of the confidential workshop that preceded the 16th edition of Forte de Copacabana in September 2019. Jan Fuhrmann, interview by author, October 15, 2019, Berlin. The ISC was annually held by KAS Turkey Office and the Center for Strategic Research of Başkent University in Ankara from 2008 to 2016; since 2017, the conference has taken place in Istanbul. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, "Istanbul Security Conference® 2019 "Reassurance and Reengagement" 28. - 30. April 2019, Istanbul: The 12th Istanbul Security Conference® 2019 organized by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Turkey in cooperation with the Center For Strategic Research of the Başkent University Ankara took place in Istanbul from 28th to 30th of April under the program title "Reassurance and Reengagement"," accessed September 7, 2020, https://www.kas.de/en/web/tuerkei/veranstaltungen/detail/-/content/istanbul-security-conference-2019-reassurance-and-reengagement-28-30-april-2019-istanbul.

[394] Annette Schwarzbauer, interview by author. "*Also, woran wir im Moment da arbeiten ist eben eine Verknüpfung von dieser europäisch-lateinamerikanischen Sicherheitskonferenz mit der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz. Also, dass man versucht da die Brücke zu schlagen und auch da das Bewusstsein zu wecken, ,Okay… Also, auch Lateinamerika ist eine wichtige Region, auf die man mal gucken sollte*."

> who has smaller meetings in between the two main events, just to ensure continuity in the debate and discussion, yes? And, thirdly, that, of course, this core group should reach out to Europe as well as to North America in order to—and then it resembles more the Munich Security Conference—in order to raise awareness that there is something going on in Latin America in terms of security and defence policies.[395]

4.5 Brazil talking to the West: claims of influence and achievements of the "Forte de Copacabana" process

As pointed out in the previous section, the language and the imagery of Munich have been appropriated by the foundation, its consultants, and closest advisers in order to frame the conference project in Brazil within a specific constellation of symbols, scenarios, and ideational agendas. Apart from merely amplifying the resonance of Forte among Western observers, the reference to the MSC or to the early "transatlantic family meeting" of *Wehrkunde* provides them with the grammar and structure with which to describe and make sense of the dialogue forum in Brazil—as in Hofmeister's "a 'Munich', in quotation marks, 'Security Conference' in Latin America."[396] Most importantly, though, the analogy contains an idea of paramount importance to the organisations driving the dialogue process in Brazil, namely the ascendancy of the US and NATO over European security and, consequently, the imperative to involve them in the conversations as well. In fact, that idea not only permeates the entire work of the foundation in the area of security policy, but also underpins KAS' ultimate objective with the "Forte de Copacabana" process: to nudge the B in the BRICS to promote and defend the Western-led liberal international system. Even if this objective has not been fully achieved, to the dialogue organisers the annual conference and its complementary mechanisms have made substantial contributions in the right direction.

[395] Carlo Masala, interview by author.

[396] Wilhelm Hofmeister, interview by author. The expression "transatlantic family meeting" appears in Wolfgang Ischinger, "Toward Mutual Security: From Wehrkunde to the Munich Security Conference," in *Towards Mutual Security: Fifty Years of Munich Security Conference*, ed. Wolfgang Ischinger, 1. Aufl. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014), 32.

4.5.1 "NATO may not be a devil": opening space for an idea

As shown in Appendix 1, the lists of conferees at the flagship event include numerous scholars from US Department of Defense institutions such as the National Defense University and the Marine Corps University as well as researchers from Washington-based think tanks such as the Wilson Center, the American Enterprise Institute, the Atlantic Council, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Furthermore, US government representatives such as Donald Camp, foreign policy adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations at the US Department of State, have joined the meetings, too. Numerous representatives from NATO and the NATO Defense College (NDC) have also taken part in the dialogue process over the years—mostly, but not exclusively, through their participation at the annual Forte de Copacabana Conferences. These include, for instance, the then Adviser on Policy Planning at the Office of the Secretary General at NATO's headquarters, Antonio Ortiz, one of the panellists in 2006; in 2010, retired German general Klaus Naumann, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee from 1996 to 1999, joined the defence ministers from Brazil and Chile, Nelson Jobim and Jaime Ravinet, to deliver one of the opening speeches at the seventh edition of the conference. Top representatives of NDC's Research Division, such as Karl-Heinz Kamp and Brooke Windsor-Smith, have also attended the event; in addition, NDC Commandant Lieutenant General Chris Whitecross was a guest speaker at the 14th edition of Forte in 2017.

Patrick Keller, KAS' former coordinator for foreign and security policy, was unequivocal when explaining the reason why NATO officials and representatives of the NDC as well as US scholars, think tankers, and government representatives must always be part of the dialogue forum in Brazil: "[a]nd maybe you also have the point, especially when you talk about security: is it useful to have a European-South American dialogue without the US?" He continues: "[t]he European security is unthinkable without the US, without NATO, so it's always part of the conversation."[397] More than simply acknowledging the relevance of the US and the transatlantic alliance for European security, by engaging them in the dialogue process in Brazil the organisers have actively sought to reduce what they perceive as a deep-seated mistrust of both the United States and NATO among Brazilian authorities. According to the former coordinator for foreign and security policy at KAS headquarters in Berlin, even though the US and NATO must always be part of the conversations, "it shouldn't be too visible. Because, as we have

[397] Patrick Keller, interview by author.

noticed, there is a gut reaction in the region, especially in Brazil, to the US that is not helpful for the kind of conversation that we strive for." [398]

Former office director Wilhelm Hofmeister shared a similar impression in this regard during our conversation in Madrid. Comparing his experience while working in Latin America to the time when he was KAS Regional Representative for Southeast Asia in Singapore later into the 2000s, Hofmeister stressed the "great deal of reluctance" he found among Brazilians towards the US and the transatlantic alliance at that moment:

> I later started a NATO-Asia dialogue in Asia because there was an interest from NATO as well, because of security problems there in Asia, but that was easier so to speak, because I found interest in NATO and there was interest on the Asian side anyway. In Latin America that was not there yet and... There was always a great deal of reluctance in Brazil towards the US. And NATO is of course dominated by the US, so I didn't get the impression that there was a great deal of interest in moving towards NATO, to get closer to it.[399]

Meanwhile, KAS staff members and consultants with whom we spoke during our research were also emphatic about the mismatch between Brazilian authorities' persistent reluctance towards the US and NATO and the latter's growing interest in strengthening links with the country during the entire period under analysis. As Masala put it, "there is an interest, of course, of NATO in Brazil, and they have this kind of awkward relationship, where basically Brazil really doesn't want to get in contact with NATO."[400] In this regard, the administration of former president Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and, in particular, the years in which Nelson Jobim served as defence minister (2007-2011) were underscored by different interviewees as the high point of Brazilian government officials' antipathy towards the transatlantic alliance.

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[398] Patrick Keller, interview by author. It is worth reproducing Keller's statement in full: "There are many strategic and tactical discussions behind all that. They are never finished, we continue having that. Because, on the one hand, in this interview I have been talking about Brazil a lot because that's the key reason, but we want to incorporate the other countries of the region as well. But if you do that sometimes you have to acknowledge that the region is not as unified as you would like to have it for a fruitful dialogue. It's mostly, then, South American countries talking among themselves about their perspectives. Which is also useful, maybe that's not so much the dialogue between the regions. And maybe you have also the point, especially when you talk about security, is it useful to have a European-South American dialogue without the US? The European security is unthinkable without the US, without NATO, so it's always part of the conversation, but it shouldn't be too visible. Because as we have noticed there is a gut reaction in the region, especially in Brazil, to the US that is not helpful for the kind of conversation that we strive for."

[399] Wilhelm Hofmeister, interview by author. "*Ich habe später in Asian einen NATO-Asien-Dialog angefangen, weil es ein Interesse gab, von der NATO auch, wegen Sicherheitsprobleme da in Asien, aber das war einfacher, sozusagen, weil bei der NATO habe ich Interesse gefunden und auf asiatischer Seite gab es ohnehin auch das Interesse. In Lateinamerika war das noch nicht da und… Es gab ja auch in Brasilien bisher immer sehr große Zurückhaltung gegenüber den USA. Und NATO ist natürlich USA-dominiert und von daher hatte ich nicht den Eindruck, dass es da so ein großes Interesse jetzt da in Richtung NATO gibt, um sich da anzunähern*."

[400] Carlo Masala, interview by author.

Documental sources related to the 2010 edition of the conference, in which former minister Jobim was accompanied on stage by the former chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Klaus Naumann, help us understand the rationale behind this narrative. In an article for BBC News Brasil reporting on the meeting, Júlia Dias Carneiro writes, for instance, that "defence minister Nelson Jobim strongly criticized the United States at the Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference," adding that "Jobim denounced the expansion of the frontiers of action of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."[401] The report quotes different passages from the minister's opening speech at the event, which quite vividly express the abovementioned reluctance and antipathy towards NATO on the part of Brazilian officials during the Workers' Party administration: "No South American nation," stated Jobim, "is part of a defensive regional alliance which claims the right to intervene anywhere in the world based on the most diverse pretexts."[402] In a similar tone, the minister acknowledged the relevance of European partners for the ambitious military build-up project envisioned for the coming years, yet he reiterated that future prospects for cooperation in the defence sector would ultimately depend on how these partners positioned themselves vis-à-vis certain "military-diplomatic schemes." In his words, as reproduced by Carneiro in the news agency report: "the less Europe supports military-diplomatic schemes that are seen as attempts to reduce Brazil's margin of autonomy, the greater the possibilities will be."[403]

The Brazilian defence minister stated his position even more plainly during a press conference held on the sidelines of the meeting, documented by the organisers' media partner, the news agency DefesaNet. Earlier that year, on 10 September 2010, Jobim had been a guest speaker at the seminar "The Future of the Transatlantic Community" in Lisbon, Portugal. The meeting, promoted by the Portuguese think tanks National Defense Institute (Instituto de Defesa Nacional, IDN) and Portuguese Institute for International Relations (Instituto Português de

[401] Júlia D. Carneiro, "Jobim critica proposta americana de unificar Atlântico Norte e Sul," November 4, 2010, accessed September 7, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2010/11/101104_jobim_entrevista_jc. "*O ministro da Defesa, Nelson Jobim, criticou duramente os Estados Unidos durante a Conferência de Segurança Internacional do Forte de Copacabana, no Rio […] Jobim condenou a expansão de fronteiras de atuação da Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (Otan).*"

[402] Carneiro, "Jobim critica proposta americana de unificar Atlântico Norte e Sul". "*Nenhuma nação sul-americana é parte de uma aliança regional defensiva que se arvora poder intervir em qualquer parte do mundo com base nos mais variados pretextos*."

[403] Carneiro, "Jobim critica proposta americana de unificar Atlântico Norte e Sul". "*Antes de encerrar a palestra, Jobim lembrou que o processo de aparelhamento e capacitação militar do Brasil já conta com fortes parcerias com países europeus, e que as possibilidades de cooperação futuras são enormes. Porém, disse que 'estas possibilidades serão tanto maiores quanto menor for o apoio da Europa a esquemas diplomáticos militares que venham a se entender como tentativas de reduzir a margem de autonomia do Brasil'*".

Relações Internacionais, IPRI), aimed at discussing NATO's new Strategic Concept, later submitted to heads of government at the alliance's November 2010 summit.[404] The message delivered by the Brazilian minister at the Lisbon seminar in September anticipated the position presented at the Forte de Copacabana Conference a few months later.[405] At the press conference in Rio, Jobim was asked to comment on the repercussions of his statements regarding NATO on foreign audiences; replying to the enquiry, he explained the reasons and rationales behind Brazil's refusal to dialogue with the transatlantic alliance at that moment:

> We have the following situation: it is our position, the Brazilian position, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was born in the post-war period. What was the purpose? During the Cold War, it was to protect the European countries from the Soviet Union, the former Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union came to an end, it seemed that NATO had lost its objective. And then there was a change in NATO's strategy. They have recently approved a new NATO strategy, that NATO's theatre of operations can be the whole world, anywhere where the interests of the alliance's member countries might be harmed. This means that we would have two international bodies: the United Nations, which can act around the world, and NATO—which would also be arrogating this to itself. We are against that. Even in the Atlantic, the South Atlantic. They wanted to talk about the South Atlantic. No, NATO has nothing to do with the South Atlantic! The South Atlantic is an issue that concerns the countries of the South.[406]

[404] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement," Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization, accessed September 11, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_63654.htm.

[405] The news agency DefesaNet documents the participation of former minister Nelson Jobim at the seminar in Lisbon and reproduces the content of his speech in full on the following address: DefesaNet, "Jobim - O Futuro da Comunidade Transatlântica: Palestra do ministro da Defesa do Brasil, Nelson A. Jobim no Encerramento da Conferência Internacional "O Futuro da Comunidade Transatlântica"," accessed September 11, 2020, https://www.defesanet.com.br/defesa/noticia/3381/.

[406] Nelson During, "Entrevista Coletiva Ministro Nelson Jobim - Forte de Copacabana: DNTV - Entrevista do Ministro Nelson Jobim no evento do Forte de Copacabana organizado pela Fundação Konrad Adenauer." November 7, 2010, accessed September 14, 2020, https://www.defesanet.com.br/dntv/78/Entrevista-Coletiva-Ministro-Nelson-Jobim---Forte-de-Copacabana-. "*A situação é a seguinte: É uma posição nossa, do Brasil, de que a Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte foi... nasceu no pós-guerra. Qual era a finalidade? No decorrer da Guerra Fria, era proteger os países europeus da União Soviética, da antiga União Soviética. Quando se extinguiu a União Soviética, ao que tudo indica, a OTAN teria perdido o seu objetivo. E aí houve uma mudança da estratégia da OTAN. Até hoje, agora recentemente, eles aprovaram uma nova estratégia da OTAN, [de] que o teatro de operações da OTAN pode ser o mundo todo, em locais em que possam ferir os interesses dos países membros da aliança. Ora, isso significa o seguinte, que nós teríamos dois organismos internacionais: as Nações Unidas, que podem agir no mundo todo, e a OTAN que também estaria se arrogando a isso. Isso nós somos contra. Inclusive quanto ao Atlântico, o Atlântico Sul. Eles queriam conversar sobre o Atlântico Sul. Não, a OTAN não tem nada a ver com o Atlântico Sul! O Atlântico Sul é um assunto que diz respeito aos países do sul."*

It should be no surprise, then, that the conference report issued by KAS' liaison office in Brazil a few days after the event highlighted the "scepticism and mistrust" of Brazilian representatives in attendance and noted, in particular, Jobim's markedly critical attitude towards the US and NATO. "For his statement 'there is no security in Europe without the U.S.,' General Naumann was critically questioned by Minister Jobim (and by other conference participants from South America)," states former KAS director in Brazil, Peter Fischer-Bollin, in that year's event report.[407] The meeting took place in the immediate aftermath of the 2010 presidential elections in Brazil, won in the run-off by Lula da Silva's successor, Dilma Rousseff; the participation of the highest-ranking government representative to defence and security issues was, therefore, "eagerly expected."[408] According to the report, the audience in attendance witnessed a "controversial debate" between Jobim, his Chilean couterpart Ravinet, and General Naumann, in which disagreements concerning the role of the US and the transatlantic alliance in the global security architecture played a crucial role. The following passage is illustrative of how the dialogue organisers narrate the course of that year's event: "Jobim stated: 'Only the South Americans are responsible for security in South America!' In the controversial debate between the two ministers and General Naumann, the strong Brazilian self-confidence (not least because of the country's wealth of resources) and its critical stance towards the US and NATO became clearly apparent."[409]

When accounting for the achievements of the Forte de Copacabana process, the narratives transmitted by the dialogue organisers consistently point to the contribution of the conference and its complementary mechanisms in establishing personal ties, assuaging fears, mistrust, and animosities, and thereby paving the way for mutual cooperation between Brazil and NATO. Alfredo Valladão, one of the architects of the conference project, used an emblematic metaphor to comment on that matter: "the conference has opened space for the idea that NATO was not

[407] Peter Fischer-Bollin, "Sicherheitskonferenz mit Verteidigungsminister Jobim und General Naumann: Differenzen offen ausgetragen," Veranstaltungsberichte (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Rio de Janeiro, 2010), https://www.kas.de/pt/web/brasilien/veranstaltungsberichte/detail/-/content/sicherheitskonferenz-mit-verteidigungsminister-jobim-und-general-naumann. "*Für seine Aussage ‚es gibt für Europa keine Sicherheit ohne die USA' wurde General Naumann von Minister Jobim (und anderen Konferenzteilnehmern aus Südamerika) kritisch hinterfragt*."

[408] Fischer-Bollin, "Sicherheitskonferenz mit Verteidigungsminister Jobim und General Naumann". „*Mit Spannung wurde der erste Auftritt des brasilianischen Verteidigungsministers Nelson Jobim nach der Wahl der neuen Präsidentin Dilma Rousseff am vergangenen Sonntag erwartet*."

[409] Fischer-Bollin, "Sicherheitskonferenz mit Verteidigungsminister Jobim und General Naumann". „*Jobim sagte: ‚Für die Sicherheit in Südamerika sind nur die Südamerikaner zuständig!' In der kontroversen Debatte zwischen den beiden Ministern und General Naumann kam das starke brasilianische Selbstbewusstsein (nicht zuletzt wegen des ressourcenreichtums des Landes) und seine kritische Haltung zu den USA sowie der NATO deutlich zum Vorschein*."

that devil who was going to eat us. That's essential. And the personal contacts, they are essential too [...] This networking and the idea that NATO may not be a devil have created the conditions for the military, the diplomats to think that it is possible to dialogue with NATO."[410] In the same vein, Felix Dane underscored the "massive interpretation the foundation can do to European partners." Noting the "difference between the rhetoric of Brazil and how it actually acts," the former head of KAS liaison office in Rio de Janeiro highlighted one of the strategies used in the foundation's security-related work in the country in order to dispel Brazilians' mistrust of US and NATO representatives: "if you listen to Brazilian officials in the first place, it doesn't sound very cooperative when it comes to NATO for example. But when you put them in a small room alone, you realize how well they cooperate and how big the interest actually is."[411]

Furthermore, Dane was emphatic about NATO-Brazil relations when narrating the main achievements of the foundation's work in the area of security policy in the country:

> Well, I think one of the main achievements, I would say, is that the conference continues to grow, that the conference now has these pre-conferences throughout the year. Another major achievement was that we managed to have the NDC, the NATO Defense College, and Brazil talking to one another. The interest of the military was by far larger than of the politicians, but that is something natural in a way. They both speak the same language if you want. That NATO-Brazil dialogue came about during the security conference when we said, "We need to do something special." And that was exactly during the closed-door workshop that we decided we needed to do something special and then during the Brazil-EU Forum, which also the foundation hosts, we created that dialogue. And then we now try to have someone of the NDC always present and we try to bring some officers to the NDC, so there is some sort of communication channel which is establishing.[412]

In the passage reproduced above, the former office director briefly accounts for the preparation process that preceded the first "High-Level Academic Roundtable Meeting on Brazil and the Euro-Atlantic Area," jointly organised by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, the NDC,

[410] Alfredo Valladão, interview by author. "*Eu acho que a conferência abriu espaço para trazer a ideia de que a OTAN não era aquele diabo que ia comer a gente. Isso é fundamental. E também foi fundamental os contatos pessoais que foram feitos. Vinha gente da OTAN, depois se conversava, tomava um drink depois, esse tipo de coisa. Esse networking, junto com essa ideia de que a OTAN pode ser que não seja um diabo, criou as condições para que os militares, os diplomatas, começassem a achar que seria possível dialogar em todo caso com a OTAN.*"

[411] Felix Dane, interview by author. "*I realised the difference between the rhetoric of Brazil and how it actually acts. That is a massive interpretation the foundation can do to European partners. Because if you listen to Brazilian officials in the first place, it doesn't sound very cooperative when it comes to NATO for example. But when you put them in a small room alone, you realize how well they cooperate and how big the interest actually is."*

[412] Felix Dane, interview by author.

and the Brazilian think tank Getulio Vargas Foundation (Fundação Getulio Vargas, FGV) on 9 May 2013 in Rio de Janeiro.[413] Convened behind closed doors, participants of the round-table meeting discussed "the position of Brazil and NATO as global security providers," addressing in five different panels a variety of security policy issues. Following an assessment of "mutual and self perceptions" at the opening session, the topics under discussion throughout the event included peace and humanitarian assistance operations, maritime security in the Atlantic, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the notions of R2P and RwP. As reported by the organisers, the unprecedented initiative expressed "a conscious effort to better understand the actors of the new geopolitical and economic environment and who they are, in order to identify opportunities for mutual reinforcement, or at least, de-confliction."[414]

Furthermore, from the one-day confidential meeting resulted a bilingual edited volume with contributions from the group of academics and senior officials gathered at the event, published two years later by the NDC as part of its Forum Paper Series.[415] Brooke Smith-Windsor, one of the moderators of the event and the editor of the 2015 publication, points out in the volume's introductory chapter that "[t]he roudtable and this book emanated from the perspective that cooperation in support of international peace and security is rarely accidental."[416] Given the growing aspirations of a "now firmly entrenched democratic Brazil" and the enduring relevance of the transatlantic alliance to the stability of the liberal world order, the time had come for both sides to start devising ways to engage in dialogue and cooperation—not least because "when it comes to the management of international security, they [Brazil and NATO] will inevitably, and increasingly, encounter one another."[417] In this regard, the then deputy head

[413] Contrary to what Dane affirmed in the passage reproduced above, the 2013 NATO-Brazil roundtable meeting was held a month before that year's edition of the "Forum Brazil-Europe," yet another venue for dialogue promoted by the global think tank in the country. In 2013, the annual event reached its 20th edition and was co-hosted by the Brazilian Parliamentary Group for EU-Brazil Relations, the Delegation of the European Union to Brazil, and the University of Brasilia. See Gregory Ryan, "XX Forum Brazil-Europe: Comprehensive event report," Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, accessed September 15, 2020, https://www.kas.de/en/web/brasilien/veranstaltungsberichte/detail/-/content/xx.-forum-brasilien-europa1.

[414] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The NATO Defense College in Brazil - 9 May: Roundtable Meeting on Brazil and the Euro-Atlantic Area," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, accessed September 15, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_100676.htm?selectedLocale=en.

[415] Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, ed., *Enduring NATO, Rising Brazil: Managing International Security in a Recalibrating Global Order*, NDC Forum Paper Series (Rome: NATO Defense College, Research Division, 2015); Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, Elena Lazarou and Bruno Reis, eds., *OTAN Duradoura, Brasil em Ascensão: Gestão da Segurança Internacional em uma Ordem Mundial em Mudança*, NDC Forum Paper Series (Rome: NATO Defense College, Research Division, 2015).

[416] Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, "Introduction," in *Enduring NATO, Rising Brazil: Managing International Security in a Recalibrating Global Order*, ed. Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, NDC Forum Paper Series (Rome: NATO Defense College, Research Division, 2015), 24.

[417] Smith-Windsor, "Introduction," 23; 25.

of NDC's research division refers in particular to NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept and to Brazil's 2012 Defence White Paper, as "notable examples" of both sides' "intention to take on international responsibilities when it comes to questions of peace and security."[418]

Likewise, in a foreword to the book, the Strategic and International Affairs Advisor to NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Stephen R. Covington, welcomes what he refers to as the "initiation of a dialogue that will benefit Brazil and NATO in many ways in this era."[419] To Covington, the confidential meeting promoted by KAS, the Getulio Vargas Foundation, and the NDC in May 2013 "marked the beginning of an intellectual partnership between Brazil and NATO to pursue open conversations and debates on broad security issues affecting both actors in the 21st century." "Ultimately," he concludes, "these discussions represent the starting point in a process that could lead to a more formalized partnership between Brazil and NATO."[420]

No similar event was held in the years following the first roundtable meeting, yet the ambition to promote dialogue and cooperation between Brazil and NATO has remained at the core of KAS' security-related work in the country. To that end, both the open stage of the annual conferences and the series of confidential meetings held on the margins of the flagship event have served as privileged discursive spaces.

Echoing the position of former office director Felix Dane on this matter, the former coordinator for international relations projects at KAS' Brazil Office, Diogo Winnikes, stressed during our conversation the relevance of confidential spaces as "a way for us to contribute, say, indirectly to this dialogue."[421] To illustrate his point, Winnikes referred to the pre-conference workshop hosted at the Fort Copacabana on 28 September 2017, in which NDC Commandant Lieutenant General Whitecross was introduced to Divisional General Décio Luís Schons, then commandant of Brazil's Superior War College: "it is in these moments when they know each other personally," he explained, "that they are able to talk about future projects. Anyway, we make this bridge. They get to know each other, and from then on the expectation is that this

[418] Smith-Windsor, "Introduction," 24.

[419] Stephen R. Covington, "Foreword," in *Enduring NATO, Rising Brazil: Managing International Security in a Recalibrating Global Order*, ed. Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, NDC Forum Paper Series (Rome: NATO Defense College, Research Division, 2015), 17.

[420] Covington, "Foreword," 17.

[421] Jan Woischnik and Diogo Winnikes, interview by author.

cooperation between Brazil and NATO, for example, will be further developed and will continue as it was the case in previous years."[422] Jan Woischnik also confirmed that expectation when we asked him to comment on the statements of his predecessor regarding NATO-Brazil relations: "Yes, with respect to NATO, what Felix Dane said is absolutely correct," stated the former head of KAS liaison office in Rio. "And I really think that it was very positive that we had Whitecross and I wish we will have another participant next year, either from the NATO Defense College or from NATO itself in Brussels.[423]

Carlo Masala, who has worked for KAS as a security policy consultant for over 25 years while occupying different positions at the NDC, provided us with a more nuanced account of the contributions that might be expected from activities such as the roundtable meeting or the pre-conference workshop to the future of NATO-Brazil relations. Narrating his long-time experience as an evaluator of and assistant to the foundation's security-related work abroad, Masala stressed the "much broader political forces pushing or blocking this kind of contact," which, in his view, should always be taken into account when one speaks of influence.[424] To him, "the Adenauer Foundation is a venue where basically NATO and a country can meet without having any official relations and discuss […] what the Adenauer Foundation can do is to facilitate these contacts and actually contribute to dispel mistrust or wrong perceptions on both sides;" nonetheless, to Masala the eventual success of any investment made to promote cooperation is ultimately conditioned by both sides' political will to dialogue and cooperate: "I wouldn't go so far and say, 'Without the Adenauer Foundation, Brazil would have never had contact with NATO' […] But at least when Brazil decided to get closer to NATO, yes, there were a couple of people in the administration who already had experience in talking to NATO

[422] Jan Woischnik and Diogo Winnikes, interview by author. Lieutenant General Chris Whitecross was NDC Commandant from 2016 to 2020; Divisional General Décio Luís Schons was ESG Commandant from 2017 to 2019. "*E só voltando à OTAN também, é exatamente isso que você falou, uma forma de a gente poder contribuir, digamos, indiretamente para esse diálogo. Por exemplo, no dia 28 [de setembro de 2017], no dia anterior, foi a oportunidade que a comandante, a Whitecross, teve a oportunidade de conhecer o general Schons, que é o comandante da Escola de Defesa do Brasil. Então, é nesses momentos em que eles se conhecem pessoalmente que eles têm condição de falar sobre futuros projetos. Enfim, a gente faz essa ponte. Eles se conhecem, e a partir daí a expectativa é de que essa cooperação entre Brasil e OTAN, por exemplo, seja ainda mais desenvolvida e seja retomada como foi feito nos anos anteriores*."

[423] Jan Woischnik and Diogo Winnikes, interview by author. "*Sim, com respeito à OTAN, é absolutamente correto o que disse o Felix Dane e acho realmente muito positivo que tivemos a Whitecross e queria também que, no ano que vem, [houvesse] outra vez uma participação, seja do NATO Defense College seja da mesma NATO em Bruxelas*."

[424] Carlo Masala, interview by author.

officials and who probably, due to their experience, could facilitate this decision. This is what I would say."[425]

4.5.2 "A better strategic conversation": complementing official diplomacy

The initiation of a dialogue channel between Brazilian authorities and NATO is but one of the achievements that KAS and its partners claim to have attained through the "Forte de Copacabana" process. In fact, a number of other claims of influence might be found in the primary source material collected and analysed during our research. An achievement in itself according to the dialogue organisers is the mere fact that the conference project has continued over the years, growing out of a small-scale, confidential event at the very Fort Copacabana to become a sought-after, online live-streamed gathering of IR scholars and practitioners, thinkers and doers. Over the course of the last fifteen years, what is more, KAS' security policy work has provoked a mentality shift in the country, promoting effective change in civil-military relations and playing a "significant role" in shaping defence policy in Brazil.[426] These are the narratives we turn to next.

Alfredo Valladão and former KAS Brazil office director Jan Woischnik explained during the interviews we conducted with them how the dialogue forum established in the early 2000s has allegedly changed the mindset of Brazilian decision makers and armed forces officials. "I think the interesting thing about Forte de Copacabana," stated the former head of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, "was that it created in Brazil […] this idea that you could have a space where academics, diplomats, military, police, and defence industry executives could discuss in a relatively simple and open way. This was totally new, in my view, to the Brazilian

[425] Carlo Masala, interview by author. It is worth reproducing Masala's statement on this issue in full: "I've participated in a lot of these events to bring certain countries closer to NATO, undertaken by the Adenauer Foundation. Of course, the Adenauer Foundation is a venue where basically NATO and a country can meet without having any official relations and discuss. I'll just give you an example: we talked to Indians for seven years about a closer cooperation with NATO. And for seven years in a row we had the feeling that nothing is moving. In the eight year the declaration was signed between NATO and India. I don't attribute this to us, because I think there's much broader political forces pushing or blocking this kind of contact. But, of course, what the Adenauer Foundation can do is to facilitate contact and actually to contribute to dispel mistrust or wrong perceptions on both sides. I wouldn't go so far and say, 'Without the Adenauer Foundation, Brazil would have never had contact with NATO'. This, I think, is pushing the envelope too far. But at least when Brazil decided to get closer to NATO, yes?, there were a couple of people in the administration who already had experience in talking to NATO officials and who probably, due to their experience, could facilitate this decision. This is what I would say. I wouldn't attribute it to the work, but I would say, 'Yes, it contributed'."

[426] Gerhard Wahlers, ed., *International Security Policy in the Global Work of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung* (Berlin, 2015), http://www.kas.de/wf/en/33.41326/, accessed March 30, 2018.

mindset in general, the mindset of Brazilian decision makers in general, who are much more narrow-minded."[427] Similarly, Woischnik stressed KAS' privileged access to government officials and state institutions in the country as an evidence of that shift—and a confirmation that one of the foundation's key objectives with Forte has been achieved: "And Forte de Copacabana […] had this objective, didn't it? To create this dialogue between the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defence, and the civil society [...] Today we have access to the Ministry, we gather in the minister's office, we have access to Fort Copacabana. This was not usual. So there, we have already changed the mindset of the Brazilian Armed Forces."[428]

The claims of influence we find in our primary sources also refer to Brazil's legal framework in the field of defence and security. In a brochure titled "International Security Policy in the Global Work of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung," for instance, the foundation offers an extensive overview of its worldwide activities in the areas of foreign and security policy.[429] Most importantly, the 2015 publication discusses the context, priorities, and achievements of a wide array of projects it conducts all over the world—in Europe and North America; in the Asia-Pacific and the MENA regions; in Sub-Saharan Africa and, also, in Latin America. Most of the ideas advanced in the publication echo the same narratives we have dealt with when discussing the evolution of the conference project in Brazil over the last two decades, with which KAS representatives make sense, justify, and legitimise their worldwide engagement in the field of international security. What stands out in this particular publication, however, is the way in which the global think tank accounts for the alleged influence of its work in the country—especially revealing as it is of how the dialogue organisers narrate the achievements of the "Forte de Copacabana" process.

Opening the chapter on Latin America, a two-page report under the heading "Rio de Janeiro, Brazil – Forte de Copacabana" begins by pointing out how the fifth largest country in the world has come to take on a "significant role within the international order where matters

[427] Alfredo Valladão, interview by author. "*Eu acho que o interessante do Forte de Copacabana foi isso foi de criar no Brasil* [...] *essa ideia de que era possível você ter um espaço onde os acadêmicos, os diplomatas, os militares, os policiais e os empresários de defesa pudessem discutir de uma maneira relativamente simples e livre. Uma coisa totalmente nova a meu ver, na mentalidade brasileira em geral, dos decision-makers brasileiros em geral, que é uma mentalidade muito mais fechada*."

[428] Jan Woischnik and Diogo Winnikes, interview by author. "*E o Forte de Copacabana, falo agora das primeiras edições a princípio do milênio, tiveram esse objetivo, não? De criar esse diálogo das Forças Armadas, do Ministério da Defesa com a sociedade civil. Esse foi um resultado do Forte, que hoje parece normal, mas não foi normal quando começamos. Hoje temos acesso ao Ministério, nos reunimos na sala do ministro, temos acesso ao Forte de Copacabana. Não foi normal. Aí já mudou a mentalidade das Forças Armadas brasileiras*."

[429] Wahlers, *International Security Policy in the Global Work of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*.

of foreign and security policy are concerned:" not just due to its natural resources and free-market economy, but also because Brazil's development and social system had been "based securely on democratic principles."[430] "The fact that Brazil sees itself as a major power," the report proceeds, "also provides the basis for the country's active diplomatic engagement, both in the Global South and vis-à-vis the Western countries and in the institutions of the liberal international system such as the UN and the G20." The account then turns to the dialogue forum initiated in the early 2000s, summarising its purpose, core themes, and, finally, its "impressive" achievements:

> The achievements of the conference are impressive. The discussed topics frequently take on a significant role in shaping and directing the debate on defence policy in some of the participating states. One current example is the Brazilian White Paper on Defence, which was commissioned by the then Brazilian Defence Minister, Nelson Jobim, after the benefits of such policy documents had been discussed in the course of the conference.[431]

As discussed in the previous chapter, Brazil's basic legal framework in the field of defence and security was remarkably expanded during the Workers' Party thirteen-year administration—the White Paper being the culmination of that process. The National Defence Policy (PDN), originally published in 1996, was updated twice in the period—in 2005 and 2012; a National Defence Strategy (END) was launched in 2008, translating the goals envisioned by the PDN into practical terms and proposing medium and long-term actions aimed at modernising the country's force structure; finally, Brazil's first-ever Defence White Paper was introduced in 2012, the same year the END went through its first review and eventually came into effect.[432]

None of the representatives of the foundation interviewed during our research, nor any of its associates driving the organisation of the conferences, goes so far as to state that Brazil's defence legislation, and the White Paper in particular, is somehow a direct outcome of the meetings. Yet what different actors do claim is that "Forte" has established itself as an unofficial, complementary channel of communication whereby EU and government officials, military personnel, and the research community from both sides of the Atlantic can jointly deliberate on the meaning and implications of each other's policies, programmes, and philosophies in matters

[430] Wahlers, *International Security Policy in the Global Work of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*, 40.

[431] Wahlers, *International Security Policy in the Global Work of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*, 40.

[432] Lima, Maria Regina Soares de et al., *Atlas da Política Brasileira de Defesa*, 30.

of defence and security—thus bridging an otherwise detrimental gap in conversations via official channels. As Valladão put it in our interview, from a certain point in time the annual conferences became a forum in which government representatives were able to "lay out the Brazilian doctrine," i.e. the ideas advanced in the new defence legislation:

> What was interesting is that, when the [Brazilian] Ministry of Defence started to get interested in it, it also gave more strength to Forte, when the defence minister participated in these things. A kind of forum was created, where certain Brazilian officials were able to lay out the Brazilian doctrine. And don't forget that this was at a time when we were preparing the White Paper and all that, the National Defence Strategy… Therefore, there was a kind of environment that allowed this forum to serve a purpose, that made this explanatory statement possible.[433]

Such an "explanatory statement" would be made by successive government representatives who attended the conference in the years following the inaugural participation of former defence minister Nelson Jobim in 2007. As noted above, Jobim returned to the event on two other occasions in the future, in 2008 and 2010; in addition, key advisors to former president Lula da Silva took part in the conference during his second term in office (2007-2010), including Roberto Mangabeira Unger (2008), Minister of Strategic Affairs, or "minister of ideas," under former presidents Lula and Dilma Rousseff, as well as Marco Aurélio Garcia (2009), the top foreign policy adviser to the president throughout the PT administrations.[434] Exceptionally, Rousseff's defence minister Celso Amorim, who had served as Minister of Foreign Affairs throughout the Lula years, never took part in the event. His time in office thus stands in stark contrast to the sequence of Brazilian defence ministers who joined the speakers and panellists at Forte between 2007 and 2018, from civilian officers Nelson Jobim (2007, 2008, 2010) and

[433] Alfredo Valladão, interview by author. "*Agora, o que foi interessante é que quando o Ministério da Defesa começou a se interessar, também deu mais força ao Forte, quando vinha o ministro da defesa participar dessas coisas. Aí começou a [se] criar uma espécie de fórum, onde alguns responsáveis brasileiros podiam expor a doutrina brasileira. E não esqueça que foi em uma época em que a gente estava fazendo o Livro Branco [de Defesa Nacional], toda aquela... a Estratégia de Defesa Nacional [Estratégia Nacional de Defesa], então havia uma espécie de ambiente, assim, que permitiu que esse fórum servisse para alguma coisa, para que houvesse essa exposição de motivos*."

[434] Roberto Mangabeira Unger served as Brazil's Minister of Strategic Affairs on two occasions: from June 2007 to June 2009, during former president Lula's second term in office, and from February 2015 to September 2015, under former president Rousseff. Marco Aurélio Garcia, a founding member and leading political figure of the Workers' Party, was the Special Advisor to the President for International Affairs from 2006 to 2016. See Alexei Barrionuevo, "'Minister of Ideas' Tries to Put Brazil's Future in Focus," February 2, 2008, accessed March 19, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/02/world/americas/02unger.html; Flávia Marreiro, "Morre Marco Aurélio Garcia, pilar da política externa de Lula e do PT," July 21, 2017, accessed March 19, 2020, https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2017/07/20/politica/1500577794_700967.html.

Raul Jungmann (2016, 2017) to Army General Joaquim Silva e Luna (2018).[435] Notwithstanding this, several different civil and military officials represented the Brazilian federal government at the conferences during Rousseff's presidency, accompanied on stage by high-level representatives of EU institutions such as the EEAS or the EUMS as well as EU member states. They include, among others, Lieutenant-Brigadier Marco Aurélio Gonçalves Mendes, Chief of Strategic Affairs at the Ministry of Defence (2011); Ambassador Guilherme de Aguiar Patriota, Deputy Advisor to the President for International Affairs (2012); Admiral Carlos Augusto de Sousa, Chief of Strategic Affairs of the Joint General Staff of the Armed Forces (2013); and Divisional General Décio Luís Schons, Deputy Head of International Affairs at the Ministry of Defence (2014, 2015).

Accompanying Divisional General Schons at the opening panel of Forte's eleventh edition in 2014 was Ambassador Roland Schäfer, former Director for the Americas at the EEAS. The EU diplomat had joined Ambassador Rodrigo Baena Soares, then head of defence affairs at the Brazilian foreign office, to assess the "Brazilian and European Perspectives on the Global Security Order" in the previous edition of the conference; in 2014, in turn, Schäfer was the highest-ranking European conferee to attend the event and delivered a keynote speech on that year's overarching theme, "Multilateral Security Governance." When recollecting his participation in the two editions of the dialogue forum in an interview conducted in August 2017, Schäfer underlined the "mutual benefit" generated by the debates in Rio at that moment, referring in particular to the Global Strategy for the EU's foreign and security policy launched in 2016 and to Brazil's Defence White Paper. In his words:

> I saw the debate in a historic moment when, as you already said, the White Book of the Brazilian armed forces was published, which I think was an important step […] There may have been other achievements ten years earlier, but this was a specific moment, when it was important to accompany the Brazilian reflection and expose our reflection. It was mutual: the Brazilians had an interest in developing their defence philosophy and we were developing our foreign policy philosophy, which then ended up in the Global Strategy, and so we had a mutual benefit from it, and it was quite clear, I mean, if you then see at least two missions from foreign ministry and defence ministry officials from Brazil coming to a longer term-trip to the European Union, the headquarters of the European Union, not NATO, but [the] European Union, and saying "we want to know more about your military activities and how

[435] Celso Amorim served as Brazil's Minister of Defence from August 2011 to January 2015. During Rousseff's interrupted second term in office (January 2015 – May 2016), Amorim had two short-lived successors: former defence ministers Jacques Wagner (January 2015 – October 2015) and Aldo Rebelo (October 2015 – May 2016).

> you deal with this and how is your structure, and…" That is a very clear and concrete achievement.[436]

Former participants and observers of the process at Brazilian defence and foreign policy institutions, unlike Ambassador Schäfer or congressmen Kiesewetter and Nick, refrained from pointing to concrete achievements of KAS' security-related work in the country. To be sure, our interviewees at the Brazilian Representation to the European Union in Brussels and the Superior War College (ESG) in Rio de Janeiro acknowledged the relevance of the annual forum and its complementary venues, stressing the growing interest in, and awareness of, the Forte de Copacabana process among the defence and foreign policy communities in the country. However, whether and, if so, how government institutions and the armed forces actually "absorb" the ideas conveyed within these spaces was a question which respondents answered with doubt and reservations.

One source at the Brazilian representation to the EU, speaking on condition of anonymity, affirmed, for instance, that "this is a conference that is in the good graces of the Brazilian government. People enjoy attending it, the institutions like to contribute, and the authorities like to participate. I think this suggests the importance of the whole thing."[437] Though not a former conferee himself, the diplomat interviewed in Brussels in May 2017 emphasised that "people at Itamaraty," the Brazilian foreign office, "take it very seriously." The foreign office representative also noted that there is nowadays a greater openness to think tanks operating in the field of defence in the country: "There are areas in which we don't even want to talk to think tanks, and areas in which they are essential. I think defence, yes, this is an area where they are growing. They help you think. The Ministry of Defence is more and more open, the military themselves, not just the Ministry of Defence." Notwithstanding this, in his view it would take an "archaeological work" to determine how much decision makers truly incorporate from what

[436] Roland Schäfer, interview by author.

[437] Brazilian diplomat, Political Section, Representation of Brazil to the European Union. Interview by author. May 17, 2017. Brussels. "*É uma conferência que caiu no gosto do governo brasileiro*. *As pessoas gostam de participar, as instituições gostam de contribuir, e as autoridades gostam de participar*. *Isso eu acho que já sugere a importância do negócio*."

is discussed at think tank-organised spaces like Forte into Brazil's foreign policymaking processes. "It is not something that is institutionally processed," he concluded.[438]

In a similar vein, former ESG Commandant Divisional General Schons also admitted being unable to pinpoint any tangible results from the conferences and complementary events. Recollecting his experience both in the 2014 and 2015 editions of Forte as well as at the pre-conference workshop in 2017, the then Commandant of Brazil's Superior War College began to comment on the question of influence by describing his perception of the forum: "My perception: I would say, a very great receptiveness in Brazil, a lot of people registered, a lot of people in attendance, but very little participation from the other countries in Latin America, in South America, practically none last year."[439] The senior army officer expressed, in turn, similar reservations as the ones voiced by the Brazilian diplomat in Brussels when narrating his assessment of the overall achievements of the Forte de Copacabana process: "I would say, from this observer here, I did not see any results. I'm not saying that there are no results, but it would be interesting to ask many people this question, people in different roles, perhaps in the very structure of the Ministry of Defence and the [armed] forces."[440]

In fact, different actors involved in the organisation of the process also admitted during our interviews the inherent problem of pointing to tangible results of their work. Peter Fischer-Bollin, former head of KAS liaison office in Rio, made a distinction between two possible meanings, or senses, of achievements when commenting on the issue of influence. In his view, such a distinction derives from the fact that, unlike state institutions, organisations such as the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the other party-affiliated political foundations are not "doing

[438] Brazilian diplomat, Political Section, Representation of Brazil to the European Union. Interview by author. "*Eu sei que sim, que as pessoas no Itamaraty levam muito a sério, querem contribuir, vão falar, mas eu não sei exatamente. Agora, o quanto também que o ministério absorve, absorve do que é dito ali, tenho minhas dúvidas... Não é uma coisa institucionalmente processada. As pessoas vão, dão palestras, conhecem pessoas, fazem networking, expõe nossas percepções, mas o quanto, como e quanto elas absorvem do que foi discutido lá é difícil medir. Você tem que fazer um trabalho arqueológico* [...] *Há áreas em que a gente não quer nem saber de conversar com think tank e há áreas em que eles são fundamentais. Eu acho que em defesa sim, é uma área em que eles estão crescendo. Eles ajudam a pensar. O Ministério da Defesa está cada vez mais aberto, os próprios militares, não só o Ministério da Defesa. Nos últimos anos as forças estão cada vez mais abertas, então acho que sim*."

[439] Décio Luís Schons, interview by author, September 25, 2018, Rio de Janeiro. "*Percepção minha: vamos dizer, uma receptividade muito grande no Brasil, muita gente inscrita, muita gente participando, mas pouquíssima participação dos demais países da América Latina, da América do Sul, praticamente zero ano passado.*"

[440] Décio Luís Schons, interview by author. "*Uma coisa que eu não posso, não tenho como dizer, não tenho como avaliar, é qual o impacto dessas conferências na nossa estrutura. Eu não percebo, não consigo perceber. […] Vamos dizer, deste observador aqui, eu não consegui perceber resultados, não estou dizendo que não haja, mas seria interessante essa pergunta ser feita para muitas pessoas, para muitas pessoas em diversas funções, talvez na própria estrutura do Ministério da Defesa e das Forças*."

international relations" through their engagement abroad, but rather "complementing" official politics and the work of governments:

> I think the achievements were to have provided the space of exchange, of building up informal relations, of learning more about the other partner, of his interest, his cultural influences, social influences, economic influences, etc. But achievements in a very concrete sense as results in governmental actions […] For me it seems very difficult to claim that. I think it might be better to ask government actors if they consider us a relevant actor in international relations, but I'm almost sure that they would confirm what I've just said, that we are actors in promoting dialogue, exchange, but we are not doing international relations. That is the work of governments, not the work of political foundations. We can complement… I will speak in Portuguese: *a gente pode complementar a política governamental*. So, we can complement the official politics, but we are not part of it.[441]

Similarly, Patrick Keller, the foundation's former security policy coordinator, argued in our conversation that the problem of influence is, indeed, the "key question" in terms of evaluation: "This is always the key question also for our own evaluation, you know. If we do something that big, that costs money and time and resources of all kinds, was it worth it?" In his view, it would be misleading to look for immediate results or direct outcomes of the conferences in order to find answers to that question—not least because in the field of international political affairs, as he put it, "it is oftentimes very difficult, if not impossible, to point to tangible evidence of your impact."[442]

"The best would always be," Keller proceeded, "if you had discussed a certain issue at such a conference and two months later parliamentarians or government officials had laid down a new law or had increased investments or had brought a country on board when it comes to a certain international initiative. I am not certain anything as clear as that has ever happened after the Forte de Copacabana, neither in Brazil nor here." Still, like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, proof of influence is scattered throughout the process and might be found in the "kind of network" built around the annual dialogue forum or the "kind of an education that you can get from attending a conference like that;" as stated by the former security policy coordinator at KAS headquarters in Berlin: "throughout this work that is being generated by an event like that we achieve our true goal, which is to have a better strategic conversation between our two countries

[441] Peter Fischer-Bollin, interview by author.

[442] Patrick Keller, interview by author.

and regions. And I think that is definitely an achievement, and you can show it with many individual pieces of the puzzle." [443]

4.6 Conclusion

Our aim with the present chapter was to bridge a gap in the literature dealt with in the previous parts of this study and explore the emergence, development, and potential influence of the work of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and its partners in the area of security policy in Brazil. Relying on the insights of narrative interpretation, the chapter has offered an in-depth account of the "Forte de Copacabana" process—a sustained unofficial dialogue mechanism through which the global think tank and its local partners have sought to influence how decision makers from the EU and the West and Brazil reflect on their respective "geopolitical realities" and thus reshape their mutual relationship in a world order in transition.[444] In this section, we will briefly summarise the steps we have taken to develop our interpretative account of "Forte de Copacabana" and discuss some of the findings that stand out from the analysis conducted above. In the concluding chapter, in turn, we will pull together all the key findings of our study and consider them in light of the relevant scholarly literature, highlighting open questions and pointing to possible avenues for future research.

The analysis conducted in this chapter spanned the years 2004 to 2018, from the inaugural meeting held at Fort Copacabana army base to the fifteenth consecutive edition of the eponymous dialogue forum in Rio de Janeiro. Three specific research questions have helped us explore the reasons and rationales behind KAS' security-related work in Brazil during that pe-

[443] Patrick Keller, interview by author. It is worth reproducing the entire interview segment in which Keller used the above-mentioned expressions "kind of network" and "kind of an education that you can get from attending a conference like that:" "What is a clear success of the Forte de Copacabana project over the years is – and I think that's the most important thing that we do as a foundation in our international work – it's the kind of network we build. I said in the beginning that, for me, it was the first time, because of the Forte de Copacabana, to come to Brazil, to meet people there, to get an understanding as superficial as it might be of the country and that by any means does not pertain to me exclusively, but we brought so many people: parliamentarians, members of the administration, journalists. We had the chance to get a bit more familiar with the mindset of the Brazilians, with the issues that are of concern there. Mostly the mindset, the way they approach problems that we approach here as well. And it differs! It is different to the way that it is being discussed at the Chatham House or the Munich Security Conference, or Brussels, or Paris. So, that is a kind of an education that you can get from attending a conference like that and I am certain that many, many people received that education. And I hope that it works the other way around as well, that for the Brazilians meeting the international guests who were in Rio that they learned something about how we approach problems and we think."

[444] Dane, "Introduction," 9–11.

riod: (SQ-7) How do representatives of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and its partner organisations in Brazil make sense of the emergence of the Forte de Copacabana process and evaluate its development since then? (SQ-8) How do they justify the scope and the purpose of the conferences and complementary events? (SQ-9) How do dialogue organisers, observers, and participants make sense of the achievements and potential influence of the Forte de Copacabana process on Brazil' relationship with the European Union and, more broadly, with the West?

To address each one of these questions, the chapter was structured alongside three main interpretative sections, prefaced with a methodological discussion about narratives and narrative research in the social sciences. The wealth of primary sources examined in the opening part of the chapter has provided the empirical basis for the argument we have built in the ensuing sections. These sources include not only think tank publications and conference-related documents such as event reports, edited volumes, and policy papers, but also textualised material such as interview transcripts and text transcriptions of promotional videos, among others. To ensure transparency and reliability when proceeding with the interpretation of our sources, we have provided numerous quotations that substantiate the argument and made sure that the statements reproduced above were not detached from their respective context—hence the reason why some of these statements were on occasion quoted at length in the text. Moreover, all sources quoted from any language other than English had their original passage in the foreign language reproduced in the footnotes, in order to display our word choice clearly and thus circumvent possible misunderstandings caused by mistranslation.

What have we learned from the analysis of our primary source material? As discussed below, three main findings stand out from our narrative interpretation. The first one concerns the rationale behind the emergence and subsequent development of the think tank-promoted dialogue mechanism in Brazil, anchored in the purpose of creating a "space of informal diplomacy."[445] The second set of findings, in turn, refers to the strategies used by think tanks in their attempt to shape the evolving dialogue between Brazil and the established powers. As pointed out above, KAS and its partners have done so not just by opening spaces like the annual conference, but also by networking selected individuals from politics, business, research, and civil society within and across these spaces; by intermediating the exchange of ideas occurring at the conferences, pre-conferences, and side events; and, finally, by catalysing and promoting policy recommendations aimed at decision makers on both sides. Besides their empirical relevance, both sets of findings have significant implications to theory, as they feed into DI's conceptual

[445] Peter Fischer-Bollin, interview by author.

framework and can provide new insights into think tanks' use of discourse to achieve influence. We return to this point in the Conclusion. Last but not least, a third set of findings refers to what our interpretative account of KAS' security-related work in Brazil suggests as far as concrete achievements are concerned. Here, conclusions are tentative at best, considering the various limitations acknowledged above (e.g. limited data set, inter-subjective character of qualitative research, reliance on anecdotal accounts of influence, etc.).

The analysis conducted above has shown how, according to KAS representatives in Berlin and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil's pole position in Latin America and growing aspirations on the global stage made it an increasingly relevant partner for the West at a time in which a seemingly inexorable shift towards multipolarity was taking place. Engaging with a rising regional power like Brazil and, most importantly, strengthening mutual relations in the field of peace and security were regarded as crucial steps that German, EU, and NATO representatives should take to ensure the legitimacy, credibility, and—ultimately—the stability of the institutions of the liberal international system. That assumed a new level of priority and concern once the acronym BRIC evolved into an institutionalised political platform associating the country to Russia, India, and China in the late 2000s—with South Africa joining the group in 2010. The picture gathered by our narrative analysis is quite clear in suggesting that Brazil's membership of the BRICS grouping marked a watershed moment in the country's relationship with the West—a critical juncture in which, as one of our interviewees put it, "we wanted to make sure that Brazil was, if it continued to rise as a power in international affairs, contributing to the international system, to the stability of the institutions that we have, rather than stand outside of that or oppose that."[446]

And yet official diplomatic channels and bureaucratic institutions on both sides proved insufficient to strengthen mutual relations in these areas, let alone guarantee Brazil's alignment with the EU and the West around critical global issues at stake at such a watershed moment; interpersonal and interinstitutional contacts were seen as largely underdeveloped; to complicate matters, a seemingly widespread and deep-seated mistrust vis-à-vis the US and NATO among Brazilian diplomats and top members of the PT administration added a major obstacle to mutual understanding on these issues. Also worrying for the architects of the "Forte de Copacabana" process was the fact that Brazilian decision makers—like their Latin American counterparts—

[446] Patrick Keller, interview by author.

seemed to avoid high-level unofficial platforms for dialogue on security issues such as the Munich Security Conferences (Dane's pointed remark "[t]he whole world is there, where is Latin America? Where is Brazil?" illustrates well this narrative.) [447]

With Forte de Copacabana, KAS, CEBRI, and their associates on board the conference project have therefore sought to provide an additional channel of communication through which policymakers and military officials from EU member states, EU institutions, NATO and the US can deliberate on peace and security issues with their counterparts in the region—above all in Brazil. In other words, their primary goal when establishing the unofficial dialogue mechanism in Rio was "to open spaces for the interregional dialogue," as stated by the organisers in the 2004 conference publication, thus expanding mutual relations beyond the official diplomatic processes already at work.[448] As pointed out above, to create a "space of informal diplomacy" or "to have other channels of communication—so-called Track Two diplomacy or second track diplomacy" were some of the expressions used by former representatives of the German foundation in Brazil when referring to the core purpose of the ongoing dialogue process.[449] The idea motivating this, in sum, is that the EU and NATO are indispensable partners with whom Brazilian authorities must engage in conversation when defining and pursuing Brazil's regional and global ambitions. We have also shown how different actors involved in the process regard this as one of the key achievements of "Forte," insofar as they claim that the conferences and

[447] Felix Dane, interview by author. None of the individuals interviewed during our research commented on possible reasons behind Brazilian authorities' reluctance to participate in the MSC. However, in a recent contribution on the subject, Oliver Stuenkel offers three main explanations for Brazilian and other South American policymakers' absence from the annual summit in Munich: firstly, "South America's marginalized status in the world of high politics," identified by the author as both a cause and a consequence of the decision not to participate in the forum; secondly, "the absence of interstate war and terrorism – often the most frequently discussed topics in Munich" in South America. To Stuenkel, that feature may have created "a perception that policymakers from the region could stay away," unlike other regions where "traditional" geopolitical threats play a more prominent role in governments' security policy agendas. Finally, a third aspect refers to the "limited role" played by the region's armed forces in politics during the past three decades. Due to that trend—clearly reversed over the last few years—South American defence officials may have been, according to the author, "reluctant to rub shoulders with global leaders on occasions like the Munich Security Conference, where a striking number of participants appear in uniform." See Oliver Stuenkel, "Wanted: South America's Participation in Global Geopolitics," *Americas Quarterly*, February 26, 2020, accessed March 13, 2020, https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/wanted-south-americas-participation-global-geopolitics.

[448] Hofmeister, *International security: public policy and biregional cooperation*, 9.

[449] Peter Fischer-Bollin, interview by author. Felix Dane, interview by author.

complementary events have effectively bridged a gap in official diplomatic channels—for instance by contributing to dispel Brazilians' mistrust towards NATO or by stimulating reflection on each other's strategic thinking.[450]

Another key finding of our analysis refers to the multiple ways in which the global think tank, as the leading actor behind the organisation of these spaces and in cooperation with foreign and local partners, uses its mediating role in the process to shape the course of discussions and advance its own ideational agendas. In this regard, we have seen how the notion of *networking* is at the core of the rationale behind the conferences, with implications that far outreach the spheres of political-military relations. In fact, the ambition to create new interpersonal and interinstitutional ties through a sustained dialogue mechanism appears in all types of conference-related material: in the opening chapters of the edited volumes published after the first two conferences, for instance, former KAS director in Rio, Wilhelm Hofmeister, affirms that the Forte de Copacabana Conferences should mainly serve "to offer an opportunity to put together actors, politicians and military personnel, with scholars, entrepreneurs and civil society organizations, from Europe and South America."[451] The "formation and intensification of networks among experts and decision makers" or the "promotion of key networks" are some further illustrations of how the organisers state that goal when justifying the purpose of the conferences and complementary mechanisms.[452]

Network building occurs at multiple, and sometimes overlapping, levels within the dialogue process. It starts with the decision as to which actors will be involved in the organisation of the conferences and complementary events (e.g. local think tanks like CEBRI and the CEAs; foreign think tanks like the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po or the Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations; sponsors and media partners like the EU Delegation to Brazil and the news agency DefesaNet, etc.). It then progresses to decisions concerning the programme design, thereby affecting the selection of speakers, panellists, and moderators—several of whom are affiliated, directly or indirectly, to the host organisations. Finally, it reverberates in and among the component organisations networked across these spaces, which gradually become part of a community "Forte de Copacabana," gathering at and beyond the annual forum. As

[450] That is, the foreign and defence policies, programmes, and philosophies laid out in strategic papers such as NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept, Brazil's 2012 National Defence White Paper, and—as far as the EU is concerned—the 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy, for instance.

[451] Hofmeister, *International security: public policy and biregional cooperation*, 9; Hofmeister, *International security*, 11.

[452] Hofmeister, "Presentation," 9; Dane, "Introduction," 11.

argued above, KAS liaison office in Brazil plays the leading role through all of these stages, exercising a significant level of control over network building. The creation and sustenance of such a broad, cross-sectoral community of researchers and practitioners was also highlighted by several of our interviewees as one of the main achievements of the foundation's security-related work in the country, a confirmation of the mentality shift brought about by the initiative to promote these platforms, and a decisive contribution to civil-military relations in Brazil.

What is more, we have also shown how the global think tank has progressively cemented its primacy throughout the years with regard to the agenda discussed at the "Forte de Copacabana" process. Apart from selecting the speakers, panellists, and moderators, the programme designers at the office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Brazil are also responsible for proposing the main theme of the conferences, pre-conferences, and closed-door workshops as well as for editing the output material that stems from these events. Consequently, key programmatic decisions reflect what the office director and his/her consultants in Brazil and abroad feel is "in the air," as former director Woischnik put it when narrating the flow and rhythm of each year's preparation process for the main event.[453] That is, issues that are identified by the programme designers as shared security problems requiring mutual reflection, convergence, and action, some of which were touched upon in Section 4.4.1. The lesson we learn from this is that the strategies of problem framing and agenda setting are essential pathways through which the global think tank attempts to influence the EU-Brazil security dialogue—e.g. by interpreting the current state of affairs and identifying certain issues as common security problems; by intermediating the exchange of ideas over these issues occurring within each one of the dialogue platforms it promotes; and, finally, by pushing for the adoption of particular policy solutions aired during the meetings.

In this regard, an additional finding refers to policy recommendations. Whereas the open conference and the output material published alongside it serve chiefly to communicate specific policy recommendations to the broader public, spaces such as the Mini-Fortes or the pre-conference workshop provide selected authorities and researchers from both sides with the opportunity to deliberate over policy issues in a more private atmosphere and "test" ideas, as different interviewees put it. Interestingly, the unofficial character of these spaces often contrasts with the official nature of the institutions within which some of the meetings have occurred, such as the Brazilian Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, where the Mini-Fortes were convened three times. "Each of these events," as the organisers state in one of the policy papers published

[453] Jan Woischnik and Diogo Winnikes, interview by author.

in 2018, "resulted in the development of a policy-oriented document reporting the discussions and, mainly, presenting the recommendations that accrued from the debate, while securing the rules of Chatham House."[454] Innovations such the biannual preparatory meetings held since 2016 or the policy paper collections published since 2017 testify to the growing concern among the organisers that the "Forte de Copacabana" process not only provides researchers, bureaucrats, and decision makers with a productive location for discourse, but also gives them the impulse to translate discourse into actionable policy recommendations. Still, it remains a moot point whether such recommendations effectively leave a mark on official institutions. This and other open questions will be explored in our concluding chapter.

[454] Woischnik, *Gestão Internacional de Crises/International Crisis Management*, 9.

5 Conclusion

The rise of the so-called "emerging powers," symbolised in particular by the BRICS grouping, has left its mark on the international relations system of the early 21st century, signalling that the world order is gradually becoming "less Western and more ideologically diverse."[455] In fact, as the BRICS—and China in particular—gained stature and influence on the global stage during the 2000s, analysts and policymakers alike heralded the dawn of a new, "post-Western" world order.[456] As pointed out in the Introduction, predictions about the speed of systemic change proved exaggerated, and early expectations that the BRICS member countries would "collectively remake global power relations" as a group have not materialised.[457] Notwithstanding this, Western authorities and decision makers from Beijing, Brasília, or New Delhi have had to "reassess their power metrics" in light of the radical transformations occurring in world politics over the last two decades—an area in which think tanks North and South of the globe have played an increasingly important role.[458]

Focused on the B in the BRICS, the present study has explored an unofficial dialogue mechanism promoted by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) in cooperation with foreign and local partners in Brazil. Held in Rio de Janeiro since 2004, the Forte de Copacabana International Security Conferences are the most salient feature of KAS' security-related work in the country—and the largest event of its kind in Latin America. As argued above, the initiative emerged against the background of Brazil's growing aspirations on the world stage under the administration of former president Lula da Silva (2003-2010), whose foreign policy strategy we analysed and explained in Chapter 3 relying on the notion of "*graduation*."[459] In the late 2000s and early 2010s, the engagement of the German foundation in the area of security policy in Brazil was considerably expanded, taking new forms and involving an even greater number of policy and knowledge actors within multiple platforms for discussion beside the annual forum in Rio. The aggregate of these spaces—and the ideas produced, re-produced, and acted

[455] Stuenkel, *The BRICS and the future of global order*, 5.

[456] As noted in the Introduction, the term "post-Western" is used by Stuenkel, *Post-western world*.

[457] Nossel, "The World's Rising Powers Have Fallen".

[458] McGann and Lazarou, "Think Tanks and the Foreign Policy Challenges Facing the Emerging Powers," 9.

[459] Milani, Pinheiro and Lima, Maria Regina Soares de, "Brazil's foreign policy and the 'graduation dilemma'," 586.

upon within them—constitute what we have so far referred to as the "Forte de Copacabana" process, a think tank-promoted dialogue mechanism connecting Brazilian representatives from politics, research, and the armed forces to their counterparts in the EU and beyond.

In this concluding chapter, we assess key findings of our study and discuss them in light of the relevant scholarly literature dealt with in the previous parts of the thesis. Section 5.1 addresses the overarching questions that have guided us through our research and explores how some of the key points discussed above might be relevant to scholars working in similar areas. Section 5.2, in turn, refers to open questions and possible avenues for future research.

5.1 Addressing the research questions

In the Introduction, we identified a gap in the literature on think tanks by noting how previous research on the topic has failed to account for the role of global or transnational think tanks on the geopolitical dialogue between the BRICS countries and the established powers. Often portrayed as "a bridge between Western institutions and the rest of the world," global think tanks are well-established, globally operating knowledge organisations that rely on a vast network of field offices located outside their headquarters country to participate in, and potentially wield influence on, different stages of transnational policy processes.[460] As discussed above, their relevance and visibility are magnified during "moments of change or transformation" in the international system, for these moments generate more complex demands for policymakers and thereby afford greater opportunities for think tanks to shape discourses on the most pressing issues at stake.[461] The rise of the BRICS, as we saw, constitutes one of such moments, and the "Forte de Copacabana" process in Brazil illustrates how one such global think tank, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, has sought to influence how decision makers on both sides reshape their mutual relationship in a world order in transition.

Two main questions have oriented the present research and informed our interpretative account of the phenomenon under investigation: (OQ-1) How does the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung participate in the evolving dialogue between Brazil and the established powers? (OQ-2) How influential is KAS' work in the area of security policy in Brazil? On our way to address each one of these questions, the first issue we have dealt with was the plethora of conceptual

[460] McGann and Sabatini, *Global Think Tanks: Policy Networks and Governance*, 121.

[461] McGann and Lazarou, "Think Tanks and the Foreign Policy Challenges Facing the Emerging Powers," 13.

definitions and theoretical frameworks advanced by the literature on think tanks, in particular concerning their relevance and appropriateness to our case. After exploring the strengths and limitations of both traditional and contemporary approaches to think tank research, we turned our focus to the grammar defined by DI in order to explain the workings of such hybrid, multi-faceted actors relying on the notion of *discourse*. As argued in Chapter 2, that notion is used by proponents of DI to refer to the "interactive process of conveying ideas," a process that is, at the same time, conditioned by agents' both background and foreground discursive abilities as well as framed by the institutional context within which it occurs.[462]

In the ensuing chapter, in turn, we assessed key developments in EU-Brazil relations over the course of the last three decades, situating them within the ebb and flow of Brazilian foreign policy. As discussed above, our aim in Chapter 3 was to provide an overview of the complex "set of consolidated multilevel institutional ties" through which Brazil and the EU interact.[463] By so doing, we were able to explore how Brazilian foreign policy has changed in the period and how that has affected the country's relationship with the global North, especially with regard to the place of the EU in Brazil's so-called "emerging power" trajectory. We then critically assessed that notion, arguing instead for the notion of *graduation* as an alternative explanatory device to account for Brazil's foreign policy trajectory under the PT administrations (2003-2016). Once both of these areas were covered, we were well-equipped to delve into the case of the "Forte de Copacabana" process and deal with the wealth of process-related primary sources collected during field research. The answers obtained to the above-mentioned research questions therefore stem from our exchange with the scholarly literature in Chapters 2 and 3 as well as from our interpretation of the primary sources analysed in Chapter 4.

5.1.1 How does the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung participate in the evolving dialogue between Brazil and the established powers?

Acting as a global think tank, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung relies on the series of discursive strategies outlined in the previous chapter in order to participate in and, to the best extent possible, wield influence on the geopolitical dialogue between the European Union and the West and Brazil. As argued above, the Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference is the

[462] Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism," 303.

[463] Poletti, "The EU for Brazil: A Partner Towards a 'Fairer' Globalization?," 273.

most salient feature of KAS' security-related work in the country and a singular undertaking in Latin America. Adding to the main event, a number of complementary platforms for dialogue promoted by KAS Brazil office and its partners—both foreign and domestic—are intended to enhance the outreach and scope of the annual security forum convened in Rio, resulting in what we have referred to as the "Forte de Copacabana" process. It is through that process that the German foundation and global think tank actively participates in the evolving dialogue between Brazilian authorities and researchers and their counterparts from Germany and other EU member states, from EU institutions, from the US as well as from NATO and the NDC.

For over fifteen years, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation has done so not just by playing a mediating role within the series of informal political spaces it helped establish in the country, but also by leveraging that role to its advantage in order to advance its own ideational agenda—or, as stated by one of our interview partners at KAS' headquarters in Berlin, in order "to be heard and to voice [its] thoughts."[464] As pointed out in Chapter 4, the global think tank has done so via discourse and, more specifically, through discursive strategies such as problem framing, agenda setting, and networking.[465] By networking with foreign and local partners to create and conduct informal spaces for dialogue such as the flagship event in Rio, its biannual preparatory meetings, or the European-South American Regional Security Symposium, the foundation has given rise to a series of privileged locations for debate and deliberation on foreign policy and geopolitical affairs among influential actors from both sides of the Atlantic. As stated by different interview partners, the continued development of these spaces is primarily understood as a long-term investment aimed at complementing official diplomatic processes at work. Most importantly, though, their ultimate purpose is to add new layers of discursive interactions and thus to shape the geopolitical dialogue between the EU and the West and Brazil by nudging the latter to align itself with the former in the governance and support of the liberal international system.

Yet how does KAS attempt to attain that objective? Far from being just a neutral broker or mediator, the global think tank positions itself within the informal political spaces it manages in Brazil as a carrier of coordinative and communicative discourses. That is to say, it plays a pivotal role in the ideational exchange occurring within these spaces not only in the phase in which ideas are introduced or "tested" among selected policy actors—usually behind closed doors, as in the biannual "Mini-Fortes," the confidential workshop occurring on the eve of the

[464] Patrick Keller, interview by author. See the original quotation in full in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.2).

[465] Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism," 303.

main conference, or the 2013 NATO-Brazil roundtable meeting—but also when they are presented to the general public, debated, contested and/or legitimated. Particularly relevant in this regard are, above all, the flagship conference in Rio, held in front of the media and of hundreds of registered participants from the general public, as well as the bilingual, policy-oriented publications launched during the event, for both of them are, at the same time, a product of coordinative discourse and a means of communicative discourse.[466]

In both of these forms of discursive interaction, what is more, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation not only benefits from its own assets and reputation, but also takes full advantage of the credentials and resources it acquires from a vast network of like-minded partners with which it cooperates worldwide. In this regard, we have underlined above how crucial it is for KAS Brazil office to count on partner organisations such as the representation of the EU in Brasília, CEBRI and, in the early years of "Forte," the CEAs and the Chaire Mercosur. Adding to this are multiple other ties that the German foundation maintains with individuals and organisations from all over the world, which KAS aptly mobilises in order to obtain access to prominent members of the foreign and security policy communities on both sides of the Atlantic.

Likewise, we have seen how the ambition to create a "'Munich', in quotation marks, 'Security Conference' in Latin America" has marked the foundation's security-related work in the country ever since the conference project was started.[467] As argued in Chapter 4, the analogy serves to situate KAS' singular initiative in the field in Latin America within a specific constellation of symbols, scenarios, and ideas—in particular, the ascendancy of the US and NATO over European security and, consequently, the imperative to involve them as well in the mutual geopolitical dialogue with Brazil. Furthermore, by resorting to the language and the imagery of Munich, the dialogue organisers at KAS Brazil office aim at amplifying the resonance of "Forte de Copacabana" among Western observers while positioning Brazil and its neighbouring countries on the Western radar also when global security issues are discussed—not least due to South American representatives' infrequent attendance of the annual security forum in Germany.

[466] This definition is close to that of Zimmerman, *Think Tanks and Non-Traditional Security*, 109–12, who defines as follows the role of formal memoranda developed within the framework of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), one of the think tank-organised dialogue forums analysed in her study: "[CSCAP] Memoranda perform a significant discursive function as they are both the products of discourse (coordinative) as well as a means of discourse (communicative). Consequently they are important tools for legitimising NTS [non-traditional security] research, presenting this research to the public and codifying CSCAP's stance on NTS issues through the promotion of new causal narratives."

[467] Wilhelm Hofmeister, interview by author.

5.1.2 How influential is KAS' work in the area of security policy in Brazil?

Aside from merely describing the inception and evolution of KAS' security-related work in Brazil, the present discussion has also sought to shed light on the question as to whether that work has left any mark on formal processes and institutions in over fifteen years of informal geopolitical dialogue. As discussed in Chapter 2, think tank observers are often confronted with a "major methodological problem" when dealing with the contested issue of influence.[468] Those who look for incontrovertible evidence of influence in think tank research usually risk obtaining spurious results or, alternatively, encountering frustration, as the impact of think tank-promoted ideas and discourses on institutions (i.e. institutionalisation) generally occurs as a gradual, context-contingent, and intangible process.

Does that mean that these actors are incapable of wielding any influence with their work? Not at all. Does that mean that we should disregard the issue and refrain from exploring think tanks' pathways to influence? That does not seem to be the case either. Instead, the stance we have adopted towards that matter consists in accepting that conclusions are tentative and depend on further investigation so that more empirical evidence is gathered—and more conclusive answers are obtained. Despite limitations, the qualitative, interpretive approach adopted in our study provides us with some initial yet invaluable insights into the achievements and potential influence of the "Forte de Copacabana" process on Brazil' relationship with the EU and, more broadly, with the West. Our conclusions in this area, as discussed above, stem from the triangulation of data obtained from different sources, including event reports and institutional material promoting the conferences and complementary events, the transcriptions of interviews conducted with numerous KAS staff members, and the testimony of selected participants and observers of "Forte de Copacabana." Besides, our own participant observation of two editions of the flagship event, in 2017 and 2018, provided us with first-hand knowledge and experience with KAS' security-related work in Brazil, which proved crucial for a more nuanced interpretation of the primary source material discussed in Chapter 4.

On the one hand, the picture gathered by our analysis shows how a significant level of moderation and restraint might be noticed when the issue of influence arises, even among the

[468] Stone, *Knowledge actors and transnational governance*, 68.

dialogue organisers themselves. In fact, some of our interview partners refrained from specifying concrete achievements of their work and underscored, instead, the gradual, incremental, and long-term contribution of the series of conferences and complementary events to a "better strategic conversation" between the two sides.[469] On the other hand, we have also addressed specific claims of influence made by representatives of the foundation and its partners as well as by participants and observers of the process. Here, three aspects in particular stood out in our narrative analysis: first, the alleged success in mobilising the idea that "NATO may not be a devil" by creating and conducting spaces for coordinative discourse between Brazilian authorities and representatives of NATO and the NDC.[470] Secondly, the "mutual benefit" generated by spaces for communicative discourse such as the flagship event in stimulating reflection on the defence and security policy doctrines updated by both the EU and Brazil in the 2000s and 2010s.[471] Finally, a third aspect we have discussed above concerns the influence of almost two decades of "Forte" on the very mentality of Brazilian decision makers and armed forces officials, allegedly bent on showing a greater disposition nowadays to reflect on sensitive policy issues with researchers, defence industry executives, and the civil society at large "in a relatively simple and open way."[472]

Besides, the lifespan of "Forte de Copacabana" itself indicates its continued relevance, both for the organisers and the attendees, as a productive location for networked engagement among politically influential stakeholders from both sides of the Atlantic. In this process, the ideas and practices of an ever-increasing community of politicians, diplomats, armed forces officials, and researchers attending these events are continuously interwoven with the ideational agenda advanced by KAS and its partners via the series of dedicated discursive spaces promoted in Brazil. Particularly relevant in this regard is the absence of any forthright oppositional or confrontational stance on the part of Brazilian authorities over the years as far as the initiative to promote such discursive spaces is concerned, neither during the PT administrations (2003-2016) nor afterwards. Rather, we have noticed an increasing level of cooperation with foreign and defence officials in the country as well as a genuine interest on their part in supporting the continuation of the process along the lines set forth by the programme designers at KAS Brazil office. One illustration of that is the fact that, since 2016, the "Mini-Fortes" have often taken

[469] Patrick Keller, interview by author.

[470] Alfredo Valladão, interview by author.

[471] Roland Schäfer, interview by author.

[472] Alfredo Valladão, interview by author.

place within the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs in Brasília and Rio de Janeiro. Although that does not translate into a direct proof of influence, these are some of the key pathways identified by our analysis along which the global think tank has sought to leave a mark on state actors and institutions.

Having covered a great deal of conceptual and empirical ground, the final section of our study turns to possible avenues for future research ensuing from the present discussion.

5.2 Open questions and possible avenues for future research

As argued above, the contributions of our interpretative account of KAS' security-related work in Brazil are not restricted to its empirical originality, nor to the in-depth look it provides into informal political spaces that have long remained uncharted territory for the literature on EU-Brazil relations.[473] Rather, they extend to the contentious issues of theorisation and conceptual definition in think tank research, adding as well to previous scholarship on think tanks and, in particular, on the domestic and international work of the German party-affiliated political foundations as part of that phenomenon.[474] Furthermore, the present monograph adds to the growing body of work in political science relying on the insights of discursive institutionalism to explain how think tanks act as carriers of ideas and discourse in their quest for influence in the policy domain.[475] Last but not least, the study also raises a number of questions that might stimulate future research to build on our discussion, review and extend empirical knowledge about our case, and further develop the conceptual framework of DI in order to trace concrete policy and institutional outcomes of think tank-promoted spaces like "Forte de Copacabana."

With this in mind, the first set of questions worth of future research concerns the very case under enquiry in the present study and the relevance of think tank-promoted discursive

[473] Whitman and Rodt, "EU-Brazil Relations" Renard, "The Treachery of Strategies">, Saraiva, "Os limites da parceria estratégica Brasil-União Europeia nos planos inter-regional e multilateral">; Domingos, "Brazil as an EU Strategic Partner"; Keukeleire and Bruyn, "The European Union, the BRICS, and Other Emerging Powers".

[474] Thunert, "Think tanks in Germany"; Heisterkamp, *Think Tanks der Parteien?*; Braml, "U.S. and German Think Tanks in Comparative Perspective"; Speth, "Think Tanks as New Channels of Influence within the Political System of Germany"; Braml, "Germany: The think and the tank".

[475] Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism"; Ladi, "Think Tanks, Discursive Institutionalism and Policy Change"; Zimmerman, *Think Tanks and Non-Traditional Security*; Zimmerman and Stone, "ASEAN think tanks, policy change and economic cooperation"; Ladi, Lazarou and Hauck, "Brazilian think tanks and the rise of austerity discourse".

spaces to the mutual political dialogue between the EU and the West and Brazil. We have analysed above a quite encompassing set of primary sources and offered a comprehensive interpretation of the narratives running through these sources. However, a number of questions remain open regarding, for instance, the ideational agenda mobilised within these spaces, the actors who mobilise such ideas, and their influence—or lack thereof—on decision makers and formal institutions on both sides of the Atlantic. Which ideas, other than those discussed above, are part of the ideational agenda promoted by the dialogue organisers? How do they justify the relevance of these ideas for the mutual dialogue between the EU and the West and Brazil? Which ideas have been rejected or discarded within these spaces? Who has been excluded from the process, and why? How do these actors account for the role and influence of such mechanisms? Further research into KAS's engagement in the field of security policy in Brazil, both within and beyond the time frame specified for this study, might cast more light on all of these questions and bring new evidence about the case of the "Forte de Copacabana" process. Likewise, more research on the Brazilian think tank environment, and on CEBRI in particular, might not only help us better understand how local think tanks benefit from cooperating with foreign organisations like KAS, but also improve our knowledge about the role and potential influence of these actors as carriers of ideas and discourses in the country's policy domain.

A second set of questions refers to the implications of recent developments in Brazil's foreign and security policy trajectories as far as mutual relations with the established powers are concerned. We have discussed above how domestic and external developments have shaped the programme of the conferences and complementary events over the years, affecting the course of discussions and leaving a mark on the perception of different actors involved in the process. However, further research is needed into how Brazil's progressive retreat from the global stage since the mid-2010s has affected the course of the conferences and complementary events as well as the outcomes resulting from the ideational exchange that occurs within these spaces. Were the end of the Workers' Party era and the subsequent foreign policy shift witnessed in the country positive developments for Brazil's security dialogue with the EU and the West? As expectations about a "solid BRICS wall" failed to manifest, what does the relative decline of such "emerging power" coalition within Brazil's foreign policy strategy in recent years tell us about future prospects of cooperation between the B in the BRICS and the West in global security affairs?[476] What are the main implications of the radical foreign policy shift

[476] Nossel, "The World's Rising Powers Have Fallen".

brought about by the administration of Jair Bolsonaro for the mutual geopolitical dialogue? What ideas have been prioritised by the dialogue organisers since then and why?

Finally, further research is needed on how think tanks wield influence on the policy domain and, in particular, on how the conceptual framework proposed by DI might help us better understand and explain the role and potential influence of these actors in transnational policy processes. Here, the gap to be filled is twofold: firstly, future studies might want to further scrutinise the epistemological foundations of discursive institutionalism, its main methodological implications, and the scope for a middle ground between qualitative, interpretative-oriented approaches such as the one adopted in our study and positivist or causal methodologies like Zimmerman's account of think tanks' governance entrepreneurship in Southeast Asia.[477] In addition, there is a vast empirical field to be covered by the literature concerning the role of these actors in areas other than the Anglo-American sphere—think tanks' participation in policy debates about the rise of the BRICS and their evolving relationship with the established powers being just one among several other illustrations of that. As a "permanent part of the political landscape" in many regions and countries, think tanks—both globally and locally operating ones—should attract the attention of anyone interested in investigating the role of knowledge, ideas, and discourses in politics.[478]

[477] Zimmerman, *Think Tanks and Non-Traditional Security*, 65–66.

[478] McGann and Lazarou, "Think Tanks and the Foreign Policy Challenges Facing the Emerging Powers," 7.

Appendices

Page

Appendix 1: List of speakers, panellists, and moderators at the Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference (2004 – 2018)

2004

11-12 November 2004, I Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference: "International Security: Public Policy and Biregional Cooperation – European-South American Dialogue"

Speaker	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
Christoph Bertram	German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)	President	Germany	Panel 1 - Defense and security in the 21st century – Europe in the New International Security System – Challenges of the ESDP
Francisco Rojas	Latin American Social Sciences Institute (FLACSO)	Secretary General	Chile	Panel 1 - Defense and security in the 21st century – South America in the New International Security System – Regional Cooperation Overview
Jose Maria Vasquez Ocampo	Argentine Ministry of Defence	Subsecretary of Technical Military Issues	Argentina	Panel 1 – Commentaries
Karl Buck	General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union	Head of Division for Relations with Latin America	European Union	Panel 1 – Commentaries
Mônica Hirst	Centre for Brazilian Studies Foundation	Executive-director, scholar	Brazil/Argentina	Panel 1 – Commentaries

Michel de Monval	French Ministry of Defence	Deputy Director of the Delegation for Strategic Affairs	France	Panel 2 – New concepts and the role of the armed forces – The role of the armed forces – European view
Murillo Barbosa	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Director of the Department of Strategy and Policy	Brazil	Panel 2 – New concepts and the role of the armed forces – The role of the armed forces – Brazilian view
Alfredo Rangel	Security and Democracy Foundation (*Fundación Seguridad y Democracia*)	Director, scholar	Colombia	Panel 2 – Commentaries
Tjarck Rössler	Centre for the Transformation of the Bundeswehr	Director	Germany	Panel 2 – Commentaries
Gabriel Gaspar Tápia	Chilean Ministry of National Defence	Subsecretary	Chile	Panel 3 – Peace Keeping Operations: Elements for a European-South American Cooperation – Interoperability between European and South American Forces: Operations Artémis and MINUSTAH. South American view.
Patrick Hébrard	French Ministry of Defence	"Operations" Deputy-Chief of Staff	France	Panel 3 – Peace Keeping Operations: Elements for a European-South American Cooperation – Interoperability between European and South American Forces: Operations Artémis and MINUSTAH. European view.
Thomaz Guedes da Costa	National Defense University	Scholar	Brazil/United States of America	Panel 3 – Commentaries

Ernesto López	Argentine Ministry of Defence	Cabinet Chief	Argentina	Panel 3 – Commentaries
Juan J. Saavedra	Coordination Centre for Peacekeeping Operations (*Centro Coordinador de Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz* - CECOMAPA)	Chief of CECOMAPA	Uruguay	Panel 3 – Commentaries
Yves Boyer	Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS)	Deputy Director	France	Panel 4 – The impact of the concept of "Military Transformation" on the European and South American armed forces – The concept of "Military Transformation" and the European armed forces
Domício Proença Jr.	Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)	Scholar, Member of the Studies Group of COPPE/UFRJ	Brazil	Panel 4 – The impact of the concept of "Military Transformation" on the European and South American armed forces – The concept of "Military Transformation" and the South American armed forces
Tjarck Rössler	Centre for the Transformation of the Bundeswehr	Director	Germany	Panel 4 – Commentaries
Craig Deare	National Defense University	Dean of Academic Affairs	United States of America	Panel 4 – Commentaries
Patrick Lamb	UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office	Deputy Head of the Counter Proliferation Department	United Kingdom	Panel 5 – Non-proliferation, disarmament and mastering of technologies for peaceful purposes – Non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. Mastering of nuclear technology – European perspective

Clóvis Brigagão	Center for American Studies (CEA), Cândido Mendes University	Director, scholar	Brazil	Panel 5 – Non-proliferation, disarmament and mastering of technologies for peaceful purposes – Non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. Mastering of nuclear technology – South American perspective
Marco Antônio Marzo	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Energy (ABACC)	Senior Officer	Brazil	Panel 5 – Commentaries
Vilmos Cserveny	International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	Director of External Relations Division	Austria	Panel 5 – Commentaries
Bruno Gallard	Embassy of France to Brazil	Armament attaché	France	Panel 6 – Arms industry – Regional and inter-regional cooperation – European arms industries cooperation. Future perspectives and cooperation with South America
Renato Dagnino	University of Campinas (UNICAMP)	Scholar, Department of Scientific and Technological Policy	Brazil	Panel 6 – Arms industry – Regional and inter-regional cooperation – South American arms industries cooperation. Future perspectives and cooperation with Europe
Romualdo Monteiro de Barros	EMBRAER	Vice-President for the Defense Market	Brazil	Panel 6 – Commentaries
Joachim Zahn	Mercedes-Benz - Daymler Chrysler	Director, Mercedes-Benz - Daimler Chrysler in São Paulo	Germany	Panel 6 – Commentaries
João Verdi Carvalho Leite	Avibras Indústria Aeroespacial	President	Brazil	Panel 6 – Commentaries

Yves Robins	Dassault Aviation	Vice-president	France	Panel 6 – Commentaries
Mário Marconini	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Executive Director	Brazil	Conclusions – Challenges for security and defence (S&D) – Cooperation between South America and Europe
Clóvis Brigagão	Center for American Studies (CEA), Cândido Mendes University	Director, scholar	Brazil	Conclusions – Challenges for security and defence (S&D) – Cooperation between South America and Europe
Alfredo Valladão	Chaire Mercosur, University of Paris (Sciences Po)	Director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, scholar	Brazil/France	Conclusions – Challenges for security and defence (S&D) – Cooperation between South America and Europe
Wilhelm Hofmeister	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Conclusions – Challenges for security and defence (S&D) – Cooperation between South America and Europe

2005

3-4 November 2005, II Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference: "International Security: European-South American Dialogue"

Speaker	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
Gabriel Gaspar Tápia	Chilean Ministry of National Defence	Representative of the Chilean Minister of Defence	Chile	Luncheon speech
Manoel Nelson Bezerra Júnior	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	General Manager of the National Defence Policy Department	Brazil	Luncheon speech
Béatrice Pouligny	Centre for International Studies and Research (CERI-Sciences-Po-CNRS)	Senior Research Fellow	France	Panel 1 – Peace Support Operations and parameters for the use of force in the context of UN Reform (European View)
Raúl Benitez Manaut	Center for Interdisciplinary Research in Science and Humanities, National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM)	Scholar	Mexico	Panel 1 – Peace Support Operations and parameters for the use of force in the context of UN Reform (South American View)
Achilles Zaluar	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Subsecretary, UN Department	Brazil	Panel 1 – Commentaries
David Chuter	UK Ministry of Defence	Representative of the Ministry of Defence	United Kingdom	Panel 1 – Commentaries
Dusan Chrenek	General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union	Policy Unit Task Force UN and Latin America	European Union	Panel 2 – Strategies for the construction of a Common Regional Security Policy (European View)

Fabian Calle	Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)	Senior Research Fellow	Argentina	Panel 2 – Strategies for the construction of a Common Regional Security Policy (South American View)
Ryszard Stemplowski	University of Krakow	Scholar	Poland	Panel 2 – Commentaries
Alfredo Rangel	Security and Democracy Foundation (*Fundación Seguridad y Democracia*)	Director, scholar	Colombia	Panel 2 – Commentaries
Ruprecht Polenz	German Parliament (*Bundestag*), German Atlantic Society (*Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft e.V.*)	Member of the German Parliament (CDU), President of the German Atlantic Society	Germany	Panel 3 – Disarmament and the struggle against nuclear proliferation: how to deal with Iran and North Korea? (European View)
Marco Antônio Marzo	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Energy (ABACC)	Senior Officer	Brazil	Panel 3 – Disarmament and the struggle against nuclear proliferation: how to deal with Iran and North Korea? (South American View)
Craig Deare	National Defense University	Dean of Academic Affairs	United States of America	Panel 3 – Commentaries
Anselmo Paschoa	Rio de Janeiro State University	Consultant, scholar	Brazil	Panel 3 – Commentaries
João Ferreira Bezerra de Souza	Petrobras	Manager of Markets Integration Southern Cone	Brazil	Panel 4 – Energy security: regional and global challenges (South American View)
Christophe-Alexandre Paillard	French Ministry of Defence	Strategic Affairs Directorate	France	Panel 4 – Energy security: regional and global challenges (European View)

Tomás Jocelyn-Holt	Christian Democratic Party (Chile)	International Spokesman	Chile	Panel 4 – Commentaries
Antônio Jorge Ramalho	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Director of the Department for Cooperation of the Secretary of Studies and Cooperation	Brazil	Panel 4 – Commentaries
Xavier Pasco	Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS)	Researcher	France	Panel 5 – Aerospace and armaments industry: perspectives of regional and interregional cooperation between Europe and South America (European View)
Luis Fernandes	Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology	Executive-secretary	Brazil	Panel 5 – Aerospace and armaments industry: perspectives of regional and interregional cooperation between Europe and South America (South American View)
Paulo Gastão da Silva	EMBRAER	F-X Business Senior Manager	Brazil	Panel 5 – Commentaries
João Verdi Carvalho Leite	Avibras Indústria Aeroespacial	President	Brazil	Panel 5 – Commentaries
Yves Robins	Dassault Aviation	Vice-president	France	Panel 5 – Commentaries
Eduardo Marson	EADS Brazil	President	Brazil	Panel 5 – Commentaries
Álvaro Vasconcelos	Portuguese Institute for Strategic and International Studies (IEEI)	Director	Portugal	Panel 6 – South American and European responsibilities in the international security system (European View)

Alfredo Valladão	Chaire Mercosur, University of Paris (Sciences Po)	Director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, scholar	Brazil/France	Panel 6 – South American and European responsibilities in the international security system (South American View)
Francisco Rojas	Latin American Social Sciences Institute (FLACSO)	Secretary General	Chile	Panel 6 – Commentaries
Manoel Nelson Bezerra Júnior	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	General Manager of the National Defence Policy Department	Brazil	Panel 6 – Commentaries
Ambrósio Alves de Mello Franco	Delegation of the European Commission to Brazil	Advisor of Economic and Institutional Affairs	European Commission	Panel 6 – Commentaries
Clóvis Brigagão	Center for American Studies (CEA), Cândido Mendes University	Director, scholar	Brazil	Conclusions – Elements for a stronger cooperation between South America and Europe in issues of security and defense
José Botafogo Gonçalves	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador, Chairman of the Board of Trustees	Brazil	Conclusions – Elements for a stronger cooperation between South America and Europe in issues of security and defense
Alfredo Valladão	Chaire Mercosur, University of Paris (Sciences Po)	Director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, scholar	Brazil/France	Conclusions – Elements for a stronger cooperation between South America and Europe in issues of security and defense
Wilhelm Hofmeister	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Conclusions – Elements for a stronger cooperation between South America and Europe in issues of security and defense

2006

12-13 October 2006, III Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference: "Renewed Missions for the Armed Forces: a European-South American Dialogue"

Speaker	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
José Américo dos Santos	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Representative of the Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Brazil	Welcome address
Carlos Moneta	Argentine Ministry of Defence	Representative of the Argentine Ministry of Defence	Argentina	Luncheon speech
Philippe Gasnot	French Ministry of Defence	Deputy Director of the Delegation for Strategic Affairs	France	Panel 1 – External missions: stability and governance
Rody Macias	Uruguayan Chief of Staff of the Army	Deputy chief of Peacekeeping Missions	Uruguay	Panel 1 – External missions: stability and governance
Michèle Oriol	Foundation for Iconographic and Documental Research	Representative of the Foundation for Iconographic and Documental Research	Haiti	Panel 1 – Commentaries
Michael Frehse	German Federal Ministry of the Interior	Director of the Department of International Cross-Border Police Cooperation	Germany	Panel 2 – Internal missions: public security
Conrado Aparicion Blanco	Centre for Superior Naval Studies of the Mexican Forces (CESNAV)	Rear Admiral	Mexico	Panel 2 – Internal missions: public security
Domício Proença Jr.	Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)	Scholar, Member of the Studies Group of COPPE/UFRJ	Brazil	Panel 2 – Commentaries

Alberto Madeira	United Nations Regional Center for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-LiREC)	Advisor to UN-LiREC	Brazil	Panel 2 – Commentaries
Jaime García Covarrubias	National Defense University	Scholar	Chile/United States of America	Panel 3 – New functions of NATO and the OEA
Antonio Ortiz	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	Advisor on Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary General	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	Panel 3 – New functions of NATO and the OEA
Gabriel Gaspar Tápia	Embassy of Chile in Colombia	Ambassador of Chile in Colombia	Chile	Panel 3 – Commentaries
José Pinto Ramalho	Institute of Superior Military Studies	Lieutenant General, invited professor	Portugal	Panel 3 – Commentaries
John Cope	National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies	Scholar	United States of America	Panel 4 – Tensions in South America and the consequences for the armed forces
Sergio Jaramillo	Ideas para la Paz	Representative of Ideas para la Paz	Colombia	Panel 4 – Tensions in South America and the consequences for the armed forces
Francine Jácome	Venezuelan Institute for Social and Political Studies (INVESP)	Executive Director	Venezuela	Panel 4 – Commentaries
Alcides Vaz	University of Brasília (UnB)	Scholar	Brazil	Panel 4 – Commentaries
Pierre Conesa	European Company of Strategic Intelligence (CEIS)	Former High Functionary, advisor of the president of CEIS	France	Panel 5 – South America's and the European Union's contributions towards a common view on the Middle East

Sarkis Karmirian	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ambassador, Director of the Middle East Department	Brazil	Panel 5 – South America's and the European Union's contributions towards a common view on the Middle East
Volker Heise	German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)	Research Fellow	Germany	Panel 5 – Commentaries
Nizar Messari	Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio)	Scholar	Brazil	Panel 5 – Commentaries
Joseph Bahout	Sciences Po Paris	Scholar	France	Panel 5 – Commentaries
Alfredo Valladão	Chaire Mercosur, University of Paris (Sciences Po)	Director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, scholar	Brazil/France	Panel 6 – Contributions from South America and the European Union towards the international security agenda: expectations and capabilities
Sergio Abreu	Uruguayan Senate, Uruguayan Council on International Relations	Senator of the Republic and President of the Uruguayan Council on International Relations	Uruguay	Panel 6 – Contributions from South America and the European Union towards the international security agenda: expectations and capabilities
Antônio Patriota	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ambassador	Brazil	Panel 6 – Commentaries
Jorge Battaglino	Torcuato di Tella University	Honorary professor	Argentina	Panel 6 – Commentaries
Clóvis Brigagão	Center for American Studies (CEA), Cândido Mendes University	Director, scholar	Brazil	Panel 6 – Commentaries

Clóvis Brigagão	Center for American Studies (CEA), Cândido Mendes University	Director, scholar	Brazil	Conclusion – Priorities in the biregional security relations
José Botafogo Gonçalves	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador, Chairman of the Board of Trustees	Brazil	Conclusion – Priorities in the biregional security relations
Alfredo Valladão	Chaire Mercosur, University of Paris (Sciences Po)	Director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, scholar	Brazil/France	Conclusion – Priorities in the biregional security relations
Wilhelm Hofmeister	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Conclusion – Priorities in the biregional security relations

2007

15-16 November 2007, IV Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference: "International Security: a European-South American Dialogue"

Speaker	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
Wilhelm Hofmeister	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Welcome address
Alfredo Valladão	Chaire Mercosur, University of Paris (Sciences Po)	Director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, scholar	Brazil/France	Welcome address
João Pacheco	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Welcome address
Nelson Jobim	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Brazilian Minister of Defence	Brazil	Luncheon speech
Nuno Severiano Teixeira	Portuguese Ministry of National Defence	Portuguese Minister of National Defence and President of the Council of Defence Ministers of the European Union	Portugal	Luncheon speech
Laurent Marboeuf	EUFOR Headquarters	Colonel, Deputy Chief of General Staff for Operations	European Union	Panel 1 – Joint Commands in External Missions: the examples of EUFOR in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Argentine-Chilean "Cruz del Sur"
Gonzalo García Pino	Chilean Ministry of National Defence	Undersecretary of War	Chile	Panel 1 – Joint Commands in External Missions: the examples of EUFOR in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Argentine-Chilean "Cruz del Sur"

Julio Alberto Hang	Institute of International Security and Strategic Issues of the Argentinean Centre of International Relations (CARI)	General	Argentina	Panel 1 – Commentaries
Alejandro Sosa	Department III of the General Staff of the Army	Colonel	Uruguay	Panel 1 – Commentaries
Roberto Abdenur	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador, Member of the Board of Trustees of CEBRI	Brazil	Panel 1 – Moderator
Werner Heidemann	German Federal Ministry of Defence	Colonel	Germany	Panel 2 – Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Reducing the Threats – European Concerns and South-American Perceptions
Marcos Vinicius Pinta Gama	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Minister, Special Counsellor to the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Brazil	Panel 2 – Commentaries
Clóvis Brigagão	Center for American Studies (CEA), Cândido Mendes University	Director, scholar	Brazil	Panel 2 – Moderator
Gudrun Wacker	German Institute of International and Security Affairs (SWP)	Head of Research Division, Asia Research Unit	Germany	Panel 3 – Asian global players in the international security system I: the emergence of China's military power and regional security
Craig Deare	National Defense University	Scholar	United States of America	Panel 3 – Asian global players in the international security system I: the emergence of China's military power and regional security
Wang Zaibang	China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)	Vice-President	China	Panel 3 – Asian global players in the international security system I: the emergence of China's military power and regional security

Roberto Jaguaribe Gomes de Mattos	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ambassador, General Under-Secretary II for Political Affairs	Brazil	Panel 3 – Commentaries
Alfredo Valladão	Chaire Mercosur, University of Paris (Sciences Po)	Director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, scholar	Brazil/France	Panel 3 – Moderator
Dipankar Banerjee	Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies	Major General (Retd.), Director	India	Panel 4 – Asian global players in the international security system II: implications of the India-United States Partnership for the regional security system
Donald Camp	US Department of State	Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations	United States of America	Panel 4 – Asian global players in the international security system II: implications of the India-United States Partnership for the regional security system
Isabelle Saint-Mézard	French Ministry of Defence	South Asia analyst at the Delegation for Strategic Affairs	France	Panel 4 – Commentaries
Paulo Roberto de Almeida	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Uniceub-Brasília	Diplomat, scholar	Brazil	Panel 4 – Commentaries
Wilhelm Hofmeister	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Panel 4 – Moderator
Clóvis Brigagão	Center for American Studies (CEA), Cândido Mendes University	Director, scholar	Brazil	Panel 5 – South American security cooperation and the threat of a new regional arms race
Diego Fleitas	Association for Public Policies	President	Argentina	Panel 5 – South American security cooperation and the threat of a new regional arms race

Francine Jácome	Venezuelan Institute for Social and Political Studies (INVESP)	Executive Director	Venezuela	Panel 5 – Commentaries
Sophie Jouineau	French Ministry of Defence	Head of the Office for Latin America, Delegation for Strategic Affairs	France	Panel 5 – Commentaries
Alfredo Valladão	Chaire Mercosur, University of Paris (Sciences Po)	Director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, scholar	Brazil/France	Panel 5 – Moderator
Pablo Dreyfus	Viva Rio	Research Coordinator, Small Arms Control Project	Brazil	Panel 6 – Small arms and light weapons: the control of illegal traffic
Mark Bromley	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute	Research Associate, Arms Transfers Project	Sweden	Panel 6 – Small arms and light weapons: the control of illegal traffic
Henning Suhr	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Political Advisor, Brazil Office	Germany	Panel 6 – Moderator
Organizers				Closing speech

2008

20-21 November 2008, V Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference: "After the Presidential Elections in the USA: the future of hemispheric and international security"[479]

Speaker	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
Wilhelm Hofmeister	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Opening remarks
Alfredo Valladão	Chaire Mercosur, University of Paris (Sciences Po)	Director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, scholar	France	Opening remarks
João Pacheco	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Opening remarks
Nelson Jobim	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Brazilian Minister of Defense	Brazil	Opening speech 1: Challenges to regional security in South America
Vytautas Landsbergis	European Parliament	Member of the European Parliament	Lithuania	Opening speech 2: Challenges to the European defence and security policies
Michael Haltzel	Center for Transatlantic Relations/Johns Hopkins University	Senior Research Fellow	United States of America	Panel 1: What to expect? The international security agenda of the coming US presidency
Heinrich Kreft	CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag)	Senior Foreign Policy Advisor	Germany	Panel 1
Ángel Flisfisch	Chilean Ministry of External Relations	Planning Director Ambassador	Chile	Panel 1

[479] Programme details for the fifth edition of the Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference are available in Portuguese only. The title of the speeches and panel discussions reproduced here were translated into English by the author.

Sergio Abreu	Uruguayan Senate	Senator	Uruguay	Panel 1 – Moderator
Marco Aurélio Garcia	Brazil's Presidency Special Advisor for International Affairs	Brazil's Presidency Special Advisor for International Affairs	Brazil	Panel 2: South America and the hemispheric security agenda: new approaches to new challenges
Marta Lucía Ramírez de Rincón	Colombian Senate	Senator	Colombia	Panel 2
Luis Bitencourt	Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, Brazil Institute	Senior Fellow	United States of America	Panel 2
Lars-Gunnar Wigemark	European Commission, Ambassador	Head of the Security Policy Unit	Sweden	Panel 2
Frederico Merke	Universidad del Salvador	Scholar	Argentina	Panel 2 – Moderator
Roberto Mangabeira Unger	Brazilian Ministry of Strategic Affairs	Brazilian Minister of Strategic Affairs	Brazil	Speech: Brazil's new defence strategy
Daniel Fata	The Cohen Group	Vice-President	United States of America	Panel 3: The future relations of Europe and the United States in the field of security
Eckart von Klaeden	CDU/CSU Parliamentary group in the German Bundestag	Foreign Policy Spokesman	Germany	Panel 3
Yves Boyer	Foundation for Strategic Research/ *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique* (FRS)	Deputy Director	France	Panel 3
Roberto Abdenur	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI), Board of Trustees,	Member of the Board of Trustees, Ambassador	Brazil	Panel 3 – Moderator

Stefan Zoller	European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company, Defence and Security Division	Chief Executive Officer	Germany	Panel 3 – Moderator
Agustín Colombo Sierra	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship	Undersecretary for Latin American Policy Argentina	Argentina	Panel 4: The new European security and defence policy and the South American Defence Council
Fernando Lista	European Union Military Staff (EUMS), Deputy Director General	Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral	European Union	Panel 4
Wilson Barbosa Guerra	Ministry of Defence, Politics and Strategy Department	Director General, Rear Admiral	Brazil	Panel 4 – Moderator
José Antonio Bellina Acevedo	Peruvian Ministry of Defence	Director General of International Affairs	Peru	Panel 4 – Moderator
Emmanuel Reinert	The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS)	Executive Director	Belgium	Panel 5: New challenges in the field of security on the bi-regional agenda South America-European Union – Topic: Drug Trafficking
Giovanni Quaglia	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime	Representative for Brazil and South Cone	Brazil	Panel 5 – Topic: Drug trafficking
Ivan Briscoe	Foundation for International Relations and Foreign Dialogue (FRIDE)	Senior Research Fellow	Spain	Panel 5 – Topic: Illegal migration
Raul Jungmann	Brazilian House of Representatives	Federal Deputy, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defence	Brazil	Panel 5 – Moderator

2009

12-13 November 2009, VI Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference: "Cooperation Europe-South America in International Security Affairs"

Speaker	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
Peter Fischer-Bollin	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Opening remarks
Alfredo Valladão	Chaire Mercosur, University of Paris (Sciences Po)	Director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, scholar	Brazil/France	Opening remarks
Christian Burgsmüller	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Politics, Economy and Information Unit, First Secretary	European Union	Opening remarks
Marcos de Azambuja	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Vice-President	Brazil	Opening remarks
Clóvis Brigagão	Center for American Studies (CEAs), Universidade Cândido Mendes	Scholar	Brazil	Opening remarks
Marco Aurélio Garcia	Brazil's Presidency Special Advisor for International Affairs	Brazil's Presidency Special Advisor for International Affairs	Brazil	Opening speech - Cooperation Europe-South America in Security and Defense: a South American perspective
Michel Miraillet	French Ministry of Defence	Chief Director for Strategic Affairs	France	Opening speech - Cooperation Europe-South America in Security and Defense: an European perspective
José Antônio Bellina Acevedo	Peruvian Ministry of Defence	Vice-Minister, Ambassador	Peru	Panel 1: A common agenda between Europe and South America for international security

Adrian Hyde-Price	Bath University	Scholar	United Kingdom	Panel 1: A common agenda between Europe and South America for international security
Antônio Carlos Pereira	O Estado de São Paulo	Editor, Journalist	Brazil	Panel 1: A common agenda between Europe and South America for international security (Moderator)
Ricardo Alves de Barros	Ministry of Defence, National Defence Policy Division	Managing Director, Navy Captain	Brazil	Panel 2: Potential European-South American Cooperation Initiatives with Africa in the Field of Security
Frank van Rooyen	Retired South African Navy Officer, South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA)	Senior Research Fellow	South Africa	Panel 2: Potential European-South American Cooperation Initiatives with Africa in the Field of Security
Marco Farani	Ministry of External Relations	Director of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency	Brazil	Panel 2: Potential European-South American Cooperation Initiatives with Africa in the Field of Security
Gert-Johannes Haguemann	German Ministry of Defence	Chief Director for Policy Planning for European and African Affairs	Germany	Panel 2: Potential European-South American Cooperation Initiatives with Africa in the Field of Security
Raul Jungmann	Brazilian House of Representatives	Federal Deputy, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defence	Brazil	Panel 3: Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: lessons to share?
Roland Kobia	European Commission	Ambassador, Member of Cabinet in charge of International Relations, Private Office of the EU Commissioner for Energy	European Union	Panel 3: Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: lessons to share?
Odilon Marcuzzo do Canto	Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Energy Agency (ABACC)	Brazilian Representative to the ABACC	Brazil	Panel 3: Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: lessons to share?

Phillipe Denier	French Ministry of Defence	Nuclear Issues Advisor, Strategic Affairs Unit	France	Panel 3: Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: lessons to share?
Gonzalo García Pino	Chilean Ministry of Defence	Undersecretary of War	Chile	Panel 4: European-South American cooperation in the fields of security and defence: which actors for which problems?
Markus Kaim	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)	Head of the International Security Division	Germany	Panel 4: European-South American cooperation in the fields of security and defence: which actors for which problems?
Miguel Carvajal	Ecuadorian Ministry of Domestic and Foreign Security	Ecuadorian Minister of Domestic and Foreign Security	Ecuador	Panel 4: European-South American cooperation in the fields of security and defence: which actors for which problems?
Carlos Gaspar	Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portuguese Institute for International Relations	Director	Portugal	Panel 4: European-South American cooperation in the fields of security and defence: which actors for which problems?
Mariana Luz	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Academic Coordinator	Brazil	Final remarks
Clóvis Brigagão	Center for American Studies (CEAs), Universidade Cândido Mendes	Scholar	Brazil	Final remarks
Alfredo Valladão	Chaire Mercosur, University of Paris (Sciences Po)	Director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, scholar	Brazil/France	Final remarks

2010

3-4 November 2010, VII Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference: "Current Challenges for Disarmament and Peace Operations on the Political Agenda"

Speaker	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
Peter Fischer-Bollin	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Opening remarks
Luiz Felipe Lampreia	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador and Honorary Vice-Chairmen of CEBRI	Brazil	Opening remarks
João Pacheco	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Opening remarks
Nelson Jobim	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Brazilian Minister of Defence	Brazil	Opening speech - Security Perspectives for South America and Europe
Jaime Ravinet	Chilean Ministry of Defence	Chilean Minister of Defence	Chile	Opening speech - Security Perspectives for South America and Europe
Klaus Naumann	NATO Military Committee/German Federal Armed Forces	Former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (1996-1999) and Chief of Staff of the German Federal Armed Forces (1991-1996), Retired General	Germany/North Atlantic Treaty Organization	Opening speech - Security Perspectives for South America and Europe
Peter Fischer-Bollin	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Opening speech - Security Perspectives for South America and Europe (Moderator)
Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	Former Force Commander (2009-2010)	Brazil	Workshop 1 - Peace Operations and Strategic Security

Elissa Golberg	Government of Canada	Director-General of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START)	Canada	Workshop 1 - Peace Operations and Strategic Security
Babu Rahman	Foreign and Commonwealth Office	Head of the Planning and Countries Team in the Stabilization Unit	United Kingdom	Workshop 1 - Peace Operations and Strategic Security
Clóvis Brigagão	Center for American Studies, Candido Mendes University	Director, scholar	Brazil	Workshop 1 - Peace Operations and Strategic Security (Facilitator)
Markus Kaim	German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)	Head of the International Security Division	Germany	Workshop 2 - Tendencies of Armament in Latin America and Europe
Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas	Pontificia Javeriana University	Head of the International Relations Department	Colombia	Workshop 2 - Tendencies of Armament in Latin America and Europe
Rocío San Miguel	Civil Association Citizen Control for Security, Defence and National Armed Forces, Venezuela	President of the civil association	Venezuela	Workshop 2 - Tendencies of Armament in Latin America and Europe
Alfredo Valladão	Chaire Mercosur, University of Paris (Sciences Po)	Director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, Scholar	Brazil	Workshop 2 - Tendencies of Armament in Latin America and Europe (Facilitator)
Raul Jungmann	Brazilian House of Representatives	Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defence, Federal Deputy	Brazil	Conference 1 – Challenges for the Defence Budget after the Economic Crisis
Sergio Abreu	Senate of Uruguay	Senator	Uruguay	Conference 1 – Challenges for the Defence Budget after the Economic Crisis
Roederich Kiesewetter	CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag	Member of the German Bundestag	Germany	Conference 1 – Challenges for the Defence Budget after the Economic Crisis

Pavel Zalewski	European Parliament	Member of the European Parliament	Poland	Conference 1 – Challenges for the Defence Budget after the Economic Crisis
Patrick Keller	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Coordinator of Foreign and Security Policy	Germany	Conference 1 – Challenges for the Defence Budget after the Economic Crisis (Moderator)
Gioconda Úbeda Rivera	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)	Secretary-General, Ambassador	Costa Rica	Panel – The Current Debate on Nuclear Disarmament
Mark Fitzpatrick	International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)	Director, Non-proliferation and Disarmament Programme	United States of America/United Kingdom	Panel – The Current Debate on Nuclear Disarmament
Roland Kobia	Delegation of the European Union to Azerbaijan	Head of the Delegation, Ambassador, former member of EURATOM	European Union	Panel – The Current Debate on Nuclear Disarmament
Roberto Abdenur	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador and Board Member of CEBRI	Brazil	Panel – The Current Debate on Nuclear Disarmament (Moderator)
				Final remarks

2011

3-4 November 2011, VIII Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference: "New Issues on the International Security Agenda"

Speaker	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
Thomas Knirsch	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Opening remarks
Ana Paula Zacarias	Delegation of the European Union in Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Opening remarks
Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	President of CEBRI	Brazil	Opening remarks
Marco Aurélio Gonçalves Mendes	Brazilian Ministry of Defense	Lieutenant-Brigadier, Chief of Strategic Affairs	Brazil	Opening conference: New challenges to collective security
Jorge Alberto Chevalier	Argentine Ministry of Defence	Brigadier General, Chief of the General Staff	Argentina	Opening conference: New challenges to collective security
Ulrich Schlie	German Ministry of Defence	Director of Policy Planning	Germany	Opening conference: New challenges to collective security
Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Member of CEBRI, Ambassador	Brazil	Opening conference: New challenges to collective security (Moderator)
Francine Jacome	Venezuelan Institute for Social and Political Studies	Executive Director and Researcher	Venezuela	Workshop 1: Climate change and energy as security issues
Jeffrey Mazo	International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)	Research Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy	United Kingdom	Workshop 1: Climate change and energy as security issues

Odilon Marcuzzo do Canto	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials´(ABACC)	Secretary of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)	Brazil	Workshop 1: Climate change and energy as security issues
Leonardo Paz Neves	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Studies and Debates Coordinator	Brazil	Workshop 1: Climate change and energy as security issues (Moderator)
Iván Valenzuela Bosne	Chilean Navy	Director of Security and Navy Operations	Chile	Workshop 2: Common threats for maritime security
Markus Kaim	German Institute for International and Security Affairs/*Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* (SWP)	Head of International Security Division	Germany	Workshop 2: Common threats for maritime security
Alfredo Valladão	Chaire Mercosur, University of Paris (Sciences Po)	Director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, scholar	Brazil	Workshop 2: Common threats for maritime security
Aline Bruno Soares	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Project Coordinator, Brazil Office	Brazil/Germany	Workshop 2: Common threats for maritime security (Moderator)
Fernando Destito Francischini	Brazilian Federal Police	Federal Police Officer	Brazil	Conference: Illicit traffic, borders and national security
Javier Fernando García Duchini	Uruguayan Federal Parliament	Federal deputy, President of the Defense Commission at the National Parliament	Uruguay	Conference: Illicit traffic, borders and national security
José Luis Ovando Patrón	Mexican House of Representatives	Federal deputy, President of the Public Security Commission	Mexico	Conference: Illicit traffic, borders and national security
Antônio Carlos Pereira	O Estado de S. Paulo, Folha da Tarde	Editorialist of the Newspapers O Estado de São Paulo and Jornal da Tarde	Brazil	Conference: Illicit traffic, borders and national security (Moderator)

José Mariano Beltrame	Rio de Janeiro State Public Safety Department	Secretary of Public Safety, Rio de Janeiro State	Brazil	Conference: Armed forces and urban peace-making
Jesús Ramirez Cano	Urban Security Company (ESU) of Medellin	Director	Colombia	Conference: Armed forces and urban peace-making
Paolo G. Tripodi	Lejeune Leadership Institute, Marine Corps University	Ethics Branch Head	United States of America	Conference: Armed forces and urban peace-making
Kai Michael Kenkel	Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (IRI/PUC-Rio)	Scholar	Brazil	Conference: Armed forces and urban peace-making
Antonio Jorge Ramalho	University of Brasilia	Scholar	Brazil	Conference: Armed forces and urban peace-making (Moderator)
Matias Spektor	Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)	Scholar	Brazil	Conclusions: New issues on the international security agenda
Patrick Keller	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Coordinator of Foreign Policy and Security	Germany	Conclusions: New issues on the international security agenda
Thomas Knirsch	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Closing remarks
Ana Paula Zacarias	Delegation of the European Union in Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Closing remarks
Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	President, Ambassador	Brazil	Closing remarks

2012

19 September 2012, IX Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference: "Security and Responsibility in a Multipolar World"

Speaker	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
Ana Paula Zacarias	Delegation of the European Union in Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Opening remarks
Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	President, Ambassador	Brazil	Opening remarks
Felix Dane	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Opening remarks
Walter Stevens	European External Action Service (EEAS)	Head of Crisis Management and Planning Department	European Union	Opening panel: Security and Responsibility in a Multipolar World
Edmund Mulet	Organization of the United Nations (UN)	Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations	United Nations Organization	Opening panel: Security and Responsibility in a Multipolar World
Mario César Sánchez Debernardi	Peruvian Ministry of Defence	Vice-Minister of Defence, Rear admiral	Peru	Opening panel: Security and Responsibility in a Multipolar World
Jürgen Menner	German Federal Ministry of Defence	Lieutenant colonel	Germany	Opening panel: Security and Responsibility in a Multipolar World
José Botafogo Gonçalves	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Vice-president emeritus of CEBRI	Brazil	Opening panel: Security and Responsibility in a Multipolar World (Moderator)
Guilherme de Aguiar Patriota	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ambassador, Deputy Advisor to the President	Brazil	Conference 1: Strategies and Tools to Achieve Responsible Security

		for International Affairs		
Danielle Pletka	American Enterprise Institute	Vice-president for foreign and defence policy	United States of America	Conference 1: Strategies and Tools to Achieve Responsible Security
Jügern Menner	German Federal Ministry of Defence	Lieutenant colonel	Germany	Conference 1: Strategies and Tools to Achieve Responsible Security
Oliver Stuenkel	Getulio Vargas Foundation/*Fundação Getulio Vargas* (FGV)	Scholar	Brazil	Conference 1: Strategies and Tools to Achieve Responsible Security
Felix Dane	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Conference 1: Strategies and Tools to Achieve Responsible Security (Moderator)
Annette Leijenaar	Institute for Security Studies (ISS)	Conflict Management and Peacebuilding Division Head	South Africa	Workshop 3: Potential Future Security Risks in the South Atlantic
Alfredo Valladão	Chaire Mercosur, University of Paris (Sciences Po)	Director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, scholar	France	Workshop 3: Potential Future Security Risks in the South Atlantic
Cláudio Portugal de Viveiros	Brazilian Naval War College/*Escola de Guerra Naval*	Director, Rear admiral	Brazil	Workshop 3: Potential Future Security Risks in the South Atlantic
Michel Foucher	Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defense/*Institut des hautes études de défense nationale*	Training, Studies and Research Director, Ambassador	France	Workshop 3: Potential Future Security Risks in the South Atlantic
Kai Kenkel	Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (IRI/PUC-Rio)	Scholar	Brazil	Workshop 3: Potential Future Security Risks in the South Atlantic (Moderator)
Edmond Mulet	Organization of the United Nations (UN)	Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations	UN	Conference 2: Challenges and Opportunities for North-South Strategic Cooperation

Karl-Heinz Kamp	NATO Defence College	Director of the Research Division	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	Conference 2: Challenges and Opportunities for North-South Strategic Cooperation
Williams da Silva Gonçalves	Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ)	Scholar	Brazil	Conference 2: Challenges and Opportunities for North-South Strategic Cooperation
Antônio Jorge Ramalho	University of Brasília	Scholar	Brazil	Conference 2: Challenges and Opportunities for North-South Strategic Cooperation (Moderator)
Julio de Amo Júnior	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Divisional general, Head of the Institutional Planning Division	Brazil	Workshop 4: The Defence White Paper and international law
Leonardo Nemer Caldeira Brant	Centre for Law and Business Studies/*Centro de Estudos em Direito e Negócios* (CEDIN)	President of CEDIN	Brazil	Workshop 4: The Defence White Paper and international law4
Torsten Stein	Europa-Institut Saarland University	Director	Germany	Workshop 4: The Defence White Paper and international law
Patrice Franko	Colby College	Scholar	United States of America	Workshop 4: The Defence White Paper and international law
Clóvis Brigagão	Center for American Studies (CEAs), Universidade Cândido Mendes	Scholar	Brazil	Workshop 4: The Defence White Paper and international law (Moderator)
Ana Paula Zacarias	Delegation of the European Union in Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Closing remarks
Fátima Berardinelli	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Executive director	Brazil	Closing remarks
Felix Dane	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Closing remarks

2013

29 November 2013, X Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference: “Brazil Emerging in the Global Security Order”

Speaker	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
Felix Dane	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Opening remarks
Marcos de Azambuja	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador, Member of the Board of Trustees	Brazil	Opening remarks
Ana Paula Zacarias	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Opening remarks
Carlos Augusto de Sousa	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Admiral, Chief of Strategic Affairs of the Joint General Staff of the Armed Forces	Brazil	Keynote speech: The Evolving Global Security Order
Ulrich Schlie	German Federal Ministry of Defence	Head of the Politics Division	Germany	Keynote speech: The Evolving Global Security Order
Rodrigo Baena Soares	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ambassador, Head of the General Coordination for Defence Affairs (CGDEF)	Brazil	Panel 1: Brazilian and European Perspectives on the Global Security Order
Roland Schäfer	European External Action Service (EEAS)	Director for the Americas	European Union	Panel 1: Brazilian and European Perspectives on the Global Security Order
Alfredo Valladão	Chaire Mercosur, University of Paris (Sciences Po)	Director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, scholar	Brazil/France	Panel 1: Brazilian and European Perspectives on the Global Security Order

Patrick Keller	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Coordinator of Foreign Policy and Security	Germany	Panel 1: Brazilian and European Perspectives on the Global Security Order (Moderator)
Adriana Abdenur	BRICS Policy Center, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (IRI/PUC-Rio)	General Coordinator, scholar	Brazil	Panel 2: Security and Cooperation in the South Atlantic
Ian Lesser	The German Marshall Fund of the United States	Vice-president for Foreign Policy	United States of America	Panel 2: Security and Cooperation in the South Atlantic
Brooke Windsor-Smith	NATO Defence College	Deputy Head Research Division	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	Panel 2: Security and Cooperation in the South Atlantic
Mashudu Godfrey Ramuhala	South African Ministry of Defence	Deputy director	South Africa	Panel 2: Security and Cooperation in the South Atlantic
Alexandre Galante	Defence Forces Magazine/*Revista Forças de Defesa*	Journalist	Brazil	Panel 2: Security and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (Moderator)
Kai Kenkel	Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (IRI/PUC-Rio)	Scholar	Germany/Brazil	Panel 3: The Imperatives and Hazards of Interventions: Libya, Mali and Syria
Michel Foucher	Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defense/*Institut des hautes études de défense nationale*	Training, Studies and Research Director, Ambassador	France	Panel 3: The Imperatives and Hazards of Interventions: Libya, Mali and Syria
Antônio Jorge Ramalho	Brazilian Ministry of Defence/Pandiá Calógeras Institute	Special Advisor, Director of the Pandiá Calógeras Institute	Brazil	Panel 3: The Imperatives and Hazards of Interventions: Libya, Mali and Syria
Cheickna Keita	Malian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ambassador of Mali to Brazil	Mali	Panel 3: The Imperatives and Hazards of Interventions: Libya, Mali and Syria

Humberto Saccomandi	*Valor Econômico* (Newspaper)	Journalist	Brazil	Panel 3: The Imperatives and Hazards of Interventions: Libya, Mali and Syria (Moderator)
Antônio Carlos Mendes Thame	Brazilian House of Representatives	Federal Deputy	Brazil	Panel 4: Security through Development: Shared Interests, Mutual Cooperation
Jean-Dufourcq	Revue Défense Nationale	Editor in chief	France	Panel 4: Security through Development: Shared Interests, Mutual Cooperation
André de Mello e Souza	Brazilian Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA)	Research fellow	Brazil	Panel 4: Security through Development: Shared Interests, Mutual Cooperation
Niklas Swanström	Institute for Security and Development Policy	Director	Sweden	Panel 4: Security through Development: Shared Interests, Mutual Cooperation
Jens Glüsing	Der Spiegel	Journalist	Germany	Panel 4: Security through Development: Shared Interests, Mutual Cooperation (Moderator)
Ana Paula Zacarias	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Closing remarks
Marcos de Azambuja	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador, Member of the Board of Trustees	Brazil	Closing remarks
Felix Dane	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Closing remarks

2014

10 October 2014, XI Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference: “Multilateral Security Governance”

Speaker	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
Felix Dane	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Opening remarks
Luis Augusto de Castro Neves	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador, President of CEBRI	Brazil	Opening remarks
Ana Paula Zacarias	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Opening remarks
Décio Luís Schons	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Divisional General, Deputy Head of International Affairs	Brazil	Opening panel: Multilateral Security Governance
Roland Schäfer	European External Action Service (EEAS)	Director for the Americas	European Union	Opening panel: Multilateral Security Governance
Antônio Jorge Ramalho	Brazilian Ministry of Defence/Pandiá Calógeras Institute	Special Advisor, Director of the Pandiá Calógeras Institute	Brazil	Panel 1: The re-emergence of regional flashpoints
Timothy Ridout	The German Marshall Fund of the United States	Wider Atlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund, USA	United States of America	Panel 1: The re-emergence of regional flashpoints
Jan Techau	Carnegie Europe	Director, Carnegie Europe, Brussels	Belgium	Panel 1: The re-emergence of regional flashpoints
Alfredo Valladão	Chaire Mercosur, University of Paris (Sciences Po)	Director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, Scholar	Brazil/France	Panel 1: The re-emergence of regional flashpoints

Renato Flores	Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV)	Scholar	Brazil	Panel 1: The re-emergence of regional flashpoints (Moderator)
Dirk Brengelmann	German Foreign Office	Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Brazil	Germany	Panel 2: Cyber Security and Cyber Governance
Adriana Abdenur	Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (IRI/PUC-Rio)	Scholar	Brazil	Panel 2: Cyber Security and Cyber Governance
Alan Denilson Lima Costa	Brazilian Armed Forces	Colonel, Deputy Chief of CDCiber, Brazilian Armed Forces	Brazil	Panel 2: Cyber Security and Cyber Governance
Jean-Loup Samaan	NATO Defense College	Researcher	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	Panel 2: Cyber Security and Cyber Governance
Thomas Fischermann	Die Zeit	Journalist	Germany	Panel 2: Cyber Security and Cyber Governance (Moderator)
Alexandre Moreli	Getulio Vargas Foundation	Scholar	Brazil	Panel 3: 100 Years Great War – 200 Years Congress of Vienna
Stella Ghervas	Harvard University	Visiting scholar	United States of America	Panel 3: 100 Years Great War – 200 Years Congress of Vienna
Eiiti Sato	University of Brasília	Scholar	Brazil	Panel 3: 100 Years Great War – 200 Years Congress of Vienna
Patrick Keller	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Coordinator of Foreign and Security Policy	Germany	Panel 3: 100 Years Great War – 200 Years Congress of Vienna (Moderator)
Felix Dane	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Closing remarks

Luis Augusto de Castro Neves	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador, President of CEBRI	Brazil	Closing remarks
Ana Paula Zacarias	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Closing remarks

2015

08 October 2015, XII Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference: "World Politics of Security"

Speaker	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
Felix Dane	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Opening remarks
Luis Augusto de Castro Neves	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador, President of CEBRI	Brazil	Opening remarks
João Gomes Cravinho	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Special talk: The new EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy
Décio Luís Schons	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Divisional General, Deputy Head of International Affairs	Brazil	Opening speech: World Politics of Security: the Brazilian approach
Maurício Lyrio	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Minister, Diplomatic Planning Secretariat	Brazil	Panel 1: World Politics of Security
Alfredo Valladão	Sciences Po/Paris School of International Affairs, EUBrasil Association	Scholar, Director at EUBrasil Association	Brazil/France	Panel 1: World Politics of Security
Dirk Brengelmann	German Foreign Office	Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Brazil	Germany	Panel 1: World Politics of Security
Dmitry Danilov	Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences	Department of European Security	Russia	Panel 1: World Politics of Security
Leonardo Nemer	Centre for Law and Business Studies/Centro de Estudos em Direito	President	Brazil	Panel 1: World Politics of Security (Moderator)

	e Negócios (CEDIN)			
Sergio Eduardo Moreira Lima	Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG)	Ambassador, President of FUNAG	Brazil	Panel 2.1: The International System: Sovereignty, Territory, and Nation State
Kai Kenkel	Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (IRI/PUC-Rio)	Scholar	Germany/Brazil	Panel 2.1: The International System: Sovereignty, Territory, and Nation State
Bill Durodié	University of Bath, Chatham House	Scholar, Associate Fellow	United Kingdom	Panel 2.1: The International System: Sovereignty, Territory, and Nation State
Walter Feichtinger	Austrian Defense Academy/Landesverteidigungsakademie (LVAk)	General	Austria	Panel 2.1: The International System: Sovereignty, Territory, and Nation State
Tinko Weibezahl	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Programme Coordinator	Germany	Panel 2.1: The International System: Sovereignty, Territory, and Nation State (Moderator)
João Cesar Zambão da Silva	Brazil's Superior War College (ESG)	General	Brazil	Panel 2.2.: Unconventional warfare: regional perspectives
Henry Cancelado	Pontificia Universidad Javeriana de Bogotá	Scholar	Colombia	Panel 2.2.: Unconventional warfare: regional perspectives
Peter Härle	German Federal Academy for Security Policy	Course Director Colonel	Germany	Panel 2.2.: Unconventional warfare: regional perspectives
Jean-Baptiste Jeangene Vilmer	French Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Policy Advisor on Security Issues	France	Panel 2.2.: Unconventional warfare: regional perspectives

Aziz Tuffi Saliba	Federal University of Minas Gerais	Scholar	Brazil	Panel 2.2.: Unconventional warfare: regional perspectives (Moderator)
Salvador Raza	National Defense University	Scholar	Brazil/United States of America	Panel 3.1: The World Security Agenda: Prospects for concerted efforts on the world politics of security
Antônio Jorge Ramalho	Brazilian Ministry of Defence/Pandiá Calógeras Institute	Special Advisor, Director at Pandiá Calógeras Institute	Brazil	Panel 3.1: The World Security Agenda: Prospects for concerted efforts on the world politics of security
Alex Ellis	British Embassy in Brazil	British Ambassador to Brazil	United Kingdom	Panel 3.1: The World Security Agenda: Prospects for concerted efforts on the world politics of security
Sophie Jouineau	French Minitry of Defence, Sciences Po/Paris School of International Affairs	Head of the Latin America Office, Scholar	France	Panel 3.1: The World Security Agenda: Prospects for concerted efforts on the world politics of security
Kristina Eichhorst	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Coordinator for counterterrorism and conflict management	Germany	Panel 3.1: The World Security Agenda: Prospects for concerted efforts on the world politics of security (Moderator)
Nivalde José de Castro	Federal University of Rio de Janeiro	Scholar	Brazil	Panel 3.2: Energy Security in an interconnected world
Eduardo Viola	University of Brasília	Scholar	Brazil	Panel 3.2: Energy Security in an interconnected world

Paul A. Isbell	John Hopkins University, SAIS	Scholar	United States of America	Panel 3.2: Energy Security in an interconnected world
Dávid Korányi	Atlantic Council, Eurasian Energy Futures Initiative	Researcher	United States of America	Panel 3.2: Energy Security in an interconnected world
Leonardo Paz	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Study and Debate Coordinator	Brazil	Panel 3.2: Energy Security in an interconnected world (Moderator)
Felix Dane	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Closing remarks
Luis Augusto de Castro Neves	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador, President of CEBRI	Brazil	Closing remarks
João Gomes Cravinho	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Closing remarks

2016

14 October 2016, XIII Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference: “Might and Right in World Politics”

Speaker	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
Jan Woischnik	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Opening remarks
Roberto Abdenur	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador, President of CEBRI	Brazil	Opening remarks
João Gomes Cravinho	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Opening remarks
Raul Jungmann	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Brazilian Minister of Defence	Brazil	Keynote Speech – Might and Right in World Politics
Gelson Fonseca Jr	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG)	Ambassador, Head of the Center for Diplomatic History and Documentation at FUNAG	Brazil	Panel 1: World Politics of Security: the balance of law and force (Introductory speech)
Alfredo Valladão	Sciences Po/Paris School of International Affairs, EU-Brasil Association	Scholar, President of the Advisory Board at the EU-Brasil Association	Brazil/France	Panel 1: World Politics of Security: the balance of law and force
Franziska Stahl	EU CSDP EUCAP Mission	Head of the Analysis Unit	European Union	Panel 1: World Politics of Security: the balance of law and force
Jens Bartelsson	Lund University	Scholar	Sweden	Panel 1: World Politics of Security: the balance of law and force
Matias Spektor	Getulio Vargas Foundation	Scholar	Brazil	Panel 1: World Politics of Security: the balance

				of law and force (Moderator)
Braz Baracuhy Neto	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Diplomat	Brazil	Panel 2: Brazilian and European Views on Defence and Geo-Economics (Introductory speech)
Susanne Gratius	Autonomous University of Madrid	Scholar	Spain	Panel 2: Brazilian and European Views on Defence and Geo-Economics
Sven Biscop	Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations	Director, Europe in the World Programme	Belgium	Panel 2: Brazilian and European Views on Defence and Geo-Economics
Renato Flôres	Getulio Vargas Foundation	Scholar	Brazil	Panel 2: Brazilian and European Views on Defence and Geo-Economics
Patrick Keller	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Coordinator of Foreign Policy and Security	Germany	Panel 2: Brazilian and European Views on Defence and Geo-Economics (Moderator)
Eamon Gilmore	European External Action Service (EEAS)	EU Special Envoy to the Colombian Peace Process	European Union	Panel 3: Restoring Peace to Nations in Conflict: Views from Europe and Latin America (Introductory speech)
Antonio Ruy da Silva	Brazil's Superior War College (ESG)	Admiral, Scholar	Brazil	Panel 3: Restoring Peace to Nations in Conflict: Views from Europe and Latin America
Amna Popovac	Women Waging Peace Network	Consultant	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Panel 3: Restoring Peace to Nations in Conflict: Views from Europe and Latin America

Mariano Aguirre	Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution	Managing Director, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF)	Norway	Panel 3: Restoring Peace to Nations in Conflict: Views from Europe and Latin America
Antônio Jorge Ramalho	South American School of Defence/Escuela Suramericana de Defensa del CDS-UNASUR (ESUDE)	Scholar, Executive Secretary at ESUDE	Brazil/Union of South American Nations	Panel 3: Restoring Peace to Nations in Conflict: Views from Europe and Latin America (Moderator)
Roberto Abdenur	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador, President of CEBRI	Brazil	Closing remarks
João Gomes Cravinho	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Closing remarks
Jan Woischnik	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Closing remarks

2017

29 September 2017, XIV Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference: "Security Architecture: an Exchange between South America and Europe"

Speaker	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
Jan Woischnik	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Opening remarks
João Gomes Cravinho	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Opening remarks
José Pio Borges	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Chairman of the Board of Trustees	Brazil	Opening remarks
Norbert Lammert	German Bundestag, CDU/CSU Parliamentary in the German Bundestag	President of the German Bundestag, Vice-President of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Germany	Keynote Speech – "Security Architecture: An Exchange between South America and Europe
Raul Jungmann	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Brazilian Minister of Defence	Brazil	Keynote Speech – "Security Architecture: An Exchange between South America and Europe
Nathalie Tocci	European External Action Service (EEAS)	Special Advisor to the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission on the EU Foreign and Security Policy Strategy	European Union	Panel 1 – "Security Architecture in a Changing World" (Introductory speech)
Chris Whitecross	NATO Defense College (NDC)	Commandant at NDC	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	Panel 1 – "Security Architecture in a Changing World"

Julius Liljeström	Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Head of the European Security Department	Sweden	Panel 1 – "Security Architecture in a Changing World"
Fernando Simas Magalhães	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ambassador and Undersecretary General for Multilateral Political Affairs, Europe and North America	Brazil	Panel 1 – "Security Architecture in a Changing World"
Roberto Abdenur	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador and Member of the Board of Trustees	Brazil	Panel 1 – "Security Architecture in a Changing World" (Moderator)
Roderich Kiesewetter	CDU/CSU Parliamentary in the German Bundestag	Member of the German Bundestag	Germany	Panel 2 – "Security Architecture and Cyber Threats" (Introductory speech)
Ronaldo Lemos	Institute for Technology & Society of Rio de Janeiro	Director	Brazil	Panel 2 – "Security Architecture and Cyber Threats"
Jorge Henrique Cabral Fernandes	University of Brasília	Scholar	Brazil	Panel 2 – "Security Architecture and Cyber Threats"
Maria Lourdes Puente Olivera	Pontifical Catholic University	Scholar	Argentina	Panel 2 – "Security Architecture and Cyber Threats"
Elena Lazarou	European Parliamentary Research Service	Policy Analyst	European Union	Panel 2 – "Security Architecture and Cyber Threats" (Moderator)
Thiago Rodrigues	Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF), Institute for Strategic Studies	Scholar	Brazil	Panel 3 – "Drug Trafficking and its Influences on the International Security" (Introductory Speech)
Alexis Goosdeel	European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction	Director	European Union	Panel 3 – "Drug Trafficking and its Influences on the International Security"

Ana Paula Pellegrino	Igarapé Institute	Associate Researcher	Brazil	Panel 3 – "Drug Trafficking and its Influences on the International Security"
Virginia Comolli	International Institute for Strategic Studies	Senior Fellow for Security and Development	United Kingdom	Panel 3 – "Drug Trafficking and its Influences on the International Security"
Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador and Vice-President Emeritus	Brazil	Panel 3 – "Drug Trafficking and its Influences on the International Security" (Moderator)
Roberto Abdenur	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador and Member of the Board of Trustees	Brazil	Closing remarks
João Gomes Cravinho	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Closing remarks
Jan Woischnik	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Closing remarks

2018

21 September 2018, XV Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference: "International Crisis Management"

Speaker	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
Jan Woischnik	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Opening remarks
João Gomes Cravinho	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Opening remarks
José Pio Borges	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Chairman of the Board of Trustees	Brazil	Opening remarks
René Leitgen	German Army	Brigadier General	Germany	Keynote Speech – International Crisis Management
Joaquim Silva e Luna	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Brazilian Minister of Defence	Brazil	Keynote Speech – International Crisis Management
Andreas Nick	CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag	Member of the German Bundestag	Germany	Panel 1 – International Management of Security Crises (Introductory Speech)
Monica Herz	Institute of International Relations, PUC-Rio	Scholar	Brazil	Panel 1 – International Management of Security Crises
Raúl Benitez-Manaut	National Autonomous University	Scholar	Mexico	Panel 1 – International Management of Security Crises
Mikael Wigell	Finnish Institute of International Affairs	Senior Research Fellow	Finland	Panel 1 – International Management of Security Crises

Georg Witschel	Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Brasília	German Ambassador in Brasília	Germany	Panel 1 – International Management of Security Crises (Moderator)
Nicolas Regaud	Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy, French Ministry of Defense	Special Representative to the Indo-Pacific	France	Panel 2 – Climate Change Crisis and its Management (Introductory Speech)
Pedro Solano	Society of Environmental Law	Executive Director	Peru	Panel 2 – Climate Change Crisis and its Management
Thomas Loster	Munich Re Foundation	Managing Director	Germany	Panel 2 – Climate Change Crisis and its Management
Izabella Teixeira	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Senior Fellow, Former Brazilian Minister of the Environment	Brazil	Panel 2 – Climate Change Crisis and its Management
Alfredo Valladão	Paris School of International Affairs, Sciences Po, EUBrasil Association	Scholar, President of the Advisory Board at the EU-Brasil Association	Brazil/France	Panel 2 – Climate Change Crisis and its Management (Moderator)
Henning Speck	CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag	Foreign and Security Policy Advisor	Germany	Panel 3 – Refugee Flows and its Management (Introductory Speech)
Milagros Betancourt	Universidad Católica Andrés Bello	Scholar	Venezuela	Panel 3 – Refugee Flows and its Management
Christian Bonfili	Chief of Staff Office	National Director of Strategic Analysis	Argentina	Panel 3 – Refugee Flows and its Management
Francesca Ramos Pismataro	Rosario University	Scholar	Colombia	Panel 3 – Refugee Flows and its Management

Mohamed Loulichki	OCP Policy Center	Senior Fellow	Morocco	Panel 3 – Refugee Flows and its Management
Monique Sochaczewski	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Projects Coordinator	Brazil	Panel 3 – Refugee Flows and its Management (Moderator)
João Gomes Cravinho	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Delegation	European Union	Closing remarks
José Pio Borges	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Chairman of the Board of Trustees	Brazil	Closing remarks
Jan Woischnik	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany	Closing remarks

Appendix 2: List of participants at the biannual preparatory meetings for the Forte de Copacabana International Security Conferences (2016-2018)[480]

2016 – 1

1st Preparatory Meeting for the XIII Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference, 30 May 2016, Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI), Rio de Janeiro.

Participant	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation
Jan Woischnik	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany
Gregory Ryan	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Coordinator for International Relations Projects, Brazil Office	Germany
Roberto Abdenur	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Chairman of the Board of Trustees	Brazil
Adriana Abdenur	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Research Fellow	Brazil
Braz Baracuhy Neto	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Diplomat	Brazil
Antonio Jorge Ramalho	South American School of Defence/Escuela Suramericana de Defensa del CDS-UNASUR (ESUDE)	Scholar, Executive Secretary at ESUDE	Brazil/UNASUR

[480] The preparatory meetings for the Forte de Copacabana International Security Conferences have taken place twice a year since 2016 behind closed doors. The lists of participants are therefore not exhaustive and only include information made public by the host organisations on their website and social media.

Eugênio Diniz	Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC-Minas)	Scholar	Brazil
Matias Spektor	Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV)/Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Scholar/Senior Fellow at CEBRI	Brazil

2016 – 2

2nd Preparatory Meeting for the XIII Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference, 4 August 2016, Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI), Rio de Janeiro, "Brazilian and European Defense Strategies", "Restoring Peace to Nations in Conflict: views from Europe and South America."

Participant	Affiliation	Position	Country
Aline Soares	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Coordinator for International Relations Projects, Brazil Office	Germany
Rafael Benke	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Chairman of the Board of Trustees	Brazil
Julia Dias Leite	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Research Fellow	Brazil
Leonardo Paz Neves	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Coordinator for Studies and Debates	Brazil
Stefan Simosas	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Political, Economic and Public Affairs Section	EU
Sérgio Moreira Lima	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG)	Head of FUNAG	Brazil
Paulo Roberto de Almeida	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation	Ambassador, Head of the Institute of Research on International Affairs (IPRI)	Brazil
Fabio Paggiaro	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Air Force Colonel, Deputy Head of the Special Planning Division	Brazil

Claudio Dornelles	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Colonel, Manager at the Defence Policy Unit	Brazil
João Marcelo Dalla Costa	Brazilian Army Command and General Staff College (ECEME)	Scholar	Brazil
Juliano Cortinhas	University of Brasília (UnB)	Scholar	Brazil
Marcelo Valença	Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ)	Scholar	Brazil
Layla Dawood	Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ)	Scholar	Brazil
Érico Esteves Duarte	Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)	Scholar	Brazil
Eduardo Viola	University of Brasília (UnB)	Scholar	Brazil
Fabio Amaral Figueira	Veirano Advogados	Lawyer	Brazil

2017 – 1

1st Preparatory Meeting for the XIV Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference, 10 April 2017, Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro, "Drug trafficking."

Participant	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation
Jan Woischnik	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany
Diogo Winnikes	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Coordinator for International Relations Projects, Brazil Office	Germany
Alexandra Steinmeyer	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Trainee, Brazil Office	Germany
José Pio Borges	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Chairman of the Board of Trustees	Brazil
Tomás Amorim	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Director of Development and Institutional Relations	Brazil
Leonardo Paz Neves	Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV)	Intelligence analyst	Brazil
Stefan Simosas	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Political, Economic and Public Affairs Section	EU
Nelson Antonio Tabajara de Oliveira	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Head of the Defense and Security Affairs Department	Brazil
Gelson Fonseca Jr.	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation/CEBRI	Ambassador, Head of the Center for Diplomatic History and Documentation at FUNAG	Brazil

Christen Olssen	Swedish Armed Forces	Colonel, Swedish Defence Attaché	Sweden
Maurício Leite Valeixo	Federal Police of Brazil	Director, Investigations and Fight Against Organized Crime (DICOR)	Brazil
Maria Lourdes Puente Oliveira	PUC Argentina	Scholar, Head of the Faculty of Politics and Government	Argentina
Antonio Jorge Ramalho	South American School of Defence/Escuela Suramericana de Defensa del CDS-UNASUR (ESUDE)	Scholar, Executive Secretary at ESUDE	Brazil/UNASUR
Carlos Alberto Vieira Filho	Brazilian Ministry of Defence/Pandiá Calógeras Institute	Head of the International Relations Division	Brazil
Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros	Brazil's Superior War College (ESG)	Scholar	Brazil

2017 – 2

2nd Preparatory Meeting for the XIV Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference, 14 June 2017, Brazilian Defence Ministry, Brasília, "Cyber threats."

Participant	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation
Jan Woischnik	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Head of the Brazil Office	Germany
Tomás Amorim	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Director of Development and Institutional Relations	Brazil
Alessandro Candeas	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Ambassador, Chief of Staff for the Office of the Brazilian Defence Minister	Brazil
Nelson Nunes da Rosa	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Rear admiral, Head of Joint Chief of Staff of the Cyber Defence Command	Brazil
Arthur Pereira Sabbat	Institutional Security Office of Brazil (GSI)	Colonel, Director of the Department of Information Security and Communications (DSIC)	Brazil
João Gomes Cravinho	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Ambassador, Head of the EU Delegation to Brazil	EU
Claudia Gintersdorfer	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Deputy Head of the Delegation	EU
Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ambassador, former Brazilian Science and Technology Minister (1999-2002)	Brazil
Helio Franchini Neto	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Counsellor, Head of the Defence Affairs Division	Brazil

Fabrício Neves	Brazilian Ministry of Defence/Pandiá Calógeras Institute	Head of Pandiá Calógeras Institute	Brazil
Diana Maria Torres Garces	Colombian Ministry of Defence	Assistant to Colombia's Defence Vice-Minister	Colombia
Luis Alejandro Doñas Núñez	Chilean Ministry of National Defence	Cooperation, Treaties and International Agreements Advisor	Chile
Vanessa Fonseca	Microsoft Brasil	Fight Against Digital Crimes Unit	Brazil
Alfredo Deak	Microsoft Brasil	Head of the Defence and Public Security Division	Brazil
Jorge Henrique Cabral Fernandes	University of Brasília (UnB)	Scholar	Brazil
Alcides Costa Vaz	University of Brasília (UnB)	Scholar	Brazil

2018 – 1

1st Preparatory Meeting for the XV Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference, 5 April 2018, Brazilian Ministry of Defence, Brasília, "Cybersecurity and National Interest during Campaign Period."

Participant	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation
Diogo Winnikes	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Coordinator for International Relations Projects, Brazil Office	Germany
Roberto Abdenur	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador and Member of the Board of Trustees	Brazil
Felipe Sampaio	Brazilian Ministry of Defence/Pandiá Calógeras Institute	Head of Pandiá Calógeras Institute	Brazil
Marco Aurélio Ruediger	Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV)	Head of Public Policy Analysis	Brazil
José de Melo Cruz	Superior Electoral Court of Brazil (TSE)	Electoral Systems Coordinator	Brazil
Sérgio Luis Fava	Federal Police of Brazil	Coordinator for Technology and Training at the Office to Combat Cybercrime/*Serviço de Repressão a Crimes Cibernéticos*	Brazil
Chiara de Teffé	Institute for Technology & Society (ITS Rio)	Research Fellow	Brazil
Antonio Jorge Ramalho	South American School of Defence/Escuela Suramericana de Defensa del CDS-UNASUR (ESUDE)	Scholar, Executive Secretary at ESUDE	Brazil/UNASUR

2018 – 2

2nd Preparatory Meeting for the XV Forte de Copacabana International Security Conference, 18 July 2018, Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI), Rio de Janeiro, "International crisis management."

Participant	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation
Diogo Winnikes	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Coordinator for International Relations Projects, Brazil Office	Germany
Franziska Hübner	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Deputy representative, Brazil Office	Germany
Roberto Abdenur	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador, Member of the Board of Trustees	Brazil
Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima	Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG)	Head of FUNAG	Brazil
Benoni Belli	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Head of Diplomatic Planning	Brazil
Marco Antônio Estevão Machado	Brazilian Ministry of Defence/Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB)	CCOPAB's Commandant, Army Infantry Colonel	Brazil
Carlos Eduardo De Francicis Ramos	Brazilian Ministry of Defence/Brazilian Army Command and General Staff College (ECEME)	Army colonel	Brazil
José Eustáquio Guimarães	Brazilian Ministry of Defence/Brazil's Superior War College (ESG)	Brigadier General, Director of the Center for Geopolitics and Strategic Studies at Brazil's Superior War College	Brazil

Mariana Kalil	Brazilian Ministry of Defence/Brazil's Superior War College (ESG)	Scholar	Brazil
Layla Dawood	Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ)	Scholar	Brazil
Eduardo Viola	University of Brasília (UnB)	Scholar	Brazil
Kai Kenkel	Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (IRI/PUC-Rio)	Scholar	Brazil
Lucas Rezende	Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC)	Scholar	Brazil

Appendix 3: List of speakers, panellists, and moderators at the European-South American Regional Security Symposium (2015 – 2018)

2015

I European-South American Regional Security Symposium, 23 April 2015, Central Military Command (Comando Militar do Planalto—CMP), Brasília.

Participant	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation
Gregory Ryan	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Coordinator for International Relations Projects, Brazil Office	Germany
Sérgio Moreira Lima	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG)	Head of FUNAG	Brazil
Jair Gomes da Costa Santos	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Brigadier, Deputy Head of International Affairs	Brazil
Jozef Smetz	Embassy of Belgium to Brazil	Ambassador	Belgium

2016

II European-South American Regional Security Symposium, 27 April 2016, Central Military Command, Brasília.

Participant	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
Gregory Ryan	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Coordinator for International Relations Projects, Brazil Office	Germany	Welcome address
Sérgio Moreira Lima	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG)	Head of FUNAG	Brazil	Welcome address
João Gomes Cravinho	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Head of the Delegation	EU	Welcome address
Jozef Smetz	Embassy of Belgium to Brazil	Ambassador	Belgium	Welcome address
Heinz Krieb	European External Action Service (EEAS), European Union Military Staff (EUMS)	Brigadier General, Director of Concepts and Capabilities	EU	Keynote speech
Joaquim Silva e Luna	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Army General, Secretary General	Brazil	Keynote speech
Nelson Antonio Tabajara de Oliveira	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ambassador, Special Advisor for Defence Affairs	Brazil	First panel: "Regional security organisations in the context of increased global insecurity"
Luís Alexandre Fuccille	Brazilian Association of Defense Studies (ABED)/ São Paulo State University (UNESP)	Scholar, Chair of ABED	Brazil	First panel: "Regional security organisations in the

				context of increased global insecurity”
Antonio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha	South American School of Defence/Escuela Suramericana de Defensa del CDS-UNASUR (ESUDE)	Scholar, Executive Secretary at ESUDE	Brazil/UNASUR	First panel: “Regional security organisations in the context of increased global insecurity”
Sven Biscop	EGMONT – Royal Institute for International Relations	Director, Europe in the World Programme	Belgium	First panel: “Regional security organisations in the context of increased global insecurity”
Marcelo Rech	Instituto InfoRel de Relações Internacionais e Defesa	Editor	Brazil	First panel: “Regional security organisations in the context of increased global insecurity” (Moderator)
Jonas Wikström	European Union Naval Force – Somalia (EU NAVFOR Somalia)	Rear admiral, Deputy Commander	EU	Second panel: “Regional security complexes and their neighbouring oceans”
Patricia Schneider	Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH)	Senior Researcher	Germany	Second panel: “Regional security complexes and their neighbouring oceans”
José Cláudio Oliveira Macedo	Brazilian Navy	Captain	Brazil	Second panel: “Regional security complexes and

				their neighbouring oceans”
Juan Carlos Guzmán Sanchez	Colombian Navy	Captain, naval attaché to Brazil	Colombia	Second panel: “Regional security complexes and their neighbouring oceans”
Antonio Ruy De Almeida Silva	Brazil’s Superior War College (ESG)	Admiral	Brazil	Second panel: “Regional security complexes and their neighbouring oceans” (Moderator)
Peter De Vliegher	Belgian General Information and Security Service	Deputy commander	Belgium	Third panel: “Building regional intelligence capabilities in response to the evolution of international crime and terrorism”
Marco Aurélio Chaves Cepik	Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)/Center for International Studies on Government (CEGOV)	Scholar, Director of CEGOV	Brazil	Third panel: “Building regional intelligence capabilities in response to the evolution of international crime and terrorism”
Carolina Sancho Hirane	Chilean Ministry of National Defence/Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos (ANEPE/Chile)	Scholar	Chile	Third panel: “Building regional intelligence capabilities in response to the evolution of

				international crime and terrorism”
Joanisval Brito Gonçalves	Brazilian Federal Senate	Legal advisor for foreign affairs and national defence	Brazil	Third panel: “Building regional intelligence capabilities in response to the evolution of international crime and terrorism” (Moderator)
Giovanni Hideki Chinaglia Okado	Pontifical Catholic University of Goiás	Scholar	Brazil	Rapporteur

2017

III European-South American Regional Security Symposium, 12-13 June 2017, Central Military Command, Brasília.

Participant	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
		12 June 2017		
Sérgio Westphalen Etchegoyen	Presidency of the Federal Republic of Brazil	General of the Army, Minister of the Cabinet of Institutional Security of the Presidency	Brazil	Welcome address
Ademir Sobrinho	Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Brazilian Armed Forces	Admiral, Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Brazilian Armed Forces	Brazil	Welcome address
João Gomes Cravinho	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Ambassador, Head of the EU Delegation to Brazil	EU	Welcome address
Esa Pulkkinen	European External Action Service (EEAS), European Union Military Staff (EUMS)	Lieutenant general, Director General of EUMS	EU	Keynote speech
Ademir Sobrinho	Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Brazilian Armed Forces	Admiral, Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Brazilian Armed Forces	Brazil	Keynote speech
Sven Biscop	EGMONT – Royal Institute for International Relations	Director, Europe in the World Programme	Belgium	First panel: "European Union Global Strategy"
Antonio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha	South American School of Defence/Escuela Suramericana de Defensa del CDS-UNASUR (ESUDE)	Scholar, Executive Secretary at ESUDE	Brazil/UNASUR	First panel: "European Union Global Strategy" (Moderator)

Christian Thiébault	French Ministry of Defence	Brigadier General, Secretary-General, Superior Council of the Military Reserve Force	France	Second panel: "Cooperation in Peace Mission"
Paolo Bressan	European External Action Service (EEAS), European Union Military Staff (EUMS)	Colonel, Assistant Chief of Staff for External Relations	EU	Second panel: "Cooperation in Peace Mission"
Luis Alejandro Doñas Núñez	Chilean Ministry of National Defence	Cooperation, Treaties and International Agreements Advisor	Chile	Second panel: "Cooperation in Peace Mission"
Mario César Sánchez Debernardi	Peruvian Ministry of Defence	Vice-Minister of Defence, Rear admiral	Peru	Second panel: "Cooperation in Peace Mission"
Maria Luísa Escorel de Moraes	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ambassador, Head of the Department of International Organisms	Brazil	Second panel: "Cooperation in Peace Mission"
Carlos Vieira	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Public Policy and Government Management Specialist	Brazil	Second panel: "Cooperation in Peace Mission" (Moderator)
Erik Von Pistohlkors	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	First councillor, Political, Economic and Communication Section	EU	Third panel: "Integration of Defence Industrial Bases"
Sven Biscop	EGMONT – Royal Institute for International Relations	Director, Europe in the World Programme	Belgium	Third panel: "Integration of Defence Industrial Bases"

Carlos Luis Yedro	Argentine Ministry of Defence	Colonel aviator, air attaché to Brazil	Argentina	Third panel: "Integration of Defence Industrial Bases"
Diana Maria Torres Garces	Colombian Ministry of National Defence	Advisor to the Deputy Minister for International Affairs	Colombia	Third panel: "Integration of Defence Industrial Bases"
Tomás Amorim	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Director of Development and Institutional Relations	Brazil	Third panel: "Integration of Defence Industrial Bases" (Moderator)
Ricardo Machado Vieira	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Lieutenant-air brigadier, Secretary of Personnel, Education, Health and Sports	Brazil	Closing remarks
Diogo Winnikes	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Coordinator for International Relations Projects, Brazil Office	Germany	Closing remarks
Fernando Simas Magalhães	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ambassador, Undersecretary-General for Multilateral Political Affairs, Europe and North America	Brazil	Closing remarks
		13 June 2017		
Jorge Fabian Berredo	Argentine Ministry of Defence	Colonel, defence attaché to Brazil	Argentina	Panel: "South American Defence Scenarios"
Fernando José Soares da Cunha Mattos	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	General, Head of the Institutional Planning Office	Brazil	Panel: "South American Defence Scenarios"

Luis Alejandro Doñas Núñez	Chilean Ministry of National Defence	Cooperation, Treaties and International Agreements Advisor	Chile	Panel: "South American Defence Scenarios"
Diana Maria Torres Garces	Colombian Ministry of National Defence	Advisor to the Deputy Minister for International Affairs	Colombia	Panel: "South American Defence Scenarios"
Paulo Roberto de Almeida	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation	Ambassador, Head of the Institute of Research on International Affairs (IPRI)	Brazil	Panel: "South American Defence Scenarios" (Moderator)
Sven Biscop	EGMONT – Royal Institute for International Relations	Director, Europe in the World Programme	Belgium	Workshop: "Europe-South America Defence Cooperation"
Hélio Franchini	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Councillor, Head of Division, Defence Affairs	Brazil	Workshop: "Europe-South America Defence Cooperation"
Luis Alejandro Doñas Núñez	Chilean Ministry of National Defence	Cooperation, Treaties and International Agreements Advisor	Chile	Workshop: "Europe-South America Defence Cooperation"
Frederic Maduraud	European External Action Service (EEAS), European Union Military Staff (EUMS)	Deputy Director, Crisis Management and Planning Directorate	EU	Workshop: "Europe-South America Defence Cooperation"
Paolo Bressan	European External Action Service (EEAS), European Union Military Staff (EUMS)	Colonel, Assistant Chief of Staff for External Relations	EU	Workshop: "Europe-South America Defence Cooperation"
Diana Maria Torres Garces	Colombian Ministry of National Defence	Advisor to the Deputy Minister for International Affairs	Colombia	Workshop: "Europe-South America Defence Cooperation"
Mario César Sánchez Debernardi	Peruvian Ministry of Defence	Vice-Minister of Defence, Rear admiral	Peru	Workshop: "Europe-South America Defence Cooperation"

Carlos Luis Yedro	Argentine Ministry of Defence	Colonel aviator, air attaché to Brazil	Argentina	Workshop: "Europe-South America Defence Cooperation"
Jorge Fabian Berredo	Argentine Ministry of Defence	Colonel, defence attaché to Brazil	Argentina	Workshop: "Europe-South America Defence Cooperation"
Marco Tulio Cabral	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation	Councillor, General Coordinator of the Institute of Research on International Affairs (IPRI)	Brazil	Workshop: "Europe-South America Defence Cooperation" (Moderator)

2018

IV European-South American Regional Security Symposium, 4 April 2018, Central Military Command, Brasília.

Participant	Affiliation	Position	Country/Organisation	Speech/Panel
Nelson Antonio Tabajara de Oliveira	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Head of the Defense and Security Affairs Department	Brazil	Welcome address
Diogo Winnikes	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung	Coordinator for International Relations Projects, Brazil Office	Germany	Welcome address
Thomas Sukutai Bvuma	Embassy of Zimbabwe to Brazil	Ambassador of Zimbabwe to Brazil	Zimbabwe	Welcome address
Leonardo Puntel	Brazilian Ministry of Defence	Head of Strategic Affairs	Brazil	Welcome address
João Gomes Cravinho	Delegation of the European Union to Brazil	Ambassador, Head of the EU Delegation to Brazil	EU	Welcome address
Sérgio Westphalen Etchegoyen	Presidency of the Federal Republic of Brazil	General of the Army, Minister of the Cabinet of Institutional Security of the Presidency	Brazil	Keynote speech
Jo Coelmont	EGMONT – Royal Institute for International Relations	Brigadier General, Senior Research Fellow	Belgium	Panel: "Defence and Security Policies"
Antonio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha	South American School of Defence/Escuela Suramericana de Defensa del CDS-UNASUR (ESUDE)	Scholar, Executive Secretary at ESUDE	Brazil/UNASUR	"Defence and Security Policies"

Alcides Costa Vaz	Brazilian Association of Defense Studies (ABED)/University of Brasília (UnB)	Scholar, Chair of ABED	Brazil	"Defence and Security Policies"
Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas	Pontificia Javeriana University	Head of the International Relations Department	Colombia	"Defence and Security Policies" (Moderator)
Admore Kambudzi	African Union (AU)	Director of the Peace and Security Department	AU	Panel: "Africa, Europe and South America: Exchange in Defence and Security Affairs"
Philippe Boutinaud	French Ministry of Defence	Brigadier General, Head of the Office for Regional Affairs, General Directorate for International Relations and Strategy	France	Panel: "Africa, Europe and South America: Exchange in Defence and Security Affairs"
Luís Henrique Sobreira Lopes	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ambassador, Head of the Africa Department	Brazil	Panel: "Africa, Europe and South America: Exchange in Defence and Security Affairs"
Marcelo Rech	Instituto InfoRel de Relações Internacionais e Defesa	Editor	Brazil	Panel: "Africa, Europe and South America: Exchange in Defence and Security Affairs" (Moderator)
Peter Debuyscher	Belgian Federal Police	Chief of International Cooperation	Belgium	Panel: "Combating Drug Trafficking and Related Transnational Offenses"
Marc Vancoillie	Belgian Federal Police	Chief of the Central Service of the Fight Against Drugs	Belgium	Panel: "Combating Drug Trafficking and Related

				Transnational Offenses”
Ivo Roberto Costa da Silva	Brazilian Federal Police	Chief of the Police Intelligence Data Analysis Service	Brazil	Panel: “Combating Drug Trafficking and Related Transnational Offenses”
Renata Dalaqua	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Project Coordinator	Brazil	Panel: “Combating Drug Trafficking and Related Transnational Offenses” (Moderator)
Felipe Sampaio	Brazilian Ministry of Defence/Pandiá Calógeras Institute	Head of Pandiá Calógeras Institute	Brazil	Closing remarks
Paulo Roberto de Almeida	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation	Ambassador, Head of the Institute of Research on International Affairs (IPRI)	Brazil	Closing remarks
Roberto Abdenur	Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)	Ambassador, Member of the Board of Trustees	Brazil	Closing remarks
Michel Miraillet	Embassy of France to Brazil	Ambassador of France to Brazil	France	Closing remarks

Appendix 4: List of interviews

1. Brazilian diplomat, Economic Section, Representation of Brazil to the European Union, interviewed 17 May 2017, Brussels, Belgium. Face-to-face interview. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 45’57”.
2. Brazilian diplomat, Political Section, Representation of Brazil to the European Union, interviewed 17 May 2017, Brussels, Belgium. Face-to-face interview. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 22’00”.
3. Roland Schäfer, Deputy Managing Director for the Americas (2013-2017), European External Action Service (EEAS), interviewed 01 August 2017, Brussels, Belgium. Face-to-face interview. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 35’37”.
4. Dr. Patrick Keller, Coordinator of Foreign and Security Policy (2008-2018), Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., interviewed 21 August 2017, Berlin, Germany. Face-to-face interview. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 54’25”.
5. Dr. Peter Fischer-Bollin, former Representative to Brazil (2009-2010), Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., interviewed 21 August 2017, Berlin, Germany. Face-to-face interview. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 39’25”.
6. Felix Dane, former Representative to Brazil (2012-2015), Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., interviewed 22 August 2017, Berlin, Germany. Face-to-face interview. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 56’52”.
7. Dr. Renata Dalaqua, Project Coordinator, Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI), interviewed 02 October 2017, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Face-to-face interview. Unrecorded.
8. Dr. Jan Woischnik, Representative to Brazil (2015-2019), Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., interviewed 03 October 2017, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Face-to-face interview. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 51’14”.
9. Diogo Winnikes, Coordinator for International Relations Projects (2016-2019), Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., interviewed 03 October 2017, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Face-to-face interview. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 51’14”.
10. Prof. Dr. Alfredo Valladão, Professor at Sciences Po/Paris School of International Affairs, former Director of the Chaire Mercosur at Sciences Po, co-host of the Forte de Copacabana Conferences (2004-2010), interviewed 12 July 2018, via Skype. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 52’46”.
11. Prof. Dr. Carlo Masala, Professor at the Bundeswehr University Munich, member of the Academic Advisory Board of the NATO Defense College, security policy consultant of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., interviewed 18 July 2018, via Skype. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 27’12”.
12. Annette Schwarzbauer, Consultant at the Latin America Team of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation e. V., interviewed 06 September 2018, Berlin, Germany. Face-to-face interview. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 46’14”.
13. Dr. João Gomes Cravinho, Head of the Delegation of the European Union in Brazil (2015-2018), interviewed 21 September 2018, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Face-to-face interview. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 09’23”.

14. Gen Ex Décio Luís Schons, Commandant of Brazil's Superior War College (2017-2019), interviewed 25 September 2018, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Face-to-face interview. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 57'41".
15. Gen Bda José Eustáquio Nogueira Guimarães, Director of the Center for Geopolitics and Strategic Studies at Brazil's Superior War College, interviewed 25 September 2018, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Face-to-face interview. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 57'41".
16. Gregory John Ryan, former Coordinator for International Relations Projects (2011-2016), Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., interviewed 12 February 2019, via WhatsApp. Unrecorded.
17. Dr. Wilhelm Hofmeister, former Representative to Brazil (1999-2009), Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., interviewed 09 April 2019, Madrid, Spain. Face-to-face interview. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 53'07".
18. Dr. Andreas Nick, Member of the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) since 2013 as part of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) parliamentary group. Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group at the Subcommittee on the United Nations, International Organisations and Globalisation, interviewed 15 October 2019, Berlin, Germany. Face-to-face interview. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 44'06".
19. Jan Fuhrmann, Research Assistant to Dr. Andreas Nick at the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag), subject area Committee on Foreign Affairs, security policy, and reporting on Turkey, Hungary and South America, interviewed 15 October 2019, Berlin, Germany. Face-to-face interview. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 28'49".
20. Roderich Kiesewetter, Member of the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) since 2009 as part of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) parliamentary group. Chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group at the Committee on Foreign Affairs, interviewed 17 October 2019, Berlin, Germany. Face-to-face interview. Storage medium: audio recording. Interview length: 15'44".

Appendix 5: Sample interview guides

Interview 3

Date: 21 August 2017, 10:00

Place: Berlin, Germany

Organisation: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. (KAS)

Interviewee: Patrick Keller, Coordinator of Foreign and Security Policy

1st Topic: The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) in Germany and abroad

- KAS' role as a party-affiliated political foundation in Germany and as a think tank with worldwide reach: What makes the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung a relevant actor nowadays?
- How does KAS contribute to Germany's international relations and foreign policy goals?
- What is the importance of regional offices around the world, not only for the organisation but also for German foreign and security policy?

2nd Topic: KAS and other think tanks worldwide: foreign and security policy-related activities

- For you, what makes the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung a think tank?
- KAS has been ranked as the world's "top think tank network" since 2014 (in 2013, when this category was first included in the GGTTIR, the foundation ranked 10th):
    - Why do you think it has been so?
    - How important has it been for foreign and security policy-related activities developed by KAS?
- KAS and think tanks in Brazil: How important is the cooperation between KAS and other policy research institutes, i.e. think tanks, for foreign and security policy-related activities there?

3rd Topic: KAS and the Forte de Copacabana Conferences

- How was your experience with the conferences in Brazil (2011, 2013, 2014, 2016)?

- How do you assess KAS' activities with the Forte de Copacabana in Brazil in comparison to similar experiences around the world, for example the EU-Asia Dialogue?
- Discuss Heinrich Kreft's[481] 2008 comparison with the Munich Security Conference.
- What have been the conferences' main achievements (if any) so far? Did discussions in 2011, 2013, 2014 or 2016 result in any specific change or move towards any particular direction in Germany's or EU's foreign policymaking to the region or to Brazil? In other words, do you think that have the conferences been able to set the agenda in this field?
- Alternatively, do you think that they somehow affected Brazil's views and/or foreign policymaking towards Germany, other EU Member States, or the EU itself?
- Do you think that organisations such as KAS and CEBRI have become relevant actors for the governance of foreign, defense, and security issues involving Germany, the EU, and Brazil? If not, why? Main obstacles, challenges, shortcomings?

[481] Then (2008) senior assistant for foreign and security policy of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the German Bundestag: "As you might know, the Munich Security Conference, the '*Wehrkundetagung*', is the dialogue forum between the US and Europe, and I could imagine that the Forte de Copacabana Security Conference could play a similar role in the security policy dialogue between Europe and Latin America".

Interview 18

Datum: 15. Oktober 2019, 12:00-13:00.

Ort: Berlin, Deutschland

Interviewpartner: Dr. Andreas Nick, seit 2013 Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages (CDU/CSU Fraktion), Ordentliches Mitglied im Auswärtigen Ausschuss und Obmann im Unterausschuss Vereinte Nationen, Internationale Organisationen und Globalisierung. Leiter der deutschen Delegation und Vizepräsident in der Parlamentarischen Versammlung des Europarats. Ehrengast an der XV. Edition der Internationalen Sicherheitskonferenz Forte de Copacabana (2018).

Einführung

- Kurze Vorstellung und wichtigste Infos zu mir; Überblick über meine akademische Laufbahn.
- Ziel dieses Gesprächs; Frage nach Zustimmung: Aufnahme und Zitieren.

Themenbereich 1: Ihre Erfahrung an der XV. Edition der Konferenz

- Sie haben im September 2018 als Ehrengast an der XV. Edition der Sicherheitskonferenz „Forte de Copacabana“ teilgenommen. Welche Erfahrung haben Sie dort gemacht?
- Sie sind ordentliches Mitglied im Auswärtigen Ausschuss und Obmann im Unterausschuss Vereinte Nationen, Internationale Organisationen und Globalisierung im Deutschen Bundestag sowie Leiter der deutschen Delegation und Vizepräsident in der Parlamentarischen Versammlung des Europarats.

  Warum ist es Ihnen wichtig, an einer internationalen Sicherheitskonferenz in Brasilien teilzunehmen und welchen Beitrag hat die Erfahrung in Rio de Janeiro zu Ihren Ämtern und Funktionen als deutscher Abgeordneter geleistet?

Themenbereich 2: Erfolge, Ergebnisse und Beiträge der Konferenz

- Seit 2004 organisieren die Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung und ihre lokalen Partner die Sicherheitskonferenz und eine Reihe Nebenveranstaltungen im Bereich Sicherheitspolitik in Brasilien. Aus Ihrer Sicht, was sind da die wichtigsten Erfolge, Ergebnisse und Beiträge?
- Wie bewerten Sie die Wahrnehmung der Konferenz und der Nebenveranstaltungen bei dem betroffenen Publikum in Deutschland und auf europäischer Ebene (vor allem bei politischen, wissenschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Akteuren)?
- Stichwort: informelle Diplomatie. Laut Mitarbeitern der KAS und des CEBRI sollten die Konferenzen u.a. der informellen Diplomatie zwischen Europa/NATO und Südamerika/Brasilien dienen. Wie bewerten Sie die Ausrichtung der Konferenz als Plattform dafür? Glauben Sie, dass es den Organisatoren bisher gelungen ist, dieses Ziel zu

erreichen? Gelingt es der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung und ihren Partnern, solche informelle Brücke zu bauen?

Themenbereich 3: *Quo vadis*? Die Zukunft des Sicherheitsdialogs zwischen der EU und Brasilien und die Rolle der Sicherheitskonferenz „Forte de Copacabana"

- 2019 hat die Sicherheitskonferenz „Forte de Copacabana" zum 16. Mal stattgefunden. Verglichen mit den ersten Jahren der Konferenz haben sich die politische Lage und das diplomatische Profil Brasiliens stark verändert. Der europäische Integrationsprozess und der Zusammenhalt des transatlantischen Bündnisses sind in die Krise geraten. Die Weltordnung ist mittlerweile instabiler und konfliktreicher geworden.

  Positionspapier „Vision 2030 – Eine Partnerschaft für die Zukunft Lateinamerika-Karibik-Strategie der CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag":

  „…Denn es steht außer Frage: die regelbasierte internationale Ordnung steht mehr unter Druck als je zuvor"

  „…zunehmenden Konkurrenz gesellschaftlicher Prinzipien- und Ordnungsmodelle auf der Welt"

  Welche Rolle können Akteure wie die KAS und Veranstaltungen wie die Sicherheitskonferenz „Forte de Copacabana" vor diesem Hintergrund spielen?

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Abstract

Despite political scientists' growing interest in exploring the role and potential influence of think tanks on foreign and security policy affairs, little is known about their involvement in geopolitical conversations between the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the West. The current literature on the topic lacks an appropriate conceptual framework and offers little empirical insight into the ideas, discourses, and practices promoted by think tanks in that area. This study aims to bridge a gap in the scholarly debate by exploring the emergence, development, and potential influence of the "Forte de Copacabana International Security Conferences" in Brazil—an annual security forum through which a German political foundation and global think tank, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), has sought to influence how Brazilian decision makers and their counterparts in the European Union (EU) and the West reflect on their respective geopolitical realities and reshape their mutual relationship.

Based on a qualitative case study design and relying on narrative interpretation, the present monograph addresses the following research questions: How does the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung participate in the evolving dialogue between Brazil and the established powers? How influential is KAS' work in the area of security policy in Brazil? A wealth of primary source material forms the empirical backbone of our study, including conference reports and policy papers; the transcripts of twenty semi-structured interviews conducted with think tank staff members as well as with selected representatives from the fields of politics, diplomacy, and the armed forces; and author observations of the 2017 and 2018 editions of the dialogue forum in Brazil. Following an introductory chapter, the thesis starts by advancing a conceptual framework to the study of think tanks centred on the notion of discourse; it then reviews Brazil's relationship with the EU and the West since the 1990s, exploring the various fault lines in the mutual dialogue on global security affairs; finally, the analysis of our primary source material yields an in-depth look into the reasons and rationales behind KAS' security-related work in Brazil from 2004 to 2018.

We argue that promoting unofficial spaces for dialogue like the conferences and complementary meetings is part of a repertoire of discursive strategies through which KAS and its partners have sought to nudge the B in the BRICS to align itself with the West in the governance and support of the liberal world order. The analysis and the conclusions regarding the influence of think tanks on the evolving dialogue between Brazil and the established powers, albeit tentative, add nuance to our understanding of formal diplomatic processes and lay the groundwork upon which future research might trace the impact of informal political spaces like "Forte de Copacabana" on concrete policy and institutional outcomes.

Zusammenfassung

Trotz des wachsenden Interesses an der Rolle und der Vorgehensweise von Thinktanks und deren potenziellen Einfluss auf außen- und sicherheitspolitische Fragen hat die Beteiligung dieser Institute am geopolitischen Dialog zwischen dem Westen und den BRICS-Staaten (Brasilien, Russland, Indien, China und Südafrika) bislang nur wenig Aufmerksamkeit in der Politikwissenschaft erfahren. In der vorliegenden Literatur zum Thema fehlt es an einem adäquaten konzeptionellen Ansatz und an empirischen Studien, die eine profunde Analyse der Ideen, Diskurse und Praktiken von Thinktanks anbieten. Die vorliegende Studie stößt in diese Forschungslücke, indem sie die Entstehung, Entwicklung und den potenziellen Einfluss der „Internationalen Sicherheitskonferenz Forte de Copacabana“ in Brasilien untersucht. Dieses jährlich stattfindende Sicherheitsforum wird von der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), einer deutschen parteinahen Stiftung und zugleich eine globale Denkfabrik, genutzt, um Einfluss auf die geopolitischen Überlegungen von brasilianischen Entscheidungsträgern und ihren Amtskollegen in der Europäischen Union (EU) und dem Westen zu nehmen und deren wechselseitigen Beziehungen neu auszugestalten.

Auf der Basis einer qualitativen Fallstudie und gestützt auf die Methode der narrativen Interpretation behandelt die vorliegende Dissertation die folgenden Forschungsfragen: Auf welche Weise engagiert sich die KAS in dem Dialog zwischen Brasilien und den etablierten Mächten? Wie einflussreich ist die Arbeit der KAS auf dem Gebiet der Sicherheitspolitik in Brasilien? Eine Vielzahl von Primärquellen bildet die empirische Basis der Studie, darunter vor allem Veranstaltungsberichte, Strategiepapiere, teilnehmende Beobachtungen des Autors während der beiden Foren von 2017 und 2018 und die Transkripte von zwanzig teilstrukturierten Interviews mit Mitarbeitern von Thinktanks sowie mit Vertretern aus Politik, Diplomatie und Streitkräften. Nach einem einleitenden Kapitel wird zunächst ein konzeptioneller Thinktank-Ansatz entwickelt, der sich auf den Begriff des Diskurses konzentriert; danach wird das Verhältnis Brasiliens zur EU und zum Westen seit den 1990er Jahren untersucht, wobei schwerpunktmäßig die verschiedenen Bruchlinien im gegenseitigen Dialog über globale Sicherheitsfragen erörtert werden; daran anknüpfend liefert die Analyse der Primärquellen einen profunden Einblick in die Grundüberlegungen und Beweggründe des sicherheitsbezogenen Engagements der KAS in Brasilien zwischen 2004 und 2018.

Dabei wird deutlich, dass die Förderung inoffizieller Dialogräume wie den Konferenzen und ergänzenden Gesprächsformaten Teil eines Repertoires diskursiver Strategien ist, mit denen die KAS und ihre Partner versuchen, Brasilien dazu zu bringen, sich mit dem Westen bei der Steuerung und Unterstützung der liberalen Weltordnung zu verbünden. Die Analyse und die Schlussfolgerungen bezüglich des Einflusses von Thinktanks auf den Dialog zwischen der EU respektive dem Westen und Brasilien tragen dazu bei, unser Verständnis von formalisierten diplomatischen Prozessen zu erweitern und schaffen eine konzeptionelle Basis für zukünftige Forschungsprojekte über die Wirkung informeller politischer Räume wie „Forte de Copacabana“ auf politische Entscheidungen.

List of publications arising from the dissertation

Book chapter

Gonçalves Gresse, Eduardo, Daniel Peters, and Fernando Preusser de Mattos. "A Brazilian Perspective on Development and R2P: Analysing the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies under Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff." In *Southern democracies and the responsibility to protect: Perspectives from India, Brazil and South Africa*. Edited by Daniel Peters and Dan Krause. 1st edition, 101–48. Studien zur Friedensethik Volume 60. Baden-Baden, Münster: Nomos; Aschendorff Verlag, 2017.