“Building a Home Abroad” – A Comparative Study of Ukrainian Migration, Immigration Policy and Diaspora Formation in Canada and Germany after the Second World War.

Dissertation
zur Erlangung der Würde des Doktors der Philosophie des Fachbereichs Philosophie und Geschichtswissenschaft der Universität Hamburg

vorgelegt von

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aus Düsseldorf

Toronto, den 26.01.2006
Hauptgutachter: Prof. Dr. Frank Golczewski

Nebengutachter: Prof. Dr. Orest Subtelny

Datum der Disputation: 29 März 2006
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Preface

This dissertation is written in American English. Direct quotes from Canadian officials were stated in British English and were reproduced and marked as such.

Some direct quotes – either from primary sources or secondary literature – have been translated from German or Ukrainian into English. Unless otherwise indicated, the translation is mine.

Transliteration from Ukrainian into English was done in accordance with the Cyrillic Transliteration of the US Library of Congress (See: http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~tarn/courses/translit-table.html, Stand January 16, 2005). According to this transliteration, ĭ is represented by i. No ligatures were used for ie (є), iu (Ю), ia (Я), and ts (Ц).

This transliteration pertains to the following names:

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Ukrainian names appearing in the title of a German or Canadian archival documents were not transliterated but cited the way they appeared in the document; Ukrainian-Canadian authors (such as Bohdan Krawchenko, Wsevolod Isajiw, or Paul Yuzyk) were not transliterated.
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<td>AA</td>
<td>Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office (Germany))</td>
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<td>AAUS*</td>
<td>Association for the Advancement of Ukrainian Studies (Arbeits- und Fördergemeinschaft der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABN</td>
<td>Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations</td>
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Association of the Free Press (Verband der Freien Presse)</td>
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<td>AMCOMLIB</td>
<td>American Committee for the Liberation from Bolshevism</td>
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<td>AUUC</td>
<td>Association of United Ukrainian Canadians</td>
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<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Bundesarchiv</td>
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<tr>
<td>BayHStA</td>
<td>Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (Bavarian Central State Archive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBU*</td>
<td>Bund zur Befreiung der Ukraine (Union for the Liberation of Ukraine)</td>
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<td>BKA</td>
<td>Bundeskriminalamt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BM</td>
<td>Bundesministerium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMB</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen</td>
</tr>
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<td>BMI</td>
<td>Bundesministerium des Innern</td>
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<td>BMVt</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für Vertriebene</td>
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<td>BUC</td>
<td>Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics</td>
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<td>CCCC</td>
<td>Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship</td>
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<td>CIUS</td>
<td>Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLC</td>
<td>Civil Liberties Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of Canada</td>
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<td>CRUEG</td>
<td>Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany (Tsentrall’ne Predstavnytstvo Ukrains’koi Emigratsii v Nimechchyni)</td>
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<td>CURB</td>
<td>Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau</td>
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<td>CUC</td>
<td>Coordinating Ukrainian Committee (Koordynatsiinyi Ukraïns’koi Komitet)</td>
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<td>CUUS*</td>
<td>Central Union of Ukrainian Students (Tsentrallnyi Soiuz Ukrains’koho Studentsva)</td>
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<td>CUYA</td>
<td>Canadian Ukrainian Youth Association (Soiuz Ukrains’koi Molodi Kanady)</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Displaced Person</td>
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<td>DUG</td>
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<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<td>Institute for the Study of the USSR</td>
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<td>KFH</td>
<td>Kriegsfolgrehilfe</td>
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<td>LVU</td>
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<td>Multicultural History Society of Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>NB</td>
<td>Nationalities Branch</td>
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<td>OUN</td>
<td>Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiia Ukrains'kykh Nationalistiv)</td>
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<td>Ob’iednannya Ukrains’kykh Zhinok (u Nimechchyni) (Association of Ukrainian Women in Germany)</td>
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<td>RCAF</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Air Force</td>
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<td>SUM</td>
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<td>Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church</td>
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<td>Zakordonni Chastyny OUN (Foreign Section of the OUN)</td>
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* Translation according to the Encyclopedia of Ukraine
Acknowledgements

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Gründung des Ukrainisch-Kanadischen Komitees (Ukrainian Canadian Committee, UCC) fort, einer nicht-politischen Organisation, die allerdings enge Kontakte zur kanadischen Regierung pflegte und so zu einer verstärkten Präsenz der Gruppe im Land beitrug. Die existierende Literatur, die sich mit Ukrainern in Kanada beschäftigt, konzentriert sich auf die ersten beiden Wellen und ihren Siedlungs- und Akkulturationsprozess im Land. Die dritte Welle hat mit Lubomyr Luciuk’s *Searching for Place* erste Beachtung gefunden; der Autor konzentriert sich auf den Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund, die League for the Liberation of Ukraine, und die Verbindung der ukrainisch-kanadischen Elite zur Regierung, hier in erster Linie zum Department of Foreign Affairs. Da Ukrainer Teil eines größeren Migrationsstroms waren, kann man auch in allgemeiner Immigrationsliteratur Informationen zum Siedlungsprozess finden. Die Lage sieht beim deutschen Beispiel anders aus. Hier sind die Ukrainer erst seit den 90er Jahren eine größere Immigrationsgruppe, was sich auch in der Literatur niederschlägt. Es gibt kaum Studien zum Leben der Ukrainer in Deutschland, und auch die Gruppe der heimatlosen Ausländer, zu der die Ukrainer nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg gehörten, ist ein allgemein vernachlässigtes Thema.

Eine Vielzahl von Primärquellen diente als Grundlage für diese Arbeit. Regierungsberichte der deutschen, kanadischen und britischen Regierung wurden im Library and Archives Canada (LAC) in Ottawa, im Bundesarchiv (BA) in Koblenz, im bayerischen Hauptstaatsarchiv (BayHStA) in München und im Archiv des kanadischen Institutes der Ukraine-Studien (Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS), Edmonton) lokalisiert. Die Akten der United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), die nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg für die Displaced Persons verantwortlich war, konnten im Archiv der Vereinten Nationen in New York eingesehen werden. Ukrainisch-spezifische Aktensammlungen im Provincial Archive of Ontario (PAO, Toronto) und im LAC boten einen Einblick in die ukrainischen Organisationen vor Ort. Gedruckte Quellen der ukrainischen Gemeinschaft in Deutschland wurden unter anderem in der Bibliothek der Ukrainischen Freien Universität in München gesichtet. Interviews mit Zeitzeugen und Zeitungsartikel aus ukrainischen und kanadischen Zeitungen runden die Quellenbasis ab. Obwohl zu dem allgemeinen Thema
„Ukrainer in Deutschland und Kanada nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg“

Sekundärliteratur existiert (insbesondere für den kanadischen Teil), wurde in einigen Bereichen Grundlagenforschung betrieben; dies gilt in besonderem Maße für das Erlebnis der Ukrainer in Deutschland und Kanada in den 1960er Jahren.


Literatur zu dieser Periode beschäftigt sich meist nur mit dem Erlebnis der Ukrainer als Gruppe oder mit der Verwaltung durch UNRRA oder die IRO. Marta Dyczok’s Studie *The Grand Alliance* nimmt als erste sowohl die ukrainische als auch die alliierte Seite in Betracht, und dieses Kapitel folgt ihrem Beispiel. Indem beide Seiten berücksichtigt werden, können Ukrainer-spezifische und DP-spezifische Probleme aufgezeigt werden.


XVI


Nach dem Angriff Hitler-Deutschlands auf die Sowjetunion änderte sich die Situation für die ukrainische Gemeinschaft in Kanada grundlegend. Die Sowjetunion war nun ein offizieller Bündnispartner und als Konsequenz daraus sahen die ukrainischen Kommunisten im Lande besseren Zeiten entgegen. Sie konnten wieder offiziell agieren und die allgemeine kanadische Bevölkerung war ihnen gegenüber positiv eingestellt. Obwohl die Verhandlungen mit der kanadischen Regierung in Bezug auf die konfiszierten Gebäude eher schleppend vorangingen, blühten kommunistische Tätigkeiten während der letzten drei Kriegsjahre auf. Ganz anders sah die Situation für die ukrainischen Nationalisten aus, die schwer damit zu kämpfen hatten, dass die Sowjetunion nun ein offizieller Bündnispartner war. Obwohl Lobbyarbeit für die Unabhängigkeit der Ukraine von der kanadischen Regierung nun noch weniger gern gesehen wurde, setzten die Ukrainer in Kanada ihr Vorhaben weiter fort – nur unter leicht veränderten Prämissen. Argumente für die Unabhängigkeit des Heimatlandes wurden nun meist
im Kontext der Atlantik Charta vorgebracht, um die kanadische Regierung nicht zu befremden. In dieser Sache arbeiteten die Ukrainer in Kanada auch mit ihren Landsleuten in den USA zusammen und entwickelten so einen Repräsentationsanspruch, für die Ukraine zu sprechen, da diese zurzeit unterdrückt sei.


und in den Augen vieler Ukrainer war die Gruppe erfolgreich gewesen, denn die DPs wurden ins Land gelassen.


XXV

Dennoch hatte dieser Zwischenfall einmal mehr gezeigt, dass die kanadische Regierung auf außenpolitischer Ebene nicht bereit war, für die Interessen der Ukrainer-Kanadier einzutreten.


Kapitel sieben wendet sich wieder dem Schicksal der Ukrainer in Deutschland zu und beginnt Ende der 40er Jahre, zu einer Zeit, als die Emigration die größte Priorität der Displaced Persons war. Allerdings konnten nicht alle der 200.000 ukrainischen DPs emigrieren, und die, die in Deutschland blieben, wurden häufig als die „Zurückgelassenen“ (zalyshentsi) bezeichnet.Die DPs gingen 1950/51 in die deutsche Verwaltung über, ihr rechtlicher Status wurde durch das Heimatlose Ausländer Gesetz (HAG) vom 25. April 1951 geregelt; dieses Gesetz war eine der Vorbedingungen der Alliierten zum Abschluss des Deutschlandvertrages. Durch die Bezeichnung „heimatlose Ausländer“ wurde der Status als politische Flüchtlinge, die nicht ins Heimatland zurückkehren wollten, hervorgehoben und somit der eigentliche Ursprung der Gruppe verschleiert. Das Gesetz wurde 1951 als sehr liberal gepriesen, und die deutsche Regierung hatte aufgrund internationalen Druckes einige Zugeständnisse machen müssen. Doch schon bald äußerte sich die internationale Gemeinschaft recht kritisch, denn das
Gesetz wurde vor allem auf niedriger administrativer Ebene recht rigide und sehr zum Nachteil der heimatlosen Ausländer implementiert.


Wie die Untersuchung der finanziellen Unterstützung gezeigt hat, war die Gemeinschaft in Deutschland während der 50er Jahre sehr von der nordamerikanischen Diaspora abhängig. Und auch sonst orientierte sich die Gruppe stark am Vorbild der Gemeinden aus Übersee. Da Ukrainer in Deutschland mit den Folgen der Massenemigration – Rückgang der Mitgliederzahlen und Aktivitäten, Auflösung vieler Institutionen – zu kämpfen hatte, dienten die Gemeinschaften in Kanada und den USA häufig als Quelle der Inspiration, denn dorthin waren viele der Emigranten ausgewandert und das Gemeindeleben mit all seinen Clubs und Institutionen boomte. Obwohl die Gemeinschaft in Deutschland in den 50er Jahren mit vielen Problemen konfrontiert war, formulierten führende Gemeindemitglieder
auch hier Ziele und Aufgaben für die Diaspora. Auch für die Ukrainer in Deutschland war es wichtig, die „Wahrheit“ über die Ukraine und ihre Unterdrückung zu verbreiten oder allgemein den Kommunismus zu bekämpfen. Allerdings war die Gemeinschaft zahlenmäßig und organisatorisch zu schwach, um zum Beispiel größere Demonstrationen in die Wege zu leiten. Zwar fanden während der 50er Jahre Gedenkfeiern statt, aber meist in kleinerem Rahmen und mit schablonenhaftem Charakter. Ein Ziel war es außerdem, das kulturelle Erbe zu erhalten. Allerdings stieß die Gemeinde hier bei der Jugend auf Probleme – viele von ihnen sprachen schon kein Ukrainisch mehr, die Eltern zeigten oft kein Interesse an einer ukrainischen Erziehung ihrer Kinder, und selbst wenn Interesse bestand, waren die Ukrainer in Deutschland sehr zerstreut, so dass es schwierig war, Samstagsschulen oder Kindergärten aufzubauen.

Ausländer mehr ins Land miteinzubeziehen; die niedrigen Einbürgerungszahlen, die sich auch im Fall der Ukrainer widerspiegelten, waren ein Beispiel dafür.

Chapter One: Introduction – Historiography and Theoretical Approach to the Topic

Ukrainians have been migrating throughout the world since the mid-19th century. Some receiving countries, such as the United States or Canada, stood out during this process due to the sheer numbers of Ukrainians they received, whereas other countries, such as Venezuela or Belgium, played only a minor part. And some countries played an important, but temporary role as hosts of Ukrainians outside of Ukraine. Germany is one such country. During and right after the Second World War, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians found themselves in Germany, the majority of whom were either repatriated or eventually migrated to other destinations. This study analyzes the experience of Ukrainians in Germany and Canada from 1945 until 1971 in the context of diaspora theories. The time period of 26 years enables us to identify continuities and ruptures in the community’s experience, and the comparison makes it easier to distinguish group-specific as well as country-specific developments. In a time of intensified discussions concerning foreigners and parallel societies, this study adds a new perspective by comparing the Ukrainian experience in an official immigration country and an alleged non-immigration country. It also deals with a time period – especially the 1960s – which was crucial for Ukrainians in both countries, but which has not been given much scholarly attention to date.

In section 1 of this chapter, I present the existing historiography on this topic, thereby summarizing what effects the differences between Germany and Canada had on the literature dealing with immigration and Ukrainians in the country. Subsequently, section 2 outlines recent changes to studying immigration history that influence the choice of sources and methodology. In section 3, I define terms such as ethnic, immigrant, refugee, and diaspora group. Section four gives an overview of the methodology, the source base, and a chapter summary. This chapter ends with a synopsis of Ukrainian migration prior to World War II.

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1 This study deals exclusively with West Germany and does not take East Germany into consideration.
1. The Comparative Approach in the Context of Historiography

At first sight, a comparison between Germany and Canada seems to be an unusual undertaking, and to date not many authors have taken this approach. Studies that contrast Germany and the United States are more common, and a variety of recent publications – mostly article collections – are evidence of this trend. Whether a comparison is done between the United States and Germany or Canada and Germany, the underlying argument against such an approach is the same – the belief that the differences between the United States and Canada as official immigration countries and Germany as a supposedly non-immigration country would be too great. On the surface, this argument has some merits. Canada is a country with a history of immigration within the framework of government policy. Throughout Canada’s existence, the country has relied on immigrants to populate its vast spaces, to farm its land, or to build its railways. People of different backgrounds have shaped and contributed to the history of the country, a fact that is acknowledged in the historiography. In contrast, for the longest time Germany

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2 For example, an article collection from Germany examines the topics of ethnicity and inequality in the comparative framework of Canada and Germany (Robin Ostow et al., eds., Ethnicity, Structured Inequality, and the State in Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany (Frankfurt am Main et al.: Peter Lang, 1991)). In a recently defended dissertation, Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos compares approaches towards citizenship in both Germany and Canada, spanning a time period of more than 100 years. The author examines how international and internal developments influenced the policy formation in each country (Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, Shifting Boundaries. Immigration, Citizenship, and the Politics of National Boundaries in Canada and Germany. Dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Political Science of the New School University, May 2004). See also: Heribert Adam, “German and Canadian Nationalism and Multiculturalism: A Comparison of Xenophobia, Racism and Integration,” in Multiculturalism in a World of Leaking Boundaries, ed. Dieter Haselbach (Münster, Hamburg, London: LIT Verlag, 1998, 193-210).


4 Another argument against a comparison could be the geographical differences between Canada and Germany. However, Heribert Adam makes us aware that the fact “that a vast Canada has space but a small Germany is crowded amounts to less of a difference once it is taken into account that 85% of all newcomers settle in the few Canadian metropolitan areas” (Adam, “German and Canadian Nationalism,” page 197).

upheld the myth of being a country where immigration did not occur. An official immigration law was only enacted in 2004, after years of debate and with many concessions to the new fear of international terrorism. Nonetheless, because Germany has continuously relied on foreign labor to sustain its economy, it has been dealing with an immigration phenomenon for more than a century. In different phases, seasonal agricultural laborers from Eastern Europe, industrial workers from Italy or Austria-Hungary, prisoners of war, forced laborers, guest workers, and refugees turned Germany, the former country of emigration, into a de-facto immigration country. Nonetheless, no matter how much the country depended on outside workers to maintain its level of prosperity, the government was eager to keep foreign labor a temporary phenomenon. Indeed, Ulrich Herbert makes us aware that the discussion about the so-called “Foreigners Question,” which nowadays resurfaces repeatedly, is not a new phenomenon, but has been conducted for the past 120 years “with essentially the same questions and frontlines.”

Although many politicians are still grappling with the reality of Germany as an immigration country, scholars have generally accepted that Germany is “one of the most important immigration regions in the world.” The wealth of recent literature and the tackling of topics such as multiculturalism as an integration concept for

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6 For early roots of the debate, see for example: Otto Kimmich, Der Aufenthalt von Ausländern in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Rechtsgrundlage, Beginn und Ende (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1980), page 12ff.
8 Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik, page 9 (This quote was translated from German into English by the author. Subsequently, all quotes taken from German or Ukrainian secondary and primary sources were translated into English by the author, unless otherwise indicated). For Germany’s dependency on foreign labor during the Second World War, see pages 143-147.
Germany are evidence of this acceptance and of the growing interest in the history of immigration in Germany.\textsuperscript{10}

Despite the fact that both countries have received their share of migration during the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the composition of the immigrants has differed between North America and Germany.\textsuperscript{11} Although the British and French Canadians dominated the ethnic make-up during the first 50\textsuperscript{th} years after Canada’s inception and although the Canadian government followed an essentially racist immigration policy (for example, by introducing the head tax for Chinese), the government early on recruited immigrants from all over Europe. Among them, Germans and Ukrainians were particularly strongly represented until the Second World War. Despite another wave of European migrants that included Germans and Ukrainians in the late 1940s, the postwar period saw a change towards intensified immigration from “non-traditional” regions such as Asia or Latin America, a trend that accelerated during the 1970s and 80s.\textsuperscript{12} Germany, on the other hand, dealt mainly with foreign workers from Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. During the Second World War, different European nationals came to Germany as prisoners or forced laborers; however, only Eastern Europeans remained after 1945. The postwar period saw an influx of millions of German expellees and refugees, a problem that dominated German internal politics until the mid-50s. Once the ‘Wirtschaftswunder’ hit Germany during the 1950s, the government started to

\textsuperscript{10} In addition to the literature mentioned in footnote 4, influential studies include: Klaus Bade, ed., Migration – Ethnizität – Konflikt. Systemfragen und Fallstudien (Osnabrück: Universitätsverlag Rasch, 1996); Klaus Bade, “From Emigration to Immigration. The German Experience in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” in Migration Past, ed. Klaus Bade, 1-37; Santel, “Auf dem Weg zur Konvergenz?”, page 15. One of the best examples that the idea of Germany as an immigration country has been accepted by a wide range of academics is a manifesto on Germany and immigration which was signed by 60 well known German academics in the early 1990s (Klaus Bade, ed., Das Manifest der 60. Deutschland und die Einwanderung (Munich: Beck, 1994)). For issues of multiculturalism in the context of the German experience, see for example: Klaus Bade, ed., Die multikulturelle Herausforderung. Menschen über Grenzen – Grenzen über Menschen (Munich: Beck, 1996). For developments in the writing of immigration history, see: Klaus Bade, “Sozialhistorische Migrationsforschung und ‘Flüchtlingsintegration,’” in Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in der westdeutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte. Bilanzierung der Forschung und Perspektiven für die künftige Forschungsarbeit, ed. Rainer Schulze, Doris von der Brelie-Lewien, and Helga Grebing (Hildesheim: Verlag August Lax, 1987); Anne von Oswald et al., “Einwanderungsland Deutschland,” pages 19-37.

\textsuperscript{11} Santel, “Auf dem Weg zur Konvergenz?” page 15ff.

\textsuperscript{12} See for example: Triadafilopoulos, Shifting Boundaries, page 1. For an extensive overview of Canadian immigration policy from the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century to the postwar period, see Kelley, The Making, pages 111-381.
recruit so-called guest workers, mostly Italians, Portuguese, and later on Turks. Despite fundamental differences in the composition of immigration, some overlapping occurred between Canada and Germany, especially in the wave that came right after the Second World War. The so-called displaced persons – Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, and Ukrainians among them – had come to Germany during or after the Second World War, and the majority of them emigrated to the US, Canada, or Australia in the late 1940s. However, part of the group stayed in Germany, thereby enabling us to compare the Ukrainian community in Canada and Germany.

Although there have been sizeable contingents of Ukrainians in Germany and Canada since the Second World War, we have to be aware of their differing starting points. Due to more than 100 years of migration to Canada, Ukrainians are a well-established and large group with one million members in the country today, a fact that is also reflected in the historiography. The majority of publications concentrate on the first two waves and the process of their settlement as pioneers, and among these, Orest Martynowych’s *Ukrainian Canadians* is particularly insightful. In another influential study – *Wedded to the Cause* – Frances Swyripa analyzes the situation of Ukrainian women in the context of Ukrainian-Canadian women’s organization from 1891 until 1991. So far, Ukrainian Canadians have not received much attention among German scholars. A recent contribution to the field, Julia Ulrike Könecke’s *A Rock and a Hard Place*, examines the preservation of

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14 For an exploration of this topic, including a definition of the term ‘displaced person,’ see chapter 2.

Ukrainian heritage in Canada, covering a period of more than 100 years. Although the study deals predominantly with Ukrainian-Canadian literature, it contains an extensive summary of the historical developments of the community in Canada, focusing on cultural and political organizations as well as the education system. The book contains a number of flaws – in many cases, the author does not take the most recent secondary literature into account. Also, regarding some historical issues (such as the formation of the UCC) the study lacks critical analysis, further losing value due to spelling and translation errors. Nonetheless, thus far it is the only study available for the German market.\textsuperscript{16} The third wave is only beginning to be of interest to historians. A first exploration of the Ukrainian experience in postwar Canada is Lubomyr Luciuk’s – in parts very personal – \textit{Searching for Place}.\textsuperscript{17} Luciuk’s study focuses on the Ukrainian political elite, in particular on the League for the Liberation of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund, and Bohdan Panchuk. Internal disputes and government surveillance are the center of attention, focusing on the time period up to the 1950s. Luciuk asserts that Ukrainians’ main interest was “the place over there,” meaning the homeland and consequently Ukraine’s liberation. Since the latter was never on the government’s agenda, Luciuk perceives Ukrainians as a group that was not taken seriously by the Canadian government.\textsuperscript{18} This study presents the Ukrainian experience in the broader context of Canadian immigration history, thereby adding a different perspective to Luciuk’s study. Furthermore, it takes the development of the community during the 1960s into consideration and analyzes the Ukrainian contribution to the multiculturalism discussion, thereby exploring a topic that has not found much scholarly attention yet.

\textsuperscript{16} Julia Ulrike Köneke, \textit{A Rock and a Hard Place. Eine Untersuchung über die Traditions- und Kulturpflege der Ukrainer in Kanada} (Frankfurt am Main, Bern, New York, Paris: Peter Lang, 2005).

\textsuperscript{17} Lubomyr Luciuk is a child of parents who came to Canada with the third wave. His motivation to write his study and his personal political views (for example, in regards to war criminals) are expressed in parts of his book and shape his overall approach (Lubomyr Luciuk, \textit{Searching for Place. Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and the Migration of Memory} (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 2001), pages IX-XV, 273-280, 287-291 (FN 7)).

\textsuperscript{18} Luciuk, \textit{Searching for Place}. For an elaboration of the marginalized status, see also chapter 5 of this work.
In Germany, Ukrainians have only recently become more common as immigrants, a fact that is also mirrored in the historiography. Since there were only approximately 25,000 Ukrainians in postwar Germany, academic studies dealing with their experience in the country are scarce. We will deal in more depth with the literature in the respective chapters. However, it can be stated right here that there is no equivalent study to that of Martynowych or Swyripa for the German case. Volodymyr Maruniak’s *Ukrains’ka Emigratsiia (Tom II)* deals with the development of the Ukrainian community in Western Germany between 1952 and 1975. However, the author does not provide any footnotes or references to archival material or secondary literature. Maruniak further does not contextualize the Ukrainian experience in the German framework. Nonetheless, *Ukrains’ka Emigratsiia* is still valuable as a source of statistical information about Ukrainian organizations in Germany that only he as an insider to the community could provide. Bernadetta Wojtowicz outlines the development and tasks of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Germany from 1945 until 1956 and thus gives insight into an important aspect of émigré life which will not find major attention in this study. Unfortunately, a recently published article by Reinhard Heydenreuter about Ukrainians in Munich does not contribute anything new to the field. It rather reflects the poor state of historiography regarding Ukrainians in Germany and a lack of knowledge on the part of the author. Not only the literature dealing with

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19 Münz, “Changing Patterns,” 65-119; Bernd Knabe, “Migration in und aus Osteuropa,” in *Migration und Flucht. Aufgaben und Strategien für Deutschland, Europa und die internationale Gemeinschaft*, ed. Steffen Angenendt, (Munich: Verlag Oldenburg, 1997), 51-59. As Knabe points out, only the disintegration of the Soviet Union made large-scale emigration possible. Since many western European countries closed their doors around the time of the break-up, some illegal immigration took place.


22 Heydenreuter included a picture of a church that he claims to be the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Munich; he is, however, mistaken (Reinhard Heydenreuter, “Ukrainer in München,” in *Xenopolis.*
Ukrainians in Germany after the Second World War is limited. Homeless foreigners in general – the official status of all those former displaced persons who came under German administration in 1950/51\textsuperscript{23} - are not at the centre of attention in postwar immigration literature that focuses primarily on expellees, German refugees, and guest workers. Although interest in migration and refugee issues intensified during the 1990s in Germany due to a rekindled debate on immigration and refugee rights, homeless foreigners and their history did not benefit from this trend.\textsuperscript{24} This study can therefore contribute not only a fresh perspective due to the comparison between Canada and Germany, but also some fundamental research on homeless foreigners and Ukrainians in Germany. It further offers a contextualization of Maruniak’s study.

The differences in the historiography and the unequal numerical distribution are two major arguments that could complicate a comparison of Ukrainians in Germany and Canada. However, there are stronger supporting arguments. Ukrainians who came to Canada after the Second World War first had to spend a considerable amount of time in Germany. The majority of them living in displaced persons camps that were under the guardianship of the international community. These years in the camps led to a common socialization among the group, a phenomenon that will be explored in chapter 2. Hardly ever does an immigrant group have such an intensive experience before emigrating and such a chance to develop a discourse of their aims and tasks for the future. Furthermore, the differences in the receiving countries can also be seen as an advantage, because they enable us to question what kind of influence the receiving country had on the developments in the group. Recent works in comparative history have shown that


\textsuperscript{23} For an elaboration on this special status see chapter 7.

an unconventional approach can bring remarkable results. For example, the article collection *Diasporas and Ethnic Migrants* examines the fate of ethnic Germans, Jews, and ethnic Russians during the 20th century and their countries’ handling of issues such as remigration, expulsion, and minority group politics. Through this unusual comparison, differences in assimilation process and return movement became much more apparent. In his influential article “Deconstructing and comparing diasporas,” William Safran also encourages a comparison between what he calls “welcoming” and “selective” countries. According to his categorization, Canada can be classified as a culturally pluralistic, welcoming country that “admit[s] immigrants and encourage[s] them to become members of the political community, but permit[s] them to retain their cultural particularities.” Germany, on the other hand, is listed as a member of the “cultural monolithic countries” that “distinguish between permanent ‘returnees’ and ‘guest workers,’ whose entry into the political community is difficult, if not impossible.” Despite current changes regarding citizenship and immigration in Germany, this classification is appropriate for our case because we deal with the historical immigration phenomenon between 1945 and 1971. A comparison between Germany and Canada could thus contribute to the growing controversy whether “diaspora identity is more enduring in culturally pluralistic or in monoculturally oriented countries.” Although diaspora identity is not the central issue in this study, the question of group identity and identification with the host country will be raised and discussed in this work (see section four).

### 2. Studying Immigration History

There are different approaches to studying immigration history that influence the choice of sources and the general perspective. On the one hand, Oscar Handlin still

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influences immigration history with his prominent theory of the uprooted.28 Handlin saw the emigration process as an unsettling experience in which the immigrant remained removed from her past and traditions and was never able to fully adapt to the new homeland. According to his theory, the immigration experience was one of alienation and displacement for the first generation. John Bodnar countered Handlin’s concept with an approach in which he saw immigrants as transplanted people. For Bodnar it was important that these people were active participants in the migration process with different responses to the challenges that they faced. Furthermore, he stressed that many immigrants brought an important institutional structure to North America.29 However, Roberto Perin shows us that immigrant communities are never static or hermetically sealed, but rather touched by their North-American culture and environment. Taking religious institutions as an example, Perin points out that “the religious universe that immigrants recreated for themselves in Canada was never exactly the same as what they had known back home.”30 Such understandings are possible these days because many historians respond to commonly made demands and take the situation in the homeland into consideration in order to evaluate changes and developments in the immigration experience.31 This is an important aspect for this study, because it is not so much the situation in the homeland per se that is relevant, but rather the developments in the DP camps in Germany. This allows for a micro-analysis of conditions before departure,32 because the majority of Ukrainians lived in the enclosed, one could even call it artificial environment of the DP camps. Not only the situation prior to departure will be taken into consideration. The developments within the group in the respective countries and the interaction with the host government and society

32 This is an aspect that Roberto Perin suggest for immigration studies (Perin, “Themes,” page 1258f).
are also of interest to us. This perspective reflects recent changes in the writing of immigration history.

Historians have often criticized the approach to writing immigration history that prevailed in Canada until the 1970s, a time when immigration history established itself as a discipline in the country. Before the 1970s and the initiation of the multiculturalism policy, members of an immigrant group typically wrote about their own group’s migration process, thereby generally celebrating the group’s experience in Canada instead of analyzing it. In recent years, the background of historians and their approach to immigration history have changed. Nowadays, both the homeland and developments in the new host country are taken into consideration. The immigrants are seen to have agency, and their experiences are often presented in the context of fields such as labor, urban, or social history. This approach is not only endorsed in the Canadian context, but also in Germany where the discussion started, however, much later. As Howard Palmer makes us aware, this new method is promoted by the fact that most of the authors dealing with immigration history today are people who have both a “link with the group, which gives them a special sense of insight, understanding and empathy, and also have university training, which gives them the sense of detachment necessary for perspective and critical analysis.”

Not many historians write immigration history as an ‘outsider.’ In general, the writing of Ukrainian immigration history is left to members of the diaspora, either to people who emigrated themselves, but more often nowadays to their...
descendants. On the one hand, familiarity with the community and language has its advantages, as Palmer has pointed out. Those historians have an intimate knowledge of community structures and developments; furthermore, the community itself trusts them – an enormous advantage when it comes to getting access to community archives or interviewees. However, being a member of an ethnic group can also put great pressure on a scholar, as Frances Swyripa points out in her article “The Politics of Redress,” in which she deals critically with the Ukrainian-Canadian redress campaign for internment during the First World War.38 Furthermore, Howard Palmer highlights that “inevitably authors must confront material which some people within the group regard as skeletons in the closet, best left undisturbed. In short, then, the historian is faced with the often unpleasant decision of whether to present the group as it would like to be seen, or as he or she believes it actually was.”39 An outsider might be in an easier position to make these choices.

Historians who are members of the group being studied can experience a lot of pressure when writing immigration history, whereas outsiders can encounter many obstacles in actually doing research within the community – a fact that Elizabeth Wangenheim, a sociologist of German origin, emphasizes. She sees the major problems as language acquisition, accessibility of sources and interviewees, and the choice of sources. Despite the difficulties, Wangenheim also points out the advantages of entering a field like this as an outsider because he or she “…is fully conscious of his general ignorance of the field and starts his research with fresh eyes. The member of the in-group will usually be in some way emotionally involved, either positively or negatively, and this could bias his results…a member

39 Palmer, “Canadian Immigration,” page 37. Ukrainian scholars themselves sometimes see the merits of having an outsider conduct research on specific topics, as Volodymyr Ianiv (Volodymyr Janiw), principal of the Ukrainian Free University in the late 1960s, stressed in reference to a book about the Ukrainian church that was written by a non-Ukrainian (Volodymyr Ianiv, “Preface,” in Kirche zwischen Ost und West. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Ukrainischen und Weißruthenischen Kirche, by Johannes Madey (Munich: UFU, 1969), page 5f).
of the in-group will tend to overlook many significant data because, having grown up surrounded by them, he takes them for granted.”

This study’s approach is based on recent developments in immigration history outlined by Palmer, Perin, and Iacovetta. I agree with Wangenheim that the perspective of an outsider can enable the historian to explore issues that are often known to the community itself, but not studied or analyzed as a historical subject. Due to this perspective, the thesis presented focuses on the broader context of Canadian and German immigration history and the community’s relationship to the host country, thereby giving more attention to external relations than internal developments. This work is a mix of cultural, political, and social history in the framework of diaspora theories; the guiding questions and the general outline will be discussed after an elaboration of the concept of diaspora.

3. Diaspora, Immigrant, Refugee, and Ethnic Group – Defining the Terminology

Diaspora theories serve as guiding parameters for this work to facilitate a comprehensive comparison of the Ukrainian experience in Canada and Germany. Diaspora studies are a new academic field that gained wider popularity during the 1980s. Originally, a “diaspora” was identified mainly through its “catastrophic origin, mass nature, and disturbing effects.” The Jews and later also the Armenians were the archetypes of a diaspora that featured coercion, dispersal, maintenance of a collective memory, and patrolling of communal boundaries as its

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41 For example, this is true for the Ukrainian involvement in the multiculturalism discussion, a topic that will be explored in chapter 6.

42 For a discussion of these topics, see Georg Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: from scientific objectivity to the postmodern challenge* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2005), 1-18.


main characteristics. However, incipient diaspora groups have been forming since the 1960s, partly due to the Civil Rights Movement in the United States and the independence of many African countries. With these new applications, the term diaspora lost its negative connotations and was increasingly applied as an academic concept as well. Consequently, the field of diaspora studies witnessed an upsurge of interest and publications during the 1990s.

As its popularity grew, so did the confusion over the definition of the term diaspora itself. The meaning of the term when applied to groups other than the Jews and Armenians is generally vague and unclear, an aspect widely criticized by theorists. William Safran, for example, laments that “the label [diaspora] has been stretched to cover almost any ethnic or religious minority that is dispersed physically from its original homeland, regardless of the conditions leading to the dispersion.” Indeed, many definitions are very short and therefore too broad to apply properly, such as the ‘working definition’ by Walker Conner in which diaspora “might well be ‘that segment of a people living outside the homeland.’” Immigrants are also people living outside the boundaries of their homeland, and not every immigrant is a member of a diaspora – at least not to all scholars. According to Tölölyan, one of the major tensions in the diaspora discourse is the question of the diachronic versus the synchronic approach – the question as to whether the historical definition should have an influence of how we interpret diasporas today. Those in favor of a narrower, more historical definition like Safran argue that the concept of diaspora is otherwise ‘denuded’ and therefore reduced to a useless metaphor. Tölölyan supports this view, stating a loosely applied definition makes it difficult to “distinguish the self-consciously organized, sometimes

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50 Safran, “Deconstructing,” page 9f.
institutionally saturated diasporas from much more loosely organized communities of first-generation migrants.”

Although the definitions of diaspora are usually broad, there are some common denominators that appear repeatedly. In general, authors stress the importance of the group being dispersed from home and scattered all over the world, while maintaining a strong sentimental attachment to its roots. Diasporas are said to be dedicated to maintaining their identity and therefore operate with other compatriots across borders in what Sheffer calls “trans-state networks.”

According to Robin Cohen, a diaspora has “a collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its location, history and achievement; an idealization of the putative ancestral homeland and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety and prosperity, even to its creation.” Indeed, many diaspora groups even fantasize about returning one day to the ancestral homeland. The question of homeland and the important role it plays for a diaspora group is a significant feature that sets a diaspora group apart from an ordinary immigrant group. A general interest in the homeland is often activated at times of trouble, for example, if a natural catastrophe hits the state of origin. However, the most interesting aspect of a diaspora community is the fact that it sees the homeland on the constant verge of a crisis, and therefore lobbying efforts to assure representation of the group as well as fund drives are named as common features of a diaspora group.

Having established the common features of a diaspora group, it is now important to apply the theory to the Ukrainian case. This study is not the first one to examine the Ukrainian immigration experience in the context of diaspora theories; Vic Satzewich has already contributed a study in this area. However, Satzewich

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54 Sheffer, “A New Field,” page 4f.
56 Vic Satzewich, The Ukrainian Diaspora (London, New York: Routledge, 2002). There are other contributions that also use the term diaspora, but this does not mean that the Ukrainian experience is analyzed from the angle of diaspora theories. Rather, the term diaspora is taken to mean “outside of the borders of Ukraine.” For an example that deals primarily with Ukrainians in Eastern Europe, see
takes what Tölölyan calls a different “selective discursive focus.”\textsuperscript{57} Satzewich applies Cohen’s model of a diaspora group\textsuperscript{58} to the Ukrainian case, thereby identifying Ukrainians as a victim diaspora that derives much of its identity from its view of the homeland. Although he makes references to almost all existing communities of the Ukrainian diaspora, Satzewich focuses on the groups in the US and Canada. By examining both the communist and non-communist factions, he stresses the multi-faceted aspects of a diaspora existence.\textsuperscript{59} The author bases his findings mostly on already published works and only supplies new sources – mainly newspaper articles – for the 1970s and 80s. Since Satzewich does not deal with any country in particular, the host society and its influence on the developments of a diaspora group do not feature prominently in his work.

This study takes a slightly different approach from Satzewich by focusing on the country-specific circumstances in Canada and Germany as host countries to Ukrainians. The focus is on the organized nationalist faction\textsuperscript{60} and their efforts to represent Ukrainians in Canada and Germany, and to establish and mould Ukrainian diaspora life. Ukrainian pro-communist activities are only taken into consideration to contrast developments in the nationalist section. The concentration on the organized community does not imply that these people are more “interesting” than the ones who blended into the host society; it is more a question of accessibility and representation. It is the organized community which claims leadership and representation of Ukrainians as a whole, no matter whether this is ‘really’ the case or not. They are the ones that are acknowledged by the government to be the official leaders, adding some sort of credibility to their views. Furthermore, they are the ones who produce sources and thus make an

\textsuperscript{57} Tölölyan, “The American Model,” page 60.
\textsuperscript{58} Cohen, \textit{Global Diasporas}.
\textsuperscript{59} For another example of categorizing diaspora as a multi-faceted phenomenon, see Donna R. Gabaccia, \textit{Italy’s Many Diasporas} (London: University College, 2000). Gabaccia points out that “to label most of Italy’s migratory networks as diasporas forces us to accept a somewhat minimalist definition of a diaspora” (page 6). Like Satzewich, Donna Gabaccia does not concentrate on one or two receiving countries in particular, but examines Italian migration as a global experience that formed many diasporas which changed over time.
\textsuperscript{60} Not “the Ukrainians” in general.
interpretation possible.\(^{61}\) And instead of a loose definition such as Cohen’s, this study bases its methodology on Safran’s and Tölöyan’s approach, focusing on the aspect of lobbying.\(^{62}\) There is a distinct advantage to employing a narrower definition of a diaspora in that it enables us to reveal issues of conscious self-organization and relationship to the host country. The latter is the major focus of this study.

Why is it important to determine whether a group can be classified as a diaspora community or not? Many authors dealing with the topic attribute an important role to diasporas. In their opinion, diasporas can serve as a link between the homeland and the host country, they can be “bridge[s] between societies”\(^{63}\) and potential “mediators between various states and regional organizations.”\(^{64}\)

Diasporas are seen as a significant contributor to global politics with special focus on the particular homeland,\(^{65}\) and this trend is predicted to intensify due to improving communication and globalization.\(^{66}\) In a nutshell, there are certain expectations of and tasks for a diaspora group that do not exist for an immigrant group. The question is whether Ukrainians fit this model and whether the host country has an influence on their development.

Before we develop the major questions for this study, we have to define other important terms. An immigrant is a person who has been accepted into the country under specific conditions that either include a labor contract or a sponsorship program and with the distinct option and intention of eventually


\(^{64}\) Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics*, page 30. In 1993, Frank Golczewski asserted that the Ukrainian diaspora had the potential to act as a financial investor and to impart knowledge of liberal political and economic practices (Frank Golczewski, “Die ukrainische Diaspora nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg,” in *Geschichte der Ukraine*, ed. Frank Golczewski (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1993), 261-268, page 268).

\(^{65}\) Conner, “The Impact,” page 37f; Sheffer, “A New Field,” page 4f. Tölöyan states, for example, that diaspora communities are sometimes used as ‘agents’ by the host government (Tölöyan, “Rethinking,” page 26).

becoming a citizen of that country. A refugee is a person who has left his or her
country of origin involuntarily and who has been given legal status in the country
of refuge. This legal status can include a work permit and the option of becoming a
citizen one day, but it does not have to. Whether immigrants and/or refugees form a
diaspora group is determined by the group’s attitude to the homeland, its
relationship to the host country, and the overall deployment of organizational
structures and lobbying, theoretical criteria that will guide not only the research,
but also the comparison in the conclusion. Apart from the abovementioned
definition of diaspora group, the term diaspora is also employed in a broader sense.
“Ukrainians in the diaspora” is sometimes used to substitute the expression
“Ukrainians outside the borders of Ukraine.” In this context, diaspora is a
geographical term and not a theoretical concept.

Apart from diaspora, immigrant, and refugee, this study also refers to
Ukrainians as an ‘ethnic group’ – a term that has triggered many an academic
discussion in recent years. For this study, it is important that we deal with an
immigration phenomenon in both countries; therefore we have to address the
definition of “ethnic group” from this angle. In a non-immigration context, the term
ethnic group refers to a group that shares the same historical ties and cultural
institutions. However, it is hardly ever used in a non-immigration context.67 The
question is whether ethnicity is objective (defined by descent) or subjective (subject
to self-identification and external boundaries). Wsevolod Isajiw attempted to
surmount this dichotomy by creating a definition that allows both for an objective
and subjective aspect, by applying the term ethnic group to “an involuntary group
of people who share the same culture or to descendants of such people who identify
themselves and/or are identified by others as belonging to the same involuntary
group.”68 Reviewing his definition in the early 1990s, Isajiw endorsed his initial
approach, but stated that he acknowledged “the constructionist idea that ethnicity is
a process.”69 In addition, he stressed that group identity changes with the group’s
development or decline.

Alternatively, in the Canadian context some historians refer to groups of non-French, non-British, and non-Native origin as immigrant groups. However, this labeling does not acknowledge that some of the group’s members were born in Canada and did not have an immigration experience at all. Since they grew up in a society that was dominated by a culture different from their ancestral culture, for many of the second or third generation, ethnic identity has more of a subjective, symbolic value, an aspect that should not be underestimated. And in the German context, homeless foreigners were not officially acknowledged as immigrant groups, but were labeled *Volksgruppen* – ethnic groups is a translation that is most fitting here. Isajiw’s definition of “ethnic group” is valuable for this study because it takes self-identification and outside identification into consideration, which were used both by Ukrainians themselves and by the respective government authorities.

4. Methodology, Source Base, and Chapter Summary

4.1. Methodology

This study compares the Ukrainian experience in Canada and Germany between 1945 and 1971. Orienting itself by recent developments in the writing of immigration history, recognizing the author’s position as an outsider to the community, and taking diaspora studies as a theoretical framework, it contextualizes the Ukrainian developments in the broader framework of Canadian and German immigration history. Its’ organization reflects its use of three perspectives in each chapter: the context, the external, and the internal perspective. The context perspective examines the geographical and numerical distribution of Ukrainians after the Second World War as well as the economic and social opportunities offered by the host countries. Furthermore, it explores the group’s identification with the host country by examining the acquisition of citizenship, participation in the country’s affairs, identification with the country’s history, and the interpretation of the members’ position in the country. The external perspective focuses on the group’s relationship to the authorities, represented either through organizations such as UNRRA or the Canadian/German government. In this context it is important to ask how Ukrainians represented themselves and their

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aspirations towards the authorities and how this changed over time. We further have to explore whether the authorities were receptive to Ukrainian lobbying efforts. Finally, the internal perspective explores the different stages of organizational development within the group in both countries. What kind of institutions existed, what purpose did they serve, and what was their relationship to the host country’s authorities? Were they self-sufficient or did they rely on outside financial support? What kind of aims and objectives did the diaspora group develop in each particular country? How did the homeland and the diaspora’s perception of it influence Ukrainians and their activities? What kind of inner conflicts existed within the Ukrainian community in the DP camps as well as later in Germany and Canada? However, internal conflicts, especially in the political sphere, are not at the center of attention and are only examined briefly in this study.

4.2. Source Base
Each chapter gives an in-depth overview of the sources used, so this part only briefly outlines the archives consulted. Since this study focuses on government policies and Ukrainian outward representation, the source base draws heavily on government archives. The majority of the Canadian material was taken from the Library and Archives Canada (LAC) in Ottawa, which houses both government as well as Ukrainian specific collections. Information on Ukrainians in Ontario and Ukrainian relief efforts could also be found in the Gordon Bohdan Panchuk Collection (GBPC) at the Provincial Archives of Ontario (PAO). Sources for the DP experience were obtained at the United Nations Archive in New York (UNA), which houses the UNRRA collections, and at the CIUS archives in Edmonton, which offers a collection of British foreign office files dealing with Ukrainians in postwar Germany. Some UNRRA sources were also found at the LAC in Ottawa. The sources for the German part come either from the federal archives in Koblenz (Bundesarchiv, BA) or from the Bavarian Central State Archive (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, hereafter BayHStA) in Munich. This study offers fundamental research in regard to the Ukrainian contribution to the Canadian multiculturalism discussion and the situation of homeless foreigners in general (and Ukrainians in particular) during the 1950s and 60s in Germany. The sources for these sources
come primarily from the Library and Archives Canada, as well as the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz.

This primary source base is complemented by community and government publications that deal with a wide range of topics, for example, the development of Ukrainian organizations or the implementation of the Homeless Foreigner Act. Newspapers, especially *Homin Ukrainy* and *Shliakh Peremohy*, but also the *Freie Presse Korrespondenz* or the *Ukrainian Quarterly*, give us insight into community development. However, newspapers are not the major source base for this study; *Homin Ukrainy* and *Shliakh Peremohy* were used only to provide a glimpse into Ukrainian activities in the respective countries. A comparison is made possible through the fact that these two papers adhere to the same OUN faction (Bandera) and therefore have the same political outlook.71 Interviews with community members complete the source base. In Germany, nine former displaced persons were interviewed in Munich. In Canada, 26 interviews were conducted in total, 15 with former displaced persons and 11 with community leaders such as priests or heads of organizations. The interviews are meant to complement the government and community sources, adding a reflection on community life during the 1940s, 50s, and 60s.

**4.3. Chapter Summary**

The second chapter deals with the situation of Ukrainians in the displaced persons camps in the three western German zones between 1945 and 1948. Since this situation has been fairly well examined from the Ukrainian point of view,72 this chapter considers both the Ukrainian and the administrative side, which was dominated by international organizations such as UNRRA or the IRO. Ukrainian outward presentation, their self-organization in the camps and UNRRA’s attitude towards the group are the centre of attention. During the camp period, Ukrainians developed an idea of their tasks and goals in the diaspora (for example preserving

71 The fact that many articles were published in both newspapers or that journalists of one paper often wrote for the other further illustrates this point. Bandera’s works, for example, were frequently published in both papers as the collection *Perspektyvy ukrains'koi revoliutsii* shows (Stepan Bandera, *Perspektyvy ukrains'koi revoliutsii* (Munich: Cicero, 1978)).

the Ukrainian language and heritage), an important feature that they would carry with them into resettlement.

The third chapter examines the Ukrainian community in Canada during the Second World War to provide an overview of the developments and conditions in the receiving country prior to the arrival of the third wave. During this period, the opposition between the nationalist and pro-communist faction was very pronounced and influenced by international political developments. During the Second World War, the organized nationalist community had to juggle old world loyalties and new world allegiances, and this chapter asserts that they were successful in doing so. The war helped the community to get established in the country, and it further laid down institutional structures that would influence the community for decades to come. The fourth chapter examines the Canadian and Ukrainian-Canadian preparations for the immigration of the displaced persons. Although the Canadian government was initially not in favor of a broad, organized immigration scheme, it changed its attitude due to international and domestic pressure during the two postwar years. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian-Canadian community intensified the lobbying efforts which it had already started during the war, now focusing on the fate of the displaced persons and hence adjusting their arguments to the developments taking place in Europe. Chapter five analyzes the settlement process of the third wave in the broader context of Canadian and Ukrainian-Canadian developments. In addition to the internal clashes that took place between the established nationalist community and the newcomers as well as the newcomers and the pro-communists, it also outlines how strong anti-communist attitudes served as a common ground for the nationalist community (both established and newcomers). Chapter 6 recaps community developments during the 1960s and focuses on the Ukrainian-Canadian contribution to the multiculturalism discussion, asserting that the debate helped the community find their place in the country.

Chapter 7 deals with the 1950s in Germany, examining the status of the homeless foreigners as well as their transition into the German society and economy. Implemented in 1951, the Homeless Foreigners Act regulated the legal status of the group in the country. Furthermore, life of homeless foreigners in the country was marked by an unofficial transition process that was dominated by the
slow abolition of camps and the persisting hope of emigrating on part of the homeless foreigners. Although this chapter concentrates on the broader context of homeless foreigners in the country, developments specific to the Ukrainian case are considered as well. Chapter 8 deals with the status of Ukrainians in Germany, illuminating the importance of their classification as political refugees. Although the community continued to decline during this decade, it saw some improvements in the realm of academic institutions, and this chapter explores the government’s reasons for becoming involved in this matter. Chapter 9 compares the Ukrainian experience in Canada and Germany and presents an overall conclusion.

As the outline shows, the same caesura dates are taken for both countries: except for the 1940s, the Ukrainian immigration experience is explored by decade (and the 1960s do not end with 1969, but with 1971/72 – a fact that is also true for other explorations of that period). When comparing the outline and the source base of the chapters, it is obvious that the Canadian part receives more attention than the German section; in addition, the source base for the Canadian part is broader and deeper. Two factors are responsible for this trend. On the one hand, as mentioned above, the topic of Ukrainians in Canada has been subject of academic research for many decades, whereas the Ukrainian experience in Germany has not attracted much attention. Furthermore, the community of 400,000 Ukrainians in Canada (Stand 1951) produced more sources than the community in Germany that never rose beyond 25,000 members. The source base in Germany is therefore more rudimentary right from the start. A look into the background of Ukrainian migration further illustrates this point.

5. The Background of Ukrainian Migration

5.1. Historical Synopsis of Ukrainian Migration to Canada

Although Ukrainians have been actively migrating to all five continents since the 19th century, they are not evenly distributed. Canada has been a magnet for Ukrainian migration since the end of the 19th century. Although it never received as

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many Ukrainian immigrants as its neighbor down south, Ukrainians have made an impact on the country due to their proportion in the host society and their geographical distribution. By 1971, three waves of Ukrainians with altogether 581,000 members and descendants\textsuperscript{75} had established themselves mainly in the three Prairie Provinces and Ontario. Throughout this period of settlement, an independent Ukraine did not exist. Those who came with the first wave of immigrants between 1891 and 1914 and who later defined themselves as Ukrainians came mostly from Bukovina and Galicia, two provinces in the Habsburg Empire; only a few came from regions within the Russian Empire.

No matter where these immigrants of the first wave were from, many were not aware of their Ukrainian heritage. In both the Russian and Austrian ruled territories the intelligentsia was responsible for spreading notions of a distinct ethnic identity. This was an elite group that possessed higher education, and, more importantly, devoted themselves to the “cultural, social and political improvement of the masses.”\textsuperscript{76} The numbers of these educated people were quite small, especially in the Russian dominated regions; developing a national identity was rather seen as a hobby.\textsuperscript{77} It was particularly difficult to promote a distinct Ukrainian nationality in the Russian Empire, because the Russian government and intelligentsia generally saw Ukrainians as an ‘offshoot’ of the Russian people due to their geographic closeness or similarities in language.\textsuperscript{78} Depicted as “Little Russians,” Ukrainians were deprived of a widely recognized and distinct identity. The situation in the Habsburg Empire, from which most of the immigrants came, was slightly different. Ukrainians in Bukovina and Galicia enjoyed more cultural freedom than their counterparts across the border, which led to a higher level of

\textsuperscript{76} Orest Subtelny, Ukraine. A History. Third Edition (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 2000), page 223. Subtelny stresses the importance of the emergence of the intelligentsia for the Ukrainian case, because it would be the intelligentsia’s task to direct and guide Ukrainians throughout the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} century on political and cultural issues.
\textsuperscript{77} For example, Kharkiv and Kiev University had produced a total of 4300 graduates by the 1860s. From this small number of graduates, only few people were interested in Ukrainian issues, such as history, folklore, language and literature (Subtelny, Ukraine, page 224f).
national development. However, this did not mean that promoting ethnic distinctiveness was easy. The intelligentsia, in this case the clergy, was very loyal to the Habsburg government, which made a promotion of intellectual growth more difficult. Ukrainians in these areas also had a problem similar to the one their counterparts faced in the Russian Empire. The Polish gentry dominated these regions, and it often saw Ukrainians as a “backward branch of the Polish nation.”

“National awakeners” who began to appear in western Ukraine in the 19th century had a hard time finding broad support for their movement. Instilling the “idea of nationhood in Ukraine was...a laborious and halting process,” because skeptics existed even among Ukrainians themselves who doubted that Ukrainians were a separate nationality whose language and culture were worth cultivating. In conclusion, the movement in Eastern Ukraine was very eager but faced more repression, while its Western counterpart was slower to take root, but still managed an appreciable development. Despite all attempts, a distinct national identity had not been achieved by the end of the 19th century, and the emigration movement to Canada revealed that.

When immigrating to Canada with the first wave, not only had many Ukrainians not developed a distinct ethnic identity, but the Canadian government was also not aware of their background and therefore registered them as Austrians, Russians, or Ruthenians. The 170,000 Ukrainian immigrants who comprised the first wave came predominantly to Canada to improve their economic prospects; and because they were interested in owning land, they headed for the Prairie regions where they worked as farmers or farm laborers. Some members of the first wave also found employment in the cities or with the Canadian railway. Like other


80 Subtelny, Ukraine, page 238f.

81 Subtelny, Ukraine, pages 239-242. Nonetheless, prior to the 1917 Revolution, Ukrainian nationalism with focus on the political future was mainly rooted in the socialist movement and did not reach the greater parts of society (Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Between Autonomy and Independence: Ukrainian Political Thought Prior to 1917,” The Ukrainian Quarterly 54 (3-4), 1998, 193-208).

82 For further information of the background of the first wave, see Orest Martynovych, Ukrainians in Canada. The Formative Period, 1891-1924 (Edmonton: CIUS Press, 1991), chapter 1.


84 Subtelny, Ukraine, page 546ff; Golczewski, “Die ukrainische Emigration,” 225.
settlers in rural areas, Ukrainian farmers faced many initial problems – primitive living conditions, lack of money, and isolation being just a few of them. But inexpensive land and an extensive bloc settlement eased the situation for the newcomers. An additional problem was discrimination on part of the Anglo-Canadian society, which diminished over time, having reached its peak during the First World War. During the war, many Ukrainians were registered as Austro-Hungarians and thus classified as enemy aliens, thereby facing censorship, forced registration, disenfranchisement, and in some cases even internment. Despite these initial hardships, Canada lived up to the expectations of most Ukrainians who were able to successfully establish themselves as farmers.

Over time, Ukrainians who came to Canada with the first wave became more and more culturally and politically aware. Early on, Ukrainians either transferred organizations from the homeland or founded institutions themselves to maintain their roots: churches and Prosvita societies were just two examples. Ukrainians coming to Canada were well aware that it was important for their children to learn English, the language of their new environment. But they also stressed the importance of maintaining their Ukrainian heritage and tried to make extensive use of the opportunity of bilingual schools. Once the initial period of settlement was mastered and merits of public education were acknowledged, Ukrainian teachers, who represented the emerging intelligentsia, actually became quite successful in raising a “Ukrainian consciousness” in- and outside of school.

85 Subtelny, Ukrainians in North America, pages 45-56.
86 For an overview of government actions, see Mark Minenko, “Without Just Cause: Canada’s First National Internment Operations,” in Canada’s Ukrainians, ed. Luciuk, 288-303. Although overall “only” 8,579 out of 540,000 “enemy aliens” were interned, the threat of internment existed throughout the war period and its impact on a carefree community life should not be underestimated (See also: Donald Avery, “Ethnicity and Class Tensions in Canada, 1918-1920: Anglo-Canadians and the Alien Worker,” in Loyalties in Conflict, ed. Francis Swyripa, 79-98).
87 Manoly Lupul, “Ukrainian-language Education in Canada's Public School,” in A Heritage in Transition. Essays in the History of Ukrainians in Canada, ed. Manoly Lupul (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1982), 215-243, page 225. This should not give the impression that all parents were in favor of the public school-system; “resistance…(was) more common than some historians…admit” (Martynovych, Ukrainians in Canada, page 343). In the beginning Ukrainians were convinced that Canada was a free country and parents could actually do with their children what they wanted. In addition to that, children were needed as helping hands on the farm, which illustrates that economic factors played a role as well (Martynovych, Ukrainians, page 342f).
88 Marcella Derkatz, “Ukrainian Language Education in Manitoba Public Schools: Reflections on a Centenary,” in Issues in the History of Education in Manitoba. From the Construction of the
Although bilingual schools were prohibited with the outbreak of the First World War, their previous existence made a transition into the private sector possible. Even though Ukrainian could no longer be the language of instruction or a class subject, the existence of bilingual teachers allowed a smooth transition to Saturday schools or afternoon classes. The community could fall back on the experience of years of Ukrainian teaching, which had created an awareness of the issue. The first wave established itself in Canada, juggling to keep a balance between the adaptation to the new environment and the preservation of at least part of their heritage. Awareness of their Ukrainian identity that had been triggered back in Europe often blossomed on the Prairies, and language and traditions such as dancing were considered to be very vital components.89

The second wave arrived during the inter-war years and traced its roots back to either Poland or the Ukrainian SSR, where its members had experienced the First World War, the Revolution, and the following civil war in one way or the other.90 Many of the newcomers had actively fought for an independent Ukraine, or had at least come into contact with this idea. As Orest Subtelny noted “…it was clear that the Ukrainians, like other nationalities, were becoming steadily more aggressive in pursuing their own interests and less willing to concern themselves with the fate of the empires that had ruled them for centuries.”91 In the end, the goal of an independent Ukrainian state was not realized – its advocates had been too divided. Furthermore, Ukrainians were surrounded by powerful neighbors and lacked a fully developed national consciousness during the time of the First World War.92 Nonetheless, the struggle for an independent state had sharpened the national consciousness of many emigrants. The second wave was fewer in number than the...
first one and is estimated at 70,000 people.93 Its members were recruited under the Railway Agreement of 1925 that allowed the Canadian Pacific Railway and the Canadian National Railway to draft immigrants to work for their companies.94 Although economic advancement was also a goal for the second wave and they, too, were eventually mostly employed in the agricultural sector, they were more educated and politically conscious than their predecessors.95 These newcomers either joined already existing organizations and churches or established associations of their own. Thus Ukrainian life in Canada in the interwar period was not only divided along denominational lines, but also along ideological ones. The major influences were nationalism and socialism: the first expressed, for example, through the Ukrainian National Federation (UNF) or the United Hetman Organization, the latter through the highly popular Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA), a pro-communist cultural organization.96 These divisions within the community were also heavily influenced by what was going on in Poland and the Ukrainian SSR during the interwar period. The community’s development during the years leading up to the Second World War will be further discussed in chapter 3.

5.2. Ukrainian Migration to Germany

Compared to countries such as the United States, Canada, Brazil, or Argentina, Germany received a small share of Ukrainian immigrants.97 This fact is also

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93 The number of immigrants was limited due to poor economic conditions in the farming regions and a restrictive immigration policy. (Subtelny, Ukraine, page 551).
95 Subtelny, Ukraine, pages 551-554. Among people leaving Ukraine after the First World War was also for the first time the ‘political émigré’. Nonetheless, this type of emigrant mostly migrated within Eastern Europe in order to be closer to home. In the historiography, the second wave only starts to gain attention, and although no monograph comparable to that of Martynowych’s pioneer study exists, several articles and article collections give a first insight into Ukrainian life in Canada during the 1920s and 30s. See for example: Serge Cipko, “In Search of a New Home: Ukrainian Emigration Patterns Between the two World Wars,” Journal of Ukrainian Studies 16 (1-2) (1991), 3-27; Gulka-Tiechko, “Ukrainian Immigration;” Brian Osborne, “‘Non-Preferred’ People: Inter-war Ukrainian Immigration to Canada,” in Canada’s Ukrainians, ed. Luciuk, 81-102; John Kolasky, The Shattered Illusion. The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada (Toronto: PMA Books, 1979), page 1-26; Lupul, ed., A Heritage in Transition; Nelson Wiseman, “The Politics of Manitoba’s Ukrainians Between the Wars,” Prairie Forum 12 (1) 1987, 95-119.
96 More background information on these organizations and an analysis of the years leading up to the Second World War can be found in chapter 3.
97 For a distribution of Ukrainians throughout the diaspora, see Ann Lencyk Pawliczko, “Ukraine and Ukrainians throughout the World: An Overview,” in Ukraine and Ukrainians, ed. Ann Lencyk
reflected in the lack of historiography, both concerning the Ukrainian case in particular and the immigration experience in general. This section only presents a short summary of Ukrainian migration to Germany to set the stage for the 1940s, a time that was the busiest era yet of Ukrainians in the country. Before then, the Ukrainian presence in Germany had been rather negligible. Of course, commercial, political, and cultural ties between Ukraine and Germany have existed for centuries, expressed through trade contacts, religious missions in the form of missionary expeditions, extensive travel on both sides, and strategic marriages to enhance dynastic relationships. Early political émigrés such as Pylyp Orlyk or his son Hryhorii attempted to recruit German support for their anti-Russian alliance, and a few Ukrainian students could already be found in German institutions in the 1500s; however, this did not mean the presence of a sizeable group of Ukrainians on German soil. Interest (if often only marginal) in Ukrainian affairs and contact with Ukraine and its people existed throughout the 18th and 19th century and expressed itself especially through travelogues, intensified exchange of goods, and publications dealing with Ukrainian culture, especially with writers such as Taras Shevchenko or Ivan Franko.

Ukraine became politically interesting to Germany during the First World War; an increase in publications dealing with the Ukrainian question is testimony to this, and in 1918 the Central Powers recognized Ukrainian independence. It was also during the First World War that the first ‘wave’ of Ukrainian migrants actually came to Germany, in addition to the existing community of agricultural laborers that had come from Austro-Hungarian Empire for seasonal work. A large

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Pawliczko, 1-33, page 9. In comparison to other European countries such as Belgium or Spain, Germany received still many Ukrainians (25,000).

98 For a soon-to-be published study of the Ukrainian emigration in Germany prior to the Second World War, see Frank Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer 1914-1939, forthcoming.

99 For an in-depth analysis of German-Ukrainian relations, see Beyer Thoma, ed., Bayern und Osteuropa; Hans-Joachim Torke, John-Paul Himka, eds., German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective (Edmonton: CIUS Press, 1994). Dmytro Doroshenko (Doroschenko) presents Ukrainian-German relations mirrored through publications throughout the ages (Dmytro Doroshenko, Die Ukraine und Deutschland: neun Jahrhunderte deutsch-ukrainischer Beziehungen (Munich: Ukrainian Free University, 1994)).

100 For an elaboration of seasonal labor, see Klaus Bade, “Labour, Migration, and the State: Germany from the Late 19th Century to the Onset of the Great Depression,” in Population, Labour, ed. Klaus Bade, 59-85, especially pages 65-72. For example, a larger number of Ukrainians lived in the north of Germany, around Bremen and Hamburg. In 1907 priest Oleskii Baziuk was sent to Bremen to take care of these Ukrainians (Wojtowicz, Geschichte, page 193).
number of them were prisoners of war, and the newly created Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (Bund zur Befreiung der Ukraine, hereafter BBU) conducted extensive educational work in the prisoner of war camps (located in Rastatt, Wetzlar, Salzwedel, and Hannoversch-Münden), hoping to be able to raise a Ukrainian consciousness among the group. The majority of the prisoners returned east, but some remained in Germany, where the group was augmented by Ukrainian students who studied at German universities and exile politicians. As Frank Golczewski points out, those who remained in or came to Western Europe after the First World War were very nationally conscious, educated Ukrainians who valued their heritage.

Ukrainian life in Germany in the interwar period distinguished itself in particular in the realms of academia and publications. Berlin became an important center with eight publishing houses, a large number of Ukrainian students, and the Ukrainian Scientific Institute (Ukrains’kyi Naukovyi Instytut, hereafter USI) located in the city. The USI was financed by the German government and operated between 1926 and 1945. Initially the USI employed primarily followers of Pavlo Skoropadskyi, and its head became historian Dmytro Doroshenko; in 1931, Ivan Mirchuk (Johann Mirtschuk) took over this position. As Golczewski points out, the USI reflected the continuing German interest in Ukrainian affairs. In 1933, the newly organized Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) tried to take over the USI; however, they were not successful in their endeavor. Ukrainian activities also found expression in the “Deutsch-Ukrainische Gesellschaft” (German Ukrainian Society, founded in 1918), which was one of the major associations during the interwar period, along with the Association of Ukrainian Students in Germany (founded in 1921). Political movements were also represented

101 Frank Golczewski, “Die deutsche „Gefangenenarbeit“ mit Ukrainern im Ersten Weltkrieg,” in Lebendige Sozialgeschichte. Gedenkschrift für Peter Borowsky, ed. Rainer Hering, Rainer Nicolaysen (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, Sonderdruck, 2003), 551-572. The BBU originated in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but was transferred to Germany in 1915 because the Austrian government had stopped funding the organization (Golczewski, “Ukrainische Emigration,” page 227f).


103 Golczewski, “Ukrainische Emigration,” page 233f (However, it was important to the Weimar government that this support of Ukrainian affairs did not interfere with German-Soviet relations. Golczewski points out that the USI also had an informal relationship of “mutual trust” with the NSDAP (page 237)). For an elaboration of the Institute’s work, see Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer, Chapter: Die ideologische Entwicklung des Exils.
through organizations such as the *Ukrainska Hromada* (Hetmantsi), the Ukrainian National Alliance (Ukrains’ke Natsional’ne Obiednannia, UNO; OUN affiliate since 1938) or politicians such as Ievhen (Yevhen) Konovalets. Hetman Skoropadskyi resided in Wannsee (close to Berlin) and maintained close contacts to the German authorities, especially to the German Foreign Office (AA).\(^{104}\) In addition to the political and academic sector, Berlin became the cultural center of Ukrainian life in Germany; the city received its first Ukrainian Catholic parish in 1927 and the Apostolic Visitatur in 1940; the latter organized the pastoral care of the many Ukrainian forced laborers during the Second World War.\(^{105}\)

5.3. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalist (OUN) arose from a union of the Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukrains’ka Viikova Orhanizatsiia, UVO) and Ukrainian student organizations; its founding congress took place in Vienna in 1929. The major aim of the organization was to establish an independent, united Ukrainian state. OUN received much of its political stimulation through Italian fascism and engaged in terrorist activities such as the assassination of government representatives. The leadership of OUN was located in Western European cities, whereas some of the younger representatives were involved in activities in Ukraine, concentrated mostly in the west. After the assassination of their leader, Ievhen Konovalets, in 1938, the younger members stationed in Ukraine challenged the more conservative members abroad, thereby plunging OUN into a crisis. Andrii Melnyk was elected as Konovalets’ successor, and a new constitution made him only responsible to “God, the Nation and his own conscience.” The younger members in Ukraine did not acknowledge Melnyk’s leadership and established a

\(^{104}\) Golczewski, “Ukrainische Emigration,” page 232.

Revolutionary section of the in 1940, headed by Stepan Bandera.\textsuperscript{106} The Melnyk section will be referred to as OUN (M), the Bandera section as OUN (B).\textsuperscript{107}

During the war, both sections initially cooperated to a certain degree with the Germans; as Golczewski points out, it was not a question whether cooperation was feasible, but rather to what degree it was employed. However, the OUN (B) proclamation of an independent Ukraine in L’viv (Lemberg) on June 30, 1941, was crushed by the Germans and many of the leading OUN (B) representatives were sent to jail. The Ukrainian National Council (Ukrains’ka Natsional’na Rada), established by the OUN (M) section in Kiev October 5, 1941, was also short lived; like Bandera, Melnyk was sent to a concentration camp.\textsuperscript{108} As a consequence of their imprisonment, the major leaders did not have any direct influence on the developments that took place in the organization. Both the OUN (M) and the OUN (B) underwent changes during the war, drifting away from fascism. In 1942, the OUN (B) formed the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrains’ka povstanska armiia, UPA) by seizing the military unit commanded by Taras Borovets (initially assisted by the OUN (M)). As Yurkevich points out, the circumstances under which the UPA was founded remain debatable even today.\textsuperscript{109} At the third OUN (B) congress in August of 1943, the section established a program that featured aspects such as social services and a call for worker participation and freedom of speech – thereby taking steps towards a more pluralistic stand. The Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (Ukrains’ka Holovna Vyzvolna Rada – UHVR), which was founded in July of 1944, also drew much of its ideology from this newly established platform. The majority of the members of the UHVR belonged to the OUN (B) or UPA, but it also boasted some prominent non-OUN (B) members such as Vasyl Mudryi. Due to ideological differences, the OUN (M) faction did not join the UHVR, despite initial talks. In 1944, leading members such as Bandera were released from prison;

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{107} Some authors also refer to the OUN (B) as the OUN (R), the Revolutionary OUN (a title the OUN (B) held during the war years). After 1946, the OUN (B) outside of Ukraine was also called the ZCh OUN (External Units of the OUN).
\item \textsuperscript{109} Yurkevich, “Ukrainian Nationalists,” page 128.
\end{itemize}
and together with representatives of the UHVR who had made their way to the west, they established the Foreign Section of the OUN (Zarkodonnі Chastyny OUN) and a Foreign Representation of the UHVR (Zakordonne Predstavnystvo UHVR). The Melnyk faction also made its way to Germany, and the presence of both OUSN units would deeply influence life in the DP camps.

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Chapter 2: Ukrainians in the Displaced Persons’ Camps, 1945-1948

1. Introduction

When examining Ukrainians in Canada and Germany after the Second World War, the displaced persons, or the so-called third wave, are an important component of this group. In order to analyze the group of Ukrainian displaced persons who settled in Canada and Germany in the late 1940s, we have to take a closer look at their formative years between 1945 and 1948. Authors agree that the time in the DP camps was “a temporary but crucial transitional stage in the lives of the Ukrainian immigrants, which holds many clues both to their background and to their subsequent adjustment in the new homelands.”¹ Not only had Ukrainians experienced Nazi terror in German slave labor or concentration camps; after the war, the artificial environment of camp life did not end for them. Along with other groups such as Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Poles, and Jews, Ukrainians lived for years in assembly centers under the care of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and later the International Refugee Organization (IRO). Until 1947, the threat of repatriation was an important component of every day life and affected Ukrainians’ actions and attitudes.

1.1. Secondary Literature and Primary Sources

The literature on the topic of DPs is many-fold and takes different aspects into consideration. Volodymyr Maruniak provides one of the earliest studies of Ukrainians during this time period;² unfortunately his book, which provides invaluable statistical data, is not well known beyond the boundaries of Ukrainian studies because it was written in Ukrainian. The article collection The Refugee Experience reached a wider audience and offers insights into political, religious, and educational aspects of camp life as well as the early stages of resettlement in

¹ Ihor V. Zielyk, “The DP Camp as a Social System,” in The Refugee Experience, ed. Wsevolod Isajiw et al., 461-470, page 461. The articles presented in this collection deal with different aspects of Ukrainian DP life and stress the importance of the experience.

the United States and Canada. The majority of the articles is based on Ukrainian sources and focuses on Ukrainian aspects of DP life, only touching on the wider context of UNRRA or IRO operations. Mark Wyman’s study places the Ukrainian experience in a wider context, as the author provides an overview of camp life for all ethnic groups by drawing heavily on oral interviews with former residents. Other studies add yet another perspective by examining the role of the Grand Alliance. Wolfgang Jacobmeyer explores the DP phenomenon through the eyes of the administration; the outside structure and policies provided by the military, UNRRA, and later the IRO receive special attention. To him, DPs lacked first the chances and later the will to take charge of their lives. Due to the nature of the camps and their administrative structure, the DP experience became a phenomenon of ‘outside domination’ (Fremdbestimmung). A recent study by Marta Dyczok at least partially disputes this argument by examining the case of Ukrainians in the context of the Grand Alliance. The author studies the changing attitude of the western coalition towards Ukrainians as well as Ukrainian organizational efforts in Germany and comes to the conclusion that “the refusal of a certain portion of Ukrainian refugees to accept repatriation to countries that denied them basic rights, and their insistence on identifying themselves in terms of nationality rather than citizenship, was a factor that led to the reconsideration of criteria for defining

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3 Isajiw et al., *The Refugee Experience*. UNRRA as an organization does not play a prominent role in this collection of articles.

4 Ihor Stebelsky, for example, is one of the few exceptions worth mentioning (Ihor Stebelsky, “Ukrainian Population Migration after World War II,” in *The Refugee Experience*, ed. Isajiw et al., 21-66).


6 Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter zum Heimatlosen Ausländer. Die Displaced Persons in Westdeutschland 1945-1951* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985). The author focuses on the Polish group and their particularity in the DP context; Ukrainians receive little attention (see pages 75-79). Since Jacobmeyer relies mostly on UNRRA and military sources it is no wonder that the DPs do not have a strong voice in his study. In Germany, Jacobmeyer’s book has remained to this day the major source of reference for historians when dealing with the DP period. In contrast, Jacobmeyer has not received the recognition he deserves in the international discourse on DP studies.

7 Marta Dyczok, *The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). Marta Dyczok does not include Jacobmeyer’s study in her work, which can be seen as one of the shortcomings of the book. Nonetheless, her research is profound and opens up a new perspective on the DP phenomenon, especially since her basic argument stands in contrast to the general statement made by Jacobmeyer. In addition, Dyczok takes Soviet sources into account and discloses what happened to those who returned to the Soviet Union.
The author considers Ukrainian actions in detail and gives the group more credit for actually influencing the allied authorities; in addition, she takes a look at international developments such as the deepening rift between east and west and the evolution of international refugee policies.

The two opposing approaches to the DP phenomenon, embodied by *The Refugee Experience* and Jacobmeyer and Dyczok, draw our attention to an important point. The relief efforts in post-war Germany involved many different groups, such as the military, UNRRA, and later the IRO as well as the DPs themselves. It is important to take all these different sides into consideration in order to reveal existing and changing power structures. Self-representation of Ukrainians at the time as well as interpretation by historians often stress only the initiative taken by Ukrainians themselves, thereby neglecting the efforts made by the authorities. Some authors even take the matter so far as to refer to the camps as “Greek city states” or a “state within a state,” a notion that is often influenced by the self-interpretation of the group at the time. For example, in a short history of the Mittenwald camps from 1947, the Ukrainian leadership gave this overview of community activities and their organization: “Immediately with the beginning of June the Ukrainians who had arrived from Karlsfeld and from Füssen, began to form their own direction together with the Ukrainians of Mittenwald, as they saw that the National Leader alone with his very restricted apparatus and the UNRRA’s not being in the least interested for Camp life, would never be able to bring all branches of the commun [sic] life to a higher level, which is indispensable for a better cultured community.”

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8 Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, page 171.
9 Daria Markus, “Education in the DP Camps,” in *The Refugee Experience*, ed. Isajiw, 185-200, page 194; Vasyl Markus, “Political Parties in the DP Camps,” in *The Refugee Experience*, ed. Isajiw, 111-124, page 115. Another reference that comes close to the city state is the “camp republic” (Stebelsky, “Ukrainians in the Displaced Person Camps after World War II,” *Ethnic Forum* 6 (1-2) (1986), 49-79, page 56. Marta Dyczok also remarks that “some observers have commented that they were able to create a micro-state which extended to most aspects of their lives” (Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, page 138).
10 *Abroad. One year’s work of the Camp of Ukrainian Emigrants (D.P.’s) at Mittenwald. In der Fremde. Ein Jahr Arbeit des Lagers der Ukrainischen Emigranten in Mittenwald* (Mittenwald 1947), page 7 (German version: page 40). This is underlined by a comment made by Doroshenko in which he stressed that all cultural and educational achievements were “due exclusively to Ukrainian immigrants themselves…” (quoted in Markus, “Education,” page 186). An almanac from the camp in Ellwangen also stressed that UNRRA representatives did not extend any material help during
1.2. Method and Outline
This chapter explores the Ukrainian DP experience through the eyes of UNRRA, analyzing what kind of outward representation Ukrainians carried out. UNRRA’s perspective is important because it was the only organization that worked in all three western zones and therefore came in contact with all DPs. The majority of the UNRRA sources are from the United Nations’ Archive in New York. Some UNRRA correspondence is also located at the Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Another international perspective is provided through material from the Ukrainian collection of the CIUS archives in Edmonton, which houses material from the British Allied Forces. The secondary literature on the Ukrainian DP experience helps to situate the UNRRA accounts in the broader context of Ukrainian DP life and will be complemented by collections from the Mittenwald and Regensburg camps, camp publications, and interviews with former Ukrainian camp residents.

The way in which Ukrainians come up in UNRRA sources can tell us something about UNRRA’s attitude towards the group as well as the outward self-presentation of Ukrainians, because officially neither UNRRA nor the military recognized Ukrainians as a separate nationality. From the outset, UNRRA guidelines made it clear that Ukrainians as a group were “not recognized as a nationality and will be dealt with according to the determined nationality status, as ‘Soviet’ nationals or other countries of which they may be citizens, or as stateless persons.” This definition certainly had something to do with the fact that during early attempts of establishing work opportunities in the camps (Odyn rik v tabori El’vangen – Ivileinyi Al’manakh (Ellwangen 1947), page 9f.

11 This does not mean that UNRRA was primarily responsible for the fate of the DPs. The displaced persons operations were dominated by two agencies – the military and UNRRA. UNRRA was dependent on the military, because it was incorporated into the administrative structure of SHAEF and therefore not able to carry out a common strategy in all three western zones (Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, page 33ff). Jacobmeyer sees UNRRA’s ability to operate put to a test due to these circumstances (Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, page 18ff). Nonetheless, UNRRA is interesting in our case because it was the only organization which had employees in all three western zones that came in contact with DPs. Some sources produced by the military will be taken into consideration to back up the argument; however, the focus will be on UNRRA as well as Ukrainian documents.

12 United Nations Archives (hereafter UNA) S 0520-0218, File: F210.2, Germany: Reports, Dispatch of Comments etc., Memorandum from S.K. Jacobs to R.J. Youdin, Subject: Ukrainians, 15 November 1946, page 2; for an elaboration on this topic, see Dyczok, Grand Alliance, page 91ff. As statistics from March 1947 explained, the “displaced persons now reported as ‘Ukrainian’ were previously reported as ‘Polish,’ ‘USSR,’ or ‘Undetermined’” (UNA S 0520-0195, UNRRA 1943-
the summer of 1945 “the situation of Ukrainian refugees was of little interest to Western political leaders” and only received some attention due to the fact that a large number of Ukrainians had come from former Poland and were therefore – in the eyes of the western authorities – not obligated to return, although the Soviet Union demanded their forcible repatriation. Since Ukrainians were officially not acknowledged as a separate nationality but presented themselves as Ukrainians, their case caused some confusion and local authorities often did not know how to deal with them. The confusion in policy towards Ukrainians is reflected in UNRRA sources. In spite of the above-mentioned guidelines, Ukrainians appear again and again in UNRRA documents. It is the aim of this chapter to explore in what context Ukrainians were mentioned in UNRRA sources and what kind of assumptions we can draw from this with regard to changing attitudes of UNRRA. Furthermore, the general development of camp life will be explored through the eyes of UNRRA. This kind of examination adds a valuable perspective to Marta Dyczok’s study because it analyzes the language of the UNRRA reports while taking a closer look at the nature of camp life.

The second part of this chapter deals with UNRRA’s initial relief efforts in Germany and sets the stage for the DP operations. The third part examines the topic of repatriation, whereas the fourth section focuses on the particularities of Ukrainian camp life and their reflection in UNRRA sources. The chapter ends with an evaluation of the importance of the camp period for the Ukrainian displaced persons.

2. UNRRA and the Initial Relief Efforts in Germany

2.1. The Formation of UNRRA

The Second World War uprooted millions of people, and on their advance into war-torn Germany, the Allied Forces were prepared to encounter a large number of so

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14 See also Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, page 48ff.
15 This theory is supported by Marta Dyczok’s research for her book *The Grand Alliance*. Here the author notes: “In some cases, Ukrainians were registered as Ukrainians and referred to as such in field reports and communications, although in reports compiled at the zonal level they were placed in the ‘Stateless Persons’ or ‘Undetermined’ categories” (Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, page 92).
called displaced persons\(^{16}\) (DPs) in Germany – people who were outside the boundaries of their homeland, mostly because they had been forced to work in German concentration or slave labor camps or had fled the advance of the Red Army.\(^{17}\) In fact, the looming refugee crisis had been anticipated early on in the war; in order to deal with these masses of dislocated people, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was formed on November 9, 1943 in Washington. The forty four countries involved planned to render assistance to refugees in war-torn Europe and the Far East.\(^{18}\) They had certain expectations of what the situation would be like in the aftermath of the war, and UNRRA was supposed to follow the military into ex-enemy territory to deal with the masses of displaced persons, thus preventing chaos and the outbreak of epidemics. George Woodbridge rightly points out that one country alone would not have been able to deal properly with the enormous task which the DP operations posed.\(^{19}\) The cooperation between so many different countries is truly remarkable, but also turned out to be problematic, because “as with all international agencies, UNRRA

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\(^{16}\) UNRRA gives the following definition of DP: “Displaced Persons are defined as civilians outside the national boundaries of their country by reason of war, who are (1) desirous but unable to return home or find homes without assistance, (2) to be returned to enemy or ex-enemy territory” (UNA S 0524-0018, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Displaced Persons and Refugees in Germany, Administrative Memorandum (Restricted, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force), Displaced Persons and Refugees in Germany, 18 November 1944). By this definition, German nationals were excluded from UNRRA care.


\(^{19}\) Woodbridge, UNRRA. Vol. I, page 26ff.
was limited in its activities and power by its members’ interests,” especially once the relationship between the Soviet Union and the western members started to deteriorate. UNRRA was a huge bureaucratic organization with people of different backgrounds and ideals working together, and the harsh reality of post-war Germany would put this idealist project to the test. Furthermore, the organization was subordinate to the military, a phenomenon which would hinder the accomplishment of UNRRA’s own goals.

Despite internal and external problems and obstacles, UNRRA brought relief to postwar Europe and initially cared for approximately 8,000,000 displaced persons in Western Germany alone. This number was decimated through a rigid repatriation drive which will be examined in section 3. When the IRO took over the care of the displaced persons in July 1947, an estimated 1,000,000 displaced persons were still left in Germany. 200,000 of them were Ukrainians – a relatively small number compared to the approximately 2 – 3 million Ukrainians among the initial group of displaced persons. The numbers for Ukrainians are vague and often based on estimates due, on the one hand, to the fact that Ukrainians did not identify themselves to UNRRA officials for fear of repatriation, and, on the other, that Ukrainians were not accepted as a separate nationality for a long time. The initial confusion in regards to Ukrainian status was further complicated by the general chaos that dominated the relief efforts during the early postwar months.

20 Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, page 34.
21 Jacobmeyer estimates that there were 8,000,000 DPs in the West German zones. Together with Austria and East Germany (where there was no official recognition of a DP problem) there were altogether 10.8 million displaced persons (Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, page 41f).
22 For a discussion of the statistics of Ukrainians from Ukrainian, UNRRA, and IRO sources, see Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, pages 135-138. The figures provided by the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration (CRUE) were the highest, but Dyczok states that “it is reasonable to accept [these figures] as being the most accurate” (page 137) because the Ukrainian leaders were aware of the widespread fear of identifying oneself as Ukrainian. Furthermore, not all Ukrainians were under UNRRA or IRO care, which led to an incompleteness of the respective sources. Dyczok states that the number of Ukrainians in Germany was most likely closer to 3 million than 2 million (Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, page 44f). Ihor Stebelsky states that some observers of the camp scene were convinced that the numbers of Ukrainians were actually much higher because a lot of them lived in hiding (Stebelsky, “Ukrainians in the Displaced Person Camps,” pages 49-54). Some Ukrainian organization even went so far as to estimate the number of Ukrainians in Germany as 3-4 Million (BFOF, August 14, 1945, WR 2434/48, FO 371/51234, page 1, Ukrainian Relief Committee Belgium, 30 July 1945, here an estimate for July 1945).
2.2. The Early DP Operations and Problems

At the end of the war, UNRRA advanced into ex-enemy territory on the heels of the army, pushing eastward and encountering more and more displaced persons on their way. These early days of the DP operation were characterized by disorder and constant movement. Sometimes camps sprung up out of nowhere, often without a real camp administration. In these early days, the size, quality, and general conditions of the hastily erected camps differed tremendously. Early UNRRA reports give an insight into the situation with which many of the UNRRA welfare workers were faced, and the reports handed in by Team 16 adequately illustrate the gaps between the different camps.

UNRRA Team 16 was on its way east from France in early May 1945 when it encountered its first camp with 2,500 Russians near Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen). These UNRRA employees had anticipated a specific state of affairs when entering Germany: they were expecting to come across dejected and sick people, but instead, according to the report

“we found a fine healthy community who were irresponsible, indulged in murder (and) brewing of illicit liquor…Despite appeals and efforts made by the Military to keep the peace, these people just refused to co-operate and a night and day guard was enforced to restore order. Even this was ignored by people whose fixed ideas were murdering Germans and looting.”

This camp near Aix-la-Chapelle was not an exception. The military and UNRRA frequently encountered DPs who had ‘gone wild,’ who spent the days after the end

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23 During the last months of the war, DPs started to organize themselves in groups to produce weapons and plan and sometimes even carry out murders of despised guards in German slave labor camps (See Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, page 36f). Once the liberating armies advanced, these groups broke out of the structures of their camps in order to take charge of their own lives, often just to end up in another camp structure. Constant movement continued because many of the recently liberated DPs were now looking for surviving relatives all over Germany and Austria (see Wyman, *DP*, pages 55-57).


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of the war indulging in revenge or raids. It was as if the end of the war had released a rage within many forced laborers and concentration camp prisoners. This kind of behavior should be considered in the context of the hardship and torture these people had undergone under German rule. For example, some members of the administration made the connection between poor diet and instances of criminal behavior: “No doubt questions both of personal character and of incentive arise, but the explanation may lie partly in an unduly low diet. It is also said that inadequacy of diet is the main cause of looting and raiding exploits of which one hears much and which give the military serious concern.”25 However, at the time the DPs’ actions astonished the majority of the authorities because they had expected to come across docile ex-prisoners who would be grateful to be released and generally easy to control. Very soon the authorities realized that the DPs and the whole operation were not manageable without problems.26 In addition, many DPs did not trust the new authorities. UNRRA staff encountered “an undernourished lot...[whose] nerves were still shattered by the life they had had under the Nazi yoke;”27 in some cases Ukrainians in particular were singled out as lacking confidence in UNRRA teams.28

It was this distrustful attitude and ‘unleashed’ behavior which bewildered not only UNRRA, but also the military and was often equated with criminal behavior. Not only the authorities were unsettled by the DP ‘outbreaks.’ The German population was – rightfully so – afraid of revenge. Where memories of DPs still exist today in Germany, they are generally connected with notions of looting, murder, and black market activities.29 As Jacobmeyer has shown, when

26 Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, page 29f. For an account of the chaotic last weeks before the end of the war, see Herbert, *Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik*, pages 181-183.
29 Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, “Ortlos am Ende des Grauens: ‘Displaced Persons’ in der Nachkriegszeit,” in *Deutsche im Ausland*, ed. Bade, 367-373, page 368ff. Jacobmeyer points to the fact that the high ratio of criminality was a short-term phenomenon unleashed by the end of the war and the absence of any kind of guiding norms in the immediate post-war period. Furthermore, in comparison to the German population, the number of offenses was not that high and dropped considerably once life in the camps had become stable (Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, page 46-
taking a closer look at the statistics it quickly becomes obvious that the criminality rate of DPs was high right after the end of the war, but sank steadily and soon did not differ from the overall German rate. Nonetheless, in the weeks directly following the end of the war, these kinds of actions perplexed outsiders and complicated organizational efforts undertaken by UNRRA and the military. Team 16 was no exception to the rule.

Overwhelmed by the chaos and the unrestrained displaced persons in Aix-la-Chapelle, the head of Team 16 came to the conclusion that the military would have to take responsibility for this camp while the team continued its search for an opportunity to set up a camp of their own. This is a good example of the constant fluctuation of people – DPs, UNRRA, and military personnel – that dominated the early relief operations and added to the initial problems of organizing the camps.30

Heading further east, Team 16 was soon confronted with problems of their own that substantiated their initial expectations of the DP operations. The next camp they encountered was not only three times the size of the one in Aix-la-Chapelle, but its standards were also very low.

“They are not as healthy as our last DPs as the food position in this area is grave. At Aachen we gave our DPs excellent US rations but here it is doubtful (that) the 2000 calorie standard is being maintained. We are short of everything. There are excellent craftsmen in the camp of every trade and profession but no tools or

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50. For German stereotypes concerning DPs see also page 209f.). Juliane Wetzel agrees with Jacobmeyer and calls the reported looting incidents, which still stick in the memories of many Germans, “exaggerated” and a remainder of Nazi propaganda that was based on a general negative attitude towards “Untermenschen” (Juliane Wetzel, “_Displaced Persons._ Ein vergessenes Kapitel der deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte,” _Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte_ 7-8 (1995), 34-39, page 38). Ulrich Müller takes a contrary position; in his work (which is mostly based on German sources) Germans are presented as victims of criminal behavior of DPs (Ulrich Müller, _Fremde in der Nachkriegszeit. Displaced Persons – zwangsverschleppte Personen – in Stuttgart und Württemberg-Baden 1945-1951_ (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1990). Dealing with the topic of criminal behavior of DPs, the publications by Jacobmeyer and Wetzel give us a deeper insight into the issue as well as a more differentiated view.

30 As one UNRRA report complained “there were three commandants here in one day,” therefore authorities did not have enough time for the proper organization of the camps (UNA S 0520-0113, UNRRA Subject Files, File: Displaced Persons – Germany, UNRRA Weekly Reports (‘Displaced Persons Operations Germany’), Period 3 June to 9 June 1945, From Director of Team 31 to Director, DP Division, ERO, UNRRA, London, 11 May 1945, page 22f). As Jacobmeyer points out, especially in the early months there was no consistent camp administration because many of the camps were solely in the hand of the military (Jacobmeyer, _Vom Zwangsarbeiter_, page 149).
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materials. We need clothes, baby and infant commodities, games, footwear, bedding and in fact anything we can procure. We have improved hospital conditions, sanitation and welfare in general but our needs are very great.”

This account is representative of the tenor that wove itself through the majority of the reports in the aftermath of the war and hints at the huge problems with which UNRRA and the military had to deal in the spring of 1945. During the early stage of the operations, the camps or ‘assembly centers’ were often nothing more than barracks with appalling sanitary conditions. Although some DPs were housed in homes confiscated from the Germans, the majority lived in military barracks (“Kasernen”), quickly built huts, seized castles, or even former slave labor or concentration camps, where the immediate improvement of the sanitary conditions and the connected health of the DPs were at the top of the agenda. UNRRA and the military were afraid that an outbreak of typhus could lead to an epidemic in the camps. DTT dusting was, therefore, on the daily agenda of all the camps, and a medical catastrophe was avoided by the administration.

Problems in the DP camps have to be considered on two levels. There were those inconveniences which existed for all DPs and were the results of the general situation in Germany and the nature of camp life, such as lack of food, poor living conditions, as well as health and psychological problems due to their experience as forced laborers and the monotony of camp life. Then there were problems, such as repatriation, that did not affect all groups equally or those problems which originated from within a group itself, for example, frictions between political or

32 UNA S 0524-0018, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Displaced Persons and Refugees in Germany; Reid, Report on Enquiry into the Provisions made for Displaced Persons in Germany, 24 August 1945, page 1. Marta Dyczok states that the majority of all Ukrainian DPs in Germany lived in camps, whereas half of the Ukrainian DP population in Austria lived in private homes (Dyczok, Grand Alliance, 76f). This trend is reflective of the overall DP population (See for example Wyman, DP, page 43f). The situation was better for those – mostly families – who had the opportunity to live in proper homes. The majority of the authors have concentrated on those DPs who lived in the camps because they were the ones who lived in a very secluded, artificial environment under direct care of UNRRA and later the IRO. Ulrich Müller is one of the few authors who deals with the subject of confiscation of German property for DPs (see for example: Müller, Fremde in der Nachkriegszeit); however, the author does not manage to present a balanced view of the situation.
33 For a more detailed account of this aspect of camp life, see for example Wyman, DP, pages 38-60.
religious factions. We will focus on the latter when dealing with the Ukrainian experience in the camps. However, it is important to see that all DPs, no matter of which ethnic background, initially experienced similar hardships during their stay in the camps. Over time, the situation improved for the residents of most of the camps; and by fall of 1945 the US military, looking back on the recent operations, came to the following conclusion:

“In the early stages, problems of security and policing were of the gravest concern to military authorities. Looting, pillaging and other disorders did take place, the result not only of the natural exuberance of liberation among the displaced persons themselves but of the necessity for not delaying military operations by utilizing vitally needed combat forces to establish immediate controls. During the past two months, all armies have reported a steady improvement in matters of public safety. Scattered incidents still occur, but these are not the rule, and many instances attributed to displaced persons were actually perpetrated by Germans. All camp commanders and team directors agree, however, that the only permanent solution to the problem of public safety is the development of systematic programs for useful employment and leisure time activities.”

The vacuum of administrative structure and guidance, which had existed in the immediate postwar months, was slowly filled by an evolving camp system under the auspices of UNRRA and the military. This can also be seen as a contributing factor in the drop of the criminality rate in and outside the camps. Furthermore, preliminary problems such as a lack of all basic supplies, not to mention any luxury items such as school books or games, could be tackled at least to some extent, but they demanded two things from UNRRA workers and DPs: organizational and improvisational talent. By the end of the summer of ‘45, the initial hardships were surmounted. The camps slowly turned into communities, offering their inhabitants the chance to lead an almost ‘normal’ life. Before delving deeper into camp life, we will turn out attention to an aspect that actually contributed to the stabilization of

34 UNA S 0524-0003, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Displaced Persons, Displaced Persons Operations in Germany and Western Europe (D-Day 1944 to August 1945) by the Operation Analysis Section, Combined Displaced Persons Executive, C/o G-5 Division, USFET Main, 8 August 1945, page 4f.
DP numbers (and with it, DP life) – the repatriation of countless DPs to their country of origin. Repatriation was the one thing which concerned most DPs in one way or another – some because they could not wait to return home, others because they feared nothing more than being repatriated.

3. Repatriation

By the end of May 1946, not more than a year after the end of the war, UNRRA had repatriated 5,888,400 displaced persons from Germany and 718,800 DPs from Austria. Only this act made the ‘management’ of the remaining DPs possible. Repatriation was the priority during the first months following the end of the war; so it is not surprising that during this peak time of the repatriation drive, welfare and recreational activities often took second place. Between May and August 1945, an average of 35,000 people were repatriated on a daily basis, and the military and UNRRA saw the repatriation efforts as “an achievement far beyond the most optimistic early expectations” and as an “outstanding accomplishment.” Indeed, the numbers of repatriates are impressive. But the (at least partial) realization of this initial goals demanded a high price – hundreds of thousands of DPs were repatriated against their will, and this phenomenon especially shaped the lives of many Ukrainians.

3.1. The Initial Stage of Repatriation

Today the topic of repatriation has a bitter aftertaste to it, and many authors deal with the subject of forced repatriation – and rightfully so. Forced repatriation was

35 UNA S 0524-0043, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: ERO-Educational and Recreational Activities in DP Camps in Germany and Austria, Educational and Recreational Activities in UNRRA Displaced Persons Camps in Germany and Austria, 26 October 1946, page 2.
36 UNA S 0524-0003, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Displaced Persons, Displaced Persons Operations in Germany and Western Europe (D-Day 1944 to August 1945), by the Operation Analysis Section, Combined Displaced Persons Executive, C/o G-5 Division, USFET Main, 8 August 1945), page 1.
37 UNA S 0524-0003, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Displaced Persons, Displaced Persons Operations in Germany and Western Europe (D-Day 1944 to August 1945), by the Operation Analysis Section, Combined Displaced Persons Executive, C/o G-5 Division, USFET Main, 8 August 1945, pages 1, 10. Many historians have a differing interpretation of the ‘success’ of this repatriation campaign. Jacobmeyer comes to the conclusion that the initial repatriation efforts failed because the allies managed to repatriate only 80% of all DPs by the fall of 1945 (Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, page 84). Mark Elliott comes to the same conclusion in regard to the Soviet repatriation campaign – the initial goal of total repatriation was not achieved because the Soviet authorities were not successful in inducing people to return (when force was not an option) (Mark Elliott, “The Soviet Repatriation Campaign,” in The Refugee Experience, ed. Isajiw, 342-359).
38 See for example: Mark Elliott, Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America’s Role in their Repatriation (Urbana et al.: University of Illinois Press, 1982); Ulrike Goeken-Haidl,
one of the most negative features of the postwar relief campaign and a great injustice to many people. Nonetheless, one should not forget that repatriation was not necessarily negative in itself. As soon as the war had ended, many of the slave laborers, concentration camp inmates, and prisoners of war, who had been forcibly held on German territory for such a long time, longed to return home. The weeks following the end of the war were dominated by a constant self-repatriation. The urge to ‘just leave’ was strong in many DPs; and although the return to their homeland was the goal of the military and UNRRA, without any regulations this stream of people flocking east and west was bound to cause trouble. Statements such as the following one adequately mirror the chaos of these early days:

“One of the greatest problems at present facing repatriation authorities is that of controlling the movements of displaced persons. The 1st US Army Psychological Warfare Detachment describes this as follows: DPs can be found ‘driving along in captured automobiles or walking, helping themselves to whatever they could find or entering clothing stores to come out with a new Spring outfit, passing out wine and alcoholic beverages to passing tankers, but only after they had imbibed enough to make themselves feel good.’”

Neither UNRRA nor the military were prepared for this kind of traffic, which set in immediately after liberation. Bringing order to this flow of DPs was one of the major goals. Guidelines already established before the end of the war were intended to give the operations structure and direction.


40 See Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, page 37ff. Keeping in mind that the major focus is usually on anti-repatriation activities by displaced persons, it is important to note that the military and UNRRA frequently encountered treks of people heading eastwards, consisting of homeless Germans, but also Poles and Russians (See UNA S 0524-0018, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Displaced Persons and Refugees in Germany, Field Report of Chief UNRRA Liaison Officer to SHAEF, Extracts from report for period 15 to 21 April 1945, page 1).
3.2. Repatriation as one of the Primary Goals

Not UNRRA, but the military was primarily responsible for formulating strategies for the supervision of the DPs. UNRRA had some say in the context of camp administration, but otherwise the Administration was subordinate to the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) since it was built into SHAEF’s structure.\(^{41}\) And SHAEF made it quite clear that “the liberation, care and repatriation of United Nations displaced persons is a major Allied objective. All available resources at the disposal of military commanders will be employed to accomplish it as a direct military responsibility. As soon as military conditions permit, UNRRA will be requested by the Supreme Commander to undertake this responsibility.”\(^{42}\) This strategy had been formulated in 1944, before the encounter with the DPs, and it was maintained throughout the whole period of the UNRRA DP operations.\(^{43}\) Repatriation was considered to be the best solution to the problem posed by the masses of DPs in German territory, and the majority of the available transport facilities were set aside to fulfill this task. However, the authorities would soon run into problems that went beyond lack of transportation or self-repatriation.

3.3. Resistance to Repatriation and International Reactions

Despite lack of transportation and infrastructure, repatriation could have been relatively smooth had it not been for massive resistance on the part of some groups among the displaced persons. Although UNRRA had anticipated that not all DPs would be open to repatriation,\(^{44}\) neither UNRRA nor the military had expected such wide-spread refusal; and the vehemence expressed by many DPs from Eastern Europe astonished the western Allies. Ukrainians were in the forefront of the resistance to anti-repatriation,\(^{45}\) and the following example can give a glimpse into

\(^{41}\) Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, page 33ff.
\(^{42}\) UNA S 0524-0018, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Displaced Persons and Refugees in Germany, Administrative Memorandum No. 39, 18 November 1944. For further interpretation, see also Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, page 30.
\(^{43}\) Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, page 35.
\(^{44}\) As one report stated: “To assume that all displaced persons may desire to return to their countries of origin will undoubtedly prove to be an oversimplification of the problem. Even though nationality may be restored to the stateless, memories of the horrors and privations of expulsion from their home countries will remain” (UNA S 0524-0026, UNRRA-Historian Subject Files, File: Committee on Displaced Persons SE # 9, Statement of the Problem of Displaced Persons, no date given, page 5f).
\(^{45}\) See for example Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, page 76f.
the desperation that many felt. While touring different camps in the British zone, UNRRA officials encountered strong feelings over the issue of repatriation:

“Many of the inhabitants were asked (not in presence of local UNRRA or camp officials) whether they wanted to return to the Ukraine. In each case there was a 100% emphatic no, in some cases an earnest statement that shooting by the British would be preferred. In fact…general feeling was that, much as they hated the Germans, they preferred forced removal and forced labour [by Germans] to staying with the Russians.”

The extreme anxiety that the repatriation drive evoked found an outlet in spontaneous outbursts such as the one cited above, as well as coordinated acts of resistance. In the beginning, independent local refugee committees were created spontaneously in order to appeal to the authorities and stall repatriation. Already during the early stages of getting the community organized, Ukrainian representatives tried to spur cooperation between the different zones in order to register and protect all Ukrainians. These initial steps were viewed with suspicion by the western authorities, and Ukrainians tried to disguise their efforts as simple attempts to create an administrative network. Since Ukrainians had to operate in an alien environment that did not recognize them as a group, the need for a centralized representative body soon became apparent. With the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration (CRUE, Tsentral’ne Predstavnytstvo Ukraïns’koi Emigratsii) that came into being at a Ukrainian congress in Aschaffenburg on October 30 – November 1, 1945, Ukrainians had a

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46 UNA S 0520-0220, UNRRA Subfiles, File: R&W Division Missions, Germany 1946, 400.1, From D.S. Jackling to the UNRRA Zone Director, British occupied zone, UNRRA HQ, Memorandum upon aspects of policy and organisation of the UNRRA Displaced Persons Operation in the British occupied zone, page 19. Dyczok also mentions suicides as the final resort to protest repatriation drives (Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, page 51).

47 Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, pages 66-68. Jacobmeyer points out that Ukrainians were the first group to form national aid committees (Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, page 77f).

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representative body that saw it as one of its major goals to provide legal and moral advice to Ukrainians in Germany and represent their case before the Allied Authorities. The members of the Central Council were elected, but envoys of the church or scholarly institutions were invited as “honorary participants.”

In order to counteract repatriation drives, mass meetings were organized to inform Ukrainians about – and generally protest against – repatriation. An UNRRA account stated that “reports have also been received at Headquarters that Baltic and Ukrainian organizations have used force to prevent the dissemination of repatriation literature and the repatriation of individual displaced persons.” Furthermore, local Ukrainian camp committees submitted complaint letters to Allied authorities in order to make them more sympathetic to their plight. The arguments put forward in these resolutions followed similar lines. In their requests for political asylum, Ukrainians stressed a deep belief in human rights and democracy as well as strong anti-fascist sentiments as their motivation for appealing to the authorities. The local Ukrainian representatives characterized Ukrainians as a group of convinced democrats who were unwilling to return “home” because freedom of speech, religious expression, and all other democratic rights were suppressed in the Soviet Union. These resolutions reveal the existence

founded as an apolitical organization that was meant to coordinate Ukrainian cultural life and represent Ukrainian displaced persons.

49 Ciuciura, “Common Organizational Efforts,” pages 95-97; Zelenets’kyi, Na hromads’kii nyvi, page 10; Dyczok, Grand Alliance, pages 78-80, 83. Initially the congress ran into problems because Ukrainians were not allowed to organize themselves; eventually, UNRRA helped to make the meeting possible. Some Ukrainians were opposed to the formation of an umbrella organization, fearing that it would expose them more easily to the Soviet officials.

50 LAC RG 26 Vol. 121 File: 3-32-2, vol.1, UNRRA, the Central Committee of the Council, from the Director General to the Central Committee, Subject: Progress and Problems of Spring Repatriation Drive, 12 June 1947, page 5. Another report stated: “Anti-repatriation activities in Germany emanate from nationalist organizations which have unlimited resources to publish anti-repatriation propaganda and to carry out other activities and have great influence in the camp life of UNRRA centers. Unlike accredited home-government liaison officers, these organizations circulate freely in Germany and all of them have direct relations with nationalist groups and organizations in England, Canada, and the U.S.A.” (UNA S 0520-0221, UNRRA Subject Files, 400.52 Germany Sub. repatriation, Activities - Polish Civil Guards, Anti Repatriation Activities in Germany, page 1).


52 See for example: Letter from Ukrainian DPs, UNRRA camp Mannheim to the PM of the British Empire, 10 October 1946; Resolution from Ukrainian DP at Dorsten/Westphalia, 13 October 1946 (403 residents present); Resolution by Residents of Camp Velbert, assembled during Protesting Meeting, 12 October 1946; Resolution from Ukrainian Residents in Ludendorff Kaserne, Dusseldorf, 10 October 1946 (Protest Meeting, 650 residents present). All these resolutions can be found in BFOF, November 20, 1946, WR 3460/23/48, FO 371/57751. It is interesting to note that the resolution from Camp Velbert and Camp Ludendorff Kaserne have the same wording which
of group consciousness on the part of Ukrainians (“we as Ukrainians”), and an awareness of the danger of their situation. They had to react because they faced repatriation, but, despite imminent danger, they identified themselves as Ukrainians.\(^{53}\) Ukrainian representatives sent appeals and resolutions to a variety of western leaders and their allies; however, the most successful were those sent to local authorities who were in direct contact with the dilemma of the displaced persons.\(^{54}\) The anti-repatriation campaigns put Ukrainians on the map and brought them into UNRRA reports because they identified themselves and were consequently identified as Ukrainians.\(^{55}\)

Through anti-repatriation campaigns Ukrainians not only made their way into UNRRA reports, but also added to their segregation from other groups. Ukrainians’ fervent refusal to be repatriated had an influence on other camp residents, such as Poles; and UNRRA and the military decided quite early to separate Ukrainians so that their anti-repatriation propaganda would not interfere with the repatriation drive.\(^{56}\) To combat anti-repatriation movements in the camps, segregation according to opinion and nationality was seen as the best solution\(^ {57}\) – and this categorization opened the door for separate Ukrainian camps and thus an unofficial recognition of ‘Ukrainian’ as a separate nationality. And, as Jacobmeyer points out, “once created, this national validation of the Ukrainian DPs could not be

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\(^{53}\) A generalization like this can be made due to the fact that several hundreds of Ukrainians signed these resolutions (see for example footnote 53). In the case of camp Lyssenko, 2320 Ukrainians could be motivated to sign a resolution that protested against the removal of 1000 Greek-Catholics from the camp (S 0524-0108, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Term Actions, British Zone DP BR 286, Appeal to the Brigade General of UNRRA, from residents of Camp Lyssenko, Hanover, 21 December 1946).

\(^{54}\) Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, page 68f.

\(^{55}\) For example, when talking about typical incidents of anti-repatriation movement by the “four major nationalities,” Ellwangen is given as a typical example of “Banderist,” i.e. “Ukrainian,” activities (UNA S 0520-0221, File: UNRRA Subject Files, 400.52 Germany Sub. Repatriation, Activities – Polish Civil Guards, One Typical Incident of Four Major Nationalities). For another reference to Ukrainians as one of the major nationalities involved in anti-repatriation campaigns, see: LAC RG 26 Vol. 121 File: 3-32-2, Vol.1, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Central Committee of the Council, from the Director General to the Central Committee, Subject: Progress and Problems of Spring Repatriation Drive, 12 June 1947, page 4f.

\(^{56}\) Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, page 78f.

\(^{57}\) LAC RG 26 Vol. 121 File: 3-32-2, vol.1, UNRRA, the Central Committee of the Council, from the Director General to the Central Committee, Subject: Progress and Problems of Spring Repatriation Drive, 12 June 1947, page 5.
reversed. Furthermore, it also accelerated the decomposition of interest in repatriation by other national groups...It was a consequential error to believe one could isolate a group according to one’s own will without causing a rupture in the system."\(^{58}\)

However, as advantageous as segregation was for Ukrainians, it also led to complications, because the authorities still attempted to separate Ukrainians from former Poland and Ukrainians from the USSR.\(^{59}\) This threat of separation within the Ukrainian group prompted Ukrainian representatives to represent their group as united, as being part of one nation. CRUE for example made it clear to the authorities that “Ukrainians were all part of one national group and should be allowed to live together.”\(^{60}\) When Greek-Orthodox residents from camp Lyssenko were threatened with removal, both denominations joined together and wrote a protest note to UNRRA, in which they asked not to be separated because “we Greek-Catholics and Orthodox, members of one nation, lived one with another in concord and peace and are doing the same now.”\(^{61}\) Apart from officially protesting repatriation, submitting resolutions or destroying literature about the home countries, Ukrainians from East and West worked together in other ways to counteract the Allies’ repatriation drive. Since Ukrainians from western Ukraine could legally not be forced to return, many fake identities were created in the camps. In order to save their counterparts from the east, Ukrainians from western Ukraine taught their them all about their home villages and towns so that these eastern Ukrainians could pose as western Ukrainians during screening interviews.\(^{62}\)

\(^{58}\) Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, page 78.
\(^{59}\) Marta Dyczok points out that DPs were segregated (from Soviet Nationals) due to the dispute between the West and the Soviet Union in regards to the definition of Soviet citizens. The author further stresses that great care was given to the determination of nationality (Dyczok: *The Grand Alliance*, pages 47f, 142f).
\(^{60}\) Dyczok, *The Grand Alliance*, page 143.
\(^{61}\) UNA S 0524-0108, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Term Actions, British Zone DP BR 286, Appeal to the Brigade General of UNRRA, from residents of Camp Lyssenko, Hanover, 21 December 1946, page 1. One of the major arguments was that camp life would be interrupted and all the institutions that had been established would be destroyed. Furthermore, the residents promised to live together in harmony and to help one another. CRUE also protested against attempts to split up the Ukrainian community (see for example: Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, page 143).
\(^{62}\) See for example: Zelenets’kyi, *Na hromads’kii nyvi*, page 11; Interviews 29, 7, 16. It was quite a common occurrence that Soviet citizens changed their name and identity in order to slip through screening processes (Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, pages 64, 140f; Elliott, *Pawns*, page 172f).
Screening took place in the context of repatriation and was meant to answer three questions: how many DPs were still theoretically eligible for repatriation, whether there were war criminals and quislings among them, and who of the remaining DPs was still eligible to hold DP status. Once resettlement was put at the top of the agenda in 1947, screening also served as a tool to uncover whether the applicants fit the immigration countries’ requirements. DPs had to fill out questionnaires and face an interrogation by a screening board with both western and Soviet representatives, sometimes several times, until the authorities were satisfied they had gained enough information. Although not officially admitted, screening was used as a means to persuade (or rather pressure) DPs to be repatriated – however, for the most part unsuccessfully. As the topic of repatriation had already done, screening evoked protest among Ukrainians in Germany as well as in the diaspora. As the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration stated, their representatives wrote memoranda to US and British governments as well as the Allied Headquarters in which they protested against screening measures, especially when they were carried out either by Soviet officials or in the presence of Soviet officials. The organization also translated screening questionnaires, which were usually in English, to make Ukrainians aware of ambiguous questions. Furthermore, screening procedures were sometimes interrupted or even made impossible by spontaneous demonstrations and disruptions in the camps. For example, in Mittenwald a Soviet repatriation mission was attacked with bricks when they attempted to enter the camp. Although screening added to the psychological burdens of the displaced persons, it also contributed to a corroboration of their status. Once the DPs had successfully passed

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63 For an overview of screening in all three zones, see Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, pages 103-114.
64 Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, page 139ff.
65 For reference to the American zone, see Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, page 108. For the British zone, see page 110f. See also Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, page 122.
66 The reaction of the Ukrainian diaspora will be examined in depth in chapter 4.
67 Zelenets’kyi, *Na hromads’kii nyvi*, pages 24-26. See also Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, pages 140-142. CRUE credits the wide range of Ukrainian efforts with having changed international attitudes in regards to screening. However, it is primarily the deteriorating relationship between the East and the West that has to be taken into consideration.
the screening, they felt themselves to be ‘bona fide’ DPs and their resistance to the Soviet authorities received further validation in their own eyes.  

While the western authorities initially did not comprehend the extent of resistance displayed by eastern Europeans, the Soviet Union was not willing to accept it. Their official explanation was that all those people who refused repatriation were war criminals who had to be put on trial in the Soviet Union. However, pursuing war criminals was not the major driving force behind the Soviet activity in the repatriation campaign. According to Mark Elliott, the Soviet authorities saw the few hundred thousand non-returnees as an embarrassing defeat. These people jeopardized the credibility of Soviet propaganda and added to the ranks of anti-communist political émigrés in the west. Furthermore, the Soviet Union needed a huge labor force to deal with its postwar problems, another reason for the vigorous implementation of the Soviet repatriation campaign. The Yalta agreement had provided the legal basis for this step, and the Leipzig Agreement (22 May 45) regulated the return of Soviet citizens and made it top priority. As Jacobmeyer rightly points out, the desire of the western powers to ensure the safe return of their military personal led to this decision in regard to repatriation.  

The Soviet Union demanded that all their citizens be returned home, by force if necessary. In the months following the end of the war, one of the greatest rifts that arose between the Soviet Union and the western Allies was over the question of who was considered to be a Soviet citizen, since there had been no definite agreement on the Soviet Union’s western borders at the time of the Yalta agreement. The Soviet Union wanted to extend the definition to those regions which it had incorporated due to the war, such as the Baltic republics and western Ukraine. Although the allied authorities did not accept this interpretation, in the

70 Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, page 54f.
73 Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, pages 59-64.
75 “Whereas the Soviet Union insisted that all people originating from areas within their new borders were Soviet citizens, and were thus subject to forcible repatriation under the Yalta accords, the Western Allies refused to repatriate forcibly people who had not been Soviet citizens before the
early months after the end of the war thousands of Baltic citizens and western Ukrainians were forcibly removed from Germany. Sometimes Soviet officials convinced western authorities that these people were Soviet citizens, and in some cases people were even kidnapped in order to be returned. Those western Ukrainians as well as Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians who had managed to escape the early repatriation drives by the Soviets were not forced to return, and this policy was slowly applied to bona fide Soviet citizens as well. Although the western authorities had an interest in returning DPs as quickly as possible, the resolute opposition displayed by these people had an effect over time. Officially, forcible repatriation was abandoned in the US zone by the end of 1945; practically, however, it continued into May of 1946. The British authorities were a bit slower in reacting on the DPs’ refusal to be repatriated. They declared on July 8, 1946 that only three categories of Soviet citizens would be forcibly repatriated – those who had been captured in German uniforms; soldiers, who had been serving in the Red Army on June 22, 1941 and who had not been demobilized; and those who evidently gave “aid and comfort” to the enemy. However, when these official measures came into force, the majority of DPs from Eastern Europe had already been repatriated to a fate that often included death, recruitment into the Red Army, or forced labor. Even those who were allowed to return home generally faced deprivation and discrimination due to their status as former displaced persons. Taking these fates into consideration, it becomes obvious why those in charge of repatriation gained a bad reputation.

3.4. UNRRA and Forced Repatriation

Although the goal of repatriation had initially been formulated by SHAEF, it was UNRRA that had to execute this policy. UNRRA’s role is important in this context,
because its involvement in the repatriation campaign aroused suspicion among contemporaries and historians alike. An internal contemporaneous observer, Marvin Klemme, complained that UNRRA was overstaffed with “Communists, aliens and Jews.” Accusations like these were widespread at the time, as a statement by the Director General of UNRRA concerning the ‘abuse’ of his organization shows. Looking back on two years of operations in the summer of 1947, the Director General defended the work of his employees, stressing that UNRRA had “consistently encouraged voluntary repatriation for those who are not in political conflict with the government of their country,” but that it had not used force in order to encourage repatriation. So what was UNRRA’s approach towards DPs and repatriation, and how can the steps and measures it took be explained?

As unclear as the situation was on an executive level as to who was repatriable and who was not, so diverse were the reactions to repatriation on the administrative level. UNRRA reports show that a variety of methods were employed to deal with the responsibility of repatriation. From the outset, the mandate was quite evident. Resolutions passed in August 45, March 46, and August 46 clearly stated that it was UNRRA’s primary duty to actively encourage repatriation, spread information about the countries of origin, work closely with liaison officers, and remove those agencies that discouraged repatriation. And many teams complied with this mandate to a high degree, which sometimes

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79 For example, Lubomyr Luciuk points out “repeated charges of sovietophilism against some UNRRA team members” and stresses in his presentation UNRRA’s support of repatriation (Luciuk, Searching for Place, page 138, also page 404, FN 138).
80 Klemme, The Inside Story of UNRRA, page 4f. General enthusiasm was often interpreted as pro-Communism, especially by Klemme who was highly suspicious of any sort of idealism (see for example pages 1-14).
resulted in bad press. For example, looking back on its operations from 1945-47, the historical outline of District 5 states:

“Repatriation in the 5th District was always the No. 1 priority commitment. It was continuously emphasised to all personnel that their primary and chief concern was repatriation and every effort must be made to encourage repatriation. A very extensive segregation programme was instituted and vigorously carried throughout the functioning of District 5. To a very great extent this prejudiced the operation, demoralised personnel and resulted in adverse publicity. There were accusations of communist sympathies, accusation of ruthlessness and accusation by the Army of various types resulting from the intensified repatriation programme which was considered to be the policy of the Administration.”

The actions of UNRRA employees must be considered from different perspectives. UNRRA was basically caught between a rock and a hard place. The major aim of this organization was the repatriation of the displaced persons, and repatriation itself had to take place within the framework of international agreements such as those of Yalta or Leipzig. And although UNRRA’s mandate was to encourage, but not force repatriation, the line between the two was rather thin. Furthermore, UNRRA was subordinate to the military, whom it felt was using ‘club law’ in some cases, thus leaving UNRRA rather helpless. Nonetheless, different local UNRRA officials reacted in various ways to the challenge of repatriation and the resistance displayed by the camp residents. Marta Dyczok states that some western officials even helped Soviets to ‘kidnap’ DPs, but stresses on the other hand that many also

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84 Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, pages 90-92, 149f.
85 Jacobmeyer illustrates the struggle between UNRRA and the military with the example of the screening process. When UNRRA gave up its resistance to the screening process in March 1947 and went along with it, the military had changed its mind, giving the DPs grounds for allegations against UNRRA (Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, pages 114-116). UNRRA officials saw the problem between UNRRA and the military as a very common one and as “a question of personalities more than anything else.” In order to combat this problem, one report recommended training in military relationships for civilian UNRRA employees (LAC MG 31 K 9 Vol. 20, File: UNRRA: Reports, Correspondence 301, Rutherford, Report on Trip to the Field (American Zone), December 6-13, pages 3, 5).
came to the rescue of DPs,86 which was not unusual. Help and compassion for the DPs on the part of UNRRA as well as the military was fuelled by the strong resistance and obvious desperation displayed by those threatened with repatriation.87

Personal opinion certainly also played a role when repatriation was enforced, but it does not necessarily have to have been stout pro-Communism which made UNRRA officials react the way they did. Indeed, some officials might have been convinced that return was the best possible solution. At the time, “the desire to secure international stability, ensure good relations among members of the Grand Alliance, and proceed with economic reconstruction” was considered more important than the interests of displaced persons. Therefore, repatriation was believed to be the best solution for the displaced millions in Central Europe,88 especially since resettlement options were not yet available. In addition, many officials were convinced that countries such as Poland or the USSR in general needed more people – especially young people – for the rebuilding process.89

Although some UNRRA employees might have been genuinely convinced that repatriation was a good step, others might have come to that conclusion due to the stress they faced in their position. Many of the UNRRA employees had not experienced the war first-hand and were therefore shocked when faced with the conditions in Germany. Those who were confronted with concentration camp survivors often found that “it hardly seemed real” to witness all the remainders of Nazi horror.90 For many it was “hard to see so much hardship and suffering about them and be unable to relieve it.”91 Bad conditions in the camps added to the initial trauma of the DP experience, especially when UNRRA employees themselves had to live under them. As one observer remarked, UNRRA personnel were “working under the most trying conditions and most primitive living arrangements. Hot water

86 Dyczok, Grand Alliance, page 53f.
87 See here Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, pages 132-142.
88 Dyczok, Grand Alliance, page 43.
90 UNA S 0524-0018, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Displaced Persons and Refugees in Germany, Field Reports of Chief UNRRA Liaison Officer to SHAEF, Extracts from Report for period 15 to 21 April 1945, page 2.
is a luxury and sanitation facilities are most elementary. Their hours of sleep are most irregular, as displaced persons may be transported in on them at all hours of the night. Days off are unknown to them…Complete isolation is their lot – yet never a complaint did I receive. Their utter devotion to their work and to UNRRA objectives is what carries them along.”92 However, devotion and enthusiasm had their limits. Time in the camps took a toll on the authorities as well as the residents,93 and to many UNRRA officials repatriation seemed the one logical solution. Although stress and mistaken assessments are poor justifications for sending people to an uncertain destiny, they can at least serve as an explanation that goes beyond the argument of pure pro-communism. Furthermore, closer study has shown that UNRRA was a diverse organization with discrepancies in official policy and implementation at local levels. A comprehensive study of UNRRA has yet to be written, and an analysis of its policies and their implementation could shed further light on this matter.

3.5. Pressure and Incentives as Means to Spur Repatriation

Once force was no longer employed as a means of repatriation (that is by the end of 1945/early 1946), the authorities had more subtle ways of “persuading” DPs to return home. In order to enforce repatriation, any kind of anti-Soviet propaganda was forbidden, no permission was granted to those organizations which intended to help people who had refused to be repatriated,94 and the latter were also disqualified from any further assistance.95 Soviet officials especially complained about the activities of “so-called Ukrainian organisations” and UNRRA issued orders that “we should not recognize any such organisations.”96 And there were a

93 Wyman speaks of a “burn-out” syndrome among some of the voluntary workers and UNRRA officials (Wyman, DP, page 129f). For an example of exhaustion from the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Mission, see Luciuk, Searching, page 178f.
94 Dyczok, Grand Alliance, page 91ff.
95 Dyczok, Grand Alliance, page 75f.
96 Quoted in Dyczok, Grand Alliance, page 49.
wide variety of Ukrainian organizations, dealing with cultural and religious issues as well as medical care. Some, like the Ukrainian Red Cross, were not officially recognized and had to work without the help of a wider network. But even worse, at the end of the summer of 1945 the same organization was broken up due to demands made by the Soviet government. As another example, the CRUE had to operate as an unrecognized, non-permitted organization until the IRO took over DP operations in 1947. Education programs suffered the same fate and were unable to generate any financial assistance from the international community. Officials discussed whether recognition should be granted to these groups. On the one hand, these organizations were not officially acknowledged in order to avoid conflicts with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, officials realized quite quickly that these groups often did valuable work. Therefore, on a local level they were often recognized or at least not prohibited from reaching out to the community.

Apart from restricting – or at least hampering – relief efforts for those who refused repatriation, other aspects of camp life were sometimes altered to spur the urge to ‘return home.’ DPs were often moved from camp to camp in order to make camp life less appealing. Some officials considered the opportunities offered in the camps to be too attractive; the high quality of the schooling was held responsible for the refusal of so many DPs to return home, and consideration was given to closing schooling facilities in those camps where the majority of the residents were considered to be repatriable. However, as one report states, this “was never accomplished nor admitted.”

Although no restrictions were imposed on cultural activities in the camps, other methods were employed to exert pressure on DPs such as the abovementioned screening process. When negative reinforcement was unsuccessful, positive propaganda about the homeland as well as food and monetary compensation were used to persuade people to return east. In order to spur repatriation, Soviet officials especially wanted to awaken homesickness in

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97 Dyczok, Grand Alliance, page 79f; Wojtowicz, Geschichte der Ukrainisch-Katholischen Kirche, page 139.
98 Dyczok, Grand Alliance, pages 80f, 94-97. However, Dyczok points out that CRUE received some UNRRA recognition on local levels (page 95f).
These different approaches to repatriation show that there were various ways of dealing with the phenomenon. Authorities used force and persuasion, bribery and protection in their treatment of the DPs; but nonetheless, not everybody returned. Once the authorities realized this, another tactic in dealing with the remaining DPs had to be found.

3.6. From Repatriation to ‘Maintenance’

Within a few months after the end of the war it became obvious that the DP problem would not be easy to solve. Repatriation came to a halt with the early onset of winter in 1945 and never resumed its full capacity. Although UNRRA’s aim officially remained repatriation, adjustments had to be made to the actual situation in the camps. Remarks in the “Report and Recommendation on UNRRA Programme for DPs in Germany” in October 1946 revealed the transformation of UNRRA’s priorities. Reviewing the past actions taken in regard to DPs in Germany, the report stated that “in general, it appears that concentration in the field in the past year has understandably been on the maintenance of displaced persons. As a result, no emphasis had been laid on implementation of UNRRA policy and therefore, our programme needs basic re-adjustment and re-orientation.” Especially the language used in this report suggests a change in DP care – suddenly ‘maintenance’ was the major focus of DP care; repatriation had been pushed to the background and was never truly resumed. As another report

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100 LAC RG 26 Vol. 121, File 3-32-2, vol.1, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Central Committee of the Council, letter from the Director General to the Central Committee, Subject: Progress and Problems of Spring Repatriation Drive, 12 June 1947, pages 1-5. See also: Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, pages 90ff, 103-114, 116-121. Jacobmeyer comes to the conclusion that authorities both in the British and US zone tried to rigorously lower the number of DPs (page 114). See also: Elliott, “Soviet Repatriation Campaign,” page 351ff. “Persuasion” was not only extended to adults. The UNRRA closure report on unaccompanied children states that the number of Polish teens was considerably lowered by “making available reliable information about Poland today” which was especially directed at those teens who were unwilling to go back (UNA S 0524-0018, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Germany (C.H.Q.), Closure Report on United Nations’ Unaccompanied Children in Germany, June 1947, page 39).

101 UNA S 0524-0043, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: ERO Relief Service (Health and DPs) Overall Org. Structure + Control of Operation #12, Report and Recommendation on UNRRA Programme for DPs in Germany by R. Radin, Chief of Consultants Branch, Welfare and Repatriation Division, to Miss S. Gifford, Director, Welfare and Repatriation Division, 10 October 1946.
stated in retrospect, UNRRA’s number one policy had become to “help the people help themselves.”

Although the authorities’ attitude towards repatriation had changed by 1946, it had lasted long enough to have had a serious impact on DPs. Repatriation had altered the lives of millions of people, many of whom were returned to their country of origin against their will. For many Ukrainians repatriation had been like the sword of Damocles hanging over their heads, and the threat only truly ceased once the IRO took over the DP operations in the summer of 1947. Furthermore, forced repatriation had shattered the DPs’ trust – which had been minimal from the outset – in the western allies and their values. To quote Jacobmeyer, DPs “had once more experienced – a direct continuation of their encounter as forced laborers – the brittleness of their existence. And therefore it is more than comprehensible that they tried to understand their world more according to the norm of direct personal advantage.” The danger of repatriation intimidated some into hiding, but many also stood up for themselves and declared again and again that they did not consider themselves to be Soviet citizens and that they did not want to return to their country of origin as long as it was under Soviet rule. Signs of resistance were not only evident in the context of the repatriation campaign, but also permeated the cultural level.

4. Community Life

The rigid repatriation drive that dragged thousands from their midst was a major threat for Ukrainians, and the fact that they were not recognized as a separate nationality made lobbying for the group’s wellbeing so much harder. On a local level, Ukrainians were faced with yet another paradox: On the one hand they were not recognized as a separate nationality; yet the DP camps – islands of stability and prosperity in the midst of an ex-enemy country – offered them an environment where they could unfold (and in some cases even discover) their cultural heritage and, more importantly, pass it on to their children. As a result, their “Ukrainianess”

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102 UNA S 0524 - 0105 (44-47), UNRRA - Historian Subject Files, Report histories of individual camps, DP US 30, A History of an Ukrainian Camp by W. V. Buckhantz, Director. UNRRA D.P. Assembly Center Ellwangen (Jagst), Germany, from February 1946 to February 1947, page 5.
103 Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, pages 52ff, 75.
104 Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, page 152.
permeated all levels of camp life, and an examination of the UNRRA documents will show how they managed to make their way into UNRRA reports as a separate nationality – despite the fact that they were not recognized as such. Hence the development of a stable camp life will be examined through the eyes of UNRRA with reference to the existing secondary literature.

4.1. Camps Evolve into Communities

The focus of this examination will be on the period between 1945-1948, thereby only briefly touching upon the IRO period. As Lubomyr Wynar points out, the period from 1948 to 1952 was one of exodus for thousands of Ukrainians leaving ex-enemy territory for the US, Canada, or Australia, and the early months of 1945 were dominated by chaos, movement and (forced) repatriation. Therefore, the period from late ‘45 to early ‘48 can be seen as the formative period for the DPs. It was a time when camps turned into communities with a remarkable degree of organizational efforts, but also faced problems of control and fights over leadership. Generally, these years are also considered the most important period by the community itself, and scholarly studies also concentrate on this phase.

Once the numbers of displaced persons had been drastically reduced due to repatriation, an intensified community life became possible. Nonetheless, the circumstances in Germany still demanded creativity and management skills, and not only from UNRRA’s workforce. The evolution of camp life depended heavily on the efforts of the DPs themselves. Reports show an appreciation for the

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motivation which the DPs displayed as well as the work which they carried out. The following memo directed to the UNRRA Council can serve as an example:

“The thing that continues to amaze one in liberated Europe is the energy and spirit with which people are taking up work surrounded by every privation and hardship. Civil servants, teachers, voluntary workers sat in icy rooms and worked through the day on a slim breakfast with cold homes and an inadequate supper to look forward to. It would have been unnatural if they did not show signs of strain: but what is surprising is the degree to which they can abstract their minds from food and fuel. They are eager to know what is being said, written and thought in the world outside.”107

This report hints at some characteristics of DP life. Many of the inhabitants were very young and eager to work; they wanted to take charge of their lives but were often slowed down by outside circumstances such as the lack of fuel, firewood, tools, and employment opportunities. The standards of living in most camps were low, and the food shortage especially took its toll on the residents. Furthermore, the camp environment was very isolated and artificial, and displaced persons often did not come into direct contact with the outside world.108 They built ‘little communities’ of their own and a contributing factor to this development was the segregation of DPs according to ethnicity.

As a consequence of Ukrainian opposition to repatriation and the authorities’ eagerness to shield other DPs’ from this influence, Ukrainians ended up with camps of their own – or at least camps where they dominated – throughout Germany. The largest number of Ukrainian camps and the largest camps in both size and exclusiveness could be found in the American zone in the south of Germany where 104,024 Ukrainians resided in March of 1946, followed by the British zone with 54,580 Ukrainians.109 These numbers were further augmented

107 LAC R 9369 Vol. 2, File: 10, UNRRA Council 1946, Report 1 April 1946, page 7. One has to keep in mind that high levels of enthusiasm were wide-spread, however, that one could also encounter the opposite trend – complete apathy – especially among the older residents for whom adjustments was very hard (Wyman, *DP*, page 106ff).
through a constant influx of Ukrainians from Austria into Western Germany. The French zone had hardly any Ukrainians to begin with⁻ and no Ukrainian-specific camps. In the British zone, camp “Lyssenko” near Hannover was the biggest Ukrainian camp with more than 3,000 people. In the American zone the camps in Aschaffenburg, Munich, Regensburg, and Mittenwald stood out with more than 4,000, and in some cases even 5,000 residents. Often these camps had Ukrainian names, such as Camp Orlyk or Camp Lyssenko, which implied the existence of a ‘little Ukraine’ within the borders of Germany¹¹² and made their way into UNRRA reports as Ukrainian specific camps.¹¹³ As a result of this segregation, many of the camps were almost uniform in their make-up, and this situation promoted the emergence of camp life along ethnic lines. Furthermore, the high level of activity in the camps was encouraged by the make up of the group, and it is here that Ukrainians correspond with the wider group of the displaced persons. A common attribute of the DP population was their age – the majority of these people were very young. UNRRA gives the following statistics in regard to DPs and their age distribution:

American government was considered to be the most moderate one in regards to repatriation and non-returnees (Dyczok, Grand Alliance, pages 69, 76f).


¹¹¹ Stebelsky, “Ukrainians in the Displaced Person Camps,” pages 50f, 57-59 (For a complete list of camps with Ukrainian population both in the British and the US zone, see tables 7 and 8).

¹¹² Pylyp Orlyk was the leader of the ‘first generation’ of political émigrés who fled their homeland after Mazepa’s failed attempt to break away from Russia in 1708/9. Orlyk and some of his followers wandered across Europe for decades, issuing warnings to governments about the ‘Russian menace’. The close identification of many Ukrainians with Orlyk and his group is grounded in the latter’s strong anti-Russian feeling combined with a dedication to self-determination. This feeling found expression in the name of DP camps (Camp Orlyk in Bavaria), newspapers (Journal Orlyk in Berchtesgaden) and dance groups (Group Orlyk (Manchester), founded in 1949), (Orest Subtelny, “Ukrainian Political Refugees: An Historical Overview,” in The Refugee Experience, ed. Isajiw, 3-20, page 4, also Footnote 4). In some cases Ukrainians residents of Ukrainian-dominated camps also renamed streets in honor of Ukrainian poets or intellectuals (Interview 33).

¹¹³ See for example: UNA S 0524-0105, UNRRA 1944-1947, UNRRA – Historian Subject Files, Report histories of individual camps, DP US 30, A History of an Ukrainian Camp by W.V.Buckhantz, Director. UNRRA DP Assembly Center Ellwangen (Jagst), Germany, from February 1946 to February 1947. (Initially, the camps had been inhabited by Balts and Ukrainians. The bulk of the Balts had been dispersed in other national camps which left Ellwangen with a clear majority of Ukrainians (roughly 3,000) (page 1)); UNA S 0524-0108, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Photograph Album, Ukrainian Camp Lyssenko, Hannover, 1947.
The group of adults is rather big and can be further broken down by adding IRO statistics. When the IRO succeeded UNRRA in the administration of the camps, they found that more than a quarter of all DPs were under the age of 17 and 61.2 percent were between the ages of 18 to 45, the working years. Overall Ukrainian statistics for that time period as well as camp specific data (here the example of camp Jägerkaserne in Mittenwald, a large Ukrainian camp in the American zone), show that the age distribution was similar among Ukrainians. Taking IRO and UNRRA as well as Ukrainian statistics together, we can safely say that roughly a quarter of the camp residents were minors – they had either been forced to work in Germany at a very young age or they were born in the camps. This phenomenon can be explained by Herbert’s estimation that more than half of all forced laborers were young women, many of whom had children. In addition, a high death rate in the Nazi-camps, especially in the concentration camps, guaranteed that often only young, strong people survived.

4.2. Children in the Camps and the Question of Educating the Youth

For those who had lived through the horrors of the Nazi Regime, the children became the focus of their lives. As one YMCA employee reported to UNRRA:

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114 S 0524-0043, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: ERO-Educational and Recreational Activities in DP Camps in Germany and Austria, Educational and Recreational Activities in UNRRA Displaced Persons Camps in Germany and Austria, 26 October 1946, page 2.
116 Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, page 136 (converting the numbers into percentages results in the following break-down: 49% men over 20 years of age, 31% women over 20, 13% youth between the ages of 14-20, and 7% children under 14); Camp Jägerkaserne, one of the largest Ukrainian camps in the American zone, gives the following statistics for July 12, 1947: 1,282 men ages 14 and up (92 men 14-17, 902 men 18-44, 288 men 45 years of age and up), 1,081 women ages 14 and up (79 women 14-17, 791 women 18-44, 211 women ages 45 years of age and up). For the children, the age distribution was as follows: 109 less than one year old, 274 from 1-5 years old and 278 from 6-13 years old). (Rohatynskyj, *Mittenval’d*, page 396).
117 Herbert, *“Ausländer-Einsatz,”* pages 361, 364f.
“The pride of these camps are the children who are cared for with [great] love.”\textsuperscript{118} Other sources stated that “all the DPs were anxious to give to their young folk the earliest possible opportunity of gaining more intellectual or professional knowledge.”\textsuperscript{119} But it was not just the DPs’ initiative which turned the focus towards the children; UNNRA itself had the idea “to make the people work for the children”\textsuperscript{120} in order to give them a positive outlet in their day-to-day routine. In this light it is not astounding that besides churches – the one institution that gave the residents stability right from the start\textsuperscript{121} – educational facilities were established early on. “In all centers where there were substantial numbers of children, UNRRA set up nurseries, schools, playgrounds, vocational centers, and child-care groups; and it gave special care to the children who had suffered extreme physical and psychological damage at the hands of the Nazis.”\textsuperscript{122} But credit for a lot of activity in this realm also has to be given to the displaced persons themselves, because “one of the first steps taken by a group of displaced persons of whatever nationality is to set up a school. So far as my enquiry went, there was no camp, large or small, where children were present in any number in which a school, conducted on normal lines as far as possible, had not been set up.”\textsuperscript{123}


\textsuperscript{120} UNA S 0524-0015, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Displaced Persons ERO Weekly Reports, UNRRA Team No. 5, Report No. 1, 7 May 1945 (M. Korwan).

\textsuperscript{121} As an UNRRA official observed: “the priest, especially in the Greek Catholic or Greek Orthodox denominations, had a large influence over the people” (UNA S 0524-0107, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Assembly Centre Administration, DP BR 24, Camp Churches, Camp Priests). For an account of the two major denominations in the Ukrainian camps – the Ukrainian Catholic and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church – see: Alexander Baran, “The Ukrainian Catholic Church,” in The Refugee Experience, ed. Isajiw, 147-157; Bohdan Bociurkiw, “The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in West Germany, 1945-50,” in The Refugee Experience, ed. Isajiw, 158-181. For an overview of the structural reorganization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Germany see: Wojtowicz, Geschichte, pages 41-69, 127.


\textsuperscript{123} UNA S 0524-0018, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Displaced Persons and Refugees in Germany, Report on an Enquiry into the Provisions made for Displaced Persons in Germany (no date given), page 10. It is interesting that one of UNRRA’s priorities – schooling – was a three-way responsibility split between the countries of origin of the displaced persons, UNRRA and the DPs themselves. The selection of the teachers was the task either of the national liaison officers or the DPs (UNA S 0524-0043, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: ERO-Educational and Recreational Activities in DP Camps in Germany and Austria, Educational and Recreational Activities in UNRRA Displaced Persons Camps in Germany and Austria, 26 October 1946, page 1f).
Although all DPs were interested in their children and education, for Ukrainians schooling, education, and recreational activities were of particular importance. These topics have been analyzed in depth elsewhere, and this section will provide only an overview of major developments and their reflection in UNRRA sources. Ukrainian education took place on two levels – the first in kindergartens, elementary, and secondary schools, the second in institutions of higher learning such as the Ukrainian Free University (UFU) or the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute (UTHI). Initially, schools sprang up in the camps rather spontaneously; only later were there successful attempts by teachers and the CRUE to standardize the curricula etc. The organization of schools benefited from the fact that living in the camps were a large number of students and qualified teachers – in some cases even professors – who were eager to fill the emptiness of camp life with education. The schooling system was modeled on the system that had existed in Western Ukraine and had two tracks – the elementary school past grade four for the broad masses and the *gymnasium* starting at grade five that prepared children for university. Many Ukrainian children who received higher schooling in the camps would otherwise probably not have had a chance to attend a *gymnasium*.

It is therefore not astonishing that schooling was considered a privilege and was therefore cherished by many students and parents alike. As one interviewee reminisced: “It was amazing, these teachers, professors, they did not have anything, but they just wrote the lectures themselves. There were dormitories for boys and girls, and the teachers made sure that we learnt.” The commitment and enthusiasm displayed by the teachers – not only among Ukrainians, but all DPs – also impressed UNRRA workers. The following remark illustrates the hardships which teachers had to endure:

“The work done and the difficulties overcome by teachers must be seen to be believed…The teachers had to start absolutely from

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125 D. Markus, “Education,” pages 186-191. Marta Dyczok points out that education was also important because it created a “semblance of normality under temporary conditions” (Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, page 80).
126 Interview 14 (see also interviews 27 (“It was a gymnasium on a very high level, all the teachers were from Ukraine”), 13, 7, 16).
nothing...Everything was short, paper, pencils, pen and ink...There were absolutely no school books obtainable. So the teachers made their own...Every scrap usable for education was taken. Labels from jam, fish, meat and milk tins were used for instructional purposes and utilised in the Kindergartens for children to make pictures with which to play. After two years of efforts the average DP child was not only saved from ignorance, but very often better of (sic) than the child who lived outside under normal conditions. The resourcefulness of these teachers could well be a lesson for teachers of modern schools and certainly an eye opener for children at home.”

In addition to a lack of lodgings and teaching equipment, Ukrainian teachers also had to deal with the fact that, for the first time ever, children from different parts of Ukraine and of different denominational backgrounds studied together in one school, a fact that – according to Daria Markus – spurred educators to teach “mutual understanding and a feeling that ‘we are all of the same nation.’” A wide variety of subjects was taught in camp schools, but the language of instruction was always Ukrainian. Textbooks were also in Ukrainian, and some camps were even able to print their own. UNRRA workers became aware of this, and the fact that only Ukrainian was taught in schools was reported as a distinctive feature of Ukrainian camp schools.

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127 UNA S 0524-0107, UNRRA - 1944-1947, File: Assembly Centre Administration, DP BR 24, Schools and Teachers.
130 For example: UNA S 0520-0220, UNRRA Subject Files, R&W Division Missions, Germany 1946, 400.1, From D.S. Jackling to the UNRRA Zone Director, British occupied zone, UNRRA HQ, Memorandum upon aspects of policy and organisation of the UNRRA Displaced Persons Operation in the British occupied zone, page 18f; UNA S 0524-0108, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Temp Actions, British Zone DP BR 286, UNRRA Team 246 by Morren, page 2; UNA S 0524 - 0105 (44-47), UNRRA - Historian Subject Files, Report histories of individual camps, DP US 30, A History of an Ukrainian Camp by W. V. Buckhantz, Director. UNRRA D.P. Assembly Center Ellwangen (Jagst), Germany, from February 1946 to February 1947, page 3. In camps where Ukrainians did not represent the majority, Ukrainians were still often listed as a distinct group and their children had the choice to either attend Polish or Russian schools (see for example: UNA S
enthusiasm and the all-Ukrainian schooling partially by the surplus of Ukrainian teachers – it is estimated that in the summer of 1948 1,103 teachers and 259 university professors resided in all three zones\(^{131}\) – but also reminds us that Ukrainians “were threatened with assimilation, and through assimilation, with extinction as a separate national or ethnic entity. Thus, for the Ukrainian refugees in the DP camps, educational enterprise was not for the sake of the individual. It was education of and for a future nation.”\(^{132}\)

The elementary school and gymnasium dominated the life of the younger generation in the camps and were supplemented by a variety of after school activities. In this context church attendance played an important role in the lives of the children because it was often mandatory and thus supervised by the school teachers.\(^{133}\) Furthermore, a network of boy scouts and girl guides troops under the auspices of the YMCA/YWCA was implemented in the camps, and their summer camps provided organized entertainment during vacation time.\(^{134}\) Apart from the YMCA, two youth groups stand out in the Ukrainian case – Plast, a scouting organization that was founded in L’viv in 1912 and revived in the DP camps in 1945, and the Association of Ukrainian Youth (Spilka Ukrains’koi Molodi, hereafter SUM),\(^{135}\) a youth branch of the OUN (B) faction. Plast worked in close cooperation with the schools, whereas SUM focused mostly on youngsters outside of regular schools.\(^{136}\) Both associations held weekly meetings for their members, where they were lectured on Ukrainian history, world events, or scouting skills, and arranged outings, summer camps, games and

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\(^{131}\) Bohatiuk, “The Economic Aspects,” page 73.

\(^{132}\) Markus, “Education,” page 194. Dyczok also agrees that education was seen as one of the ways of maintaining identity (Dyczok, \textit{Grand Alliance}, page 80).

\(^{133}\) Markus, “Education,” page 193.

\(^{134}\) S 0524-0043, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: ERO-Educational and Recreational Activities in DP Camps in Germany and Austria, Educational and Recreational Activities in UNRRA Displaced Persons Camps in Germany and Austria, 26 October 1946, page 6.

\(^{135}\) Dyczok, \textit{Grand Alliance}, page 84.

\(^{136}\) Markus, “Education,” page 193f.
Ukrainians in the Displaced Persons’ Camps, 1945-1948

sports, choirs, or Christmas caroling. For these youth organizations the primary goal was not to provide leisure activities for their members, but “to raise the Ukrainian youth with love for its traditions, its belief, the mother tongue and the Ukrainian people and to keep them in the best physical condition.” Sport activities were therefore high on the agenda, and camp Mittenwald even celebrated a “Day of Physical Culture” with sport performances and national dances, and it hosted a “DP Olympiad” which attracted not only DP participants, but also representatives of the allied forces and the IRO.

For children and youngsters, life in the camps offered a wide variety of activities and entertainment, and many of the younger generation remember very fondly their time in the assembly centers, and especially the summer camps and jamborees that brought Ukrainian youth together. This fondness was partially due to the horrors they had experienced previously, as one interviewee illustrates: “It was fun for me, this is where I met all my friends, we played volleyball and went to concerts; to me it was the best time of my life. Maybe not the best time, but compared to what I went through before…I loved it, it was like being in a scout camp, you are used to seeing your friends every day.” The camps brought stability to lives that had been traumatized by the war, and in most cases the younger generation flourished in these Ukrainian dominated environments.

Once Ukrainian pupils had finished the prestigious gymnasium, there were opportunities for them to start a university degree. Like all other DPs, Ukrainian

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137 For example see Rohatynskyj, *Mittenwald*, pages 301-315, 401, 469-471.
139 See for example: Utrysko, “Pratsia viddilu,” page 298f.
141 See for example interviews 14, 10, 27, 7, 16. As a former resident of Mittenwald stated: “Many of us, who at that time were in our adolescent years, have many wonderful memories of hikes in the mountains, camping, get-togethers, but most importantly – of friendships that were born through shared experiences and mutual cooperation during sing-songs by the camp fire and during celebrations of national anniversaries” (Areta Wytanowycz Halibey, “‘Hey, our young and carefree life…” About Plast in Mittenwald,” in *Mittenwald*, ed. Rohatynskyj, page 462). For another positive account concerning life and activities in the camps, see Olga Harmatij Mychajliw, “…And I was in Mittenwald,” in *Mittenwald*, ed. Rohatynskyj, 464-465.
142 Interview 14 (see interview 7).
students could attend the UNRRA University in Munich. In fact, UNRRA statistics listed 26% of the entire student body as Ukrainians. Alternatively, Ukrainian-specific institutions of higher learning, such as the Ukrainian Free University (UFU) in Munich, the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute (UTHI) which started its operations in Regensburg and later moved to Munich, and the Ukrainian Higher School of Economics (UHSE) in Munich, as well as two theological schools – the Ukrainian Orthodox Theological Academy (UOTA) and the Ukrainian Catholic Theological Seminary (UCTS), offered Ukrainians a broad spectrum of academic learning. Together with scientific societies, such as Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences (Ukrains’ka Vilna Akademiia Nauk, hereafter UVAN) or the Shevchenko Society, the institutions of higher learning presented a broad range of employment, publication, and learning opportunities for Ukrainian students and professors as well as researchers. As in the schools, UNRRA officials observed a profound dedication to study and research within the university student population. Yet, although they formed a vital part of the camp population, pupils, students and professors made up only a portion of the DP residents. Studying and teaching occupied this part of the DP population, but there were still many left with lots of time to spare, and the allied authorities wanted to channel this large pool of unused energy.

4.3. Work Opportunities for Displaced Persons

Work was an important aspect of the DP life in Germany. It was hard for the organizing authorities to come up with a stringent guideline for the employment of DPs. One had to keep in mind that the majority of these people had been forced


144 Wynar, “Ukrainian Scholarship,” page 323ff. For an overview of the instruction of Ukrainian Catholic priests, see Wojtowicz, Geschichte, pages 97-116.

145 As one report stated: “The university apparently was of great significance [sic] to Displaced Persons...the academic interests and diligence of the students and the earnest and fruitful work of the faculty were almost selfsustaining [sic].” (UNA S 0524-0104, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Report - Camp Activities, Welfare and Employment, DP US 15, G. Richmann, C. Clark: UNRRA US Zone Germany, History Report No. 24, Annex a, Welfare Section. History of the Zone Welfare - Education Section).
laborers; therefore, it was generally understood that they should not be put under pressure. Although UNRRA did not want to force the DPs to work, the administration still considered employment a top priority of camp life, not only for the psychological benefit to the residents, but also for the smooth operation of the camps. Here the DPs could work in a variety of occupations, as national group leaders and assistants, interpreters, cooks, cleaning personnel, or teachers among others. However, examples from different camps showed that the percentage of employment was, especially in 1945, rather low. Furthermore, payment was not regulated and usually consisted of an early claim to clothing, extra food, or cigarettes. Workshops in the camps also provided opportunities for paid labor, as did work for German employers.\(^{146}\)

It was a delicate situation: the former forced laborers, now under the care of UNRRA, did not completely provide for their own living, and rumors spread (and persisted) that DPs were reluctant to work. Local and even army newspapers carried articles focusing on the ‘unwillingness’ of the DPs to work. UNRRA tried to counteract such misinformation through exhibitions featuring products which had been manufactured by DPs.\(^{147}\) Nonetheless, the wide-spread negative attitude towards DPs was hard to combat and persisted in many western officials.\(^{148}\) So it is not astonishing that in the fall of 1946 the British government introduced compulsory work in their zone, and announced that DPs who had rejected repatriation were to have the same status as Germans.\(^{149}\) After this, the employment rate in the camps rose, and displaced persons worked in areas such as construction, security, and transport. The employment rate of DPs in the camps was meant to

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\(^{146}\) Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, page 159ff.


\(^{149}\) Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter*, pages 159-161. This breach of the existing contract led to tensions between UNRRA and the military and shows once again that UNRRA was subordinate to the military and without real power on the legislative level. Despite the attempts to ‘usefully employ’ all DPs, many did not have steady employment, especially not during the first year of the DP operations.
stay at 7.5%; in 1946 it was raised to 10%, and in 1947 it rose for a short while to 14%.\textsuperscript{150} In reports on the percentage of DPs working in the British zone, the workforce was also broken down along the lines of ethnicity, stating that the majority of the “undetermined” group was made up by Ukrainians, of which roughly 25,000 were working.\textsuperscript{151} And their work was appreciated, as the authorities noted that “the Ukrainians were the most regular” in work attendance.\textsuperscript{152} Despite attempts to ensure full-employment, work was not available for everybody; and recreational activities were often seen as a useful alternative. The evolving camps offered their residents different opportunities to pass their time, and Ukrainians also managed to leave a distinctly Ukrainian mark in this area.

4.4. Cultural Activities of Ukrainians

Taking into consideration the catastrophic conditions with which the DPs and the authorities were faced in 1945, the evolution of a diverse camp life is truly amazing. As Dyczok rightly points out, “cultural activities flourished among Ukrainian refugees during this period, since they provided a means for channeling creative forces after the destructive experience of the war.”\textsuperscript{153} Apart from schooling, universities, scientific societies, and the occasional employment opportunity, camps also offered education and entertainment for the broader masses. Vocational classes were an important aspect of camp life, because all DPs wanted to boost their chances of being accepted as an emigrant, once the major repatriation drive was over and the displaced persons started looking to North America for a new life. Vocational courses were offered by Ukrainian institutions such as the UTHI or by UNRRA and later the IRO,\textsuperscript{154} because the Administration

\textsuperscript{150} Angelika Eder, “Displaced Persons/\textquoteleft\textquoteleft Heimatlose Ausländer\textquoteleft\textquoteleft als Arbeitskräfte in Westdeutschland,” \textit{Archiv für Sozialgeschichte} 42 (2002), 1-17, page 3f.
\textsuperscript{153} Dyczok, \textit{Grand Alliance}, page 81f. Since Ukrainians were officially not recognized, many of the cultural activities had to be sponsored from within the group as well.
\textsuperscript{154} Bohatiuk, “The Economic Aspects,” page 82f.
realized that the future of many of these people did not lie in manual labor. DPs could learn English in language seminars, or they could take lessons in driving or automobile mechanics, to name only the most popular courses. One district in the British zone can serve as an example for the variety of vocational and recreational classes offered under the auspices of UNRRA. Already in November 1945 – even long before resettlement came into question – the following educational programs were listed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Schooling</th>
<th>Vocational Education</th>
<th>Recreation Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 elementary schools</td>
<td>17 sewing classes</td>
<td>25 music classes (choir, band, orchestra)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 special language classes</td>
<td>12 show repair classes</td>
<td>17 sports classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 adult schools</td>
<td>8 classes in barbering</td>
<td>17 literature (newspaper) classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 mechanical schools</td>
<td>7 classes in carpentry</td>
<td>15 scouts programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 art classes</td>
<td>4 classes in knitting</td>
<td>12 adult recreation classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 sewing classes</td>
<td>4 classes in mechanics</td>
<td>10 art classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 classes in toy making</td>
<td>10 children’s play classes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This example gives us a glimpse into the variety of educational and recreational life in the camps. The assortment and quality of the programs depended on the size of the camp as well as tools and material at their disposal.

The ethnic segregation offered the unique possibility of adding a cultural ‘touch’ to camp life, which was the intention of UNRRA. Early on, UNRRA decided that “leaders and organizers of leisure-time activities should preferably be sought from within the community since the success or failure of these activities will depend largely on their leadership.” The recreational activities were divided into three sectors, one dealing with “social culture and national activities including music, dances, plays, singing, newspapers, discussions etc;” the next focusing on “handicrafts and manual activities,” for example knitting or basket making; whereas the third part dealt with sports and games. As an UNRRA report stressed,
“the national culture was emphasized by most of the national groups, and activities on these lines found expression in embroidery, national music, singing and dancing. UNRRA personnel saw itself as the instigators of these programs, the contribution of voluntary agencies and, of course, the DPs themselves were very much needed in order to make the agenda work.” Indeed, cultural activities offered Ukrainians an opportunity to expose their traditions and culture to a wider audience and a further chance to make their way into UNRRA reports.

Whereas the school was a section of camp life that had a more internal aspect to it, the purpose of cultural activities such as dancing, singing or art exhibits was twofold – they served as opportunities inwardly to perpetuate ‘Ukrainianess,’ but also made it possible to represent Ukrainian culture to the outside world. Ukrainians in the displaced person camps established a variety of choirs and dance ensembles, quickly making dance and concert performances an indispensable part of camp routine. Public performances were staged not only for the benefit of Ukrainian residents in the camps, but also for UNRRA, military or YMCA personnel. UNRRA staff was quite eager to encourage DPs to make their performances accessible to a wider audience, as the following statement from camp Lyssenko demonstrates: “It also needed a lot of talk during the best part of a year to convince our artists that they were not helping anybody by presenting always the same national songs and dances, generally gloomy, but that it would be to the benefit of all if they put on gay performances intermingled with national interlude[sic], shows which could be appreciated in camps of all nationalities and by members of the forces of occupation.” Photographs taken by UNRRA officials give further insight into Ukrainian DP activities such as choir presentations, where

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159 S 0524-0043, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: ERO-Educational and Recreational Activities in DP Camps in Germany and Austria, “Educational and Recreational Activities in UNRRA Displaced Persons Camps in Germany and Austria, 26 October 1946, pages 6-9. As another report dealing specifically with the US zone stated: “UNRRA teams…supervise, guide and work through the DP leaders” (LAC MG 31 K 9 Vol. 20, UNRRA: Reports, Correspondence 301, Rutherford, Report on Trip to the Field (American Zone), December 6-13, page 5).

160 See for example: UNA S 0524-0015, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Displaced Persons ERO Weekly Reports, UNRRA Team No. 5, Report No. 1, 7 May 1945 (M. Korwan), page 1. For a detailed account of these organizational efforts, see for example: Valerian Revutsky, “Theatre in the Camps,” in The Refugee Experience, ed. Isajiw, 292-310. See also interview 33.

161 UNA S 0524-0108, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Term Actions, British Zone DP BR 286, UNRRA Team 246 by Morren, page 3. Interviews with former camp residents also stressed the importance of cultural performances in the camps (see for example interview 33).
Ukrainians in traditional costumes performed for a wider audience.\textsuperscript{162} Through these public performances Ukrainians reinforced stereotypes about their cultural heritage, as a report about the Ukrainian camp Ellwangen clearly showed. Describing a big party on election day in the camp, the director remarked: “And speaking of dancing: The Ukrainians are noted – like all Slavic people – for their love of music, dancing and singing and this camp proved no exception to the rule. A modern theatre was an excellent excuse to start almost immediately theatrical performances, dancing parties and other entertainment.”\textsuperscript{163}

Apart from choir and dance performances, Ukrainians also caught the administration’s attention through the production of artifacts such as embroidery. As one observer remarked “among the Ukrainians, I admired particularly their choirs, instrument makers, embroidery, and the high quality of their leather work.”\textsuperscript{164} Exhibitions offered Ukrainians another forum to display not only their resourcefulness and activity, but also their Ukrainian heritage. In order to demonstrate the resourcefulness of the displaced persons, UNRRA organized exhibitions featuring products which had been manufactured by DPs.\textsuperscript{165} For example Mittenwald, a district comprising up to five Ukrainian camps at one time, hosted an exhibition in 1947 displaying one year’s work by the camp residents.\textsuperscript{166} UNRRA pictures from such exhibitions clearly identify spectators as Ukrainians; one subtitle states, for example “More examples of the skill and ingenuity of the displaced persons. Ukrainian girls, wearing costumes made by themselves, inspect

\textsuperscript{162} UNA S 0524-0103, UNRRA 1944-1947, Photo Album Funk Kaserne (Ukrainian Choir); for Ukrainian choir and dance performances, staged for the benefit of the authorities, see for example: UNA S 0524-0103, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Voluntary Agencies, Attachments, DP US 4a, Extracts from Field Reports for the month of March, DP Operations, page 9f (here about a festival in Rosenheim).

\textsuperscript{163} UNA S 0524-0105 (44-47), UNRRA - Historian Subject Files, Report histories of individual camps, DP US 30, A History of an Ukrainian Camp by W. V. Buckhantz, Director. UNRRA D.P. Assembly Center Ellwangen (Jagst), Germany, from February 1946 to February 1947, page 3.


\textsuperscript{166} Rohatynskyj, \textit{Mittenval'd}, pages 345ff, 519f.
articles at an exhibition held in Amberg.” Display artifacts were crafted in UNRRA assembly centers by Ukrainians themselves, and the process was clearly marked in photos as ‘traditionally’ or ‘old’ Ukrainian. As a YMCA report stated: “An Ukrainian camp at Wasserburg has excellent workshops, in which they are making musical instruments most beautifully…with inadequate tools and materials.” Ukrainian arts and crafts also attracted many foreign buyers and provided at least some income for their makers. In some cases Ukrainian exhibitions even traveled abroad. For example, with the help of the Ukrainian diaspora Ukrainian DPs were able to display their artifacts in the Foyle Art Gallery in London.

Another outlet for cultural activity was the commemoration of religious holidays such as Easter, Christmas, or the Day of St. Volodymyr, famous Ukrainians such as Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko, Ukrainian Veterans in general, or Ukrainian historical events such as Independence Day (January 22). These events were usually celebrated with church services, processions, concerts, and theatre performances and drew a large attendance from the camp inhabitants, especially from the younger generation since students’ participation was mandatory. The photo album of the Mittenwald collection gives an impression of the commemorative processions that took place in the camps, in which members of different organizations – such as SUM, Plast, or the Association of Ukrainian University Students – laid wreaths for Ukrainian freedom fighters at the “tomb of

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168 UNA S 0524-0043, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: ERO – Educational and Recreational Activities in DP Camps in Germany and Austria, ERO #13, Photo with the subtitle: “Ukrainian Displaced Persons at the UNRRA Assembly Centre at Ludwigsburg are practicing an old Ukrainian art in making wooden boxes decorated with straw mosaic. Jaroslaw Stellmachowicz selects pieces of straw suitable for work in the mosaic.” More pictures of exhibitions can be found in Rohatynskyj, Mittenval’d, pages 345-351.
171 See flyer in LAC MG 28 V 119 Vol. 11, File: 14, An exhibition of Ukrainian Folk Art and Handicrafts. As the flyer stated, the artifacts “represent, in our humble opinion, not only the fundamentals of Ukrainian folk and peasant art and handicrafts preserved through centuries, but also the height of skill, initiative and originality in improvisation” (page 2).
172 Markus, “Education,” page 193; see also Wojtowicz, Geschichte, pages 161, 166ff, 174f.
the unknown soldier” that had been erected in the camp.\textsuperscript{173} As the evaluation of the UNRRA material has shown, Ukrainian cultural activities were usually seen in a positive light by the administration and therefore supported or at least not discouraged. However, another important factor of Ukrainian camp life – the political activity and struggles over self-administration – did not receive such a positive interpretation.

4.5. The Political Party Spectrum and Attempts of Consolidation

Ukrainians were not only particularly active in the cultural and educational sphere, but also emerged as a politically vigorous group. This was by and large due to their war time experience, which had seen several attempts to erect a free Ukraine. The struggle for independence continued in the camps and the ideology debate over how to reach this aim caused clashes between the different political groups.

According to Vasyl Markus, the Ukrainian political parties present in postwar Germany can be divided into three camps – the left, including such parties as the Revolutionary Democratic Party (URDP) or the OUN (Z),\textsuperscript{174} the right, with the Alliance of Hetmanites (SHD), the OUN (B) and the OUN (M), and the centre with parties such as the National Democratic Alliance (UNDO). In theory, Ukrainians boasted a multi-party system; however, the most influential group – the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) – was wary of a multi-party system and therefore turned out to be “a clumsy giant among a plethora of small, weak parties,” especially because all other groups – except for the Revolutionary Democrats – can be labeled “mini-parties.”\textsuperscript{175} In addition to these parties, the government in exile, originally established by Symon Petliura, had been reorganized at the end of the war by Andrii Livyts’kyi (Andrij Livyts’kyj) in Weimar and moved to Bad Kissingen in the spring of 1945. The government-in-exile represented a competition to the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Ukrains’ka Holovna Vyzvolna Rada, hereafter UHVR) which was supported by the OUN-B faction,\textsuperscript{176} and their opposing stances emerged especially during

\textsuperscript{173} Rohatynskyj, \textit{Mittenval’d}, pages 358-361. For other positive memories, see also interviews 7, 11, 17.

\textsuperscript{174} OUN abroad or “Dviikari” (after the Bandera split in 1953/4).

\textsuperscript{175} V. Markus, “Political Parties,” pages 113-114, quote from page 114.

\textsuperscript{176} Yurkevich, “Ukrainian Nationalists,” pages 129-131. The Supreme Liberation Council was established in July 1944 in Ukraine by OUN-B representatives, UPA members, and other activists.
attempts to unify the opposing factions, as the formation of the Coordinating
Ukrainian Committee (CUC, Koordynatsiinyi Ukrains’kyi Komitet), for example, shows.

In early 1946, it was obvious that political factionalism posed a serious
threat to the smooth operation of Ukrainian community life in the DP camps; and
through the intervention of Reverend Kushnir, a Ukrainian Canadian visiting the
DP camps, a Coordinating Ukrainian Committee (CUC) was established in Munich
in July 1946. Initially, all Ukrainian political parties were members of this umbrella
organization, but the OUN-B left the committee only two months later “on the
grounds that since they were the only political force continuing armed struggle in
Ukraine, they were entitled to a monopoly of political power.” The OUN-B itself
argued that it expected the government-in-exile to acknowledge the supremacy of
the UHVR (the government-in-exile’s refusal to do so was a major point of
discontent) and stressed that only democratic elections could ascertain the position
of the people. For Bandera and his followers, “democracy meant competition
among various political currents and the victory of one.”

Despite the opposition of the Bandera faction, the CUC continued its work,
and consolidation of the different quarreling factions seemed once more in reach
with the formation of the Ukrainian National Council (Ukrains’ka National’na
Rada, UNRada) of the government-in-exile in 1948. Initially, the Bandera faction
agreed to join this body but insisted that the UHVR had to be acknowledged as the
leading authority in Ukraine’s struggle for independence. Despite this original
willingness to become a member, members of the OUN-B and the Foreign
Representation of the UHVR raised several points of criticism early on. One of
them concerned the constitution of UNRada which put all parties on a par

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who did not belong to either organization. Initially the OUN-B and UPA members were interested
in the OUN-M joining the UHVR; however, ideological differences prevented such a step. The
UHVR adopted parts of the platform devised at the third Extraordinary Congress of Ukrainian
Nationalists (OUN-B faction) in August 1943, which introduced democratic elements into the

177 Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, page 144f, quote from page 145. See also Ciuciura, “Common
Organizational Efforts,” page 99f.

178 Yurkevich, “Ukrainian Nationalists,” pages 131-135, quote from page 134. After February 1946,
Bandera associates outside Ukraine were represented through the Foreign Center of the OUN
(Zakordonni chastyny OUN, ZCh OUN) and their position on democracy started to estrange them
from members of the Foreign Representation of the UHVR.
regardless of their size. Another point of contention was the fact that UNRada was generally considered as the successor of the Ukrainian government-in-exile, despite the fact that it included additional parties. Since UNRada did not acknowledge the supremacy of the UHVR and made no mention of OUN in its opening announcement, the OUN-B did not involve itself in the executive and formed an opposition within the council. In spring of 1950, it withdrew from the council which was subsequently carried on by the liberal and socialist groups as well as the OUN-M.179 Political strife also surfaced in other organizations such as the CRUE. Although the CRUE was initially founded as a non-political organization, “the people staffing the supposedly non-political organization of the Ukrainian exile community were mostly Ukrainian political activists, who brought political biases and objectives into their work.”180 Tensions quickly arose when the Bandera faction was accused of trying to monopolize the organization through the constitution. Those opposing the OUN-B attempt at domination left the CRUE and formed their own rival “Association of Ukrainians in Germany” in 1949 (however, the Association joined CRUE again in 1952). Similar disputes could be observed in the Association of Ukrainian Journalists, the League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners, or the Central Union of Ukrainian Students (Tsentralnyi Soiuz Ukrainskoho Studentsva, CUUS).181 The entire newspaper discourse was also heavily influenced by political strife between different parties and ideologies.182 And the fierce competition between the contending political groups was not confined only to the realm of political parties and Ukrainian organizations, but also permeated the administration of camp life.

4.6. Political Rivalry in the Context of Self-Administration

Once camp life stabilized, UNRRA continued to provide the organizational framework and general supplies, but more authority was delegated to the DPs

179 Yurkevich, “Ukrainian Nationalists,” pages 136-139. The Council thus became a “virtual alliance opposing the OUN-B” (Vasyl Markus, “Political Parties,” page 121f).
themselves. At first, leaders were chosen by the administration; later they were
elected in camp-wide elections. They took up positions in the camp
administration and often supplied the volunteer police as well. Simply filling the
posts was not a problem because there were many men eager to take on the
responsibility. However, the quality of leadership was not always adequate, as an
analysis by Ciuciura reveals: “Some of these ‘self-appointed’ leaders were men
with previous experience in communal affairs; others had only ambition and ability
to lead, occasionally helped with a little luck. Most of them were dedicated and
honest men who worked diligently to the best of their ability and in the face of
considerable difficulties. However, not a few of these UNRRA-appointed
administrators became loathsome and ridiculous camps despots, ‘tsars’ or
‘kings.’” Ukrainian self-administration was hampered by the make-up of the
group and the internal political rivalries and factionalism. And Ukrainian internal
struggle was an aspect of camp life that was negatively received by the authorities.

Since all DP groups received the privilege of supplying an administration of
their own, UNRRA officials were able to compare the different approaches;
unfortunately, in this comparison Ukrainians often did not fare well. In comparison
to the Balts, Ukrainians were often subject to criticism. As one report states:

“My preference is as follows: a) Balts, b) Ukrainians, c) Poles and
Yugoslavs. Integrity and honesty, without any consideration of race
were the predominant qualities of the Baltic administration staff. They
realised better than the Ukrainians, who were inclined to a certain
extent to dictatorship, the full meaning of the word
“democracy”….Good results [in context of the police] were obtained
in the Baltic and Polish camps…they did their job with intelligence

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183 Ciuciura, “Common Organizational Efforts,” page 92. For examples see the cases of Ellwagen
“LYSSENKO”, Hannover 1947, VB 6; UNA S 0524 - 0105 (44-47), UNRRA - Historian Subject
Buckhantz, Director. UNRRA D.P. Assembly Center Ellwagen (Jagst), Germany, from February
1946 to February 1947, page 2.
184 Here the example of the Ukrainian camp Hallendorf: UNA S 0520-0220, UNRRA Subfiles, File:
R&W Division Missions, Germany 1946, 400.1, From D.S. Jackling to the UNRRA Zone Director,
British occupied zone, UNRRA HQ, Memorandum upon aspects of policy and organisation of the
UNRRA Displaced Persons Operation in the British occupied zone, page 18f.
and good spirit, having a certain amount of professional qualification...Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the Ukrainian camp police almost exclusively composed of young fellows chosen by the camp leaders. They were instructed, before our arrival in the camps, in a way which reminded us of dictatorship methods.\textsuperscript{186}

Comparing the self-administration of the Balts and the Ukrainians, another report stated that “the Ukrainian way of arranging their own affairs went very much the same way, only somewhat slower, more haphazard and not so well organized. A very unfortunate tendency had to be combated, namely that of the Western Ukrainian to override the Eastern Ukrainian.”\textsuperscript{187}

Although political activities were prohibited by the military and UNRRA, the different political parties – the OUN-B being the most vigorous among them – attempted to gain control of the DP camps.\textsuperscript{188} This phenomenon alarmed Ukrainian Diaspora observers\textsuperscript{189} and did not go unnoticed by UNRRA officials as well. In Ukrainian political life, the struggles between the rivaling OUN-B and OUN-M drew particular attention in UNRRA reports, which occasionally compared the Bandera faction to a “terrorist” organization that was particularly eager to seize control of the camps.\textsuperscript{190} According to an UNRRA observer, the problems among Ukrainian political factions “clearly indicate the inner turmoil of thought and planning among Ukrainian people.”\textsuperscript{191} Another report stated in retrospect: “In every Ukrainian camp under our supervision we found evidence of favouritism, and it

\textsuperscript{186} UNA S 0524-0108, UNRRA 1944-1947, File: Term Actions, British Zone DP BR 286, History of UNRRA Team 252, page 10. Balts generally fared well in UNRRA reports; they were often seen as ‘superior people’ in comparison to DPs of other ethnic background (see for example: LAC MG 31 K9 Vol. 20, File: UNRRA: Reports, Correspondence 301, Letter by D. J. Williams to Rutherford, 16 August 1945, page 2. The author talks in this context specifically about Latvians). However, in this context it has to be taken into consideration that the Balts were a group that was generally preferred by the western powers (Eder, “Displaced Person/”Heimatlose Ausländer”,“ page 9; Holleuffer, \textit{Zwischen Fremde}, page 114; Triadafilopoulos, \textit{Shifting Boundaries}, page 126f).


\textsuperscript{188} Dyczok, \textit{Grand Alliance}, page 144; Yurkevich, “Ukrainian Nationalists,” page 135f.

\textsuperscript{189} For an examination, see Luciuk, \textit{Searching for Place}, for example pages 149ff, 214f.

\textsuperscript{190} See for example: UNA S 0520-0247, UNRRA Subject Files, Germany-DPs, Informational Report on the Background of “Ukrainian” Groups, from Harold S. Smith, District Eligibility Officer, to Mr. Ralph B. Price, UNRRA Zone Hq, Heidelberg, 10 February 1947, page 3 and Appendix B: Communique of the Co-ordination Ukrainian Committee (KUK).

\textsuperscript{191} UNA S 0520-0247, UNRRA Subject Files, File: Germany-DPs, Informational Report on the Background of “Ukrainian” Groups, from Harold S. Smith, District Eligibility Officer, to Mr. Ralph B. Price, UNRRA Zone HQ, Heidelberg, 10 February 1947, page 4.
was very difficult to improve the situation. This was due to the great political and religious differences existing among the Ukrainian population...this can probably be explained by the low degree of education of the Ukrainian people, their ignorance of democratic way of life, and the sectarianism of their leaders.”

The negative attitude of many UNRRA officials stemmed from their frustration with the Ukrainians’ unwillingness to be repatriated, which was viewed as being inspired by collaboration with the Germans. Many UNRRA officials “assumed that both organizations [OUN-B and OUN-M] are partially staffed by German collaborators.” Another UNRRA employee from Camp Lyssenko stated: “There is always an undercurrent of faction amongst the Ukrainians...I attach specimens of the subscription receipts issued by the Bandera Underground Army, which have been found in the camp. I am not sufficiently in touch with the political situation to know what the YUA Ukrainian Partisan army really stands [sic] for but am informed that there was a certain element which collaborated with all and sundry including the Germans and was frankly out for what it could get. This element has been quiescent for some time as fairly strong measures have been taken.” UNRRA and the military monitored activities in the camps closely, and in some cases intervened when they felt that the political strife got out of hand. Although UNRRA often did not have an insight into the roots and development of factionalism, its officials took action if they felt that the rights of a group had been infringed upon. In camp Lyssenko, “undoubtedly the election carried out in 1945-46 had been on a limited basis with the result that the Greek Catholics (Polish Galician element) had a disproportionate share of authority. The matter was settled in early 47. A democratic election returned a Greek Orthodox majority. The Greek Catholic minority interest was taken care of. Apart from a faction fight after a holiday in early February there has been no more trouble.”

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194 UNA S 0520-0221, UNRRA Subject Files, 400.52 Germany Sub. Repatriation. Activities - Polish Civil Guards, Anti Repatriation Activities in Germany.
Despite difficulties, effective self-administration was established in most camps, but this took time, as an appraisal of the activities in camp Ellwangen – a camp with a well-known history of internal struggles – noted. The UNRRA camp director wished “to state that this system of self-government was not born overnight, but has been proven by many trials and tribulations. In fact this took almost two years of field experience to come to the present system. It is my sincere belief that he time has come to let the people govern themselves, except for those departments which are controlling matters directly concerning UNRRA.”\textsuperscript{196} Over time Ukrainians gained more power over their own lives; and, since the administrative level was influenced by the politically active members of the community, it is interesting to ask to what extent this politicization permeated the lower levels.

\textbf{4.7. Ukrainians as a Politicized Group}

For many of these Ukrainian displaced persons, the camps in Germany and Austria offered for the first time an opportunity not only to express their cultural heritage, but also to articulate political opinions. In the discourse on the DP experience, the political character of the group is often stressed. For example, Luciuk asserts that “the DP camps….did quickly become hotbeds of intrigue, arenas within which competing political movements sought to assert themselves and gain control.” And, according to Luciuk, they did so with some success, because he concludes that “tens of thousands of Ukrainians, of all ages, political philosophies, religious beliefs, regional and socio-economic backgrounds, had been forced to cluster for several years or more. In these refugee camps they had gradually been transformed from a rather heterogeneous mass into something of a schooled cohort, united in its world-view, under the almost complete control of the militant nationalists active among them.”\textsuperscript{197} Marta Dyczok, on the other hand, takes a more cautionary stand, stating that “although only a small proportion of the refugees was involved directly in political activities, they were all affected indirectly by the political rivalry that occurred in their midst.” However, she also stresses that there were many apolitical

\textsuperscript{196} UNA S 0524-0105 (44-47), UNRRA - Historian Subject Files, Report histories of individual camps, DP US 30, Letter from W. V. Buckhantz, Director of Assembly Center Ellwangen, to District Director UNRRA District No. 1, 19 March 1947.

\textsuperscript{197} Luciuk, \textit{Searching}, first quote from page 143, second quote from page 214.
leaders who tried hard “to maintain normal relations within the community.” According to Ciuciura, “the Ukrainian exile masses were rather socially apathetic. Some Ukrainians were even completely unaware of the whole community framework and its problems. People were primarily interested in trying to emigrate from Germany as soon as possible. Still, there was not doubt that the OUN-B was the most active group in the community, led by dedicated and energetic men.”

Although correct statistics on party membership are hard to procure, available data support Ciuciura’s stance. For example, in 1948 OUN-B had approximately 5,000 members in Western Europe, 70% of whom were in the DP camps.

Although this section does not give a definite answer to the question of how widespread political activities and beliefs were in the camps, it wants to stress the idea that we have to consider two levels of political activity. First of all, a party system existed in the camps, and the leaders of different political factions tried to influence Ukrainian politics and struggled for control of the camps. As Kulyk’s research has shown, in this politically charged environment, camp newspapers served as a vehicle to spread a discourse of the tasks of the Ukrainian nation. Dedication to independence and the preservation of heritage were at the core of this ideology, and it was perpetuated through the isolation of the camps and the relative secure economic situation of the DPs. However, despite attempts to present a unified image, the newspapers could not escape the realities of political struggle. As Kulyk points out, “the discursive construction of unity was…impeded by a competition between two political camps drawing on different ideological traditions and having mutually incompatible strategies of asserting their political role among the refugees. By aiming delegitimizing narratives against one another, they undermined some important premises of the common discourse of ‘the political emigration’, thus significantly diminishing its persuasiveness.” Indeed, it is questionable to what degree all Ukrainian DPs participated in this highly charged debate.

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198 Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, first quote from page 144, second quote from page 145.
199 Ciuciura, “Common Organizational Efforts,” page 100.
200 Vasyl Markus, “Political Parties,” page 118. OUN-M had 1,200-1,500 members.
The Ukrainians interviewed for this project support Ciuciura’s claim that many of the displaced persons were apathetic, i.e. their political activity did not necessarily mean party affiliation. Although the competition between the different political factions was serious on a higher level, it did not mean that it permeated the lower levels as well. The interviews conducted for this project indicate that the awareness of camp inhabitants of the struggles between the political factions – especially between the Banderivtsi and Melnykivtsi – varied and depended on the person’s age and own political activity. Those who were younger or not interested in politics stated that they hardly noticed any fights in the camps. An interviewee who had been a teenager in the Mittenwald camp answered to the question whether she had been aware of the fact that Mittenwald was heavily influenced by the Bandera faction: “Well, see, yes, now from a perspective I can say yes. But at that time, I was in Plast, I was in school and that was all that was important. I did not feel any influence there.”\(^{202}\) Another interviewee who was already an adult in camp Lyssenko, another stronghold of the Bandera faction, stated: “Serious problems…I don’t remember. No. The Banderivtsi had their own group and the Melnykivtsi had their own group…but I did not belong to them, I don’t know, I did not belong to any political group at that time…We never had pressure, no, no.”\(^{203}\) Others were aware of problems in the camps without having been a member of a political group themselves.\(^{204}\) And others were active in some sort of political activity, either because they belonged to one of the factions or because they were recruited in the camps. One interviewee who was a youngster during her stay in Regensburg remembered: “For a short period, they involved me, the Banderivtsi, someone of a class higher would approach me, told me I had good discipline, it was like a privilege, you had to be asked… It was very romantic, because I never knew who belonged, apart from the one person who approached me, because the meetings were in the evenings, when the sun set, usually in the forest… And then we left the

\(^{202}\) Interview 7 For a similar account see interviews 27, 16, 17 (For example the latter points out that at the time it was not known in Camp Jagerkaserne that Bandera’s family resided there under an assumed name).

\(^{203}\) Interview 11.

\(^{204}\) Interview 13.
This is what happened to many displaced persons: they left the politically charged environment of the camps at the end of the 1940s, hoping for a fresh start in the US, Canada, or Australia.

Nonetheless, although many of them did not necessarily take sides in the political party struggles, the general masses of the Ukrainian DPs can still be classified as a politicized group. One has to keep in mind that the situation itself was a political one. The DP experience took place in the wider context of international politics – the alliance of the western powers with the Soviet Union, the fateful Yalta agreement, and the developing falling out between the ‘reluctant allies’. And for a certain period of time, any kind of Ukrainian activity was in a way a political activity, because Ukrainians were not recognized as a separate nationality and the Soviet Union wanted all of them repatriated. Thus expressing one’s ‘Ukrainianess’ was in a way a political statement. Furthermore, threats like repatriation and screening bonded the community together. In that sense, the majority or even all of the Ukrainian DPs were politicized, because as the examination of UNRRA reports has shown, Ukrainian cultural expression was widespread and penetrated UNRRA reports. Furthermore, not only did the newspaper – as examined by Kulyk – spread a discourse on the tasks of the community in the emigration; other non-political organizations did this as well. The Ukrainian Sanitary Charitable Service (USCS, Ukrains’ka Sanitarno-Kharytatynna Sluzhba), the successor of the Ukrainian Red Cross, can serve as another example of the values and goals formulated in the diaspora. In 1947, the organization issued an album in which it outlined the tasks of Ukrainians in the emigration. In ten pictures with captions, the organization made Ukrainians aware that they had to establish world organizations of mutual support, help the veterans, widows, and orphans who

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205 Interview 14. Vasyl Markus makes us aware that “membership in the two nationalist groups was conspiratorial. Members used pseudonyms internally and sometimes belonged only to small primary units (zveno), which had up to five members” (V. Markus, “Political Parties,” page 118). See also interviews 33, 20.

206 Dyczok, Grand Alliance, page 145.

207 The Ukrainian Sanitary Charitable Service (sometimes also referred to as the Ukrainian Medical Charitable Service) was the successor organization of the Ukrainian Red Cross. Once the Ukrainian Red Cross was banned by the international community, the Ukrainian Catholic Church took care of the organization and renamed it Ukrainian Sanitary Charitable Service. In 1947, the organization opened up and accepted Ukrainian protestant and orthodox members (Wojtowicz, Geschichte, page 139f).
had been affected by Ukraine’s liberation struggle, stand up for political prisoners, and raise a new intelligentsia. This booklet also stressed the importance of maintaining Ukrainian arts and culture and educating the youth, because “the children, they are the future of our nation.” Many Ukrainians could identify with the idea of a liberated Ukraine, with dedication to the Ukrainian language and culture, and with a strong anti-Soviet attitude, without belonging to a particular political party. However, for the majority of DPs, their own lives took prominence over strictly political issues. For example, while the political parties were still fighting over supremacy in the political arena, the average DP was getting ready to leave the camps for a new destination abroad.

5. From UNRRA to IRO – the Final Acknowledgment of Ukrainians

Ukrainians were not recognized as a separate nationality, but they made their way into UNRRA reports. Nonetheless, “information on the reporting of ‘Ukrainians’ is particularly sketchy in reports from the German operations,” as a contemporary observer put it. In analyzing UNRRA reports one can break down the contexts in which Ukrainians are referred to into three categories. First, scattered statistics in the realms of employment or general aid to displaced persons list ‘Ukrainian’ as an independent category. Secondly, reports of assembly centers such as Lyssenko in the British zone or Ellwangen in the American zone clearly refer to them as ‘Ukrainian camps.’ Furthermore, activities taking place in the camps or on a regional level (such as art exhibitions or sport festivals) are specifically identified as “Ukrainian” in the reports and pictures and reveal actions taken on a cultural as well as a political level. Thirdly, reports that deal with general topics such as religious or recreational life in the camps often referred to a variety of ethnic groups; Ukrainians are specified as one of them and are sometimes compared to other groups. In this context cultural work was seen as something positive which should be reinforced, but self-administration, political activities, and propaganda were considered to be dangerous and had to be kept within certain boundaries. In UNRRA reports Ukrainians often fared rather badly in comparison with other

ethnic groups, especially with the Balts, because of the political struggles and the fights for domination between the different factions of the OUN in the camps. However, whether it was good (cultural sphere) or bad (political sphere) press, the most important thing for our purposes is the fact that Ukrainians were mentioned at all, that they made their way into the reports and thereby ‘affirmed’ their existence already during the UNRRA period.

Once the IRO took over the refugee operations in Germany on 1 July 1947, Ukrainians were officially acknowledged as an ethnic group – however, sometimes they were still listed as Polish Ukrainians or as Ukrainians from the Ukrainian SSR in statistical data. With the new organization, the focus of DP work shifted. Resettlement was on top of the agenda, and more than one million displaced persons found a new home through the help of the IRO, among them more than 110,000 Ukrainians. The resettlement scheme with all its aspects of selecting and screening appropriate candidates will be analyzed in chapter 4 in the context of Canadian immigration policy. For our purposes it is sufficient to point out that the IRO period brought partial relief to Ukrainians because the CRUE as well as diaspora organizations were finally recognized by the international community and could consequently operate more freely. They could now cooperate with the IRO, which meant more influence in the resettlement and relief scheme; and soon the camps were cleared of many of their residents. Although resettlement is usually hailed as a positive experience, it took a toll on those left in the camps, whose prospects for the future grew dimmer and dimmer with every new wave of fellow displaced persons leaving the camps. Life in the camps became harder due to a shortage of food and supplies, and the insecurity of their situation was also a psychological burden for many. To make matters even worse, political strife intensified during the period and made a successful management of the remaining group almost impossible.211 As the IRO period continued, not much was left of the once vibrant camp life that had been so significant for many Ukrainians.

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211 For an overview of the IRO operations see Dyczok, Grand Alliance, pages 148-164. The remaining years in the camps will also be analyzed in chapter 7 in the context of the transition into the German economy.
6. Conclusion

Undoubtedly, the years of camp life in Germany had a tremendous impact on the Ukrainians involved, and the literature on the third wave stresses the importance and exceptionality of that period. However, one has to keep the uniqueness of their experience in perspective – in the context of the overall DP phenomenon, Ukrainians were one group among many. Like their Baltic, Jewish or Polish counterparts, they had to battle food shortages, poor living conditions, and psychological stress from trauma, boredom, and insecurity about the future. Furthermore, the DP experience has to be examined in the context of the outside organizations such as UNRRA or the military authorities. Although a flourishing camp life was dependent on resourcefulness of the DPs, it could only prosper because DPs were provided with food and accommodation by the allied authorities. Furthermore, DPs had to operate in a framework set by UNRRA and the military; they were dependent on structures and decisions which were established on a higher organizational level. For example, employees in the camps were paid by UNRRA, and UNRRA or the military had the power to interfere with camp activities which they deemed undesirable.

The DP experience involved a relationship between two groups which had different degrees of power. Outwardly it seemed that DPs lacked the capability to take control of their lives; however, the analysis of the material, supported by Marta Dyczok’s study, reveals a certain influence on part of the DPs, with Ukrainians as an example. Their actions are reflected in UNRRA reports, and their refusal to be repatriated not only bewildered the authorities, ultimately it also led to an acceptance of Ukrainians as an ethnic group as well as a change of attitude towards refugees in general, as Marta Dyczok has pointed out. However, this influence on part of Ukrainians could only be subtle and indirect. The discrepancy of power, which was especially pronounced in the early DP period, manifested itself in the high level of repatriation and the patronizing attitude on part of some UNRRA officials.212 The examination of the relationship between UNRRA and the

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212 The analysis of UNRRA sources leads us to insights which go beyond the Ukrainian example; the ranking scheme, for example, hints at a feeling of superiority and an understanding on part of some UNRRA officials that they had to bring democracy to the DPs. This interpretation should not be generalized for UNRRA as an organization; the evidence collected is not broad enough to draw
Ukrainian DPs has already revealed some of the particularities of the Ukrainian case, such as the extent of their lobbying with the authorities, and it is worth recapitulating them here in conclusion.

The most important topic for DPs was the question of repatriation, and Ukrainians are an outstanding example due to the political realities in their homeland and the fact that they were not recognized as a separate nationality. These two features set them apart from the rest of the DPs and led to another element of Ukrainian DP life – the high level of lobbying as well as intense attempts to form umbrella organizations early on. It then becomes obvious that the threat of repatriation combined with non-recognition accelerated the scale of organizational efforts such as lobbying which brought Ukrainians into contact with the authorities. Another aspect of the Ukrainian case was the internal friction which took place on a high organizational level in the camps and beyond. These conflicts drew the authorities’ attention to the Ukrainian group, so one can assert that these negative features had one positive aspect to them – they set Ukrainians apart from other groups and led to a reaffirmation of their distinctiveness in the eyes of the authorities, although the judgment was not necessarily positive since political activities were discouraged in the camps. The UNRRA sources give us an insight into this aspect of camp life, one which does not feature prominently in the Ukrainian perspective on this issue. Taking the high level of organizational activities, the proclamation of a common cause such as the independence of Ukraine, or a deeply rooted anti-Sovietism into consideration, the Ukrainian phenomenon in the camps can be best described as ‘unity in diversity.’ Divisions along political, religious, or even geographical lines were not eradicated and were eventually carried into the diaspora. However, despite all tensions and divisions, a Ukrainian identity was developed that went beyond the boundaries of one particular political faction and encompassed common features such as a strong anti-Soviet

such a wide-ranging conclusion. Nonetheless, the inconsistency between policy development at headquarters and its implementation on local levels, as well as the differing attitudes of UNRRA officials toward DPs have shown what a diverse organization UNRRA was. Only a detailed study of UNRRA can properly deal with the topic of local implementation versus official policy as well as the issue of prejudices and even pro-Sovietism. The conclusion which can be drawn for our case is that DPs were dependent on sympathy of UNRRA and military officials in the context of repatriation, but could, on the other hand, have some influence on that attitude (change through action).
attitude, dedication to the independence of Ukraine combined with a high level of organizational structures and life. Charles Taylor’s and Benedict Anderson’s theory of identity formation and nation building can help us to explain these features.

In his essay “The Politics of Recognition” Charles Taylor makes the argument that identity is formed in a dialogical process with ‘significant others.’ Historically he sets the beginning of this process with the decline of social hierarchies. According to him, language – not only in the form of spoken words, but also general expression through, for example, art – is an important factor in the process of identity formation. Recognition by outside forces such as ‘significant others’ as well as the state are important for the healthy development of identity.213 If we take the case of Ukrainian identity formation in the DP camps, two crucial features become obvious. On the one hand, the lumping together of Ukrainians of different class and geographical backgrounds broke down the traditionally existing hierarchical structures and made possible the development of an identity which was not bound to a specific class or region. Second, this identity was not officially recognized by the authorities, which not only put the identity itself in jeopardy but actually threatened the lives of many Ukrainians, especially those from eastern Ukraine. Recognition was important for identity formation; and in order to gain such recognition, a Ukrainian element was inserted into each aspect of camp life. This is where the nature of the camps played an important role. They were artificial units separated from the main stream society which, for the first time for many of the inhabitants, allowed for almost unlimited artistic and linguistic expression. This is a crucial component in the development of a national consciousness, as Benedict Anderson skillfully shows in his book *Imagined Communities*. In his theory, the print media for example, gave people of one nation the opportunity to celebrate something like a ‘mass ceremony,’ where “each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest idea. Furthermore, this ceremony is incessantly repeated at daily or half-daily intervals throughout the calendar. What more vivid figure for the secular,

historically-clocked, imagined community can be envisioned.”\textsuperscript{214} The camps with their artificial seclusion and unlimited focus on cultural expression gave Ukrainians the opportunity to experience the creation of such simultaneous situations – petitions to the authorities on behalf of all Ukrainians, staging of Ukrainian art-, sport- or music-festivals, synchronized school curricula, celebrations of Ukrainian holidays and heroes etc. Transfers from one camp to another, which often took place especially in 1945/46,\textsuperscript{215} brought Ukrainians into contact with brethren residing in different parts of Germany. In addition, camp names such as Orlyk or Lyssenko suggested the existence of a ‘little Ukraine’ within the borders of Germany. Since all Ukrainian activities were at some point forbidden, these activities can be classified as ‘political,’ even though not all Ukrainian DPs necessarily sympathized with a political faction in particular. Camps made an imagination and expression of Ukraine outside the geographical boundaries of homeland possible, a phenomenon and understanding which Ukrainians would take with them into the diaspora.

The end of the 1940s marked the exodus of many Ukrainian DPs into an insecure future abroad, whether it was in Canada, the US, Australia or South America. The farewell was not an easy one as for many of those leaving Germany (i.e. Europe) the move also meant leaving Ukraine behind. The hope of a quick return into a liberated homeland had once more faded into the background, making space for an immediate challenge – settlement abroad.


\textsuperscript{215} Here take Mittenwald as an example: the conglomerate of camps received newcomers from abolished camps such as Füssen.
Chapter 3: Ukrainians in Canada during the Second World War

1. Introduction

After exploring the situation for Ukrainian displaced persons in the postwar period, it is now time to focus the attention on the situation in the receiving country, Canada. Before determining the conditions in the country at the time of immigration, we must first examine the situation for Ukrainians during the formative war years. The Second World War was one of the most decisive periods in Canadian history. For more than a year – between spring of 1940 and June of 1941 – Canada was Britain’s most important war ally. Through this new position on the international stage, Canada gained more importance and influence in worldwide affairs. However, the war not only affected Canada’s status in the international sphere, it also transformed the country’s domestic scene. Only six years, from 1939 to 1945, made Canada a different country. By 1945, Canadians had witnessed the introduction of higher income taxes, social and health insurance, and advanced union rights, just to name the most crucial developments. Apart from the wider Canadian context, the war years were also one of the most significant periods for the so-called ‘ethnic communities’ in Canada – all those people of non-British, non-French and non-Native origin. In a way, the war was a contradictory event. On the one hand, Germans, Italians, and especially Japanese, as well as communists, faced internment and other restrictions due to their status as enemy aliens. On the other hand, the Canadian government was sincerely interested in drawing the ethnic communities into the war effort in Europe and on the home

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1 For a concise overview of Canada’s military achievements, international treaties such as the Ogdensburg Agreement or the Hyde Park Agreement, and more information about topics such as the conscription crisis, see: Desmond Morton, 1945. When Canada won the War (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1995) (Booklet No. 54). Military achievements as well as domestic developments are also treated in depth in the following works: Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, Canada, 1900-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), pages 317-387; Jack L. Granatstein and Desmond Morton, A Nation Forged in Fire. Canadians in the Second World War 1939-1945 (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1989); Desmond Morton, Canada at War (Toronto, Vancouver: Butterworth and Company, 1981), pages 104-149. The topic of social welfare is explored in: Jack L. Granatstein, Canada’s War. The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945. Second Edition (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1990).

2 This is a definition of the time. For an example of usage, see: LAC RG 26 Vol. 29, Foreign Language Press 1945-1961, V. J. Kaye, Editorial Section of the Canadian Citizenship Branch, 1 November 1945.
front. Nonetheless, the issue of war was not an easy one for many groups, who felt torn between old-world allegiances and new-world loyalties. Ukrainians in Canada can serve as a good example of how the war changed the standing of ethnic groups in Canada, and how these groups tried to cope with their ‘divided loyalties.’ Developments took place that would turn out to be important for their future interaction with the government as well as the new wave of Ukrainian immigrants.

1.1. Secondary Literature

Times of crisis, such as war or depression, are particularly significant for minorities in a country because they expose majority attitudes towards them. The Second World War is no exception to this rule. Irving Abella and Harold Troper revealed in 1983 how Canadian racist attitudes, which were reflected in its refugee policy, had prevented the entry of thousands of Jewish refugees before and during the Second World War. However, Canada’s xenophobia did not affect only its refugee policy, but also the situation of minorities within the country. The most outstanding example is the treatment of the Japanese in Canada which involved interment, dispersal, confiscation of property, and deportation. The handling of the Japanese case recalls the situation of ‘enemy aliens’ during the First World War, when many groups such as Germans or Ukrainians were faced with censorship, disenfranchisement, internment, or even deportation.

Due to the similarities in the treatment of minorities during the First and Second World War, the question arises whether the situation for ethnic groups in the 1940s was different from that during the First World War. To what extent were these groups truly involved in the war effort? Can the Second World War be described as a war of Canada’s ethnic minorities? The collection of articles entitled On Guard for Thee is dedicated to these questions; the different contributions examine the situation for ethnic minorities during the war and deal with topics such

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5 See for example: Frances Swyripa and John Herd Thompson, ed., Loyalties in Conflict: Ukrainians in Canada during the Great War (Edmonton: CIUS Press, 1982).
as the rise of bureaucracy during that period. Norman Hillmer, one of the editors of this book, asserts that the Second World War was an “(un)national” experience, stressing that anti-immigrant and anti-immigration feelings were wide-spread in Canada at the time. The author takes the suspension of civil liberties as examples and states that the government provided inadequate responses to the real needs of ethnic minorities. Lubomyr Luciuk and Bohdan Kordan, who analyze the topic of nation-building with special reference to Ukrainian Canadians, also come to the conclusion that the state fell short of understanding and coping with the Ukrainians in the country.

Other historians take a different stand on this topic and interpret the developments in the country in a more positive light. Although he acknowledges restrictive measures against ‘enemy aliens’ during the Second World War and concurs that the situation for Japanese in Canada was especially bleak, John Herd Thompson points out that the intensity and focus of these measures had changed. Although some Germans and Italians as well as communists in general faced repressions due to their status within the country, Thompson stresses that the government’s attitude had at least partially improved; he cites the treatment of the Ukrainian nationalist faction as a positive example. According to him, the majority of ethnic groups fared better during the Second World War in comparison to the First World War. Most of the victimized ethnic groups (with the exception of the Hutterites, for example) were better integrated into mainstream Canadian life after the war – although the motivation for this integration might have varied. In his opinion “some of this came as a result of the war’s economic effects: military service and jobs in wartime industry drew Ukrainians, Germans, and Mennonites out of homogenous rural settlements in western Canada. But some assimilation was a response to the humiliating blow the wartime experience dealt to ethnic

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identity." Howard Palmer supports this view, pointing out that the war had a different influence on minority groups within the country. Although there was an early backlash against Germans in Canada due to military developments in Europe, Germans in Alberta, for example, fared generally better during the Second World War in comparison to the First World War. Palmer stresses that the same was true for the majority of Ukrainians. The author also takes the situation of the Hutterites and Mennonites to illustrate different ways of reacting to the war and Canadian developments: the Mennonites tried to assimilate to the changing circumstances and faced less hostility than the Hutterites, for example, who were strictly against any form of assimilation. The literature on ethnic minorities during the Second World War has shown that there were different ways of treating minority groups as well as varying group responses to the developments in Canada. In this context, the case of Ukrainian Canadians is of particular interest to us.

The specific literature on Ukrainians and the Second World War has broadened during recent years. Thomas Prymak provided us with the first in-depth study of the situation of Ukrainians in Canada and abroad, examining the Ukrainian language press in particular. The question of military service is of special importance to him because the high level of Ukrainian enlistment during the war has reached the status of an actual ‘myth’ within the nationalist community. The government’s attitude towards the Ukrainian-Canadian community during the Second World War is examined in greater depth in the abovementioned article by Luciuk and Kordan, as well as in Bohdan Kordan’s Canada and the Ukrainian Question. The book critically analyzes the Canadian government’s approach to both the Ukrainian question in general and the group in the country, stressing that the Canadian state fell short of actually fulfilling the goal – international justice –

9 John Herd Thompson, Ethnic Minorities during Two World Wars (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1991), 10-17, quote from page 17.
11 Thomas Prymak, Maple Leaf and Trident. The Ukrainian Canadians during the Second World War (Toronto: MHSO, 1988).
13 Bohdan Kordan, Canada and the Ukrainian Question, 1939-1945. A Study in Statecraft (Montreal, Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001). One of the major criticisms of this book is the fact that there is no bibliography included, nor is there an evaluation of existing literature, which makes it harder to contextualize this work. Furthermore, sometimes the reader gets lost in meticulous government correspondence that diverts the attention from an overall picture.
for which the country initially went to war. In order to deal with the community in
the country, the government used different means such as increased RCMP
surveillance, a topic that receives attention in Kordan’s book and is also examined
in a recent article by Myron Momryk.14 Another important step was the
government’s help – some would call it intervention – in creating an umbrella
organization (the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC)) for the Ukrainian
community in Canada. Information about the evolution of this umbrella
organization can be found in an article by Oleh Gerus,15 and Fred Dreisziger
analyzes the special role of Tracy Philipps in the process of uniting the different
Ukrainian-Canadian factions during the Second World War.16 However, one must
not forget that the Ukrainian community in Canada was highly divided between
pro- and anti-communists at the time, and this division played an important role
during the war. In his book The Shattered Illusion, John Kolasky deals extensively
with the situation of Ukrainian pro-communists in Canada during and after the
Second World War, analyzing such aspects as internment, confiscation of property,
the changing relationship with the government, and the ideological struggle with
the Ukrainian nationalist faction.17 The existing literature and the contrasting
interpretations of the Canadian wartime experience guide the questions and
approach for this chapter.

14 Myron Momryk, “The Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Surveillance of the Ukrainian
Canadian Community,” Journal of Ukrainian Studies 28 (2) (2003), 89-112, pages 100-108. The
RCMP actually hired a constable – Michael Petrowsky, a Ukrainian-Canadian journalist – whose
task it was to supply information and analysis of developments within the Ukrainian-Canadian
community. In order to gather such information, Petrowsky attended conferences and congresses of
the different organizations in Canada (Momryk, “The Royal Canadian,” pages 101-106).
15 Oleh W. Gerus, “The Ukrainian Canadian Committee,” in A Heritage in Transition, ed. Lupul,
195-214.
16 N. Fred Dreisziger, “Tracy Philipps and the Achievement of Ukrainian-Canadian Unity,” in
Canada’s Ukrainians, ed. Luciuk, 326-341.
17 John Kolasky, The Shattered Illusion. The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in
Canada (Toronto: PMA Books, 1979). For another examination of the Ukrainian left, see also:
Donald Avery, “Divided Loyalties: The Ukrainian Left and the Canadian State,” in Canada’s
Ukrainians, ed. Luciuk, 271-287. Situating the topic of communists in the country in the wider
international context, the article collection Canadian-Soviet Relations is helpful (Aloysius
collection the following articles are of particular interest: Aloysius Balawyder, “Canada in the
Uneasy War Alliance,” (pages 1-14); Samuel J. Nesdoly, “Changing Perspectives: The Ukrainian-
Canadians [sic] Role in Canadian-Soviet Relations,” (pages 107-127)). Some sources concerning the
Ukrainian-Canadian left can be found in John Kolasky, ed., Prophets and Proletarians. Documents
on the History of the Rise and Decline of Ukrainian Communism in Canada (Edmonton: CIUS
1.2. Source Base, Approach and Major Questions

The case of Ukrainian Canadians is a good example of important developments during and after the war; an examination can further reveal the self-understanding of the group in Canada. Ukrainians are not only an interesting case because of their internal political divisions, but also due to their relationship to the homeland. During the Second World War, the territories which today form Ukraine were one of the most important theatres of war and were alternately under Soviet and German rule. The developments in Europe interested and influenced Ukrainians in Canada, because of their concern over the fate of their brethren abroad as well as the question of what would happen to these territories once the war was over. Accordingly, their position in Canada has to be analyzed in the context of the homeland question. Although the focus will be on the nationalist faction of the community, the fate of the communists will be also touched upon. Since the topic has gained wider attention, especially in Ukrainian-Canadian studies, this analysis summarizes the major developments, structures them in a different way, adds the aspect of Ukrainian-Canadian and Ukrainian-American cooperation and interprets the attitude of the Canadian government in a more positive light, especially since the wider immigration literature is taken into consideration.

In order to examine internal developments as well as external presentations of Ukrainians in Canada, two kinds of sources were used. Publications by the UCC about the congress held in 1943 give us an insight into the internal discourse and developments. The Ukrainian Quarterly, a journal published by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA), the UCC’s counterpart in the U.S., serves as a source for resolutions composed by the UCCA and the UCC and also sheds light on the cooperation between Ukrainians from the US and Canada. On the other hand, government correspondence and RCMP surveillance reports from the LAC collections can give us an insight into government attitudes towards Ukrainians and Ukrainians’ self-presentation when dealing with the government.

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18 Thomas Prymak makes us aware that the term ‘nationalist’ has at least two different levels of meaning. On the one hand, it is often used to describe any organization that is not communist in its ideology; on the other hand, authors like Prymak use it to refer to “describe members of an avowedly nationalist organization thoroughly committed to anti-Communism and to the struggle for Ukrainian independence” (Prymak, Maple Leaf, page 2). In this paper, the term nationalist will be used for the organized anti-communist factions.
The following questions have to be addressed when analyzing how the Ukrainian community in Canada developed during the crucial war years. How did nationalist and communist Ukrainians deal with the question of war and the international developments that affected Canada and the Ukrainian territories? Did the Ukrainian nationalists manage to juggle old-world allegiances and new-world loyalties? What kind of strategies did they employ? How did international developments and community affiliation affect their standing in Canada and how did they position themselves? The analysis of the existing community in Canada is also of crucial importance in the overall approach of this work. We can only assess the DPs’ experience in the country if we know how Canada (and especially the Ukrainian-Canadian community) developed during the war. Our focus is on the organized community in Canada, because the war had a significant influence on the development of organized Ukrainian life in Canada. The period of the Second World War can be divided into two major phases – from the outbreak of war in September 1939 to June 1941, and from Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 until the end of the war in May 1945. During these two phases, the opposing factions of the Ukrainian-Canadian community had different positions within the country and had to deal with varying challenges. The first phase turned out to be formative for the nationalist faction of the community and challenging for the communist part.

2. Canada and the Initial Years of War

Canada declared war on Germany on September 10, 1939. According to Morton, the country went to war for pretty much the same reasons as in 1914 – out of loyalty to the British Empire. But unlike 1914, there was not a wave of enthusiasm sweeping across Canada – the war was rather seen as a grim necessity. Nonetheless, even before the war was officially declared, the nationalist Ukrainian faction pledged their full support to the war effort, maybe because they “had still not forgotten the unfortunate position of their fathers at the start of the First World War,” as Prymak suggests. After a short wave of enthusiasm for a war against Hitler in early September, the communists within the country soon brought their position in line with that of the Soviet Union, which had annexed eastern Poland in

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19 Morton, *Canada and War*, page 104f.
accordance with the non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Hitler Germany. Claiming that the eastern territories had been ‘liberated’ by the Red Army, their interpretation of the war quickly changed from it being anti-fascist to ‘imperialistic.’\textsuperscript{20} Despite this change of opinion, major pro-communist newspapers like \textit{Narodna Hazeta} did not openly oppose the war to avoid alienating the government.\textsuperscript{21} They were well aware that the Canadian government thoroughly scrutinized minorities’ reactions to the war, and, as Prymak states, “these Ukrainian-Canadian reactions to the outbreak of the war in Europe were of considerable interest to the general Canadian public.”\textsuperscript{22} One of the reasons for this particular attention was the numerical strength and the geographically concentrated settlement of the group.

With more than 300,000 members, Ukrainians were the second biggest ethnic group in Canada at the time of the war.\textsuperscript{23} They predominantly lived in the three Prairie Provinces and the majority (48.2\%) was employed in agriculture.\textsuperscript{24} Through a network of schools, community organizations, and churches they had managed to maintain part of their culture, focusing on the Ukrainian language as an important vehicle. More than 90\% of all Ukrainians spoke Ukrainian, and 79\% of the community was affiliated with one of the major denominations (Ukrainian Catholic or Orthodox).\textsuperscript{25} As mentioned above, the community was divided along pro- and anti-communist as well as denominational lines. This division is often seen as a negative feature of the community; however, Oleh Gerus points out that

\textsuperscript{20} Prymak, \textit{Maple Leaf}, pages 35-38. For a change in the Soviet interpretation of the war, see also: Black, \textit{Canada in the Soviet Mirror}, pages 121-124.
\textsuperscript{21} Kolasky, \textit{The Shattered Illusion}, page 27f.
\textsuperscript{22} Prymak, \textit{Maple Leaf}, page 38.
\textsuperscript{23} According to government definition, the ‘other ethnic groups’ (often just referred to as ‘ethnic groups’) were all those groups of non-native, non-British and non-French background. Out of these groups, Ukrainians were the second largest one. See table of the 1941 census in Hillmer, “The Second World War,” page XIII. The Germans were the largest group with 464,682 members.
\textsuperscript{24} Leo Driedger, “Urbanization of Ukrainians in Canada: Consequences for Ethnic Identity,” in \textit{Changing Realities. Social Trends among Ukrainian Canadians}, ed. Roman Petryshyn (Edmonton: CIUS Press, 1980), 107-133, page 109, table 2 page 110. 66\% of all Ukrainians lived in rural areas; this explains the high numbers for agricultural employment. 29\% of all Ukrainians lived in Manitoba, 26\% in Saskatchewan, and 23\% in Alberta. Roughly 16\% of all Ukrainians had chosen Ontario as their home, and the remaining 6\% were distributed among British Columbia, Quebec and the Maritimes, although the Ukrainian population in the Maritimes was negligible with only 735 people (page 110). For employment figures see: William Darcovich, “The ‘Statistical Compendium’: An Overview of Trends,” in \textit{Changing Realities}, ed. Petryshyn, 3-17, pages 10-11.
\textsuperscript{25} Darcovich, “The ‘Statistical Compendium,’” page 12.
there are also positive aspects to it. According to him “the competition intensified organizational life and gave it a national basis. The oral and literary polemics could only be sustained with nation-wide funds, and national organizations with appropriate newspapers became indispensable. Equally important, the competition stimulated a national consciousness in many.” And this national consciousness became a factor of interest to the Canadian government which tried to find a way to deal with the different factions of the Ukrainian-Canadian community during a time of crisis.

However, during the first months of the war, the Canadian government did not really face major issues, either at home or abroad. Of course, recruitment started and the limited Canadian army had to be mobilized, but overall the country faced what some historians have labeled a ‘phony war’. The situation changed entirely when Germany invaded Denmark and Norway in April 1940 and started its Blitzkrieg on neighboring France, Holland, and Belgium only a month later. Furthermore, once Fascist Italy under Mussolini became an ally of Nazi-Germany, the war was extended to Africa and the Mediterranean. The ‘phony war’ was over. Hitler’s Germany had overrun Britain’s major allies, and by early summer 1940 Canada saw itself bumped up to Britain’s most important partner in the war. Apart from their military consequences, developments in Europe also influenced Canadian domestic policies. The circumstances seemed more and more pressing not only on the European front, but also at home. Unity was desperately needed and the government took steps to ensure this.

2.1. Internment and Restriction – the Situation for the Communists
As the war grew more severe, one of the major responses of the Great War was also employed for the Second World War – to intern those ‘elements’ that were deemed dangerous for the war effort and to outlaw their organizations. The Defense of Canada Regulations, declared under the War Measures Act, made the “wholesale suspension of civil rights in the country” possible. Besides Germans and Italians,
this affected predominantly communists, and with them a sizable number of Ukrainians in the country. The Ukrainian communists were mainly organized around the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA), an organization that had emerged in 1918 and that boasted 10,000 members in 1939. Officially, the ULFTA was a cultural organization; however, many of its members were also affiliated with the Communist Party of Canada (CPC). Until 1941, communists in Canada – including Ukrainians – were opposed to the war, and the Canadian government outlawed the Communist Party and with it the ULFTA on June 4, 1940. The property of these organizations (including newspapers such as Narodna Hazeta) was seized and leased or sold, often to members of the Ukrainian nationalist faction. Furthermore, important leaders of the ULFTA were interned; and Kolasky makes us aware that during this period the ULFTA suffered more than the CPC itself, because the leaders of the latter either left the country or went into hiding, whereas thirty-three leaders of the ULFTA were actually interned. However, although official communist organizations had been crushed by the government, activities did not cease. Eventually, the CPC as well as the Ukrainian communists continued their work underground or through new organizations and representatives. However, despite all efforts at continuation, the situation for communists in Canada would really change only with Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Until then, the Canadian government had successfully limited one part of Canadian society which it considered undesirable and potentially dangerous.

Interment and restriction was something that was deemed to work for the communist part of society, but officials soon realized that this was not the way to deal with the larger majority of the ethnic groups. Although RCMP officials had suggested the prohibition of Ukrainian organizations and internment for their

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30 Ol’ha Woycenko, “Community Organizations,” in A Heritage in Transition, ed. Lupul, 173-194, page 179f. 10% of the ULFTA were also members of the CPC.
31 Although the sale to the nationalist faction had not taken place intentionally – as the government side stressed, no group had been favored and the halls had simply been sold to the highest bidders – it would cause problems once the communists were officially reinstated in Canada (Kordan, Canada, page 102f.)
leaders due to Ukrainian lobbying for independence, none of these recommendations were followed. Rather than restricting them, the government made serious efforts to draw ethnic anti-communist elements closer into the war effort. This was an important development for the Ukrainian nationalist factions, because the government sensed that the time had come to unite the quarrelling groups to make them work for the war effort; the newly created Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) was meant to be a tool for this purpose. Before dealing with the actual formation process of the UCC, we have to take a closer look at the make-up of the community, the different types of organizations and their ideological orientation.

2.2. The Nationalist Faction during the Early War Years

Among the nationalist faction of the Ukrainian-Canadian community, four organizations dominated the scene by the end of the 1930s. Two of these groups – the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League (USRL) and the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics (BUC) – had their roots in the pioneer period of the first wave of Ukrainian migration at the turn of the 19th century. The initiators of the USRL were school teachers in the community, the founders of the newspaper **Ukrains’kyi Holos**, or supporters of **bursy** and **narodni domy**, in a nutshell, the leaders of important community institutions of the early settlement period. The USRL started as a local organization and was initially held together ideologically by the newspaper **Ukrains’kyi Holos**; a national structure was eventually established in 1927. The USRL had special sections for women and children and a wide variety of community centers. Over time, the organization became strongly affiliated with the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church due to the denominational attachment of its leaders. The USRL stressed its loyalty to Canada and its responsibility within the country but also focused on the preservation of Ukrainian heritage and the struggle for an independent Ukraine. USRL was very dynamic in the late 1920s and early

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33 Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question*, pages 22, 56 (Kordan mentions the Ukrainian National Federation (UNF) in particular). The author meticulously outlines internal memos on Ukrainian-Canadian activities and their initial hopes concerning Ukraine’s independence that were sparked by the developments in Carpatho Ukraine in 1939. For a short while, an independent Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic was declared; however, only two weeks later it was annexed by Hungary. According to Kordan, this interlude made it clear to Ukrainians in Canada that the Ukrainian question was vital to peace in Europe, and that a future independent Ukraine relied on Britain, not Germany (Kordan, *Canada*, pages 11-58, particularly 13ff, 34).
1930s; and Ol’ha Woycenko sees the association as the “avant-garde among Ukrainian organizations” at the time because it organized protest meetings and appeals concerning issues such as the collectivization or the famine in Ukraine. However, by the late 1930s, the organization had lost some of its appeal due to internal denominational differences in the organization. Here Oleh Gerus makes us aware that the USRL did not become an “all-embracing nationalist organization” because of its pronounced ties to the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church which, for example, alienated Catholic Ukrainians. Indeed, religion divided community life, and another organization that went back to the early 20th century served the Catholic counterparts in the community – the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics, which had its roots in the early sister- and brotherhoods of the community. In 1932, the central lay-organization was founded which had special sections for women and children. With an outlook comparable to that of the USRL, BUC was interested in preserving Ukrainian heritage and promoting Ukrainian independence in the context of Canadian society and loyalty.

In contrast to the USRL and BUK, the United Hetman Organization (UHO) and the Ukrainian National Federation (UNF) were organizations of the second wave that came during the interwar period. The United Hetman Organization started out in 1924 as the Sich organization, renamed in 1928 into the Canadian Sich Organization and in 1934 into the United Hetman Organization. UHO had a monarchist outlook and maintained Skoropadskyi’s family’s claim to “the throne of an independent Ukraine.” Although the UHO was situated at the periphery of Ukrainian-Canadian community life by the outbreak of the war, it still attracted

35 Oleh W. Gerus, “Consolidating the Community: The Ukrainian Self-Reliance League,” in Canada’s Ukrainians, ed. Luciuk, 157-186, page 164ff. Especially many members of the younger generation felt uncomfortable with the strong Orthodox outlook of the organization and did not join for this reason.
37 Woycenko, “Community Organizations,” page 182f.
38 Danylo Skoropadsky, the son of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, toured Ukrainian communities in Canada in 1937/38 and enjoyed quite a warm welcome. Already two years later the Ministry of External Affairs observed deteriorating support for the Hetman’s son. Nonetheless, the probability of Ukrainian-Canadian enthusiasm for an independent Ukraine endorsed by Hitler continued to worry the authorities (LAC RG 25 Vol. 2095, File: 39/1, Letter from Robertson to High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain, 15 June 1939, pages 1-5). The United Hetman
attention by the RCMP and the Ministry of External affairs because of its “anti-
democratic and pro-German tendencies.” Their interest was further heightened
once Hitler attacked the Soviet Union and thus brought the question of an
independent Ukraine back on the table. According to Robertson, the Secretary of
State for External Affairs, the UHO was a potential danger to the country if it kept
its connections with the Hetman Centre in Europe and nourished the hope of a
Ukrainian state under the tutelage of Skoropadskyi’s son and backed by Hitler.

The UHO was not the only association with possible pro-German leanings
that worried the Canadian government. The authorities especially kept an eye on
the Ukrainian National Federation, a nationalist organization with OUN-leanings
that was founded in 1932 by members of the Ukrainian War Veterans’ Association.
UNF’s main concern was Ukraine’s liberation and the fight against the communist
movement in Canada. In the eyes of many of the interwar immigrants who joined
UNF, the existing Ukrainian-Canadian organizations did not approach the issue of
independence with enough fervor and focused too much on Canadian issues.
Despite its criticism of the existing institutions, UNF attracted members of the first
wave, among them Alexander Gregorovich, the organization’s first national
president, and future Member of Parliament Anthony Hlynka, who was also a
founding member. UNF established a women’s and a youth section, built a
network of halls across Canada, and developed into an important Ukrainian-
Canadian organization during the 1930s. Once UNF’s claims that Ukraine’s

Organization had been quite strong in Canada in the early 1930s (Golczewski, “Ukrainische
Emigration,” page 238f).

39 LAC RG 25 Vol. 2095, File: 39/1, Letter from Robertson, Secretary of State for External Affairs,
to the High Commissioner for Canada in the UK, 10 October 1941.
40 LAC RG 25 Vol. 2095, File: 39/1, Letter from Robertson, Secretary of State for External Affairs,
to the High Commissioner for Canada in the UK, 10 October 1941. For more information, see also:
LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, 165-39cIII, Report regarding the United Hetman Organization of Canada,
by M. Petrowsky, 8 September 1941, pages 1-11.
41 Anthony Hlynka, born in 1907 in Galicia, immigrated at the age of three with his parents to
Canada where the family settled in Alberta. Hlynka was the second Ukrainian Canadian elected to
the House of Commons where he served between 1940 and 1949 (Oleh W. Gerus, “Introduction,” in
The Honourable Member for Vegreville. The Memoirs and Diary of Anthony Hlynka, MP, ed. Oleh
W. Gerus and Denis Hlynka (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005), XIX-XLIII). Gerus
points out that Hlynka had a “sense of mission” in representing Ukrainian Canadians (except the
pro-communists) and promoting Ukraine’s liberation (pages XX, XXVII).
42 Woycenko, “Community Organizations,” page 183f. An organization that was close to UNF was
the War Veterans’ Association which was founded in 1928 in Canada and comprised mostly former
independence was not only a matter of international justice, but also a political necessity grew louder in the early war years, the Canadian authorities devoted more attention to the organization. Concerns about the organization’s OUN leanings (the Melnyk faction after the split of 1940) and pro-German sympathies were perpetuated by secret reports that portrayed the UNF leadership as “fanatics” and stressed the UNF’s devotion to Ukraine’s liberation.

Apart from these major organizations, which are of particular interest to us because they were the founding members of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, other smaller organizations had flourished in the interwar period, for example, mutual aid associations such as the Workers’ Benevolent Society of Canada on the national level and many others on the local one. A number of narodni domy and enlightenment societies existed in cities such as Winnipeg and Toronto, where they had remained independent of a national structure due to their diverse membership. On the local level the parishes and schools (especially the ridni shkoly and bursy) played a crucial role in community life and development. Ukrainian life in Canada was structured by a network of local and nationwide organizations, but only the big ones like the UNF or the USRL actually gained recognition from the government, especially once the war in Europe spiraled out of control.

2.3. The Formation of the UCC

The idea of a representative body for Ukrainians in Canada was not new in 1940; attempts to unify the different nationalist factions had been made before from within the Ukrainian-Canadian community. Ol’ha Woycenko sees the Central Committee of 1920 as a forerunner of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, arguing that it set a pattern for future unifying forces although it had not been permanent. The Central Committee had joined existing Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic

solids of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen or the Ukrainian Galician Army. Although many of them joined UNF, the veterans’ association continued to exist independently.

organizations to coordinate the work of the Ukrainian Red Cross. This Central Committee was the first, but not the last attempt to unite the different Ukrainian-Canadian groups. In 1933, the Ukrainian-Canadian community unsuccessfully attempted to join forces in order to synchronize protests against the persecution of Ukrainians in Western and Eastern Ukraine. In 1938, the heads of three of the major Ukrainian organizations in Canada – Vasyl (Basil) Kushnir of BUC, Teodor Datskiv, editor of Kanadiisky Farmer, representing the UHO, and three representatives of the USRL began talks concerning a representative body. The discussion failed because of internal rivalries over leadership and political direction. The Czechoslovakia Crisis and especially the outbreak of the war made the need for a representative body clearer than ever to the community organizations. However, instead of one unifying body, two committees emerged – the Representative Committee of Ukrainian Canadians (RCUC), encompassing the UNF and BUC, and a rival, the Ukrainian Central Committee of Canada (UCCC), which represented the UHO, the USRL, and the League of Ukrainian Organizations, a small socialist group. The UNF and the USRL had already been major opponents during the interwar period, and this antagonism was especially expressed in their newspapers Novyi Shliakh and Ukrains’kyi Holos. Unification from within the community seemed impossible.

In this situation, the Canadian government took a deep interest in the Ukrainian-Canadian community, because the state was in dire need of manpower and recruits. Furthermore, according to Luciuk and Kordan, the government was also deeply concerned with the number of memos submitted by Ukrainian Canadians, in which they expressed their hope that the Allied side would acknowledge Ukraine’s claims to independence during the course of war. With the intervention of prominent Canadians like Watson Kirkconnel, Vladimir Kaye,
and George Simpson, and Tracy Philipps from Britain, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee was initiated at the end of 1940. Tracy Philipps undertook a lecture tour of the Prairies Provinces and together with Simpson arranged a gathering of the main Ukrainian-Canadian organizations, emphasizing the interest of the Canadian government in unity among Ukrainian Canadians. Eventually these meetings led to the formation of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee on November 6/7, 1940, in Winnipeg. This umbrella organization encompassed the Ukrainian National Federation, the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics, the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League, the Ukrainian Hetman Organization and the League of Ukrainian Organizations – in a nutshell, groups from the different religious and political factions of Ukrainian society.

The government saw the common interest and support for the idea of a Ukrainian national state as the unifying force for all these organizations - although it was not necessarily supportive of the idea itself. However, during the time of crisis it was important to the Canadian officials “to eliminate as much as possible the friction which had existed amongst Ukrainian groups and to enlist their support for the war effort.” The interests of the Ukrainian organizations and the government are mirrored in the constitution of the UCC. The umbrella organization focused heavily on the co-ordination and intensification of Ukrainian-Canadian participation in the war effort for the victory of “the principles of democracy and Christian civilization, social justice, freedom and independence of peoples.” It further resolved to represent to the government and public the views of “Ukrainians in Europe who are striving to obtain political independence upon the ethnographic Ukrainian territories” and to render them assistance within the framework of the

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52 Vladimir J. Kaye (Kysilewsky) was a civil servant in the Citizenship Branch, Tracy Philipps was a British specialist on Eastern Europe, Watson Kirkconnell was a Professor at McMaster University, and George Simpson was a History Professor at the University of Saskatchewan. Out of the four, only Kaye was Ukrainian; however, all four took a deep interest in Ukrainian affairs (Gerus, “Ukrainian Canadian Committee,” page 197ff).

53 Kordan, Canada, page 38ff.


55 See Kordan, Canada, 28ff. However, Nesdoly states that the government was sympathetic to Ukrainian claims, but that it did not extend support because this was considered to be an impossible endeavor (Nesdoly, “Changing Perspectives,” page 109).

Canadian constitution. Further noted were the goal of maintaining good cooperation between the above-mentioned organizations and to represent the Ukrainian-Canadian community to the public and government. The newly found committee assured the government that it had the support of the entire Ukrainian non-communist community in Canada.\(^\text{57}\)

The catalogue of aims in the UCC constitution reveals something about the self-understanding of Ukrainians in Canada, how and where they saw their position and priorities. The mobilization for the war effort was mentioned first – understandably so, because this was the reason why the UCC was initiated in the first place. However, the representation of the views of Ukrainians striving for independence in Europe already took second place on the agenda. This shows how important this issue was to the organized Ukrainian community in Canada, and furthermore illustrates that they saw themselves as representatives of their brethren abroad – in the context of the Canadian constitution. Here the efforts to juggle the desire to help the homeland and the wish to show loyalty to Canada become obvious. To what extent these aims were realized during the war will be analyzed further in this chapter.

The judgment of the formation of the UCC varies. At the time, the Ukrainian as well as the Canadian press reacted in a positive way, stressing the importance of having achieved unity and cooperation for the war effort.\(^\text{58}\) The interpretation in retrospect is divided. According to Oleh Gerus, “in November 1940 the nationally conscious Ukrainians of Canada became consolidated in the form of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee.” The author sees the formation of this umbrella organization as a “major achievement on the part of the highly individualistic and factious Ukrainians.” \(^\text{59}\) For others, the event itself and especially the government intervention were not positive. According to Luciuk and Kordan “the government involved itself in Ukrainian-Canadian affairs, notably in the creation of an Ukrainian-Canadian committee, thus bequeathing a constraining and inflexible organizational structure that has persisted, largely unmodified, since.” \(^\text{59}\)


\(^{58}\) Gerus, “Ukrainian Canadian Committee,” page 199.

\(^{59}\) Gerus, “Consolidating the Community,” page 157.
their eyes “the measures taken by the Canadian bureaucracy hampered and handicapped Ukrainians well into the postwar period.” The “inflexible organizational structure” needs some explanation. According to the UCC constitution, positions on the executive committee – divided into a presidium and an executive council – were filled with designated members from the different member organizations, which essentially received veto power. For example, the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics had a monopoly on the presidency: Reverend Kushnir filled the first position and – apart from a short interval – stayed there until 1971. This kind of regulation of the organizational structure was intended to prevent the formation of blocks within the community. However, during the 1960s an observer remarked that “there have been some critical observations that the manner of filling executive posts in the committee is not in keeping with democratic principles” because posts within the organization were not rotated, but assigned to one particular organization. In addition to the problem of filling the posts of the organization, the UCC had to reach a unanimous consensus in their decisions, a fact that Luciuk states bestowed “a crippling legacy” upon Ukrainian Canadians.

Whether the formation of the UCC was hailed as a grand community achievement or a rigid structure forced upon the community from the outside, fact is that for the first time ever, it united the major non-communist community organizations and gave them a voice in their dealing with the Canadian government. Although there had been lobbying on behalf of Ukraine and suggestions to integrate Ukrainians into the war efforts before, after November of 1940 the community could approach the issue as an outwardly united front. This was an achievement that they would carry over into the postwar period.

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60 Kordan, Luciuk, “A Prescription,” first quote from page 85, second quote from page 97.
63 Luciuk, Searching for Place, page 48. Luciuk states further that the UCC’s “ad-hoc structure” had been meant initially to last only for the duration of the war.
64 In October of 1939, UNF, for example, proposed to the Canadian government the formation of specific Ukrainian military units in order to facilitate recruitment efforts (Kordan, Canada, page 23f).
before that could happen, the committee and its dual goals would be put to a test due to developments in Europe.

3. Times of Crisis, 1941-1945

The summer of 1941 proved once more that international developments often have an effect on ethnic communities in an immigration country. On June 22, 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union, a step that changed the scope of the war and its alliances. With Hitler-Germany as their common enemy, the British government opted for cooperation with the Soviet Union, thereby adding a new powerful ally to its war coalition. As a partner in war, Canada joined what Balawyder called an “uneasy alliance,” a partnership that would turn out to have profound consequences for Canada’s domestic scene and for Ukrainians in particular. Although talks regarding, and especially demands for a potential independent Ukraine had been unwelcome before the Soviet Union joined the Allies, after June of 1941 the Canadian government was even more careful not to alienate the new ally. And this meant changes for the entire Ukrainian-Canadian community in Canada.

3.1. Consequences for the Communists

Once the Soviet Union joined the war, the situation changed dramatically for the communists in Canada. As an official ally of Canada and Britain, the Soviet Union gained a different status in the world, and with it communists gained a better standing in Canada as well. Even more importantly, communists now fully supported the war effort. A massive wave of activity swept through the community and did not stop at Ukrainians.

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65 Balawyder, “Canada in the Uneasy War Alliance,” pages 9-11. Balawyder points out that despite the immediate support from the Allies, a feeling of uneasiness and distrust lingered on. It expressed itself in the context of the United Nations Commission on War Criminals, UNRRA operations, and technical and military exchanges. This was especially true for Canada since the Soviet Union insisted that Great Britain was to represent the entire Commonwealth, whereas all the Soviet republics were to participate individually.

66 See for example: LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIII, Davis to Robertson, 13 December 1940. This letter deals with the Ukrainian-Canadian community and its relationship to Tracy Philips. Referring to a conversation about British and Canadian policies towards a postwar Ukraine, Davis states: “Immediately [when] I received this letter I wrote to Col. Mess and told him to write to Philips at once and point out that there should not be any discussion publicly or privately, directly or indirectly, along these lines. I pointed out to him the difficulty the British Government was in due to the neutrality of Russia. An independent Ukraine must be carved out of Russia. It is clear that nothing could advisedly be said about this matter at this stage in the war” (page 1). See also: Kordan, Canada, pages 11-58; Nesdoly, “Changing Perspectives,” page 109f.
Like all other communists in the country, Ukrainians began to reorganize themselves, first in the Ukrainian Committee in Aid of the Fatherland, which became the Ukrainian Association to Aid the Fatherland, and finally the Ukrainian Canadian Association. A new paper was also founded – *Ukrains’ke Zhyttia* (Ukrainian Life), and the older paper *Ukrains’ke Slovo* (Ukrainian Word) grew as well. However, the new level of activity was not only restricted to the revival and creation of community organizations and newspapers. Ukrainian communists in Canada displayed their unrestricted support for the war effort through the entertainment of military and civilian audiences across the country, through support drives and rallies. Furthermore, they lobbied for the release of their community leaders and the return of their property. In regard to this matter, the support by other communists as well as some prominent Canadians proved to be very helpful. Public opinion shifted quickly in favor of communists, because the Canadian “pro-Soviet euphoria was at its height” as Soviet forces were on the offensive in Europe, and “pro-communists were riding high on the waves of the Red Army successes.”

Furthermore, many people felt that adherents of such an important ally should not face repression in Canada, claiming that the Defense Act had been arbitrarily applied.

Despite the support from the wider Canadian public, negotiations with the government went rather slowly. The authorities lifted the ban on the communist movement and agreed to restore its confiscated property in October of 1943; however, it took almost two years for Ukrainians to get the matter of the ULFTA Halls settled. In the end, a decision was reached on May 10, 1945, a day after the official end of the war. The government returned the ULFTA halls that had not been sold and paid some compensation for those centers that could no longer be

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67 After the war, the AUUC was founded in 1946 and remained the only Ukrainian pro-communist organization in postwar Canada.
69 Kolasky, *Shattered Illusion*, 69f; Balawyder, “Canada in the Uneasy War Alliance,” pages 3-9 (Apart from the wider Canadian public, the Canadian government also expressed its good will early on, by shipping goods such as flour to the Soviet Union in order to support the war cause. Diplomatic exchange with the Soviet Union was initiated in February of 1942).
It becomes obvious that, although Canada had become an ally of the Soviet Union and although this alliance had a profound effect on international and domestic developments, this did not mean that the situation for the communist community was easy after the summer of 1941. Nonetheless, communist organizations could flourish more openly once the Soviet Union joined the war alliance, and the group in general emerged out of the war stronger than ever. Kolasky attributes this to the fact that “the membership remained loyal, united and disciplined, continuing the cultural activities (although on a smaller scale) after the ULFTA was banned. Their unselfish involvement in the war effort, the Red Cross campaigns and the recruiting drives after the USSR became an ally won for the pro-communists wide public respect and support.”

Over time, the communists in Canada had gained a better standing than ever. The situation for the nationalist faction looked a lot bleaker in comparison.

3.2. The Ukrainian Nationalist Community

The developments of the summer of 1941 challenged the nationalist community in their beliefs and positions. Their worldview was turned upside down: before June of 1941, the war had been the appropriate response to Hitler Germany’s ravaging attacks on its neighboring countries, and the Soviet Union, in a position of neutrality, was under attack by the nationalist faction for its apathy towards Germany and its treatment of Ukraine. Furthermore, Ukraine’s independence was a goal that seemed not completely out of reach during the first two years of war. However, as the government observed, “the German attack on the USSR, and the subsequent acceptance of the USSR as one of the United nations [sic], has obviously been a considerable embarrassment to the Ukrainian nationalists. They have not been prepared to abandon an objective of such long standing as independence for the Ukraine, but at the same time have been quite genuinely interested in supporting the war effort of Canada and the United Nations in general.” Looking back in 1943 the government stated that “they have, therefore, been generally very discreet in their public statements in regard to the Ukrainian

70 For the situation of the Ukrainian communists in Canada during the Second World War, see Kolasky, *Shattered Illusion*, pages 27-47. See also: Avery, “Divided Loyalties,” pages 280-283.
71 Kolasky, *Shattered Illusion*, page 42.
question and until recently have avoided any overt comment on the relation of the USSR to this problem.”

Indeed, after the summer of 1941 it had become harder for the Ukrainian Nationalist community to accommodate both sides – on the one hand showing loyalty to Canada and the war effort, on the other hand pursuing the matter of independence. As an example, UNF called upon its members at the sixth annual provincial convention in Toronto to increase the enlistments in the Canadian army “to the maximum” and to support the war effort in any possible way, for example through campaigns like the Red Cross Drive or the Victory Loan Campaign. This was all to be done to ensure national unity, which was considered to be of utmost importance. However, that did not necessarily mean that the organization’s paper – Novyi Shliakh – relinquished its anti-Soviet stand, because that would have alienated the UNF members who constituted the majority of their readership. A process of juggling started between affirming support for the war and denouncing Soviet policies in Ukraine. However, the government kept an eye on organizations and the foreign language press. In reaction to an ‘uncomfortable’ editorial in Novyi Shliakh “the press censors sent the paper a polite but firm warning that such articles were likely to be harmful to the war effort and, therefore, contravened the Defence of Canada Regulations.” Nonetheless, despite government supervision and the explicit directions on what kind of comments were appropriate during the war, the issue of an independent Ukraine was not forgotten or dropped, but adjusted. Ukrainians in Canada used forums like the First Ukrainian Canadian Congress in Winnipeg in June 1943, Ukrainian-Canadian newspapers, and submissions to the Canadian government to convey their ideas of an independent

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74 The folders LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, 165-39e III und IV can serve as an example for the close RCMP supervision of Ukrainians in Canada. See also Momryk, The Royal Canadian Mounted Police.”
75 Prymak, Maple Leaf, 56f; Nesdoly, “Changing Perspectives,” page 111f.
76 For a detailed account of the First Congress, including different reactions to the congress as well as internal struggles between different Ukrainian nationalist factions, see Prymak, Maple Leaf, pages 88-97.
Ukrainians in Canada during the Second World War

Ukraine. And in this context they also started to join forces with their Ukrainian counterparts in the US.

3.2.1. Joint Canadian and American Ukrainian efforts

During the Second World War, Ukrainians in Canada and the US began a cooperative effort between the two communities, a trend that continued after the war and had a profound influence on their relief efforts for the displaced persons in Europe. During the first years of the war, contacts were rather loose, and it was never quite clear to the Canadian government how far cooperation between the two groups went. For example, in March 1943 a Canadian government paper on Ukrainians in Canada stated that there was not “much evidence of close connection with Ukrainian organizations in the United States although there are occasional contacts” especially between the “fascist and semi-fascist Groups on the two sides of the border.”77 In contrast to this statement an RCMP report from October 1943 stressed that “among Slavic groups in the western hemisphere, only the Ukrainians are represented in Canada by a community as large as that in the USA, and the two communities are in such close touch that they might in effect be described as a single political potential of one million persons.”78

The fact is that the two groups started to work more closely together during the course of the war; this cooperation was spurred by the war itself and the common interest in the fate of Ukraine and Ukrainians abroad. The major indicator of this intensified cooperation was a conference held by representatives of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA) and the UCC in New York City on September 23 and 24, 1944.79 One of the aims of this conference was to explore the possibilities of cooperation between the two committees in particular and Ukrainians in Canada and the US in general. At this conference, the

79 Ukrainian-American Life: Rev. Kushnir, Stephen Shumeyko, “Joint Communique of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the Ukrainian Canadian Congress,” Ukrainian Quarterly 1 (1) (1944/45), 82-84. Attempts for joint conferences had been made before, for example in 1940 in context of the Congress of Americans of Ukrainian Descent in Washington or in 1943 through an Argentine proposal; however, all these attempts had been unsuccessful (LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIV, Ukrainian Separatists of the United States and Canada join Forces, page 2).
representatives affirmed their support for the war effort and their interest in relief work and propaganda for an independent Ukraine. Furthermore, it was stressed that future cooperation should be undertaken in the field of cultural work, here in the context of introducing “into American and Canadian culture the finest elements of their Ukrainian cultural heritage.” The *Ukrainian Quarterly*, a journal published by the UCCA and a forum for joint US-Canadian Ukrainian news, saw this meeting and the joint communiqué as “truly a historic document,” because it marked “the first time in the history of Americans and Canadians of Ukrainian descent that a definite step has been taken toward collaboration between them along lines of common interest.” Furthermore, the *Ukrainian Quarterly* stressed that the UCCA as well as the UCC had wide backing from their respective national Ukrainian organizations as well as the press.

### 3.2.2. Lobbying for an Independent Ukraine

Whether Ukrainians in Canada worked with their brethren across the border or on their own, a specific discourse developed over time that had two major characteristics – lobbying for an independent Ukraine, and claims to represent the entire Ukrainian nation by Ukrainians in North America. However, these were not safe topics, especially after the summer of 1941. Due to the new alliance with the Soviet Union, discussions about the possibility of an independent Ukraine had become even more unacceptable within Canadian society. It was deemed inappropriate to talk about this issue because it concerned the territories officially belonging to the new ally. Nonetheless, independence was an issue close to the hearts of many Ukrainians who were concerned that “the rights of Ukrainians for national unity, freedom and self-government should not be overlooked.” After 1941, Ukrainians in Canada were eager to reconcile their goals of an independent Ukraine with their loyalty to Canada. The UNF, for example, made clear that they believed that “the Ukrainian nation is entitled to build, on its own ethnographic

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80 Kushnir, “Joint Communique,” page 83.
82 Ukrainian-American Life: “Ukrainians of USA and Canada in Cooperation,” *Ukrainian Quarterly* 1 (1) (1944/45), page 81f.
Ukrainians in Canada during the Second World War

territories, a free, independent and sovereign state. We believe that, within the limits of our loyalty to Canada, we should support morally and materially the efforts of the Ukrainian nation towards its political freedom.84 Ways had to be found to argue in favor of Ukrainian independence in the context of the allied war effort. Here international treaties played into the hands of the Ukrainians.

At their first wartime meeting in August 1941, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill devised the Atlantic Charter, a document that would become one of the pillars of the United Nations. The basic principles of the Atlantic Charter were the right of the peoples to choose their kind of government and the right to self-determination. However, for the allied alliance, these rights were understood within the context of the prewar status quo; and Kordan points out that the vagueness of the charter allowed for diverse interpretations.85 The topic of self-determination raised enthusiasm among the Ukrainian-Canadian community. However, the Atlantic Charter also caused some misgiving because there was no specific mentioning of Ukraine.86 Nonetheless, in order to make a case for an independent Ukraine without aggravating the Canadian government, Ukrainian Canadians used the Atlantic Charter as one of their major arguments during the war.

The First Ukrainian Canadian Congress in Winnipeg was one of the major forums to publicize the idea of a free Ukraine based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter. For example Miroslav Stechishin, the editor of Ukrains’kyi Holos, pointed out that the self-determination of nations was one of the Allies’ post-war goals and should also apply to Ukraine.87 The UCC stated in its resolutions at this

85 Kordan, Canada, page 67f. According to Kordan, the British strove for the status quo, i.e. returning to the preexisting order, and in this context the Ukrainian question was of no importance. The author criticizes the gap between the ideals expressed and the policy followed.
86 Prymak, Maple Leaf, pages 57, 61f; See also Kordan, Luciuk, “A Prescription,” page 93f; Luciuk, Searching, page 40f.
Congress – as it had done before – that the Atlantic Charter had affirmed the people’s right of expressing their free will and that this right should also be accorded to Ukrainians in Ukraine. On other occasions, this line of argumentation was repeated. For example, Ukrainians in Alberta pledged to the government after their annual convention in 1943 that Ukrainians in Canada and the US were “looking to the leaders of The United Nations in seeking the establishment of a free Ukrainian State in Europe.” It was argued that the Atlantic Charter had to apply to Ukrainians as well; indeed it was seen as the “sacred duty of the Nations concerned” to ensure the rights of all people. In addition, Ukrainians provided arguments to stress the importance of a free Ukraine for the world.

In the eyes of the Ukrainian communities in North America, Ukraine’s independence was vitally important to ensure lasting peace in the world. Since the ‘Ukrainian problem’ was often seen as one of the reasons for the outbreak of the war, it was argued that this problem had to be solved to assure stability and security in a postwar world. Ukrainians, whose members made up a considerable portion of Canada’s forces, stressed that they were “willing to fight at any time for freedom, but we do not wish to send our sons and daughters overseas every generation to maintain a weak political structure.” The war had to be fought to ensure a strong and balanced world order, and a free Ukraine was seen as one of the

88 UCC, First Ukrainian Canadian Congress, June 22, 23, and 24, 1943, Winnipeg, Canada (Winnipeg: Ketchen Printing, 1943), pages 175-179. Already in March 1943 the UCC, through Anthony Hlynka, had submitted a memorandum to the government in which they had stressed their support for the war effort, but at the same time had “urged the government to consider the justice of the Ukrainian claims to national unity, self-determination and equal treatment according to the principles of the Atlantic Charter which had been publicly proclaimed by the Allies” (Prymak, Maple Leaf, page 90). For a US example arguing along the same lines see the UCCA appeal to President Roosevelt (Stephen Shumeyko, “In Retrospect,” Ukrainian Quarterly 1 (2) (1944/45), 164-173, page 171f.


91 LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIV, RCMP Report on the First Ukrainian Canadian Congress held June 22, 23 and 24, 1943, in Winnipeg, Dr. Pavlychenko, page 17. To fight for a free Ukraine was often seen as a good reason to fight in the war, and it was deemed only fair that the English-speaking world would have to make some concessions for Ukraine (LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIII, Ukrainian Canadians, Alberta Division, Letter to the Governor General of Canada, 15 February 1943, pages 1-2. See also Kordan, Luciuk, “A Prescription for Nationbuilding,” page 88).
pillars for such a world. The UNF leadership, for example, pointed out that only a victory of the United Nations would ensure “freedom and independence of peoples and nations” and that “the first and most important factors in assuring a lasting peace after this war, is the granting of sovereign rights to all peoples of Europe within their ethnographical boundaries, without any consideration of the so-called political or strategic boundaries, as outlined in articles 2, 3 and 6 of the Atlantic Charter.” Often the argument was made that Canada could only remain free in a world where other peoples were not oppressed or enslaved, that there could be “no freedom in this world if a great Ukrainian nation of 45 millions is left under an occupation and oppression by foreign states.” An examination by the Canadian government of the Ukrainian language press in Canada and the US confirms that newspapers such as Novyi Shliakh or Svoboda supported these demands for Ukrainian independence. These examples clearly illustrate the intense process of juggling by Ukrainians in Canada. On the one hand, they were eager to affirm their loyalty to the country and its democratic ideals, their support for the troops and the war effort; but they also stressed at the same time that they were concerned about the future of Ukraine and their aim that Ukraine should become a “free and united member in the European family of nations.” In order to make a strong claim for an independent Ukraine, the diaspora not only had to speak with a united voice, but also on behalf of Ukrainians abroad.

3.2.3. Claims of Representation

For the organized part of the Ukrainian community in Canada, the Second World War brought intensified contacts with their brethren across the border as well as the Canadian government. In this context it was important to assess questions of representation. On the one hand, representation within the country was important. The UCC, for example, claimed that the organizations joined under its umbrella

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92 Here see also, for example: A.A. Granovsky, “Free Ukraine is Vital to Lasting Peace,” Ukrainian Quarterly 1 (2) (1944/45), 117-131.
96 UCC, First Ukrainian Canadian Congress, pages 175-179.
represented “at least 80% of Ukrainian Canadians,”97 thereby stressing that the organization stood for the majority of Ukrainians in Canada. However, at a time of international struggle, national representation did not seem enough, especially when it came to the fate and future of Ukraine. It becomes obvious that at least some representatives of the organized Ukrainian nationalist faction made claims of wider representation to have an influence on Ukrainian affairs.

The UCC, as the umbrella organization of the major nationalist groups in Canada, claimed to represent before the government and public the views of “Ukrainians in Europe who are striving to obtain political independence upon the ethnographic Ukrainian territories.”98 The same claim can be found in the UCC counterpart across the border. As the Ukrainian Quarterly stated: “Realizing that their kinsmen in Ukraine lack freedom of expression, and what they do manage to say there is distorted by those who do or would rule over them, Americans of Ukrainian descent, removed from their kinsmen at most by one generation, have taken upon themselves the task of making better known the truth concerning them.”99 The same message was repeated by the Ukrainian language press in Canada and the US.100 The idea was that Ukrainians in Ukraine were oppressed by the Soviet government, and therefore the diaspora had to take over duties of representation. In this context Anthony Hlynka, for example, raised the question in the House of Commons in February of 1942 of how Ukrainians should be represented at various Allied conferences. In his view, Ukrainian committees from

97 LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39eIV, Report Number 426 (Canada: Ukrainian Groups and Mr. Tracy Philipps, 21 October 1943, page 1 background). This estimation was not really far from that of the government which stated that “the number of Ukrainians belonging to the various nationalist organizations is estimated at 75% of the whole Ukrainian group” (LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39eIV, Memorandum: Ukrainian Canadians, 15. September 1943, page 5). Watson Kirkconnell also reckoned that the Ukrainian nationalists constituted approximately 80% of Ukrainians in Canada (Statement by Kirkconnell in Prymak, Maple Leaf, page 49f).
99 Shumeyko, “In Retrospect,” page 164. The same thought was repeated in a UCCA appeal to President Roosevelt (cited in Shumeyko, “In Retrospect,” page 172).
100 Here see an examination by the Canadian government of the Ukrainian language press in Canada and the US (LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39eIV, Ukrainian Separatists of the United States and Canada Join Forces, pages 3-4). Novyi Shliakh is quoted stating that Ukrainians from Canada and the US “should get together and present demands to the Great Powers in the name of the Ukrainian people which is suffering in bondage at a time where there is general talk about freedom for all subjugated peoples…At present we have in Canada and America appropriate bodies whose important duty it is to speak out loudly about freedom for the Ukrainian people upon their own territory” (page 3).
the United States, Britain, and Canada should be “invited to delegate their representative or representatives to express the view of 50 million Ukrainian people at conferences held by the allied nations.”\footnote{Quoted in Kolasky, \textit{Shattered Illusion}, page 68.}

Other examples, following the same lines of argumentation, can be found from smaller organizations or individuals. Ukrainian Canadians from Alberta, who met at their annual convention in Edmonton in 1943, wanted to make their opinions known to the government, because they were certain that they “express(ed) the views of over five hundred thousand Ukrainians Canadians and over eight hundred thousand Ukrainian Americans.” Furthermore this group was convinced that “the Ukrainians of this hemisphere are the only true interpreters and proxies in the position to freely declare the natural, historic and human rights of the fifty million Ukrainians in the world today to a free independent state.”\footnote{LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIII, Ukrainian Canadians, Alberta Division, Letter to the Governor General of Canada, 15 February 1943, page 1.} At another occasion, a UNF representative referred to the UCC Congress in Winnipeg as the “Ukrainian parliament, the only free form of the Ukrainian people in the world.”\footnote{LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIV, Report Number 426 (Canada: Ukrainians and Mr. Tracy Philipps, 12 October 1943), page 4.} In all these instances it was rarely questioned what ‘the Ukrainian people’ wanted or whether ideas developed in the diaspora actually reflected the situation in Ukraine. For many diaspora leaders, the idea was quite clear – Ukraine was under Soviet oppression, suffering as one of the main theatres of war, and the Ukrainian people were not represented in worldwide affairs and needed intervention by the diaspora community. However, it has to be stressed that these claims of universal representation should not be generalized for the entire Ukrainian-Canadian (or, for that matter, American) community. In some cases, community leaders stated that they were speaking on behalf of their brethren abroad rather than claiming to be fully representing them.

\textbf{3.3. Reactions to Ukrainian Claims}

Remarks made in the context of lobbying efforts or claims of representation did not go unnoticed – neither within the Ukrainian-Canadian community, nor by the government or the communist elements in and outside of Canada. Reactions within
the Ukrainian-Canadian community can be divided into two categories – those from the broader masses and those from leaders within the community who saw themselves as community representatives and were therefore eager not to alienate the government. Three speeches by Anthony Hlynka, Watson Kirkconnell, and General Sikevich (Sikewich) can serve as examples to illustrate these diverse reactions.

As outlined above, the First Ukrainian Canadian Congress in Winnipeg served as a forum to express statements of loyalty and support for the war cause as well as carefully formulated statements concerning the independence of Ukraine. Although the Congress was generally judged to have been ‘inoffensive,’ some incidents occurred that were out of line with the organizers’ requirement to play down the independence issue. Several incidents took place at the Congress that caused quite a stir, because the topic of independence was addressed outside the context of the Atlantic Charter. For example, General Sikevich, a member of UNF, broke the congress protocol when he “insisted that the Congress was to be looked upon as the Ukrainian parliament, the only free form of the Ukrainian people in the world,” calling the UCC the ‘ambassador’ of the Ukrainian people. Watson Kirkconnell directly addressed the territorial question of the Ukrainian/Polish border, a rather sensitive subject since Poland was an official ally of Great Britain. And Anthony Hlynka contributed a speech, the tenor of which was interpreted as anti-communist and anti-Soviet. Interesting in this context are the reactions which were reported by the RCMP.

The RCMP was not happy about Hlynka’s, Kirkconnell’s, or Sikevich’s speeches; however, the crowd openly expressed its appreciation of the leaders’ frank remarks. In the case of Sikevich, the RCMP observed that “the leaders of the

105 LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIV, RCMP Report on the First Ukrainian Canadian Congress held June 22, 23 and 24, 1943, in Winnipeg, page 2. Participants and organizers displayed nervousness during the weeks leading up to the congress, hoping that no “embarrassing issues” (such as Ukraine’s independence) would come up during the congress.
congress and the most intelligent section of those present appeared to have been embarrassed by the general’s unfortunate remark, however, at the conclusion of his address he was given a thunderous applause by the mass of the guests. It seems that the applause was prompted by the respect the old general enjoys among the masses rather than by his repetition of old Ukrainian patriotic sentiments.” This RCMP officer might have hoped this to be true, especially since this remark “was carried by the loud-speaking system to the farthest corner of the main hotel lobby.” Since the Soviet Legation Counselor in Ottawa and the Soviet Press Attaché were staying at the same hotel at the time, the danger was great that they had heard this remark. 109 According to Prymak, the speeches by Kirkconnell, Hlynka, and Sikevich – “surprises” at the Congress – “turned out to be the most popular part of the congress and helped to infuse the mass of delegates with a new enthusiasm for the war effort.” 110 The masses could obviously identify with this kind of polemics, whereas the Ukrainian-Canadian leadership and the RCMP were rather embarrassed and aggravated by them. Here the Ukrainian leadership had the Canadian government in mind – which was generally aware and weary of Ukrainian-Canadian lobbying for independence. 111 The RCMP remark indicates that the reactions of the Soviet ally and the communists within the country were foremost on the minds of the RCMP officers.

Indeed, the Soviet government often reacted sharply to the Ukrainian lobbying for independence as well as claims of representation. In reaction to a UCC memorandum to the Canadian government in which the UCC advocated a separate independent Ukrainian state, Soviet papers were very critical and disputed “the right of this group of Canadian Ukrainians to speak for the whole Ukrainian nation.” 112 The activities of the UCC were closely monitored by the Soviet authorities, 113 who expressed their astonishment that the Canadian government was

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110 Prymak, Maple Leaf, page 97.

111 For other examples see Kordan, Luciuk, “A Prescription,” page 90ff.


113 For example, Soviet authorities sent two representatives to the First Ukrainian Canadian Congress in Winnipeg in order to monitor the congress and to take part in rival activities such as
not able or not willing to suppress the ethnic press. In response to protests by Soviet officials, representatives from the Department of External Affairs stressed that censorship of nationalist papers was considered counterproductive, asking the Soviet side for more patience since “the process of assimilation took time…and although the Ukrainians were a very large bloc in Canada…they were not factor in influencing Canadian government policy.” As Kordan and Luciuk have shown in detail, this response was typical of the government’s dealing with the Soviet Union. But the wartime ally was not the only opponent with which the Canadian government had to deal.

Claims of representation as well as opposing visions about the future of postwar Ukraine also led to direct conflicts between the Ukrainian nationalists and communists in Canada, but these quarrels were mostly confined to the respective newspapers and submissions to the government. In pamphlets and articles, communists warned about “Hitler’s Agents in Canada,” because in their opinion a “potentially dangerous fifth column” was hiding among Ukrainian Canadians. The New Pathway was a special thorn in the communists’ side. The general strategy in the communist propaganda was to discredit Ukrainian nationalist organizations in any way possible by branding them as Nazi sympathizers and traitors to the war effort. Nationalist organizations countered these accusations through articles and pamphlets outlining their status in Canada and their loyalty to the war effort.

However, according to Kolasky’s interpretation, “the nationalists could not match the communist propaganda, backed by the USSR and often repeated by the

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117 For examples from the pro-communist side, see the selected newspaper articles in Kolasky, ed., Prophets and Proletarians, pages 341-345.
118 See for example: William Kardash, Hitler’s Agents in Canada. A Revealing Story of Potentially Dangerous Fifth Column Activities in Canada among Ukrainian Canadians (Toronto: Morris Printing Company, 1942); For a local example see: Ilko Kozyra, ed., Ukraintsi v Tander Bei (Thunder Bay: UCC, 1986), page 181f. A government observer remarked that “within the last year a bitter feud has developed between the Ukrainian Canadian Associations (sic) and the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, in which each side has accused the other of being under the control of agencies located outside Canada” (LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIV, Memorandum: Ukrainian Canadians, 15 September 1943, page 3).
Canadian press, in either scope or intensity.” The communists were also in a better position due to the pro-Soviet attitude that had developed in Canadian society.\footnote{Kolasky, \textit{Shattered Illusion}, pages 67-75, quote page 68. Kolasky further points out that the communist propaganda did have some influence on some Ukrainian nationalists (who turned towards communist organizations), thereby further weakening the nationalist camp (page 76ff).} Although most of the hostilities were confined to backbiting and accusations in the respective newspapers, incidents of physical violence also occurred. A secret RCMP report from 1943 revealed “the physical extremity the Ukrainian-Canadian Association will bring about towards the Ukrainian National Organization at any convenient occasion, i.e., tearing up to UNO flag and fighting with UNO members during the Victory Parade at St. Catherines [sic], Ontario, and smashing windows etc., of the UNO Hall in Toronto, while UNO members were holding a meeting there.”\footnote{LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIII, Secret RCMP Report, 25 March 1943, page 2. For other examples see Kordan, \textit{Canada}, page 117f.} Although the community was generally divided between pro- and anti-communist, the differences between the communists and the UNF were reported to be particularly deep. As an RCMP report states: “The federation is a deadly enemy to the communist elements. In other words, members of the federation hate communists like poison and communists hate the federationists whom they brand as Fascists, worse than poison. They are deadly poison to each other, and just which of the two is the worst poison would be hard to determine.”\footnote{LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIII, RCMP Report regarding the UNF, 18 January 1943, page 1. For other examples see Kordan, \textit{Canada}, page 79.} Although the nationalist factions were determined to avoid any conflict with the government, this did not mean that there were no direct attacks on communists in Canada. Mr. Kossar, for example, accused Ukrainian communists of using “immoral methods, falsehood, malice, hatred, spite against the federation” and causing bodily harm to some of the UNF members.\footnote{LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIII, RCMP Report: Ukrainian National Federation 1943 Annual Convention Winnipeg, 18 January 1943, page 3.}

On some occasions the Canadian government was directly asked to take a stand in conflicts between Ukrainian pro-communists and nationalists. During these conflicts between the two Ukrainian factions, the government kept aloof, not officially aligning itself with either side. For example, the Ukrainian Canadian Association accused the nationalist – in their interpretation ‘fascist’ – groups of
insulting “the war aims of Canada and her allies” and of provoking other
Ukrainians by carrying “this Hitler-blessed Yellow and Blue Flag” in official
parades.\footnote{LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIII, National Executive Committee of the Ukrainian
Canadian Association to N.A. Robertson, 7 November 1942, pages 1-3, quote from page 2.} In a letter to the organization, Robertson stated that the complaint was
duly noted; nonetheless, he also asked the organization to bear in mind that in this
war it was “the common responsibility of all Canadians, and of all residents of
Canada, to oppose the enemy’s efforts to create disunity by exploiting the
differences of outlook between various groups.”\footnote{LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIII, Letter from Robertson to John Horbatiuk, Ukrainian
Canadian Association, 28 December 1942.} According to Kordan, “the
perception that Ottawa was negligent in shielding the nationalist community
from…attacks fuelled the view among the nationalists that the government was
abandoning the community and retreating from its professed role of preserving
national unity.”\footnote{Kordan, \textit{Canada}, page 107. Luciuk also points out that the nationalist community was frustrated
with the government’s lack of interference on their behalf (Luciuk, \textit{Searching}, page 53).} However, although the government did not support either side
openly, it did take steps during the war to maintain some level of influence and
surveillance.

4. An Overview of Actions and Views of the Canadian Government

As the above examination has shown, the Canadian government was very much
interested in what was going on not only in the Ukrainian communist community,
but also in the Ukrainian nationalist community. Since Ukrainians were not the
only group of interest, an administrative structure had to be created to deal with the
ethnic factions within the country. As Dreisziger points out, not only was Canada’s
military unprepared for the war, but the country also lacked an institutional
infrastructure to organize and incorporate the ethnic groups into the war effort.\footnote{Dreisziger, “The Rise of a Bureaucracy,” page 1.} In
order to deal with this deficiency, the Department of National War Services was
created in July 1940 as a reaction to the opening of the western front in Europe,
which had caused hysteria in Canada. To respond to the intensified fear of potential
“fifth columns” in Canada, the Department established the Nationalities Branch
(NB) in November of 1941. George Simpson became the head of the branch, and
Tracy Philipps acted as its European advisor. Once Simpson resigned from his post,
Philipps took over and was later joined by Vladimir Kaye. Apart from the Nationalities Branch, the government also established the Advisory Committee on Co-operation in Canadian Citizenship (CCCC) in November 1941. The creation of both institutions was motivated by the wish to make “good citizens” out of newcomers by drawing them into the war effort instead of excluding them. To reach this goal it was understood early on that the government would have to address the groups in their own languages, for example through pamphlets about the war effort and the ethnic press. The Bureau of Public Information (after 1942 the Wartime Information Board) was responsible for this kind of propaganda, while the Nationalities Branch was to deal with the people. In the context of these efforts, the Department of National War Services organized public lecture tours across Canada. For example, Tracy Philipps was a prominent speaker who toured western Canada and addressed groups such as Ukrainians to mobilize them for the war effort. Despite the initial publicity surrounding their creation, the existence of the NB and the CCCC was very precarious; due to a lack of funding, the CCCC was not called together for an extended period of time. In 1944 the existing structures were reorganized; and the Citizenship Division of the Department of National War Services was created, a new bureaucratic structure that would outlast the end of the war, at first as part of the Department of the Secretary of State, until it was transferred to the newly created Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1950.127

These newly established institutions provided the government with a structure to address the different ethnic groups within the country. Within this framework, officials developed several strategies to deal with Ukrainians in particular. As Kordan and Luciuk have shown, the government was concerned about remarks and proposals by the Ukrainian nationalist faction that could possibly alienate the Soviet Union. In this context government officials largely ignored Ukrainian appeals, a method that they also suggested to the Soviet side.128

128 Kordan, Luciuk, “A Prescription,” especially page 97. Kordan, Canada; Luciuk, Searching, pages 39-55. Luciuk states that the Canadian government was convinced that “a moderate policy…might quell the persistent lobbying of Ukrainian Canadians on behalf of their compatriots” (Luciuk, Searching, page 43f).
Apparently Canadian officials were embarrassed by the Ukrainian-Canadian community, but not embarrassed enough to intervene as they had done during the First World War. Instead of directly interfering in community affairs (except for the internment of some Ukrainian communists), officials chose a way of showing the community what was deemed appropriate during wartime through 'pats on the back' or unofficial warnings with regard to what was being said and published.\textsuperscript{129}

However, it is important to note that this government attitude did not mean an overall negative judgment of the Ukrainian nationalist community and its efforts. The Department of External Affairs estimated that “all the Ukrainian organizations which have been named [i.e. the members of the UCC] have given admirable support to the Canadian war effort…The meetings of these organizations have been investigated by the RCMP and their press has been followed closely by the censorship authorities. In spite of their interest in Ukrainian independence, their activities have not given rise to any serious objection since the outbreak of the war.”\textsuperscript{130} It was further noted that the Ukrainian-Canadian community tried to juggle loyalties in the war effort. A secret RCMP report from 1943 stated, for example, that the adopted principles of the UNF were “patriotic from the Canadian point of view and from the view-point of Ukrainian nationalism, but within the limite [sic] of loyalty of Canada”.\textsuperscript{131} In particular the work of the UCC gained more respect and acceptance within the government as the war progressed. In the beginning, the UCC’s recruitment efforts were judged to have been ‘useful’, but at the same time it was doubted how much influence the UCC had among the general Ukrainian-Canadian public.\textsuperscript{132} Over time, it was observed that Ukrainian Canadians made efforts to “strengthen the Ukrainian Canadian Committee by giving it more extensive financial support, and by promoting a more effective program of education and publication.”\textsuperscript{133} Already by fall of 1943, the Congress in Winnipeg

\textsuperscript{129} LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIII, Memorandum for the Under-Secretary: Policy toward Foreign Groups, 2 July 1942 pages 1-5, quotes from page 2 and 3.
\textsuperscript{133} LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIV, Memorandum: Ukrainian Canadians, 15 September 1943, page 4 (Here Kossar is named as driving force).
was hailed as the “crowning achievement of unity of the Ukrainians Canadians,” and an RCMP officer described the 600 delegates as “men and women who really represent the people, interpret its thoughts and problems and give leadership in local and national affairs.” This first Congress was very important for the general standing of Ukrainians in Canada and for their acceptance by the government, because only a few months earlier the government had noted that “the Ukrainian Canadian Committee is really only an executive appointed by representatives from the various member organizations. There is not record of any general Convention or meeting of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee ever having been held.”

The government generally hoped to be able to draw the Ukrainian community more deeply into the war effort, and to instill in them a dedication to Canada that would take precedence over the question of Ukraine’s independence. They saw these hopes nourished by their own observations of the community. The general interpretation (or should one rather call it hope?) of the government was that a deep interest in Ukrainian affairs in general was more a pursuit of the older generation. In a report on Ukrainians we read: “Except for the question of an independent Ukraine, Ukrainian-Canadians take typical Canadian attitudes on all current issues. This is especially noticeable among the young people. Although they continue to speak Ukrainian, they do so only among their elders, who find English difficult. Among themselves, however, they are far more at ease in English. For them the question of Ukrainian independence is a remote issue, which they discuss only out of deference to their elders.” Assimilation was seen to take place very quickly, especially through an increased level of inter-marriage. The conflicts between the nationalist and communist factions of the community were often seen as ‘embarrassing’, but the government took consolation in the fact that

“it is not clear how strong a following either of these organizations actually has. Most Ukrainian-Canadians are probably more interested in Canada than in Europe, and give their support one way or the other to the local Ukrainian organizations depending on a general interest in radical reform or alternatively on a general sympathy for Ukrainian nationalism.”

However, although Ukrainians in Canada strongly stressed their support for the Canadian war effort, questions about Ukraine’s independence and future role after the war did not cease, no matter how much the government disliked them or how much they hoped that they might not be of interest to the community. In a way, the Ukrainian involvement in the war gave many of community leaders new self-esteem, and the comparatively high enlistment in the Canadian army was a particularly important factor that was often used to support the growing demands. Anthony Hlynka put this idea into words at the First Ukrainian Congress in Winnipeg in 1943. His statement is particularly interesting considering that he was a Member of Parliament:

“One of the qualifications of post-war immigration should be based on the enlistment of ethnic groups seeking entrance in proportion to their population in Canada. This may seem a harsh test but it is a just one if we desire the type of Canadians who would not only make their living in Canada, but who would also defend Canada if need be.”

By the end of the war, Ukrainians in Canada had started to realize their own potential for influence and status within Canadian society. As Dr. Andrusyshyn pointed out at the First Congress of Ukrainian Canadians: “Until now, Canadian Ukrainians, comparatively speaking, have not been an active force in Canadian life.

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139 See Prymak, Maple Leaf. Gerus states that approximately 35,000 Ukrainian Canadians (roughly 10%) signed up for service in the military, either because they were inspired by community campaigns or because they wanted to escape the dire economic situation on the prairies. However, despite a high enlistment many Ukrainian-Canadian ridings voted against conscription in 1942, thereby humiliating the UCC (Gerus, “Introduction,” page XXVIII).
140 LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIV, RCMP Report on the First Ukrainian Canadian Congress held June 22, 23 and 24, 1943, in Winnipeg, page 16. For a full account of Hlynka’s speech, see: UCC, First Ukrainian Canadian Congress, page 82-88. This line of argumentation would not be last heard in 1943; indeed, it would be a reoccurring issue in decades to come, especially in the context of the DP question.
Their potential strength is daily becoming more evident. It must not be forgotten that in Canada we are at least 300,000 strong. Given good leadership, that great mass can incalculably contribute to the material and spiritual progress of Canada. Indeed, the war years were formative for the community and paved the way for interaction with the government in the years to come.

5. Conclusion

By the outbreak of the Second World War, the Ukrainian community in Canada had been established for 48 years; most of its members had settled in the Prairie Provinces where the majority still lived as farmers. The community boasted a variety of organizations that catered to any needs and interests in society – pro-communist, orthodox, catholic, and secular ones that were either moderately or deeply nationalist. Topics such as the maintenance of heritage as well as the independence of Ukraine were of particular interest to the nationalist community, and different opinions existed on how this goal could be best reached. The strong interest in independence and the possibility of pro-Nazi currents among parts of the Ukrainian-Canadian nationalist community on the one hand, and the pro-Soviet attitude among Ukrainian communists, on the other hand, heightened the government’s interest in the group. Until the Soviet Union joined the Allies in 1941, Ukrainian pro-communists faced internment and organizational restrictions in Canada, but after 1941 the loyalty of their nationalist counterparts was questioned due to their fervent support of Ukrainian independence. Throughout the course of the war, Ukrainian communists and nationalists were carefully watched, and the government tried to gain more influence through organizations such as the UCC. On an internal community level, the gap between Ukrainian nationalists and communists widened and was accompanied by backbiting and a defamation campaign on both sides.

However, despite heightened levels of surveillance, the war was not necessarily a totally negative experience. In contrast to the First World War, the government took an interest in Ukrainians in general; and as Momryk has pointed out, as a consequence of war surveillance and intensive dealings with the

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Ukrainian-Canadian community, the government no longer perceived Ukrainians “as a uniform monolithic mass but as a complex and segmented group.” The government reaction to Ukrainian activities has received different interpretations over time. In an early, more general approach, Oleh Gerus asserted that “the Ukrainian response to the war effort, both in Europe and at home, brought constant praise from the government….which equated Ukrainian activism with Canadianism.” Contemporary examinations have shown that some quarters in the Canadian government were – to say the least – reserved, if not even straight out hostile to Ukrainian-Canadian demands for Ukrainian independence. However, it has to be kept in mind that the government did not take direct action and recommended to their Soviet counterparts to ‘sit the problem out’ – a response that suggests that the government was rather impartial than hostile to the subject.

Not denying suspicions on part of the Canadian government of Ukrainian leftist as well as nationalist factions within the country, this chapter argues that the war brought important – and positive – changes to the nationalist community. In contrast to the First World War, minority groups – and Ukrainians as a key group among them – were important to the war effort during the 1940s. Their military and personal contribution to the country was acknowledged and formed the basis for a discourse that would influence future communications and negotiations with the government. Furthermore, Ukrainians in Canada discovered the merits of lobbying. In their submissions they learned to juggle their old world allegiances with new world loyalties, to adjust their lobbying efforts to international developments, and to appeal to treaties such as the Atlantic Charter – developments that would have a profound influence on postwar strategies concerning Ukrainian displaced persons. Ukrainians in Canada and the US also developed a discourse on how and why Ukraine should be independent and asserted claims of representation on behalf of their brethren abroad. Furthermore, the Ukrainian-Canadian community initiated wider coordinated joint lobbying efforts with the community across the border which formed the basis of a cooperation that would continue – though not always on easy terms – in the following decades.

143 Gerus, “Ukrainian Canadian Committee,” page 199.
144 Here see especially Kordan, Canada; Kordan, Luciuk, “A Prescription.”
And in the context of the war efforts, Ukrainians in Canada received – through government intervention – an umbrella organization that dominated Ukrainian-Canadian life into the 21st century. Criticism of the UCC has been widespread and continuous; and as Satzewich points out, the unchanging character of the UCC constitution was the major focus of disapproval. However, Satzewich also shows that the UCC leadership tended to be reluctant to give up power while at the same time being deeply divided on certain issues.145 It has to be kept in mind that it the umbrella organization was originally created for the duration of the war as a provisional institution146 and was not intended to last for decades to come. It is, of course, speculation whether a different kind of umbrella organization would have led to a better community consolidation during the postwar period. Fact is that the community received an organ through which they could communicate with the government and that would turn out to be of importance in their lobbying efforts during the DP campaign and the multiculturalism debate, as the following chapters will show. Although Canada did not live up to the expectations of many Ukrainian Canadians from an external affairs’ point of view, from an internal, Canadian perspective, the Second World War can be interpreted not only as a formative, but also as an overall positive experience for the community. Ukrainians were able to display their loyalty to the country, and they gained more confidence in their standing in Canada as the next decades would show.

145 Satzewich, The Ukrainian Diaspora, pages 133-135. In addition to the abovementioned opponents, community members such as John Gregorovich or Wsevolod Isajiw also heavily criticized the UCC during the 1980s and 90s.
146 Luciuk, Searching, page 47.
Chapter 4: Preparing for the Arrival of the Displaced Persons in Canada, 1945-1947

1. Introduction

By May of 1945, it was obvious that the war had brought enormous changes to the world – changes that were noticeable not only in Europe, but also in Canada. For Ukrainians in the country and abroad, the central goal of achieving Ukrainian independence, which they had cherished during the war, had not been realized. The Ukrainian territories that were at last united were now part of the USSR. Nonetheless, the diaspora’s focus of attention shifted temporarily from the homeland itself to the fate of the many refugees outside the borders of the Soviet Union. In the early postwar months, the number of Ukrainians on ex-enemy territory was large and the refugee issue itself rather complex. Despite a strict policy of repatriation, approximately 200,000 Ukrainians remained in Germany and Austria, who were mostly looking to North America for a better future. Although the Canadian government was initially indifferent, one could even say hostile, towards immigration, it remained a topic that dominated Canadian policy and discourse during the immediate postwar period. Since the issue of Canada’s postwar attitude towards immigration has been examined in depth,¹ this chapter summarizes only the most important aspects in section 2 to set the stage for the Ukrainian position in the discussion.

By 1947, it was evident that emigration was the only feasible solution to the DP problem in Europe. The Ukrainian community in Canada shared this opinion early on and developed a systematic lobbying strategy to influence the Canadian

government on this matter. Traditionally, lobbying tries to influence government
decision-making processes, and at the core of the procedure are the respective
representatives and their communications with the government. As Steve John has
shown, nowadays professional lobbyists such as consultants often undertake
lobbying and their methods can also include non-direct work such as strategy
advice. However, in the 1940s, lobbying itself was a fairly new theoretical concept
without any professional envoys. When dealing with the government, Ukrainians in
Canada made use of the experience and knowledge they had gained during the
Second World War and applied them to postwar tasks and challenges. General
ethnic lobbying in the postwar period has found attention in works by Harold
Troper or Myron Momryk, thereby providing the context for the Ukrainian case.
Lubomyr Luciuk also raises the phenomenon of lobbying in his book, Searching
for Place, stating that Ukrainian-Canadian representatives described the Ukrainian
DPs in a favorable light to convince the government of their usefulness. Apart
from Luciuk, historians dealing with the issue do not attribute great influence to
ethnic lobbying during the immigration discussion.

Although this study does not claim that Ukrainian-Canadian lobbying
changed the Canadian government’s perspective on immigration, it argues that the
lobbying process was nonetheless important because it set the stage for later
endeavors such as participation during the multiculturalism discussion.
Furthermore, the arguments used in this campaign shed light on the Ukrainian

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3 John, The Persuaders, pages 8-10.
413f.
5 See Luciuk, Searching for Place, pages 152, 198, 205f, 210-212 (lobbying against forcible
repatriation, page 75ff). Luciuk concentrates in particular on Panchuk and his positive presentation
of the DPs towards the Ukrainian-Canadian community and the Canadian government. The
Ukrainian-Canadian lobbying efforts, especially with regard to the Galician Division, are also
shortly examined in Howard Margolian, Unauthorized Entry. The Truth about Nazi War Criminals
in Canada, 1946-1956 (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 2000), pages 138-
142.
6 Luciuk states that “there can be little doubt that their efforts did help influence the federal
government in favour of DP immigration” (Luciuk, Searching, page 198). Dyczok also states that
“the persistence of the Ukrainian voluntary agencies, particularly in their lobbying, resulted in a
gradual change in Western policies towards Ukrainian refugees.” However, Dyczok bases this
statement on findings presented in Lubomy Luciuk, “A Troubled Venture. Ukrainian-Canadian
Refugee Relief Efforts, 1945-51,” in The Refugee Experience, ed. Isajiw, 435-457 (See Dyczok, The
Grand Alliance, page 89ff, quote from page 91).
Canadians’ perception of themselves and the DP issue. This study will add to the existing historiography by broadening the source base and providing a chronological analysis of Ukrainian lobbying efforts, exploring the lines of argumentation in depth in section 3.1. An examination of Canadian government collections as well as British government files reveals the nature and development of Ukrainian-Canadian lobbying. In this context it is important to explore who addressed whom, what Ukrainians in Canada lobbied for, how this changed over time, and how the Canadian government reacted.

Although lobbying the government was perhaps the most important aspect of Ukrainian-Canadian activities between 1945 and 1947, it was not the only one. Ukrainians also took active steps to extend material and legal help to their brethren in Europe. The matter of refugee relief has been examined by Lubomyr Luciuk, and this chapter does not offer a new perspective, but retells the story in section 3.2., while incorporating some new sources. Although Ukrainian-Canadian relief efforts brought some help to the refugees in Europe, the majority of the displaced persons came to Canada as part of an organized immigration scheme. Drawing on existing literature and records of the Department of External Affairs and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, section 4 examines the motivation of the Canadian government to accept DPs and the immigration schemes that were developed. This analysis emphasizes the nature of the third wave’s migration to Canada as bona fide labor migrants. This aspect is especially important in comparison to the German case.

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8 Luciuk, Searching for Place (a large part of the book concentrates on the Ukrainian-Canadian community and their relief efforts in Germany); Luciuk, “A Troubled Venture,” pages 435-457; Lubomyr Luciuk, “This Should Never Be Spoken or Quoted Publicly”: Canada’s Ukrainians and Their Encounter with the DPs,” in Canada’s Ukrainians, ed. Lubomyr Luciuk, 103-122.

9 In addition to those works mentioned in footnote 1, the following book is of interest in this context: Milda Danys, DP. Lithuanian Immigration to Canada after the Second World War (Toronto: MHSO, 1986).
2. The Canadian Government and the DP Problem

Once the war was officially over and the initial chaos turned into postwar routine, the magnitude of the displaced person problem dawned on the international community. More than one million displaced persons had resisted repatriation to their respective countries of origin or citizenship and were now looking for a new home. Initially, the Canadian government – just like its American and Australian counterparts – remained hesitant to open its doors to these foreigners, although it had started to appreciate the contribution of ethnic communities in the country during the Second World War. However, the Canadian authorities feared that the Canadian economy would not be able to successfully make the transition from its booming wartime height to postwar ‘normality.’ Since immigration was strongly connected to the fluctuation of the labor market, it did not seem feasible to accept a large number of foreign workers at a time when the economic situation was anything but predictable. Furthermore, it was the country’s priority to provide for the veterans returning from Europe, and job and university placement were on top of the agenda.

Although Canada remained skeptical towards immigration, it did not completely abandon the thought of it. In order to assess the prospects of an immigration scheme during the early postwar era, the Canadian government carefully monitored not only the economy but also society in general, because it also anticipated that Canadians would be apprehensive about large-scale immigration. However, some surprises awaited the Canadian government in the mid-1940s. Instead of plummeting, the economy continued its upward rise, and soon the forest, mining, and farming industries were in dire need of workers because few Canadians were willing to perform manual labor. Furthermore, the Polish War Veteran Scheme, a first small-scale attempt to allow immigration to the country, was a success with businesses and society alike. In the Polish War Veteran Scheme, Canada traded its German POWs for 2,900 Polish male workers. All

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11 During the 1930s, the strong connection between immigration and the labor market led to a virtual halt of all immigration to the country due to the depression (Margolian, *Unauthorized Entry*, page 21ff).
12 Compare for example: Avery, *Reluctant Host*, 144-150; Margolian, *Unauthorized Entry*, page 23f.
Polish participants had to be under the age of 35, healthy, and able to work in physically demanding jobs. This scheme provided Canadian authorities with a better idea of how to approach large-scale labor immigration and served as a model for the later DP operations. In addition to these internal developments, the IRO started pressuring member countries to accept a fair share of those non-repatriable DPs. Great Britain – the role model for Canada in many ways– started to seriously address the DP issue by bringing people over through programs such as “Westward Ho.” In combination with rising demands by businesses to open the gates for large-scale immigration, these factors contributed to a reorientation of the government attitude in 1946/47.

Compared to the pressure from businesses and the booming economy that Canada faced between 1945 and 1950, the lobbying efforts by Canadian ethnic groups to convince the government of the advantages of immigration might not be considered significant. However, it has to be kept in mind that the industrial sector was not the only one to pursue the matter of immigration with the government. Although the family reunion scheme had been technically introduced in 1946, many of the applications were not processed in the initial two years because there were no Canadian immigration officials in Europe yet. As months and months went by, many Canadians grew impatient to get their family or community members out of the camps in Germany and into Canada as quickly as possible. The Ukrainian-Canadian community was one of the most vocal groups on this issue.

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13 Authorities realized that a medical screening process was necessary to identify capable healthy laborers; the Poles, for example, had only undergone security screening and were sometimes too sick to work upon their arrival in the country (Troper, “The Canadian Government,” page 408; Momryk, “Ukrainian DP Immigration,” pages 416-418; Margolian, Unauthorized Entry, pages 44-66).

14 For a concise overview of the Canadian government’s attitude towards DPs in the immediate postwar period, see Troper, “The Canadian Government,” pages 403-412; Danys, DP.

15 See Margolian, Unauthorized Entry, page 27ff. (“PC 695 was amended to extend admissibility to the parents, unmarried children, siblings, or orphaned nephews and nieces of any Canadian resident who was prepared to receive and care for them,” page 28).

16 As Margolian makes us aware, many Canadians of European origin, especially from Eastern Europe, pressured the Canadian government to allow the admission of their relatives to the country, thereby also working together with the Canadian railway companies to make their case (Margolian, Unauthorized Entry, page 24f).
3. The Ukrainian-Canadian Community and the Issue of Immigration

During the Second World War, the prospects of an independent Ukraine were at the forefront of the diaspora’s attention. After the end of the war the focus shifted from Ukraine itself to the plight of Ukrainian refugees and the threat of repatriation in Europe. As remote as Europe and the DP question were geographically, the community still had more opportunities to take action than they ever had with the issue of independence. They employed two strategies to help their brethren in Europe. On the one hand, they brought direct help to the DP camps through their relief missions in Europe, an aspect that will be explored in section 3.2. Apart from immediate material and legal assistance, Ukrainians in Canada also undertook an extensive lobbying campaign to terminate repatriation and promote emigration.

3.1. General Lobbying for Recognition and Protection

Lobbying on behalf of Ukrainian DPs was a top priority of the Ukrainian community right after the end of the war. However, the focus of lobbying shifted as events unfolded in Europe. In May of 1945, the UCC, for example, wrote a memorandum to Mackenzie King, addressing the subject of forcible repatriation. The UCC predicted – correctly – that many of the Ukrainians, who at that time were on German territory, would refuse to return to the Soviet Union, and appealed “in the name of humanity…to the Government of Canada to do whatever may be possible to prevent such deportations to the Soviet territories.”17 As the analysis in chapter 2 has shown, the non-recognition of Ukrainians as an ethnic group endangered them during the repatriation campaign; and the topic of forcible return along with the appeal to interfere on their behalf occupied Ukrainian-Canadian correspondence with the government during the early postwar period and was also the focus of public meetings and mass rallies.18 One of the arguments underlining

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17 LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39eIV, Ukrainian Canadian Committee, Memorandum to Right Honourable W.L. Mackenzie King on Ukrainian Refugees, no date given, pages 1-4, quote from page 4. This memo is obviously from 24 May, 45; there is a letter enclosed stating that this memo was delivered in Winnipeg to Mackenzie King on that date. There is another copy in this folder which gives the date as 23 May 1945. The UCC had already written to the Department of National War Services in October of 1944, stating that the organization was anxious to start collecting funds for Ukrainians overseas (Luciuk, “A Troubled Venture,” page 436).
18 BFOF, January 30, 1946, N 1348/141/38, FO 371/56791, Addis (communicated), Prime Minister’s Department, 24 January 1946, Treatment of Ukrainians in British Zone of Germany; BFOF, February 14, 1946, N 2036/141/38, FO 371/56791, Holmes to Brimelow, Canada House, 8 February 1946, Protest from Canada against forcible repatriation of Ukrainians. In correspondence
this continued appeal for protection and recognition of Ukrainians as a separate group was the fact that Canadians of Ukrainian origin were accepted as such by the Canadian government.\textsuperscript{19}

The line of argumentation used in this correspondence also suggests that UCC representatives, acting as spokespersons for Ukrainian DPs, saw themselves as intermediaries between the government and their brethren in Europe. For example, the umbrella organization asked to be advised of definitive Allied policy to pass this information on to the European committees which were appealing to the UCC for assistance. They pointed out that “it appears that all nations with exception of Ukrainians have Governmental Agencies taking care of their immediate interests while the Ukrainian refugees are left to themselves in complete confusion.”\textsuperscript{20} Since Ukrainian DPs did not have official spokespersons in Europe or abroad,\textsuperscript{21} some Ukrainians in Canada were of the opinion that they “express[ed] the views and the feelings of the refugees and displaced persons themselves”\textsuperscript{22} to the Canadian government so that their voice would be heard. This sentiment was further reinforced through letters asking for support which the UCC received from DPs in Europe.\textsuperscript{23}

with the UCC, the Department of External Affairs states that its communication with the UCC had intensified during the past few months. However, the Department stressed that the Canadian government had no administrative authority in the zones and therefore could not influence any policy towards refugees. Furthermore, the issue of immigration had to wait because the return of all soldiers was top priority (BFOF, February 14, 1946, N 2036/141/38, FO 371/56791, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, N.A. Robertson, Ottawa, to J.V. Arsenych, Secretary of the UCC, 1 February 1946); LAC MG 31 D 69 Vol. 6, File: 17, CURB, Vol. 1, No. 3, February 1947, page 16; Yvonna Romanow, “The Ukrainian Community in Windsor – Past and Present,” in Ukrainians in Ontario, ed. Lubomyr Luciuk and Iroida Wynnyckyj (Toronto: MHSO, 1988), 75-82, page 80.

\textsuperscript{19} PAO GBPC F1405 MU 9986, File: 9986-11, Panchuk: Memorandum regarding Ukrainians and Ukrainian Nationality, 10 August 1948, page 2.

\textsuperscript{20} LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIV, Letter from Kushnir and Arsenych (UCC) to Mackenzie King, 13 August 45, page 1f. (For correspondence from Europe to the UCC see LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39cIV, Plight of the Ukrainian Refugees. Excerpts from letters received by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee).

\textsuperscript{21} Representative committees such as CRUE were not recognized, see chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{22} PAO GBPC F1405 MU 9986, File: 9986-11, Panchuk: Comments with Respect to Immigration and Resettlement of Refugees and DPs and Selection by Immigration Missions, Geneva, 6 November 1947, page 1.

\textsuperscript{23} LAC RG 25 Vol. 1896, File: 165-39c IV, Plight of the Ukrainian Refugees. Excerpts from letters received by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, pages 1-4.
3.2. Demanding Emigration to Canada

Appealing solely for recognition and protection of the DPs quickly gave way to demanding their emigration to Canada. Here, the community addressed different people and institutions such as the Prime Minister himself, the Immigration Labor Committee, and even the United Nations.\textsuperscript{24} Requests of this kind were made not only through letters and petitions, but also in person. For example, F.S. Zaplitny, M.P., demanded in the House of Commons that “we should take as many of these people as it is possible for the country to absorb at this time in order that they may get away from the conditions which surround them.”\textsuperscript{25} Ukrainian community leaders also met with government officials such as representatives of the Department of Mines and Resources to address the issue of immigration.\textsuperscript{26} These meetings gave them an opportunity to outline their demands and suggestions.

Furthermore, the Senate Standing Committee on Immigration and Labor held a hearing where prominent members of both the nationalist (UCC) and the pro-Communist sections of the Ukrainian community made their cases, the former pleading on behalf of the DPs and in favor of immigration, the latter ones testifying against the same group, warning the Canadian government not to let “war criminals” and “quislings” into the country.\textsuperscript{27} The conflict that had existed between Ukrainian nationalists and communists during the war essentially was carried over into the postwar period. These diametrically opposed opinions within the Ukrainian community were not uncommon for ethnic communities in postwar Canada. Avery gives examples that include the Polish and Yugoslav community battling with

\textsuperscript{24} Marunchak cites UCC submissions to the Prime Minster in which the UCC tried to convince the Canadian government to take in up to 300,000 Ukrainians (Marunchak, \textit{Ukrainian Canadians}, page 563); LAC RG 76, Vol. 856, File: 554-33, Minutes of the twenty-second meeting of the Immigration Labour Committee held...on Wednesday, 12 November 1947, page 2; LAC MG 28 V 119 Vol. 10, File: 20, Resettlement of Displaced Persons. Memorandum by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee representing Canadian Citizens of Ukrainian Origin to the Economic and Social Council and General Assembly to the United Nations, also to those who by the grace of God or by the will of the people have the destiny of mankind in their hands, September 1946.
\textsuperscript{25} Quoted in Momryk, “Ukrainian DP Immigration,” page 418.
\textsuperscript{26} Momryk, “Ukrainian DP Immigration,” page 419f.
\textsuperscript{27} Momryk, “Ukrainian DP Immigration,” page 416. For other examples of the pro-communist faction slandering Ukrainian refugees, see selected articles in Kolasky, \textit{Prophets and Proletarians}, pages 347-349, 359-361. (The pro-communist presentation at the Standing Committee on Immigration can also be found in Kolasky, \textit{Prophets and Proletarians}, pages 363-366).
exactly the same problems. However, the Ukrainian nationalist group was at some advantage here. Apart from well-known community members like Anthony Hlynka, Rev. Dr. Vasyl Kushnir, and Rev. Semen Savchuk (Sawchuk), the delegation also included Bohdan Panchuk, a member of the RCAF and the Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen Association (UCSA), who had only recently visited Europe and could give first hand information about the camps and their inhabitants. This information was backed up by Rev. Kushnir who had also visited DP camps in Germany in the postwar period and who had been involved in organizing the Central Ukrainian Committee. Panchuk “appeared in his RCAF uniform with two rows of ribbons on his chest,” which obviously had made some impression on the committee, because “after the hearing, the senators patted Flt. Lt. Panchuk on the back and thanked him for enlightening them on an important question.” Through the participation of numerous prominent community members in the hearing, Ukrainians made a strong case of their support for the displaced persons. Panchuk’s appearance in his military uniform symbolized the vital Ukrainian contribution to the war effort, an aspect that provided the nationalist group with more clout when they demanded the increased DP immigration.

3.3. The Case of Specialists in the Camps
But before long, lobbying for the general admission of Ukrainian DPs to the country was not enough. As the international resettlement scheme unfolded in 1947, Ukrainian-Canadian lobbying efforts adjusted to new developments and challenges presenting themselves in Europe. For example, at the peak of the resettlement scheme it became obvious that the resettlement of large numbers of intellectuals and specialists in the camps would be difficult. Since the

30 Information about Kushnir’s visit to Europe can be found in the folder: LAC RG 25 Vol. 3747 File: 6980 GR 40.
32 The IRO informed the international community about this problem, see for example: LAC RG 26 Box 143, File: 3-41-1, List of Professional Refugees in IRO Assembly Centres, 30 September 1948;
professional occupations were generally “the sources from which much of the Ukrainian elite and future leadership tend[ed] to be drawn,”

Ukrainian community leaders made special lobbying efforts on behalf of this group of people. For example, Bishop Ladyka stated that there was a lack of priests in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Canada and that clerics from the DP camps – one of the groups in dire need of immigration support – posed a unique opportunity to fill this void.

On another occasion, Anthony Iaremovich (Yaremovich), active member of the Ukrainian Canadian Veterans’ Association (UCVA) and the Canadian Ukrainian Relief Bureau (CURB), outlined in a letter to the Commissioner of Immigration the general need for cultural workers and the benefit that they could bring not only to the Ukrainian-Canadian community, but to society as a whole: “We feel that by the admittance of Ukrainian cultural workers and artists, their activities will be leading to the creating of the mosaic of Canadian culture which we all hope that Canada will have some day.”

Early on, Ukrainians in Canada argued in favor of diversity, stressing that Ukrainians could add something positive to the country, whether it was as a professional worker or a lumberjack.

3.4. Portrayal of Displaced Persons

In order to convince the addressees of the desirability of these immigrants – whether they were workers, specialists, or family members – Ukrainian Canadians described the collective group of Ukrainians in Europe in a very positive light.

LAC RG 26 Box 143, File: 3-41-1, IRO: The Refugee Specialist Problem; LAC RG 26 Box 143, File: 3-41-1, IRO: The Forgotten Elite. The Story of Refugee Specialists, 12 October 1949. Among the specialists were many teachers, professors, artists and musicians, who often made up a great portion of the cultural workers in a community. They were still left in the camps since the international community was following a tactic that the IRO described as a ‘ban on brains’ (In The Forgotten Elite, page 1); Avery, Reluctant Host, pages 160-162.


34 LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: 3-33-34, Memorandum, ALJ:HKp, 15 May 1947, pages 1-4; LAC RG 26 Box 143, File: 3-41-1, Memorandum by Director regarding the admission of DPs belonging to professional and specialist classes on sponsorship of members of Rotary Clubs and similar organizations, 5 October, 1949, pages 1-2. Out of the Ukrainian-Catholic group, the majority of priests settled in the US and the second largest group immigrated to Canada (Wojtowicz, Geschichte der Ukrainisch-Katholischen Kirche, page 79).

They were presented as “democratic, western-minded, religious, and hard working people.” Overall, it was stressed that they would make good Canadians if admitted into the country. This section explores the motivation behind this kind of presentation. On the one hand, some community members were truly convinced of the desirability of these immigrants. On the other hand, it is obvious that this presentation was part of a well-calculated approach.

Already in 1946, members of the Ukrainian-Canadian relief mission met with representatives of the Department of Secretary of State, with members of the Immigration Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources, and with delegates of the Canadian National Committee on Refugees. Panchuk, one of the participants at these meetings, later told the UCC that Canadian officials were interested “to know what the refugees were like, were they ambitious, keen, willing, capable trained etc. Were they anti-Semites?” Although there is no direct link between this particular meeting and the representation of the DPs as western minded, hard working and democratic, it is obvious that Ukrainian Canadians used these early meetings to find out what immigration officials valued in potential immigrants. As Luciuk points out, some community members – at the forefront Panchuk, who had come into direct contact with DPs in Europe – quickly became disillusioned with the character of the DPs, especially owing to the heightened politicization in the camps. One response, according to Luciuk, was the attempt to suppress Ukrainian DP political activity in the camps; furthermore, Ukrainian Canadians did not publicize their disappointment to avoid alarming the Canadian government and

36 PAO GBPC F1405 MU 9979, File: 9979.32, File: Canadian Relief Team (Anne Crapleve), 1947-1948, Notes for Miss Ann Crapleve, member of the Canadian Relief Mission for Ukrainian Refugees in Western Europe for Series of Talks given to the Women's Institutes of Wales, February 4 to February 7 inclusive, 1947; Anthony Hlynka at the Second All-Canadian Congress, in Marunchak, *Ukrainian Canadians*, page 561f; BFOF, January 30, 1946, WR 279/279/48, FO 371/57828, Memorandum to the Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, England, on Ukrainian Refugees by the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau, Paddington, London, Signed by Kushnir, Chairman, Board of Directors, and S.W. Frolick, General Secretary, page 1f; see also: Lubomyr, “‘This Should Never,’” page 105; Luciuk, *Searching*, page 198.
38 PAO GBPC F1405 MU 9979, File: 9979-31 Canadian Relief Team, pages 7-12, quote from page 9. Luciuk also points out that “CURB’s men were also telling government decision makers and their own communities what they knew their audiences wanted to hear. They understood those markets well and tailored their promotional literature accordingly” (Luciuk, *Searching*, page 152).
hampering immigration efforts. However, in this context one has to keep in mind that the government itself was keeping track of the DPs and their political activities through a broad screening system. And with the government, the hope and conviction prevailed that the majority of these people were rather apolitical. As Keenleyside, the deputy minister of the Immigration Branch, stated in 1949: “In general, I think that the refugees coming to Canada are more interested in economic re-establishment than in political matters in Europe, and as such their primary aim is to become successful citizens of Canada.”

The RCMP had a similar interpretation of Ukrainians DPs, stating that “the ultra-nationalist minded would probably flock to the [League for the Liberation of Ukraine], with the remainder, quite possibly the larger portion, being absorbed by the other Ukrainian nationalist organizations.”

However, fear of offending the Canadian government and disappointment with DP behavior were only two of the motivational factors for suppressing any public discussion of the political activities of the DPs. The positive portrayal of their brethren abroad was also stimulated through personal, Canadian aspects. What the Ukrainian-Canadian community said about DPs also mirrored how they perceived themselves in the country. For example, in a petition regarding the admission of Ukrainian displaced persons, the UCC made a direct reference to Ukrainian settlers in the country: “They are noted for their diligence and thrift and for their inborn desire to work on the land. They are religious and morally sound and have proven their worth by their unswerving loyalty to the laws of the country.

39 Luciuk, “This Should Never,” pages 117-120. One of Panchuk’s most memorable quotes was his belief that his observations of Ukrainian DP life should “never be spoken of or quoted publicly” (as cited in Luciuk, Searching, page 150). Initially, Panchuk did not communicate his fears to the UCC, and Luciuk insinuates that Panchuk might have been influenced by Kushnir to play down the factionalism in the camps; this is given as an explanation why it does not come up in his later reports (Luciuk, Searching, pages 89f, 151).
41 The League for the Liberation of Ukraine was founded by members of the third wave and is dealt with in chapter 5.
43 Furthermore, since it is unresolved how widespread political activities were among DPs, it is questionable whether disappointment with DPs was common among Ukrainian Canadians (see chapter 2, pages 81-84).
they inhabit. It would not be amiss to say that the present Ukrainian refugees are of the same caliber. Highlighting the positive qualities of being Ukrainian was as much about reinforcing the place of Ukrainians already in Canada as it was about convincing the Canadian government to increase Ukrainian immigration.

Another uniting factor between the two groups was their strong anti-communist attitude – although the 1950s would show that there were considerable differences with regard to the scope, ideology, and intensity of this feeling. However, during the 1940s’ lobbying campaign, Ukrainian Canadians highlighted the anti-communist character of the DPs as one of their major assets. A standard petition (circulated among Ukrainian-Canadian communities and then submitted to the government) illustrates this point: “These people are anti-Communists, and are representatives of every walk of life. During the last three years under the protection of the Western Allies they have displayed their skill in organizational and constructive work. These displaced persons if assisted to settle in Canada, would spearhead the movement and combat Communism since they are victims of its menace.” With this anti-Communist argument, Ukrainian Canadians struck a cord with their government, whose major concern during the postwar years was to keep communist elements out of the country. By the late 1940s, however, the Canadian government was no longer only concerned about communists, but also about other ‘subversive elements’ among the DPs in Europe – an attitude that made lobbying efforts for Ukrainians in Canada difficult when it came to the Galician Division.

47 This particular division of the German Armed Forces went by different names, such as “The 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS,” “the Volunteer Division Galicia,” “The Galician Division,” or the “SS Riflemen’s Division Galicia.” In order to avoid confusion, it will be referred to as “Galician Division” or simply as the Division throughout this work. For an overview of the different names given to this military unit, see Wolfdieter Bihl, “Ukrainians in the Armed Forces of the Reich: The 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS,” in German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective, ed. Hans-Joachim Torke and John-Paul Himka (Edmonton: CIUS Press, 1994), 138-162, 144.
3.5. The Case of the Galician Division

Once the bulk labor scheme was well underway and flourishing in 1948/49, the community’s attention was drawn towards members of the former Galician Division, a Ukrainian SS Division whose members surrendered to the British in Austria and who were detained in Rimini. Many of the Division members avoided repatriation due to an intervention by the Vatican, and were later transferred to Great Britain. The British government wanted to distribute the Division members throughout the Commonwealth. However, at first Canada was reluctant to approve the immigration of these Ukrainians who had fought for the Axis Powers and therefore ranked high on Canada’s ‘non-admissible’ list. The Ukrainian-Canadian community attempted to counter their government’s skepticism through “strong representations,” trying to convince the government that members of the Division did not pose a threat to the country and would not become public charges, but “valuable and desirable citizens.”

Nonetheless, lobbying for the admission of members of the Division was a rather challenging task because Ukrainian Canadians not only had to convince the government of their qualities as immigrants, but further had to explain the very existence of the Division. In addition to stressing that “any of these vigorous and

48 Myron Momryk gives a short overview of the Division immigration scheme to Canada (Momryk, “Ukrainian DP Immigration,” pages 421-425). Howard Margolian also deals with the case of the 1,200-2,000 Ukrainian SS veterans who made their way to Canada and gives a concise overview of the unit’s formation and history. Recruitment for the division started in March 1943 and resulted in the initial conscription of 8,000 men, who saw their first combat action in the summer of 1944 at the Eastern front at Brody. Only 3,000 men survived this operation, and they were later joined by new recruits. In the winter of 1944 the division was sent to Slovakia, and in spring of 1945 the newly named “First Division of the Ukrainian National Army” went from Slovenia to Austria were they surrendered to the British forces (Margolian, Unauthorized Entry, pages 131-147). For a more elaborate overview of the Division as well as the Roland Legion and the Nachtigall Legion, see Bihl, “Ukrainians in the Armed Forces,” pages 138-151).

49 Bishop Buchko had appealed to Pope Pius XII to intervene on behalf of the Division, whom he described as “good Catholics and fervent anti-communists.” Due to the Vatican interference, the British authorities switched the status from POW to surrendered enemy personnel (Margolian, Unauthorized Entry, page 135; Wojtowicz, Geschichte der Ukrainisch-Katholischen Kirche, page 51).

50 Avery, Reluctant Host, page 148f; Momryk, “Ukrainian DP Immigration,” pages 421-422.

51 LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: 3-33-34, Letter by N.A. Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet, to Mr. Gibson, Minister of Mines and Resources, Confidential, 15 September 1949, page 2; LAC RG 25 Vol. 6178, File: 232-L-40 (part 1.1), Letter from the UCC to Louis St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada, 21 April 1949, page 1.
willing workers would be an asset to a country that admitted them as immigrants.“52
and the usual presentation of them as western minded, religious, democratic, good,
strong, and healthy workers,53 many of the briefs stressed that fighting on the
German side was a “result of opportunity and necessity.” It was emphasized that
the Galician Division had been an ‘all-Ukrainian’ unit that had never been deployed
against western forces. It was further stated that this unit had been meant to serve
as a cadre for a future Ukrainian National Army. The community made the case
that the Division had not fought for Nazi Germany, but for the liberation of Ukraine
from Soviet oppression and that the only alternative for most Division members
would have been forced labor. Ukrainian Canadians further argued that these
people had been civilianized in Great Britain, that other countries such as Argentina
had already accepted them, and that Canada was admitting Germans by the early
1950s.54

The line of argumentation used by Ukrainian Canadians in reference to the
creation and purpose of the Galician Division had also been employed in Ukraine.
Frank Golczewski points out that the idea of an army as a precondition for
independence was very strong within the Ukrainian liberation movement. The
formation of the Galician Division and other paramilitary organizations were thus
deemed acceptable, even if it meant cooperation with the Germans.55 Although

52 LAC RG 25 Vol. 6178, File: 232-L-40 (part 1.1), Letter from Osyp Fundak, President of the
53 PAO, GBPC F1405 MU 9980, File: 9980.16, Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau, General
Correspondence, Memos etc., 1946-47, Urgent and Confidential: Memorandum on “Divisia
Halyhynya” a total of about 9,000 surrendered enemy personnel now in Rimini, Italy, London, 17
December 1946. See also Margolian, Unauthorized Entry, page 137f.
54 LAC RG 25 Vol. 6178, File: 232-L-40 (part 1.1), Letter from Osyp Fundak, President of the
6178, File: 232-L-40 (part 1.1), Letter from Theodore Danyliw, Secretary General of the Central
Co-ordinating Committee of Ukrainian Organisations, to L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State for
External Affairs, 23 March 1950; LAC RG 25 Vol. 6178, File: 232-L-40 (part 1.1), Letter from the
UCC to Louis St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada, 21 April 1949, page 1f; LAC RG 25 Vol.
6178, File: 232-L-40 (part 1.1), Letter from Panchuk to Minister of Justice and Attorney General of
Canada, 23 November 1948, page 1f; PAO GBPC F1405 MU 9989, File: 9989.31, Yaworsky, P.R.,
1948, Letter to P.R. Yaworsky, Montreal, 9 September, 1948. On March 28, 1950, immigration
rules in Canada changed, allowing “Volksdeutsch DPs and refugees who acquired German
nationality after 1 September 1939 and German nationals who were first degree relatives of
Canadian residents” into the country (Momryk, “Ukrainian DP Immigration,” page 423).
55 Golczewski calls the concept “army at all costs” (Armee um jeden Preis) (Frank Golczewski, “Die
Kollaboration in der Ukraine,” in Kooperation und Verbrechen. Formen der „Kollaboration“ im
östlichen Europa 1939-1945, ed. Christoph Dieckmann, Babette Quinkert, and Tatjana Tönsmeyer
(Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003), 151-182, page 177f).
many Canadian officials had been resistant to the case in the late 1940s, by the early 1950s some Canadian government officials fell in line with this reasoning. For example, Arnold Heeney, the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, stated in private correspondence with the RCMP that the Division “members appear to have joined the Wehrmacht in the belief that the German would honour their promises to create an independent Ukraine.” However, a lot of time had to pass until the Canadian authorities considered the admission of this particular group of people. On May 31, 1950, the Cabinet reached the decision that members of the Division should be let into the country; however, each case still had to be carefully screened. The actual admission was further delayed due to protests by the Canadian Jewish Congress; and the government once more looked into the background of this group, coming to the conclusion that there were no specific charges concerning war crimes. In the end, the Canadian government endorsed the processing of Ukrainian applicants from England on January 5, 1951. These members of the Division were the last part of the actual ‘wave’ of DP migration. By 1952, the DP immigration scheme was virtually over.

3.6. Lobbying Efforts and the Question of Success

Submissions to the government on behalf of Ukrainian refugees – whether they were ‘normal’ refugees or members of the Division – were made by different individuals and organizations. For example, members of CURB/UCRF (such as Panchuk or Kossar), prominent Ukrainian Canadians like Anthony Hlynka, the

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56 Margolian, *Unauthorized Entry*, page 140f.
58 Momryk, “Ukrainian DP Immigration,” pages 423-425. Momryk states that Division members were only able to enter the country once an order-in-council was passed allowing the entrance of German ‘enemy aliens’. The topic of the Division and its entry to Canada would gain prominence in the 1980s during the discussion on war criminals in general. An outlook on this topic will be given in chapter 6.
UCC,\textsuperscript{61} the UNF,\textsuperscript{62} the Church,\textsuperscript{63} and local communities\textsuperscript{64} sent their briefs to local and federal authorities. The correspondence conducted by these groups was quite extensive, suggesting that the mid- to late 1940s were a peak time of lobbying.

Luciuk states as an example that the UCRF and UCC launched an extensive campaign to raise funds for CURB and during the early spring of 1945 alone, 40,000 letters of appeal were sent out.\textsuperscript{65} The UNF, for example, mailed 9,783 pieces of correspondence alone between 1947 and 1950, 4,885 of which were sent out in 1949.\textsuperscript{66} In the context of the Division members, Laval Fortier, the Deputy Minister of the Immigration Branch, estimated that his branch had received 400-500 applications by 1950.\textsuperscript{67} The director of immigration complained to the Department of External Affairs that his office was “being literally flooded with

\textsuperscript{61} See for example: LAC RG 25 Vol. 6178, File: 232-L-40, part 1.1, UCC (Kushnir, Syrnick) to Louis St. Laurent, Prime Minister, 21 April 1949.
\textsuperscript{63} LAC RG 25 Vol. 2095, File: 39/2, Letter by the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Acting High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain, Ottawa, 18 October 1945; LAC RG 25 Vol. 3747, File: 6980-GR-40, Letter from Robertson, High Commissioner for Canada, Canada House, London, to Pearson, Dept of External Affairs, 7 January 1946, 1f; LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: 3-33-34, 15 May 1947, Memorandum, ALJ:HKp, pages 1-3. Ukrainian churches did not only appeal to the government directly, but also contacted other denominations such as the Presbyterian Church, asking them to lobby on behalf of Ukrainians. Here their lobbying efforts were met with some success, see for example: LAC RG 27 Vol. 290 File: 1-26-56-6, Letter from Rev. Pickup, Director of Immigration, the Presbyterian Church in Canada, to W. Dawson, Department of Labour, 17 April 1951. Marunchak lists a submission by the Ukrainian Catholic Council to the Minister of Mines and Resources from October 1946 (Marunchak, The Ukrainian Canadians, page 563).
\textsuperscript{64} Blank petition forms existed that could be filled out at community meetings and were then sent to Ottawa. For an example for a filled out form, see LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: Admission to Canada, Resolution (stamp: Minister of Mines and Resources, 24 May 1948). Several of these forms were actually sent in, see: LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: 3-33-34 (Vol. 1), Letter by E.H. Coleman, Under Secretary of State, to the Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources.
\textsuperscript{65} Luciuk, “A Troubled Venture,” page 439. Luciuk does not specify this any further, however, it is likely that these letters were foremost addressed to Ukrainian-Canadian community members to raise money.
\textsuperscript{66} Zvit z Diial’nosti kraiovoi ekzekutyvy Ukrains’koho natsional’noho Ob’iednannia Kanady za rik 1950 (Winnipeg 1951), page 8. In 1947, UNF received 628 letters and sent out 972, in 1948 the organization received 1,062 letters and sent out 1,474, in 1949 it received 1,803 letters and sent out 4,885, and in 1950 it received 1,187 letters and sent out 2,452.
\textsuperscript{67} LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: 3-33-34 (Ukrainians - Admission to Canada), Memorandum by L. Fortier, Deputy Minister, to the Honourable Walter Harris, regarding Ukrainian (surrendered enemy personnel) in the United Kingdom, 23 March 1950, page 3.
applications from former residents of Continental Europe now in Canada for the admission of relatives from Europe, the majority of whom are [DPs].”

‘Bombarding’ Ottawa with petitions from organizations and individuals was actually a lobbying strategy, designed to bring the DP issue to the top of the government agenda. Panchuk, for example, recommended this method to anybody who approached him, asking for help with individual family cases. From time to time, this kind of fervent lobbying led to raised eyebrows and aggravation within government circles. One official remarked: “I am wondering where the Ukrainian Canadian Committee gets the authority to state that we will shortly be issuing permits of entry for those who are able to produce documentary release to civilian status”. Apparently, the UCC had made these assertions about the Division in the New Pathway and the Ukrainian News at a time when the government had no interest in dealing with this group. Nonetheless, government officials grudgingly admitted that they could not completely disregard Ukrainian-Canadian lobbying efforts. For example, an official of Canada House in London, England, remarked to the Department of External Affairs after meeting Bohdan Panchuk: “You will note that Mr. Panchuk has a few remarks to make about selective immigration. These remarks seem to be of special interest as they come from a member of the largest group of foreign extraction in Canada.”

68 Quoted in: Troper, “The Canadian Government,” page 406f. External affairs also stated that it was under pressure from “foreign language organizations,” page 407.

69 Panchuk was convinced that Ottawa needed pressure from the public to react on the DP issue (PAO GBPC F1405 MU 9979, File: 9979-31, Canadian Relief Team, Report on meetings and conferences of Canadian relief Team for Ukrainian D.P.’s prior to departure from Canada. From Panchuk to UCC and UCRF, pages 1-16). In personal correspondence with Ukrainian Canadians who were eager to bring over relatives, Panchuk advised them to ‘bombard’ Ottawa with letters to push their case (PAO GBPC F1405 MU 9977, File: 9977.36, Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, Correspondence 1948-49, Letter from Panchuk to Nick Mokrynsky, Alberta, Canada, 23 November 1948; PAO GBPC F1405 MU 9981, File: 9981.02, Letter to Peter Chodak; PAO GBPC F1405 MU 9984, File: 9984.46, Lesick Family, 1948/49, Letter from W.A. Lesick (Andrew, Alberta) to Bohdan Panchuk, 11 June 1948 (There are Panchuk’s handwritten remarks on the letter, suggesting that Lesick “continue to bombard Ottawa direct, then M.P. etc”)).

70 LAC RG 76 Vol. 856, File: 554-33, Letter from District Superintendent, to Mr. Smith, Commissioner of Immigration, 19 October 1948. See also Margolian, Unauthorized Entry, page 141.

71 LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: 3-33-34, Letter by the High Commission for Canada in London to Mr. Riddell, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, 16 June 1947). The admittance of Ukrainians as contract laborers (although they ranked behind, for example, the Baltic groups) was seen as advisable because it would “be favourably received in some quarters here” as one report stated (Quoted in Danys, DP, page 89).
The problem with a topic like lobbying is how to measure success. As Steve John points out, it is hard to measure effectiveness, because lobbying itself is a rather vague concept. In addition, many variables are involved in the decision making process; therefore, the final outcome can never be attributed to one factor alone.\footnote{John, \textit{The Persuaders}, pages 24-30.} According to Luciuk, “there can be little doubt that their efforts did help influence the federal government in favour of DP immigration.”\footnote{Luciuk, \textit{Searching}, page 198 (although, at another point in his book, Luciuk himself states that it is debatable whether the Senate hearing, for example, had any profound influence on the immigration policy (page 98f). Luciuk also quotes a Canadian report which observed that the UCC had some influence on British policy towards DPs (page 99, for British positive attitude towards Ukrainian Canadians, see page 199f).} He further asserts that “throughout the late 1940s a tug of war took place between Ukrainian-Canadian activists boosting DP immigration and Canada’s gate-keepers, as the latter waxed and waned over whether or not to allow for any large-scale immigration of the refugees, and the former kept up lobbying for just such an immigration.”\footnote{Luciuk, \textit{Searching}, page 211.} However, the issue has to be situated in the broader context of Canadian immigration history. Margolian makes us aware that ethnic groups sometimes forged alliances with big businesses such as the railway companies, thereby successfully strengthening their case.\footnote{Margolian, \textit{Unauthorized Entry}, page 24ff.} Margolian also argues that Ukrainian-Canadian lobbying on behalf of the Division was not successful and did not contribute to the reversal of the government’s decision.\footnote{Margolian stresses that it was a more important factor that the Volksdeutsche who had served in the German armed forces were admitted into the country by 1950 (Margolian, \textit{Unauthorized Entry}, page 143).} Likewise, Troper is of the opinion that “ethnic group representation to immigration authorities may have carried little weight.” He sees the continuing labor shortage, the strong upswing in the Canadian economy, massive pressure from businesses, and a growing voice from within the cabinet as major push factors for opening up immigration policy in Canada. Although Troper does not dismiss ethnic group efforts, he does not see them as a major factor.\footnote{Troper, “The Canadian Government,” page 407.} The majority of authors agree with Troper’s and Margolian’s interpretation. Myron Momryk points out that there was a combination of pressure groups – such as members of Parliament, transportation companies, religious and ethno-cultural groups (including the UCC) – that have to be taken into...
consideration. He sees their influence as mostly “reflected in the complex collection of orders-in-council regarding security regulations, age, health, and other standards that controlled entry into Canada.” Satzewich comes to the conclusion that ethnic lobbying was not necessary, because economic forces and the fact that the Ukrainian DPs were considered ‘white’ worked in their favor.

This study agrees with the assessment that the economic upswing and the demands from businesses were the most important factors influencing the government’s attitude on immigration. Nonetheless, Ukrainian-Canadian lobbying efforts were still important for the community’s standing and further development. As this analysis of their lobbying campaign has shown, Ukrainian Canadians were successful in motivating their compatriots on an issue that did not directly pertain to the community in Canada. They were able to initiate a lobbying campaign that reached different levels of government and adjusted to developments in Europe. In addition, they affirmed their self-ascribed role as guardians of the DPs; the interest in the homeland had temporarily shifted from Ukraine itself to the DP camps in Europe, where the Ukrainian DPs represented something like the homeland. The lobbying process sets the stage for the next phase – the settlement of the DPs in Canada. Conflicts within the community can only be understood by taking into consideration that the established community had invested considerable time and resources to lobby on behalf of the DPs and that they had certain expectations of them.

3.7. Ukrainian Relief Efforts in Germany and Austria

Early on, the organized community in Canada realized that lobbying and collecting funds for DPs was not enough, and their focus was directed towards the European continent itself. Anthony Hlynka, for example, undertook a “private and self-financed fact-finding mission to Europe” in order to determine the fate of the Ukrainian displaced persons. Luciuk argues that Ukrainian Canadians wanted to help DPs in Europe because they “sincerely believed that an influx of Ukrainian refugees would invigorate their existing organizations,” and a relief mission sent to the continent was the most important step in this context. By the early 1950s,

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78 Momryk, “Ukrainian DP Immigration,” pages 413f, 420.
79 Satzewich, The Ukrainian Diaspora, page 102.
however, Luciuk states that Ukrainian Canadians lost interest in relief efforts because they were disillusioned by their interactions with the third wave and by internal conflicts that preoccupied the UCC.81

Various organizations were involved in bringing Ukrainian relief to war torn Europe. Even before the war was over, the UCC contacted the Department of National War Services in October of 1944, expressing its desire to start collecting funds for Ukrainian Displaced Persons. In January of 1945, after some debate with the Department of National War Services and the Department of External Affairs, the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund (UCRF) was created.82 Gordon Bohdan Panchuk, a Ukrainian-Canadian Serviceman stationed in England, led the European relief mission.83 He founded the Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen’s Association (UCSA) which later became the nucleus of the Canadian Ukrainian Relief Bureau (CURB). Already in June 1945, Panchuk was well aware of the destitute situation of Ukrainian DPs in Europe and urged the UCC to intervene on their behalf. In Canada, the UCC and the UCRF campaigned to raise money which would then be used by CURB to coordinate their activities and bring help to Ukrainian displaced persons. In 1945, the UCRF had $65,563.19 at its disposal,84 and by 1948, the organization had collected more than $200,000. In addition, Ukrainian-Canadian families privately shipped numerous relief parcels to their counterparts in Germany and Austria.85 The donations were collected mostly during donation drives and special events such as concerts or Easter breakfasts, which were organized by Ukrainian communities across Canada.86

82 Luciuk, “A Troubled Venture,” page 436f. The authorities were rather apprehensive towards the formation of a Ukrainian-Canadian relief agency, because they feared that it might be misconstrued by the Soviet authorities. And indeed, the Soviet authorities were opposed to any kind of help or intervention on behalf of displaced persons (Luciuk, Searching, page 69ff).
83 For further development of the UCRF (later the Social Services of Ukrainians in Canada) see “Suspil’na Sluzhba Ukraintsiv Kanady”, in Zbirnyk materiialiv i dokumentiv u 25-littia diial’nosti KUK, 1940-1965, pages 141-145.
84 “Suspil’na Sluzhba”, page 141. (The amount dropped to $63,536.11 in 1946, a sign that either not much activity had been going on in the early years (or if money had been spent, it was replaced through new donations). In 1947, the organization had $60,968.35 at its disposal, and in 1948 only $18,601.28).
85 Marunchak, The Ukrainian Canadians, page 566.
However, collecting donations was only one element in the relief efforts. The other crucial part was bringing direct assistance to Europe, and it was here that the community encountered some difficulties. Some Ukrainian servicemen first established contact with Ukrainian DPs soon after the Allies liberated Europe and reported back to the UCSA in Britain or the UCC about the situation in Germany. However, it turned out to be difficult to actually send official Ukrainian-Canadian representatives to Europe. Initially, the relief efforts were opposed by the communist camp in Canada and abroad. Since Canada and Britain were still eager in the early postwar period to maintain an excellent relationship with the Soviet Union and since the government at that point had no intention of encouraging any DP emigration, Ukrainian-Canadian travelers to Europe were carefully screened. Their representatives were instructed not to express opinions which the Soviet authorities might consider provocative, and to calm down the nationalist elements in the camps.87

In addition, Ukrainian Canadians ran into further problems. It took some time before the relief mission could build up organized contact with the DPs because securing permission to travel and work in the British zone was extremely complicated. 1947 was the first year when actual relief work in Europe became possible.88 The Ukrainian organizations in Germany as well as diaspora relief organizations were only fully recognized once the IRO took over the DP operations in the summer of 1947.89 Furthermore, a lot of time and energy was spent coordinating Ukrainian-Canadian and Ukrainian-American relief efforts, an attempt that was hampered by internal bickering.90 In the end, Ukrainian-Canadian representatives made it to Europe, located Ukrainian DPs, visited the camps, distributed material aid such as food or clothing, and gave legal aid. However, it is rather hard to estimate the scope of the work, because only a few staff members

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88 Luciuk, Searching, pages 153-161. Kushnir’s visit to the continent in the first half of 1946 can serve as an example of the problems and obstacles surrounding such a trip at the time (Luciuk, Searching, page 72f). However, individuals such as Panchuk had gotten in touch with Ukrainian DPs even earlier during his military stay on the continent (Luciuk, Searching, page 70f).
89 Dyczok, Grand Alliance, page 153f.
were working in Europe under very difficult conditions. This led to frustration, because, as Luciuk states, “disconcertingly, their hard work often seemed to have few obviously successful outcomes” and was sometimes also opposed by Ukrainian nationalists within the camps. In the end, Ukrainian organizations and individuals were successful in sponsoring some Ukrainian DPs to come to Canada, but the majority of this group was brought to Canada as part of a labor scheme and thus supported through international rather than specifically Ukrainian-Canadian efforts.

4. Immigration schemes – Getting Them Over

More than 18 months after the end of the war, the Canadian government took clear steps to facilitate postwar immigration. On January 30, 1947 a first order-in-council made broader admission of close relatives possible; DPs could be sponsored either by direct relatives or an ethnic organization that guaranteed to take care of them so that they did not become public charges. A further series of orders-in-council issued later in 1947 initiated the immigration of contract laborers. Although this scheme was still rather restrictive in the beginning, it opened the door for wider immigration in the future. The government explained this turn towards increased immigration as follows: “The reasons for the Canadian action were both humanitarian and pragmatic. The Government desired to make a contribution to the solution of a sad human problem both directly and by setting an example for others. It also wished to add a new and valuable element to the Canadian economy.” The labor market and the absorption of immigrants into Canadian society continued to be central concerns, and the development of a larger immigration scheme was still

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91 Luciuk, Searching, page 178.
92 Eventually, this antagonism went so far that Panchuk was ousted from the AUGB by a group of Hetmancts and Banderivtsi (who had come to England from German DP camps) (Luciuk, Searching, page 220f). Another indicator that relief work was not widespread is the fact that several DPs heard for the first time about the relief fund after their arrival in Canada (Luciuk, Searching, page 235).
93 The UCRF stated, for example, in an annual report for 1949 that “400 visits had been made to various refugee camps; documents for 2,747 Ukrainian immigrants had been prepared; 422 contacts between sponsors and immigrants desiring to leave for Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Brazil, and Argentina had been set up; interventions had been made in 802 cases where delays were being experienced; and 7,137 ‘souls’ had been notified about permits for entry to Canada” (Luciuk, Searching, page 182).
94 See for example Margolian, Unauthorized Entry, pages 28, 42ff, 74.
95 LAC RG 26 Vol. 121, File: 3-32-2 (Vol. 1), Keenleyside, Deputy Minister, Memorandum for the Cabinet Committee on Immigration Policy, 3 September 1948, page 1.
cautious. Until the new Immigration Act became effective in June 1953, the decision-making process was in the hands of a small number of immigration officials. As a result, immigration of laborers and close relatives was regulated through orders-in-council throughout the 1940s. The demand for more and more workers increased steadily; and by June 1950, the admissible category was further enlarged to any person who was “a suitable immigrant having regard to the climatic, the social, educational, industrial, labour, or other conditions or requirements or [sic] Canada.”

Most Ukrainians, who were still believed to be among the “best peasant labourers in Europe,” came as members of the Bulk-Labor Scheme that was supervised by delegates of the departments of Mines and Resources (Immigration Branch), Labor, External Affairs and the RCMP. The Bulk-Labor Scheme was tailored to the Canadian job market and targeted groups such as miners, lumberjacks, farmers, and domestics. At the time, this type of labor force best suited Canada’s needs, and the Bulk-Labor scheme was a good opportunity for those DPs who either did not have relatives in Canada or did not want to make use of the sponsorship plan. One interviewee explained her and her husband’s motivation to join the program as follows: “We did not want to have a sponsor. If you have a sponsor, you are obligated to pay them…or you feel all your life that you owe them something. And me and my husband, we were a little bit proud

96 The new Immigration Act was passed in 1952 and became effective June 1953 (Momryk, “Ukrainian DP Immigration,” page 428).
97 Momryk, “Ukrainian DP Immigration,” pages 418-421, quote from page 421.
98 LAC RG 25 Vol. 6178, File: 232-L-40 (part 1.1), Maurice Pope, head of Canadian Military Mission Berlin, to Secretary of State, External Affairs, 3 December 1947, page 2. (See also Avery, Reluctant Host, page 157). Many Ukrainians applied in the farming category although they did not necessarily intend to stay in this kind of profession (see for example: LAC RG 26 Vol. 141, File: 3-40-11 Part I, Immigration to Canada from Overseas showing intended occupation by racial origin for calendar year 1951).
99 In the late 1940s, no Department of Immigration existed. Immigration had been a branch of the Department of Mines and Resources since 1936, and, as Margolian points out, “some of its responsibilities had been transferred to other government departments. The resulting fragmentation of the immigration bureaucracy brought about confusion, turf war, and, for a time, paralysis” (Margolian, Unauthorized Entry, page 29).
100 For an analysis of the Bulk Labor Scheme, see for example: Momryk, “Ukrainian DP Immigration,” pages 413-434 (Momryk also mentions the Catholic Orphan Immigration Scheme through which some Ukrainian orphans found their way to Canada, pages 425-428); Henriette von Holleuffer explores the Canadian immigration scheme with special focus on the selection process in Europe (Holleuffer, Zwischen Fremde, pages 137-150). In the context of the Lithuanian case, Milda Danys explores the different ways that existed for DPs to come to Canada as contract laborers (Danys, DP, pages 86-199).
people, we were independent."\textsuperscript{101} Officially, no quota was installed for ethnic groups; however, certain groups – such as Jews – were still ‘non-preferred’ immigrants and were neglected by immigration teams sent to Germany.\textsuperscript{102}

Especially in the beginning, the general process of choosing and moving DPs was rather slow because of a lack of transportation, difficulty in locating suitable DPs, the inadequate facilities of the IGCR in Germany, and difficulties with translators.\textsuperscript{103}

To be admitted into the country, DPs and their dependants had to undergo an extensive screening process that was carried out by RCMP security officers in cooperation with the Canadian immigration teams. The major goal of this inspection was to uncover criminal as well as ‘subversive activities,’ service in the German armed forces, or communist leanings.\textsuperscript{104} The Canadian officials had also learned from the Polish War Veteran Scheme the importance of screening for health suitability.\textsuperscript{105} The Canadian authorities wanted to make sure that these people would be successful in their respective jobs as miners or lumberjacks,\textsuperscript{106} therefore, physical assessments – including screening for tuberculosis – were a main concern. Apart from their health, the prospective immigrants had to convince the immigration officials that they were ‘bona fide’ lumberjacks or miners. In general, DPs underwent a variety of job screenings and soon knew what officials were looking for. Cutting wood became a favorite pastime in the camps because

\textsuperscript{101} Interview 11.

\textsuperscript{102} Immigration officials often expressed preferences in their choice of immigrants, as an examination of the Lithuanian case has shown (Danys, \textit{DP}, pages 76f, 89f). Jews were still one of the groups that were not wanted in Canada, neither during nor after the war (Avery, \textit{Reluctant Host}, pages 155-157; for a general examination of this topic see Abella et al., \textit{None Is Too Many}).

\textsuperscript{103} LAC RG 26 Vol. 121 File: 3-32-2 (Vol. 1), MacKinnon, Acting Minister of Mines and Resources, Memorandum to the Cabinet: Immigration Inspection and Selection of Displaced Persons in Germany and Austria, 8 August 1947, page 2.

\textsuperscript{104} LAC RG 25 Vol. 6178, File: 232-L-40 (part 1.1), Letter from High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 4 August 1948, page 1; Momryk, “Ukrainian DP Immigration,” page 417; Whitaker, “A Secret Policy,” pages 356-359. Since the Gouzenko Affair in September 1945 – Gouzenko had been a Soviet cipher clerk who defected to the Canadian side and revealed an extensive Soviet spy network in Canada – the Canadian government had become more aware and afraid of Communists in their midst. However, Margolian stresses that Canadian officials were not taken over by Soviet ‘hysteria’ and that one of their primary goals was still to keep any ‘subversives’ out of the country, a category that included ‘active’ Nazis as well (Margolian, \textit{Unauthorized Entry}, pages 34-41, 94f).


\textsuperscript{106} LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: 3-33-34, Letter from Keenleyside to Yaremovich, 28 April 1948.
wheals on one's hands convinced many an immigration official of the suitability of the candidate. Furthermore, applicants often exaggerated previous experiences as lumberjacks, miners, or farmers to get a work contract.\(^\text{107}\)

Initially, the category of ‘satisfactory DPs’ who were accepted for immigration comprised only those who would be able to perform physically demanding jobs. This meant that the majority of intellectuals in the camps who could not pass as lumberjacks or miners were ignored in early schemes. The selection process was geared towards the young, healthy and strong DPs, and this preference was also expressed by immigration officials through remarks they made in the comment section on the selection sheets. For example, in the context of prospective Ukrainian immigrants, comments like “nice, healthy”, “good, strong” or “neat, not very strong” reflect the judgment these officials passed on these workers.\(^\text{108}\) The rigid selection process was criticized abroad because it put a strain on many DPs who felt like they were at a ‘slave market.’\(^\text{109}\) Ukrainian-Canadian representatives, for example, argued that this approach did not acknowledge that the DPs’ health had suffered due to the war and that it was impossible for many of them to meet the high health standards required by Canada. Furthermore, the community stressed that neglecting intellectual leaders and breaking up families produced more psychological harm during the immigration process.\(^\text{110}\)

However, once the race was on to recruit the ‘best DPs’ into the country,\(^\text{111}\) the Canadian selection process changed. By 1948, Canadian government authorities observed that it was harder and harder to get ‘satisfactory DPs’ because, not only did Canada have very strict entry requirements, but other countries such as

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\(^{107}\) Holleuffer, *Zwischen Fremde*, page 344f; Danys, *DPs*, pages 91-94. Milda Danys states that many immigration officials were probably aware that the majority of the screened DPs were not professional lumberjacks.


\(^{111}\) The Canadian National Committee on Refugees (CNCR), for example, argued that the Canadian government had to take swift action to get the best DPs over (Avery, *Reluctant Host*, page 150f).
the US or Australia had stepped up their immigration programs. Once the ‘competition for the souls’ started internationally, many officials and interested parties in Canada feared that the country would ‘miss out’ if it did not relax its regulations and make it easier for dependents to join family members who already emigrated. Due to international competition, Canadian government officials realized the value of specialists among the DPs, and the intellectual category became part of an official government agenda in 1948; however, as Avery points out, the motivating factor for the government was again the self-interest of the country. Howard Adelman also shows that the Canadian immigration scheme was primarily spurred by economic self-interest and not by humanitarian concerns. Canada was not alone in this approach among the international community. The utilization of displaced persons for the booming labor market was widely criticized by the Soviet Union which condemned the working conditions and general ‘exploitation’ of these people. Furthermore, Soviet officials accused western governments and international relief agencies of hindering repatriation efforts. The majority of complaints in the forum of the United Nations were submitted by delegates of the Soviet satellite states or Soviet republics such as Ukraine or Byelorussia, and not by Russian or ‘general’ Soviet representatives.

112 LAC RG 26 Vol. 146, File: 3-41-23, part I, Memo from Wylie to Keenleyside, 23 September 1948. Angelika Sauer explores the deepened interest in DPs due to competition, for example, with Australia (Angelika Sauer, “Christian Charity, Government Policy and German Immigration to Canada and Australia, 1947 to 1952,” Canadian Issues 18 (1996), 159-180).

113 In the context of German immigration to Canada, Angelika Sauer describes the government’s and the church’s activities as ‘competition for the souls’ (Sauer, “Christian Charity,” pages 159-180).

114 See for example: LAC RG 26 Vol. 122, 3-32-9 (Vol. 1) (Close Relatives - Dependents of Immigrants/ Admission to Canada), E.A. Armstrong, Australia Eager For DPs.

115 LAC RG 26 Vol. 121 File: 3-32-2 (Vol. 1), Keenleyside, Deputy Minister, 3 September 1948, Memorandum for the Cabinet Committee on Immigration Policy, page 2; Avery, Reluctant Host, pages 148, 160-164. For more on the immigration of the specialist or professional category, see Holleuffer, Zwischen Fremde, page 273ff.


117 As Henriette von Holleuffer points out, the three countries she examined – Australia, Canada and the United States – were driven by the desire to recruit new laborers into the country and failed to truly address the case of the ‘hard core’ cases (Holleuffer, Zwischen Fremde, page 377f).

The tenor of UN submissions was repeated in the Soviet press, which implied that those DPs who eventually emigrated were abused by the ‘Slave Market’ of the IRO and hindered from returning to their homeland. Although these complaints were obviously tainted by Soviet ideology and phraseology, there was something to the accusations. The DP problem was tackled by the international community mainly because it was interested in filling all those jobs that none of their own people were willing to do. Furthermore, the selection process has also been criticized by historians who state that people were sometimes ‘treated like cattle.’

Despite all difficulties of selecting and moving ‘satisfactory’ DPs, the overall immigration scheme was a success. Canada badly needed the laborers, and so her own needs conveniently coincided with her obligations with regard to the international refugee problem. Between 1947 and 1951, approximately 130,000 displaced persons were admitted to the country. Only a few of the DPs who had been sent from Europe turned out to be unfit for the work to which they had been assigned and had to be returned. The majority of the men and women stayed at least initially in their contract jobs which introduced them to Canadian life.

5. Conclusion

Those DPs who made their way across the ocean between 1947 and 1952 came to a country that was well prepared for their arrival. The Ukrainian community and the Canadian government had had years to plan for the immigration of the newcomers, because the first significant group (in terms of numbers) arrived more than two years after the war had ended and the extent of the DP problem had become


120 Avery, Reluctant Host, page 155f; Holleuffer, Zwischen Fremde, page 144.
121 Avery, Reluctant Host, pages 167-168.
122 Holleuffer, Zwischen Fremde, page 146. Other scholars provide higher numbers of displaced persons, for example Gerus states that 190,000 DPs came to Canada until 1952 (Gerus, “Introduction,” page XXXVII). Kelley asserts that 165,000 refugees were admitted to Canada between 1947 and 1953 (Kelley, The Making, 313).
123 Danys, DPs, page 97f; LAC RG 76 Vol. 856, File: 554-33, Minutes of the twenty-second meeting of the Immigration Labour Committee held...on Wednesday, 12 November 1947, page 1.
obvious. Initially Canada was skeptical of immigration and focused on the safe return of its soldiers and their dependants. However, as the postwar months went by, the need for a controlled labor migration became obvious as Canada experienced an unprecedented economic upswing. Since the majority of Canadians were unwilling to perform all kinds of manual labor, businesses soon started to pressure the government to allow a large-scale labor migration into the country. However, although Canada opened its gates, the target group of the immediate postwar period was still white immigrants.\(^\text{124}\) This aim could be reached by turning national attention toward the escalating DP problem in Europe, whereupon the Canadian government was able to fulfill its international obligations to the IRO while at the same time addressing a major concern at home. Thus Ukrainians were part of a labor migration and de facto lost their status as a refugee wave once they immigrated to Canada – even though mentally many of the third wave continued to see themselves as refugees, as chapter 5 will show.

As part of either a bulk-labor or a sponsorship program, Ukrainians were subject to intensive screening tests in Europe. Although these measures raised protests among the community members, they were important to insure the moral and medical fitness of the applicants. Despite the government precautions, some war criminals made their way to Canada; and since the issue provoked a fervent discussion during the 1980s with the Ukrainian community at the centre of attention,\(^\text{125}\) it is important to touch on that topic as well. Margolian estimates that 1,500-2,000 war criminals made their way to Canada, that is to say 1-2% of the entire refugee movement. Since these were no ordinary criminals, the issue cannot be dismissed lightly. However, Margolian also points out that these 1-2% were mostly admitted due to limitations of the Canadian screening system. The Canadian authorities developed the screening system only during the immigration process, and their efforts were hampered due to the lack of access to documents and sources. In Margolian’s view, Ottawa’s officials were determined to keep war criminals out.

\(^{124}\) Triadafilopoulos, *Shifting Boundaries*, pages 103, 120ff.  
\(^{125}\) For general literature on the war criminal discussion, see Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld, *Old Wounds: Jews, Ukrainians, and the Hunt for War Criminals in Canada* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989); Ukrainian Canadian Committee, *Ukrainian Canadian Committee Submission to the Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals* (Toronto: Justinian Press for Civil Liberties Commission, Ukrainian Canadian Committee, 1986).
of the country and did their best in devising a large-scale immigration scheme, even though a few ‘undesirable’ characters might have slipped through.\textsuperscript{126} The question of war criminals is not crucial for this study; however, one has to be aware that this issue would turn out to be significant during the 1980s.

Although Ukrainian-Canadian lobbying had, if at all, only marginal influence on the immigration scheme that was developed in the postwar period, it was still an important issue for the community. Through their efforts Ukrainians in Canada had shown that they could be mobilized for a greater cause, a case that would repeat itself during the 1960s. During the three postwar years, Ukrainians in Canada continued and modified the extensive lobbying efforts which they had started during the Second World War. In the eyes of many community members, their lobbying was successful because members of the third wave, even those of the Galician Division, were admitted to Canada. Coupled with pride in extensive Ukrainian-Canadian participation in the Canadian army, this led to a stronger self-confidence during the postwar period. An examination of the lobbying discourse further reveals that the community developed a discourse on what a ‘true’ Ukrainian was all about – western-minded, democratic, religious, and hardworking. This ideal reflected not only their interpretation (or idealization) of the third wave, but also the picture that they had of themselves. Indeed, the established community had high expectations for these newcomers, expectations which were hard to fulfill, as the following chapter will show.

\textsuperscript{126} Margolian, \textit{Unauthorized Entry}. Margolian sees the blame for the entrance of some war criminals rather with the western intelligence agencies that made admission to the country possible. In the case of the Ukrainian SS Division, Margolian comes to the conclusion that the division “deserved the clean bill of health conferred on it by a Canadian royal commission in 1986” (page 134) but also points out that an extensive screening process was employed and that “only a few dozen of the 1,200-2,000 former members of the division who were admitted to Canada were subsequently revealed to have had prior auxiliary police service” (page 146).
Chapter 5: The Settlement Process of the Third Wave and Community Development during the 1950s

1. Introduction

By the end of the 1950s, more than 35,000 Ukrainians of the third wave had established themselves in Canada. Most of them came as part of the bulk-labor movement and found their first employment in the mining and lumbering towns in northern Ontario. Later the majority of the third wave settled in this province in cities such as Toronto, Thunder Bay, Hamilton, Kingston, or Ottawa. They joined existing institutions and founded organizations of their own, the biggest of which – the League for the Liberation of Ukraine – finally joined the UCC in 1959. However, until this stage could be reached, Ukrainians had to surmount several difficulties in the new country of settlement. Helpful during this process were not only the DPs’ motivation and educational background, but also the favorable circumstances which they encountered in Canada.

The settlement of the DP wave in general and the Ukrainians in particular is a subject that has found little attention in the wider historiography. This chapter starts with an examination of the third wave’s initial three years in the country. Based on a broad range of sources from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and drawing on interviews with community members and secondary literature, we get an overview of their initial work contracts, their settlement patterns, and their struggle for a better life in Canada. Taking the existing community into consideration, the rural-urban and the labor-professional shift is examined as well. Once Ukrainians had settled in the country, different organizations were helpful in their adjustment process. The topic of government integration measures and general postwar settlement efforts still needs more research, but preliminary studies indicate that voluntary agencies played an important role in this process. For example, Franca Iacovetta takes case files of the International Institute and their services for immigrants as an example for the many

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1 For example: Avery, Reluctant Host; Holleuffer, Zwischen Fremde; Stella Hryniuk, “Ukrainian Immigration to Ontario: An Overview,” in Ukrainians in Ontario, ed. Luciuk, 21-26; Darcovich, “The ‘Statistical Compendium.’”
church and voluntary agencies dealing with immigrants after WWII. Apart from voluntary agencies, the church and ethnic cultural organizations are of vital importance for the general settlement experience. Taking voluntary and government agencies into consideration, section 2.4. examines the opportunities for Ukrainian newcomers in the wider Canadian framework. This perspective is important for a later comparison to the Ukrainian experience in Germany, because it shows that Ukrainians were classified as bona-fide labor immigrants in the country and had to display initiative of their own to master the settlement process. It also adds a new point of view on the subject, because Lubomyr Luciuk, who is the only scholar to have examined the initial settlement period of the third wave in Canada to date, focuses most of his attention on government surveillance of the group and ideological rivalries between the established community and the newcomers.

Clashes between the existing community and the newcomers were not uncommon in postwar Canada, as Angelika Sauer has shown for the case of the Germans. The German Lutheran church had displayed particular interest in the emigration of Germans to Canada, hoping to be able to boost their own community through this influx. However, the newcomers did not live up to the expectations placed on them by the existing community, which came out of this experience disappointed. Since the divided character of the Ukrainian-Canadian community is widely accepted, this chapter outlines the differences within the nationalist community and between the nationalists and the pro-communist faction in section 3. Furthermore, it examines the nationalist community’s development during the

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2 The work of the institution was influenced by strong anti-Communism and idealized middle-class concepts of family that often saw the father as the sole provider of the family (Franca Iacovetta, “Making ‘New Canadians’: Social Workers, Women and the Reshaping of Immigrant Families,” in A Nation of Immigrants. Women, Workers, and Communities in Canadian History, 1840s – 1960s, ed. Franca Iacovetta, Paula Draper, and Robert Ventresca (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 482-513).
3 Jean Burnet and Howard Palmer deal with different aspects of the immigration process such as voluntary organizations, ethnicity, or the church, thereby providing an excellent framework for the analysis of the immigration experience (Burnet, Palmer, “Coming Canadians”). Through oral interviews, Barry Broadfoot gives us an insight into the immigrants’ postwar immigration process, dealing with aspects such as finding work or the general ‘culture shock’ (Barry Broadfoot, The Immigrant Years. From Britain and Europe to Canada, 1945-1967 (Vancouver, Toronto: Douglas and McIntyre, 1986).
4 Luciuk, Searching, pages 222-244, 251-263.
1950s in section 4, asking whether a unifying factor existed for the group. The hypothesis is that, despite serious ideological differences, the third wave and the established community found common ground due to their opposition of the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian pro-communist faction in Canada. Articles from *Homin Ukrayiny*, the newspaper of the League, publications by Ukrainian-Canadian institutions, and interviews serve as a source base for this part.

While the Ukrainian-Canadian community had to deal with some internal problems during the 1950s, the broader Canadian context for their community development is not neglected and will be examined in section 4.3. The wider Canadian context allows for a broader interpretation of the Ukrainian experience in Canada. Taking Ukrainians and their abiding interest in Ukraine’s independence as a basis for his argument, Luciuk comes to the conclusion that Ukrainians in Canada were ultimately a group whose interests were not taken seriously by the government, because Ukraine’s liberation was never “an objective of Canadian policy.” Even worse, according to Luciuk “Ottawa’s men, no matter how muddled a collection of mediocrities they generally seem to have been, did at several points in time purposefully intervene in Ukrainian Canadian affairs […] with traumatic and long-term impact on the nature of Ukrainian Canadian life,” their intervention in the formation of the UCC being one of the examples. If one solely takes the foreign policy aspect – Ukraine’s liberation – as the basis for exploring the Ukrainian experience in Canada, then indeed one cannot come to another conclusion, because Ukraine’s liberation was not on the agenda of the Canadian government. However, the Ukrainian experience in Canada contained other aspects that were closely connected to their immigration to and settlement in the country. Although only section 4.3 deals in particular with this issue, the entire chapter

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situates the Ukrainian experience within the broader Canadian framework. While exploring the opportunities that Ukrainians had in Canada, this chapter analyzes the immediate challenges that awaited them in country, thereby stressing that Ukrainians faced important issues that did not pertain to their homeland.

2. Settlement Process and Integration Approach
2.1. Working as Contract Laborers

Although the Canadian immigration scheme is generally hailed as a success, it was not completely free of difficulties and setbacks. All those DPs who did not come under the family scheme were theoretically bound to a one-year work contract in Canada. The majority of them worked in the farming, mining, textile, or hydro-electricity industries, or as domestics in families and institutions. From the start, neither employers nor DPs felt particularly obliged to fulfill these contracts. For example, employers in the lumbering industry let newcomers go after ten instead of twelve months if there was not enough work available, which meant that these people were then unemployed in a foreign country, often without sufficient language skills or job training. On the other hand, many DPs themselves quit their jobs if they felt that these were not what they had been looking for. As one interviewee, who came to Canada with her mother as a domestic, remembered: “We worked in Forest Hill…we had to work one full year, but the lady of the house, she was jealous, because I knew how to play to piano and her daughter did not, she was brainwashing me, [saying] you will never marry anybody higher than a hairdresser. It was very difficult. They did not give us any money…we could not go downtown, actually it was not as it was promised. They did not behave as they should have. So we left sooner.” This situation was evidently very common, because in 1948 MacNamara, the Deputy Minister of the Department of Labor, felt compelled to “give some friendly advice” to DP girls and women who had come under the domestic scheme. He told this group not to quit their jobs and, even more

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10 Danys, DP, pages 105-109.
11 Interview 14; for other examples of degrading experiences working as a domestic, see Holleuffer, Zwischen Fremde, page 362.
important, to remain in the field to which they had been assigned once they had fulfilled their initial first work contract.12

Similar appeals were also addressed to male workers in labor programs, warning them that “the possibility of bringing additional thousands from displaced persons camps to Canada is dependent upon your co-operation with the Department of Labour in carrying out your part of this undertaking.”13 And this was a powerful threat, because the majority of newcomers were interested in bringing their next of kin over.14 However, they were not the only ones. As MacKinnon, the Minister of Mines and Resources, pointed out:

“We must not, however, overlook the fact that our first duty is to bring over the relatives of Canadian citizens. To the end of March 29,330 applications for this class have been received and of that number 23,277 have been approved. So far only 5,167 have been brought to Canada…the Government has been criticized for the small numbers that have been admitted and it is suggested we have been giving too much preference to the bulk movement of labour. There are some grounds for this complaint. If…we should now invite applications from all Displaced Person workers in Canada when we have such a backlog of relatives of Canadian citizens, we would only be adding to our difficulties”.15

However, although Canadians received preferential treatment, the government could not completely ignore the pleas of displaced persons. First of all, the opportunity to sponsor relatives had been part of the immigration scheme,16 and the slow process frustrated DPs. Second, the Canadian government was very pleased with the overall outcome of the DP scheme and was therefore willing to keep the

12 LAC RG 26 Vol. 67, File: 2-18-2, 7 September 1948, MacNamara: A Personal Letter from the Deputy Minister of Labour for Canada Addressed to all Domestic Workers from Displaced Persons Camps.
13 LAC RG 26 Vol. 67, File: 2-18-2, Deputy Minister of Labour, To those who have chosen to make your home in Canada, no date given. Those who quit their contracts before the twelve months were over generally did not face any negative consequences (Holleuffer, Zwischen Fremde, page 266).
16 Avery, Reluctant Host, page 153f.
people involved satisfied. MacNamara expressed this positive appreciation in 1948, when he stated that “the movement of these displaced persons to mines has already changed the whole labour situation and has done more to stabilize the labour front than anything else which could have been arranged.” Consequently he came to the conclusion that the government ought to give DPs special consideration when it came to admitting close family members.17 The Minister of Labor, Humphrey Mitchell, also felt that “we are under pretty strong obligation to the DP workers in Canada to bring their dependents without delay. The men themselves are more likely to become good Canadian citizens if they are joined promptly by their families.”18

In the end, complaints from Canadian citizens and DPs were successful, because in September 1948 the government oriented itself away from the bulk labor movement (without, however, completely discontinuing it) towards a strengthened relative-sponsorship program. The aim was to “move to Canada as rapidly as possible all admissible relatives of residents of Canada for whom application has been made - thus to include the dependants of DPs who have already arrived and who are in a position to receive and care for their families who were left behind.”19 Officially, DPs could sponsor their relatives once they had spent three years in the country;20 but in many cases it took even less than that. For example, a Ukrainian domestic was able to sponsor her fiancé, whom she had met in a DP camp in Regensburg, after only two years in the country. Not only did she agree to sponsor him during his settlement period, but she also paid for his boat trip to Canada.21

19 LAC RG 26 Vol. 121, File: 3-32-2 (Vol. 1), Keenleyside, Deputy Minister, Memorandum for the Cabinet Committee on Immigration Policy, 3 September 1948, page 2; LAC RG 26, File: 3-40-21, Extracts from the Immigration Branch Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1948-49, page 3.
20 Satzwich, The Ukrainian Diaspora, page 101.
21 Interview 14. Another interviewee stated that she and her child joined her husband, who had come under a labor contract, after only half a year (Interview with Sophia Stepaniuk, in Ukrainians in Ontario, ed. Luciuk, page 253f). For further examples, see interviews 11, 16.
2.2. Striving for a Better Life – the Shift from Laborers to Professionals

The influx of family members lifted a psychological burden from many DPs and inspired them to create a better life for themselves and their families in Canada. This trend was mirrored in the career shift from laboring to professional categories. Already in 1953, the government revealed that professional, clerical, manufacturing, commercial, and service occupations took up higher shares of the 1946-1951 immigration than originally intended and that agriculture, logging, and mining employment experienced decreases during the same time period. One government official tried to explain this trend as follows: “A factor in the movement into the professional and clerical classes from other classes is the fact that we accepted, in bulk movements particularly, for employment as farm workers, foundry workers, etc. a good number of persons with professional and clerical qualifications. It was natural for many of these to revert to professional, clerical jobs etc. as soon as they had complied with conditions of entry.” Ukrainians were no exception to the rule. Whereas the first two waves of Ukrainian immigrants had been primarily farmers, railroad laborers or miners, members of the third wave strove for other careers. As the interviews revealed, many members of the third wave valued professional success and were willing to work hard and sacrifice their leisure time to achieve this goal. This often meant that people were working in physically challenging jobs to make a living while attending university classes in the evening to upgrade their educational qualifications. Due to their career interests, many of the third wave did not want to live in the Prairie Provinces, the ‘typical’ areas of Ukrainian settlement in Canada. One interviewee described his first encounter with Ukrainians in rural Canada as follows: “I was not impressed with the living quarters and the farm, they did not have much ambition to improve anything, and they used these little lamps… and then I said: ‘How come?’ I was

22 LAC RG 26 Vol. 141, File: 3-40-11 Part I, Memorandum from Jean Boucher for the Deputy Minister concerning the Occupational Distribution of the 1946-1951 Immigrant Population at the 1951 Census, 21 March 1953, page 1f (attached to this letter are tables that clearly indicate the rise in the professional category and the drop in agriculture). Initially, the group of professionals that was admitted under the immigration scheme was rather small. The Rotary Club, for example, carried out a ‘Specialist Resettlement Scheme’ (Holleuffer, Zwischen Fremde, page 273).


24 For examples of interviewees, see interviews 16, 10, 15, 17, 13, 26. See also Interview with Nadia Iwachniuk in Ukrainians in Ontario, ed. Luciuk, page 251f.
told: ‘You know, it was good for my father, it is good for me.’ I thought, well, I have to go back to Toronto.”25 This interviewee was not alone in his desire to establish himself in a bigger city. This effort to gain a better life contributed to an overall trend of the time – the rural-urban shift.

2.3. The Rural-Urban Shift – Ukrainian Settlements in the Postwar Period

The general tendency of displaced persons to leave their contract jobs as soon as possible to find better work in clerical or professional positions was also mirrored in the geographical distribution of the DPs. Once their contracts expired, the new immigrants were free to choose where to live and what employment to accept. Although the newly created Department of Immigration was eager to direct immigrants towards areas where they could be “readily integrated into the Canadian economy”26 and wanted them to stay in the field for which they had been hired, many displaced persons left the remote farming and mining towns as soon as possible for the cities.27 The majority of these newcomers chose Ontario as their province of settlement; Toronto led among the receiving cities, closely followed by Hamilton, Windsor, and London.28 Yet again, the third wave was part of an overall (Ukrainian) Canadian trend, as the following statistics indicate. Whereas 48,153 Ukrainians had lived in Ontario in 1941, by 1951 this number had skyrocketed to 93,595, a development that was due to the influx of the third wave and inter-province migration. Stella Hryniuk, for example, states that 80% of the third wave settled in Ontario, where the majority lived in urban areas.29 Especially Toronto

25 Interview 15. For a similar account, see interview 17.
28 LAC RG 26 Vol. 141, File: 3-40-11 part 2, Map: Ontario. Percentage distribution of 1946-1951 immigrants resident in Ontario. Between 25,1% and 40% alone had settled in Toronto. Toronto was especially attractive due to its metal, machine, and clothing industry (Holleuffer, Zwischen Fremde, page 272).
became a magnet for these people; Andrew Gregorovich asserts that between 1946 and 1951 alone, 12,570 Ukrainians came to Toronto.\(^{30}\)

Although Toronto was the ‘hub’ of Ukrainian DP life in Canada, many other Ontario cities also profited from the influx of the third wave and the inter-province migration. By 1951, 37.5\% (approximately 150,000 of 400,000) of all Ukrainians in Canada lived in 11 major urban centers. Winnipeg, Toronto, Edmonton, Vancouver, and Montreal ranked on top of this list, but a sizeable number of Ukrainians also lived in Thunder Bay, Hamilton, Windsor, Saskatoon, St. Catharines, and Sudbury, a sure sign that Ontario cities were most attractive for newcomers as well as for inter-province migrants.\(^{31}\) Many Ukrainian communities in Ontario developed only due to the influx of the third wave. For example, Ukrainian families had lived in Guelph or Kitchener Waterloo prior to the war. But only with the influx of the third wave did an organized community life – in Guelph centered around the Ukrainian Catholic Parish of the Protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary – develop.\(^{32}\) Kingston saw a variety of Ukrainian organizations – with the League emerging as the strongest among them – develop between 1946 and 1956.\(^{33}\) Indeed, many of the organizations of the third wave established themselves mainly in Ontario. For example, SUM, the Bandera-adherent youth organization, had 12 branches in Canada by 1949. SUM offices were located in Toronto, Oshawa, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Hamilton, Fort William, Windsor, Sudbury, Brantford, Noranda, St. Catharines, and Vancouver – primarily in Ontario and mostly in larger cities.\(^{34}\) Taking these developments into consideration, it is not astonishing that the Ukrainian political power base spread from rural to urban


\(^{31}\) Driedger, “Urbanization of Ukrainians,” pages 111-116, especially table 4. The Ontario cities had grown remarkably when comparing the 1941 and 1951 data. Hamilton, for example, grew by almost 200\%, St. Catharines by 190\%, Thunder Bay by 37\%, Windsor by 127\% and Sudbury by almost 60\%.

\(^{32}\) Iroida Wynnyckyj, “Ukrainians in Waterloo and Wellington Counties,” in *Ukrainians in Ontario*, ed. Luciuk, 55-61, page 59. The third wave also meant an increased influx of Ukrainians of Orthodox denomination; in Kitchener Waterloo this made the erection of a Ukrainian Orthodox parish possible in the early 1950s (page 59). See also Wynnyckyj, *Litopys*, pages 9f, 16


centers and started to shift from the Prairies to Ontario, British Columbia, and Montreal during the 1940s and 50s.\footnote{Darcovych, “The ‘Statistical Compendium,’” page 15f.} A combination of the professional as well as rural-urban shift could also be seen in the mushrooming of Ukrainian businesses. For the period from 1950 to 1959, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration reported 64 Ukrainian businesses in the country, 47 of which were located in Ontario.\footnote{LAC RG 26 Vol. 90, File: 3-1-4 part 2, Department of Citizenship and Immigration: Number of Immigrants reported established in business from 1950 to 1959 inclusive (by nationality and province). Of course, this does not include the many small private Ukrainian businesses across the country (see for example Yuzyk, \textit{Ukrainian Canadians}, page 20f).} The preference for the towns and cities in Ontario over the rural frontier not only meant better job chances for the majority of the DPs. It also entailed easier access to a variety of services provided by Canadian and Ukrainian organizations.

2.4. Initial Contact with Canada

Since most of the initial jobs in the mining and farming industry were available in the virtually closed societies of northern Ontario or the rural districts of the Prairies, direct contact with Canadians and a ‘Canadian way of life’ was rare for these newcomers. Visits of Canadian officials to the mining camps, for example, were part of the few existing opportunities to establish contacts.\footnote{Danys, \textit{DP}; Holleuffer, \textit{Zwischen Fremde}, pages 270f, 278-281.} The secluded character of the early work places meant that many Ukrainians of the third wave were not necessarily in direct touch with Ukrainian-Canadian life either.\footnote{Luciuk cites some correspondence between newcomers (for example in northern Ontario) and Frolick in Toronto (Luciuk, \textit{Searching}, page 234f). However, it is not clear how widespread this phenomenon was.} However, once they moved to the cities, they were exposed to different kinds of environments. On the one hand, the immediate family and friends as well as organizations of the third wave formed a tight circle of direct support.\footnote{As interviewees disclosed, many of their close friends were ‘recruited’ from the DP community; they met through the churches or through their children’s Ukrainian schools (See for example: Interviews 14, 13, 3, 20).} On the other hand, government and voluntary agencies as well as the established Ukrainian-Canadian community were there to help the newcomers with the initial settlement process.\footnote{An in-depth study of these early adjustment processes has yet to be done, and the following is just a preliminary outline of the different agencies involved.}
Already during the war, the Canadian government had established a bureaucratic structure to promote the integration of the non-British, non-French groups into the war effort. Of this, the Citizenship Branch survived the end of the war and was first transferred to the Department of Secretary of State and in 1950 to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. The Branch had three divisions: the Liaison Division, the Programs and Material Division, and the Research Division. Its staff provided services to immigrant and voluntary organizations to “develop a greater mutual understanding amongst all Canadians.”

Early on, members of the Canadian Citizenship Branch realized that “the influx of nearly one million newcomers since 1945 has had, and will continue to have a vital influence on practically every aspect of the life of this country,” and ways had to be found to integrate the newcomers. Henriette von Holleuffer provides us with a short overview of the government’s integration concept after the war. Although ideas of what constituted a “true Canadian” varied, the Canadian government stressed that it favored integration over assimilation, meaning that new immigrants were not expected to be completely absorbed into Canadian culture. Rather, the individuals were meant to include themselves voluntarily, and integration was understood as the cooperation of different cultural groups. However, it was clear from the start that all displaced persons were to become Canadian citizens.

The Canadian government, represented through Eugen Bussiere, the Director of the Canadian Citizenship Branch, also promoted this concept in international forums such as the UNESCO Conference on the Cultural Integration of Immigrants held in Havana in 1956. Bussiere pointed out that the concept of integration, as defined and practiced by Canada (stressing the acceptance of and the right to difference as long as national unity was not threatened), “was considered a more realistic and desirable

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41 LAC RG 26, Vol. 75, File: 1-1-1 part 1, Alex Sim, Acting Director, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, to Nichols, Technical Services, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, 18 July 1956, pages 1-4, quote from page 2.
43 Holleuffer, Zwischen Fremde, page 354f.
approach, as it recognizes the benefit derived from cultural pluralism for both the immigrants and the receiving country.”

In order to ease the adjustment process for the newcomers, the Canadian government developed a program that included language and citizenship training and operated primarily through established contacts with immigrant communities and through liaison officers. In addition to language and citizenship classes, the distribution of informational literature such as handbooks and brochures about Canada and its ethnic composition was seen as one of the best ways to familiarize newcomers with the country. Immigrants could learn more about Canada through booklets such as “Facts about Canada” or “This is Canada” which were meant to “provide the newcomers with the maximum of basic information on Canada in friendly practical terms and in such a format as to be conveniently carried in the pocket.” Some pamphlets were also translated into different languages, among them German, Dutch, and Ukrainian, to ensure that these new immigrants could be reached right from the start. Furthermore, assembly centers showed films about citizenship training, Canadian history and geography, and the CBC broadcast.

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45 As early as 1946/47, with the arrival of the first Polish DPs, the government realized that language instruction was one of the most important issues for the newcomers. Classes were sponsored either by local authorities or through voluntary organizations. In order to convince the newcomers of the necessity of these language classes, government officials argued that they would thus have better employment chances and more opportunities to participate in community life. Voluntary as well as ethnic organizations also played a major role in convincing the new immigrants of the usefulness of these classes (LAC RG 26 Vol. 76, File: 1-5-11 (Vol. 3), Language Instruction for Immigrants, a paper prepared by the Canadian Citizenship Branch, 1 December 1961, pages 1-8).
46 LAC RG 26 Vol. 67, File: 2-18-2, Advisory Committee on Citizenship, The Tenth meeting was held on Friday, 13 February 1953, at 11:00 am, page 1.
49 The National Employment Service, for example, had an assembly centre in Ajax, close to Toronto, where it could take care of a few hundred people at the same time (Holleuffer, Zwischen Fremde, page 270). However, Holleuffer also points out that some preparation classes that were planned by the Department of Labor were not carried out (page 363). More research is needed to determine to what extent these classes were carried out.
programs tailored to immigrants and their needs. The radio programs covered topics that were important to immigrants, such as language acquisition, contracts with employers, and money, and provided information about ethnic communities. The Ontario government even organized Ukrainian language broadcasting for the newcomers thirteen times weekly. To reach as many of the new immigrants as possible, the Citizenship Branch provided ethnic newspapers with some paid advertisement. Informative articles about Canada’s history and political system were distributed by *The Canadian Scene* and printed in papers such as *Batkivshyna* (founded in 1952, Hetmanite leanings), *Nasha Meta* (the newspapers of the diocese of the Greek Catholic Church of Eastern Canada, founded in 1949) or *Novyi Shliakh* (UNF). Indeed, representatives of the Canadian Citizenship Branch remarked that those newspapers established by immigrants in the postwar period “also know their duty to inform about Canada.” For example, *Homin Ukrainy*, the paper of the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine, featured a series entitled “V Kanadi i pro Kanadu” (In Canada and about Canada), in which it informed its readers about topics such as health insurance, Canadian cities, or cultural events. And newspapers were actually a realistic tool to bring Canada and its way of life closer to the new immigrants. Ukrainians were a particularly easy
group to reach – by the end of the 1950s, they had 36 major periodicals in the
country, the highest number after the British and the French Canadians.56

The program developed by the Canadian government was guided by the
idea that newcomers could be drawn closer to the country by promoting a better
knowledge of Canada, its languages, history, and geography. Once the newcomers
had adjusted to Canada, the next step was the acquisition of citizenship, an aspect
that was close to the heart of the Canadian government, because from the start
officials had been looking for a “type most likely to make good citizens.”57 And
this type, it must kept in mind, was white and preferably European; although
Canada redirected itself towards a more open immigration and citizenship policy in
the postwar period, the target group was still white immigrants.58 In order to
become a citizen, the new immigrant had to spent five years in the country, be
subjected to a hearing by a judge to establish whether he or she was a ‘fit and
proper person,’ had to demonstrate knowledge of either English or French and
some understanding of Canadian history and geography.59 The Canadian
Citizenship Council, a national, non-governmental body founded in 1940 consisting
of some government departments, major national and provincial voluntary
organizations, as well as individual citizens, realized that “for many newcomers,
the action of renouncing their old citizenship and nationality - as is required - in
order to take out Canadian citizenship, is... an emotional experience. It is therefore
of tremendous importance, to the new citizens and to Canada, that their next step -
that of swearing allegiance to their new country and the rest of the naturalization
ceremony - is as positive as personal and meaningful as humanly possible.” To
assess their effectiveness, the Citizenship Council initiated a survey of
naturalization ceremonies across the country and came to the conclusion that the
ceremonies should not be a mass event, that people should receive half a day off

Service, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Summary of material from The Alliance,
Polish Paper, Toronto, 4 February 1959.
57 LAC RG 26 Vol. 143, File: 3-40-21 (Statistics, Ten years of Post war Immigration), The Purpose
of Immigration, Notes for speech to be delivered by the Honourable J.W. Pickersgill, M.P., at
Victoria, 18 November 1955, pages 2, 9. See also Triadafilopoulos, Shifting Boundaries, page 126.
58 Triadafilopoulos, Shifting Boundaries, pages 117-143.
integration of immigrants in Canada.
work so that they would have enough time to attend the ceremony, and that a standardized exam should be introduced to test the applicant’s knowledge of Canada.60

The strong interest in the newcomers’ acquisition of citizenship is mirrored in advertisements that the Citizenship Branch published in ethnic newspapers. In an ad published in Homin Ukrainy under the title “Kanada zaproshuie vas do svoiei sim’i” (Canada welcomes you into its family), the Citizenship Branch outlined the requirements to become a Canadian citizen and urged people to take this step, because “the minute you become a Canadian citizen, you cease to be a foreigner.” A coupon was attached to the ad that the reader was to send back to the Citizenship Branch to obtain more information.61 The Ukrainians interviewed for this project can serve as a first example of the success of the government’s campaign because they stressed that they had generally felt welcome in the country. As one interviewee reminisced: “They [the Canadian government] were always rather positive and they said that you should become citizen; and we did as soon as we could.”62 This is a picture that is quite different from the situation in Germany as chapter 8 will reveal.

The Citizenship Branch developed an approach to integrating the newcomers after the war through classes and the distribution of literature. However, it could not achieve this goal alone. Essentially, the Citizenship Branch saw itself as “a service agency for voluntary organizations whose role in developing good citizenship is fully recognized.”63 During conferences of the Canadian Citizenship Branch, participating officials stressed the importance of

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61 Homin Ukrainy, 7 March 1953, page 4, Kanada zaproshuie vas do svoiei sim’i. For another example, see Homin Ukrainy, 28 February 1953, page 4, Novoprybuli! Ta obsluga, shcho vnyzu podana – dlia vas. (This ad not only encouraged newcomers to inform themselves about citizenship, but also let them know about services and programs provided by the Canadian government and voluntary organizations).
62 Interview 16. The question of citizenship did not come up in all interviews during the first round. When I conducted follow-up interviews to confirm the issue of citizenship, some of the interviewees had already died. However, those who could be reached confirmed all that they and their families had taken citizenship as quickly as possible (see for example: Interviews 3, 7, 11, 21, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17).
The Settlement of the Third Wave and Community Development during the 1950s

agencies such as schools, neighbors, voluntary groups, the church, health nurses, the National Employment Services, and Vocational Counselors. And indeed, voluntary organizations took over providing a lot of the direct help supplied to newcomers. Representatives of the YMCA/YWCA or the Catholic Women’s League, for example, met with DPs and arranged movie nights or language courses for them. It was the organizations’ goal to make them into ‘effective citizens’ as soon as possible and to make them feel part of the country. Both the Canadian government and voluntary organizations were inspired to make ‘effective citizens’ out of the wave of new immigrants that swept the country in the postwar period. In itself, this was not a new concept because prior waves were also expected to become ‘good citizens,’ often in the sense of complete assimilation. However, the general concept of integration began to change after the war. During this period the idea arose that it was not only newcomers who had to be trained, but also established Canadians so that they would accept the newcomers. The idea that established Canadians also had to be trained in the context of immigration and integration was only really possible because society had become more open towards newcomers – the third wave came at a time when the general Canadian public and press publicly supported immigration. Although many Anglo Canadians were still in favor of assimilating newcomers because they considered

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67 LAC RG 26 Vol. 67, File: 2-18-2, Advisory Committee on Citizenship. Tenth meeting, held on Friday, 13 February 1953, at 11:00 am, 2-3.
68 LAC RG 26 Vol. 90, File: 3-1-4 part 1, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Conference, Settlement Service, 22-24 August 1950, page 2 (see also Broadfoot, The Immigrant Years, pages 57-99). Avery states that the general Canadian public had become more open towards immigration in 1946, when the realization set in that these people would take jobs that Canadians were unwilling to do (Avery, Reluctant Host, page 149f). This general openness was not extended to all groups; there was a general fear of communist subversives among the DPs and their possible entry to the country (Whitaker, “A Secret Policy,” page 358). Jews were also still one of the groups not ‘preferred’ among Canadians (Triadafilopoulos, Shifting Boundaries, page 119).
69 Ferguson, “British-Canadian Intellectuals,” pages 304-325. Ferguson’s study starts at the end of the 19th century and ends with the 1950s, thereby providing a good overview of the developments over the time.
especially the men to be dangerous,\textsuperscript{70} the overall attitude slowly started to change. As Howard Palmer puts it: “Earlier arrivals had accustomed English-Canadians to diversity, the war had enabled some previously unaccepted groups to prove their loyalty, and the tie between immigration and economic growth was firmly cemented in the public mind.” It further helped that the postwar immigrant wave contained a large proportion of educated and skilled people who could quickly adjust to the new surroundings.\textsuperscript{71} Ukrainians who came with the third wave fit with this general trend. As chapters 2 and 4 have shown, the majority of Ukrainians in the camps were motivated and well educated, and the international community applied strict criteria to select the best applicants for their immigration programs.

Another helpful feature was the fact that those DPs that came during the 1940s were generally classified as a ‘young, motivated wave’, which made an adjustment easier because they were resourceful, capable of working, and willing to invest time and energy in education and professional upgrading. A statistical survey from 1952 gives an overview of immigration to the country between 1946 and 1951, revealing that 624,780 immigrants were admitted to Canada, of whom 62\% were under the age of 30.\textsuperscript{72} However, in this context it is important to ascertain how we define ‘young’. The group of children and youngsters (10-24) was rather small among the new arrivals compared to the group of DPs between the ages of 25 and 39.\textsuperscript{73} The same trend can be observed in the group of Ukrainians. For example, in retrospect SUM stated that generally members who founded the organization in Canada were older and directed therefore a lot of attention to organizing youth sectors (first one organized in 1952) and schools that could serve as a base to recruit further young members.\textsuperscript{74}


\textsuperscript{73} LAC RG 26 Vol. 141, File: 3-40-10, Letter from LeNeveu, Chief Social Analysis Section, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, to Jean Boucher, Special Assistant to the Deputy Minister, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, 17 March 1953, page 1f.

\textsuperscript{74} Mycak, \textit{The Ukrainian Youth Association}, page 7f.
3. Contact between the Third Wave and the Established Community

Apart from Canadian voluntary and government agencies, the Ukrainian-Canadian community also contributed to easing of the settling process. Although many interviewees – especially when comparing themselves to the fourth wave that came after 1991 – generally stressed that they had ‘made it on their own,’ the mere existence of a Ukrainian-Canadian community was appreciated because it eased the settlement process. Actual help was also extended, as one interviewee illustrated: “Oh, they were very well organized, the existing community, they had the base…The first group was very helpful, the medical doctors would assist without any fees… We bought a house in Toronto, for 150 dollars down payment, in 1951…this was the UNO credit Union, on College, my mother was a widow and I was still in high school, they trusted us that we would give it back.”

Another interviewee reminisced about her arrival in Canada and the contact with the established community: “When we arrived in Halifax, we were transferred to a camp in Montreal, from there we were supposed to be divided and sent to work…Ukrainian representatives came right away with a priest, they met all the Ukrainians, asked whether we needed help…[the] church gave 100 $ loan and we got our first room with a Ukrainian family. The job was taken care through the government. The community was helpful, and the church of course, and that was sort of understood…I met my husband at church.”

Indeed, the church, an important source of comfort and support for many immigrant groups, was also the first point of contact for many Ukrainian DPs. Sometimes they were informed about existing churches and their services (for example language classes) through members of the community. The established community was helpful not only for the settlement of some individuals, but also for the establishment of organizations.

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75 See for example interviews 1, 11, 20, 16, 3, 26, 14, 17. A representative of St. Vladimir observed that many parish members of the third wave were of the opinion: “When we came, nobody helped us,…we had to struggle and struggle, so why shouldn’t these people [fourth wave] have to struggle?” (Interview 1)
76 Broadfoot, *The Immigrant Years*, page 87f; Interviews 20, 3 (This interviewee, for example, stated in reference to the existing community: “I was glad that there were Ukrainians, that was why I liked to be here.”)
77 Interview 14. Other interviewee also stressed support through the existing community, see for example interview 13.
78 Interview 7.
79 Burnet, Palmer, *“Coming Canadians”*, page 125.
80 Interviews 14, 15, 3, 7, 11, 17.
For example, Ukrainian Canadians from Toronto helped the Plast Toronto branch to acquire their first premises on 992 Dundas Street.\textsuperscript{81} Community organizations such as the UNF also started recruitment campaigns to attract new members into their organization – an interesting phenomenon if one considers later indignation about the ‘take-over’ of the organization by the third wave.\textsuperscript{82} But the third wave also established organizations of their own which led to a considerable amount of friction with the established community.

3.1. Clashes within the Nationalist Community

As chapter 4 has demonstrated, the organized Ukrainian community developed an idealized vision of the DPs and their qualities. In their attempt to convince the Canadian government to accept these refugees, they painted a picture of a group whose members were industrious, religious, western minded, and democratic – in a nutshell, perfect Ukrainians and ideal Canadian citizens. Furthermore, many organizations had hoped that the newcomers would revitalize their life and initiate more activities.\textsuperscript{83} For example, UNF representatives had anticipated that the newcomers would flock to their organization; and initially some DPs did join and establish themselves in the organization. This is illustrated through the fact that the 1950s saw the beginning of a string of UNF presidents who were all members of the third wave. The first president to break this tradition was Maria Pidkovych, who had come to Canada with the second wave and became UNF’s president in 1995.\textsuperscript{84} Although there is no data available that could shed light on the numbers of DPs who joined UNF, an RCMP report indicates that it was less than initially expected. According to the report, the newcomers “proved to be too extreme in their nationalist sentiments to suit the leadership. A number of Displaced Persons and some UNF leaders, either voluntarily left, or were ousted and formed an organization in Toronto, Ontario, approximately two years ago, known as the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[81] Waschuk, “Plast,” page 172f.
\item[82] Luciuk, \textit{Searching}, page 235f; page 462f, FN 83.
\end{footnotes}
Indeed, contrary to what the established community had expected, many members of the third wave were not interested in joining Ukrainian-Canadian organizations other than the church. The differences between the established community and the newcomers became particularly visible in the context of political organizations.

The third wave established a variety of new organizations in Canada, and the League for the Liberation of Ukraine (Liga Vyzvolennia Ukrainy, LVU) was the most important one of them. For the first time in the history of the nationalist Ukrainian movement, the Bandera faction of the OUN came to Canada in form of the League. Until their arrival, only the Melnyk faction had existed in Canada, represented by UNF. The League for the Liberation of Ukraine was officially established in May 1949 at a meeting that was called by Stanley Frolick, a Ukrainian born in Canada who sympathized with the Bandera faction of the OUN. The founding conference of the new organization took place 25 December 1949 in Toronto. The organization changed its name to “Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine” in December of 1950, a step that Luciuk attributes to the influence of the otherwise weak moderate faction of the group. The organization had a Women’s Association and a newspaper, Homin Ukrainy (The Ukrainian Echo), which had already been published in December 1948 by the same printing press that also produced the paper of the United Hetman Organization – for Luciuk a sure sign of the complicity between Banderivtsi and Hetmantsi at the time. The first branch of the organization was established in Toronto, and by the end of 1949 addition local offices existed in Hamilton, Oshawa, and St. Thomas. The members of the League felt that they were “fresh from the resistance frontlines of Ukraine and highly motivated” and thus formulated goals for the organization that focused

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86 Luciuk, Searching, pages 91f, 229-233, 238. Stanley Frolick was born in Hillcrest, Alberta, and was sent to Western Ukraine at the age of 12 to attend school there. In Ukraine he also got into contact with OUN. In 1941 he returned to Toronto and again left for Europe – this time London – in June of 1945. He worked for CURB until 1946, when he was ousted from the organization, allegedly because of his sympathy and support for the Bandera faction of the OUN. Back in Canada he became the OUN (B) resident for Canada. For more information on Frolick, see Lubomy Luciuk and Marco Carynyyk, eds, Between Two Worlds: The Memoirs of Stanley Frolick (Toronto: MHSO, 1990).

87 Luciuk, Searching, page 223.
on the liberation of Ukraine from Soviet oppression. 88 SUM, the Ukrainian Youth Association that had flourished in the DP camps, was associated with the League in Canada and started its first Canadian branch in Toronto in the summer of 1948, spreading afterwards to other places of Ukrainian settlement. 89

Apart from the League, the DP wave brought other smaller political organizations to Canada, such as the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (URDP) with its youth organization, the Organization of Democratic Ukrainian Youth (ODUM), 90 or Suzhero (Soiuz Ukraintsiv Zhertv Rosiis’koho Komunistychnoho Teroru - Ukrainian Association of Victims of Russian Communist Terror), a group of approximately 5000 former Soviet prisoners who wanted to inform the public through demonstrations and publications about the terrors of the Soviet regime. 91 Some non-political organizations also successfully made the transition from DP camp life to the diaspora. For example, the Central Union of Ukrainian Students transferred part of their organization and many of its activities to Canada. The Canadian equivalent SUSK (Soiuz Ukraintsiv Kyiv Studentiv Kanady/ Ukrainian Canadian Student Union) was founded in 1953 in Winnipeg, and during the 1950s, more and more of the international Ukrainian students’ conferences took place on the North American continent. 92 Plast was another organization that put down roots in Canada during the late 1940s and experienced enormous growth during the 1950s. 93 As Toronto developed into the center of Ukrainian DP life in Canada, a lot of growth took place in this city. Especially the churches benefited from the influx of newcomers and inter-provincial migrants alike. Parishes in the city grew, and some new ones – such as St. Nicholas Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Holy Protection Catholic Church, or the Ukrainian Baptist Church – were founded to accommodate the growing numbers of parishioners. With the congregations, the activities expanded as well,

90 Luciuk, Searching, page 225.
and today the 1950s and 60s are often referred to as the ‘golden years’ of these parishes.\(^{94}\)

Overall, since many of the organizations established or transferred by the third wave were more political in outlook, the differences in ideology could lead to friction between the newcomers and the established community, not only in Toronto, the hub of Ukrainian postwar life, but also in smaller communities such as Ottawa.\(^{95}\) Clashes within the nationalist community were rather subtle and did not involve physical violence. Like many ideological conflicts they took place “more on an intellectual level”\(^{96}\) and were mostly confined to the pages the organizations’ newspapers, here especially *Novyi Shliakh* (UNF) and *Homin Ukrainy* (LVU). As one interviewee, an active member of UNF, put it: “They argued, in the paper mostly, otherwise, what else could you do?”\(^{97}\)

This chapter gives a first impression of the major differences between the newcomers (focusing on the League) and the established community. The newcomers had one important argument on their side: in contrast to their Canadian counterparts, they had actually experienced the war and Communism first hand in Europe. Many of them felt that they ‘knew the enemy’ because they had endured the famine or the Soviet annexation of western Ukraine personally, and almost all of them had come into contact with Soviet officials in the DP camps.\(^{98}\) Some members of the third wave, for example, had the feeling that the existing community was neither willing nor prepared enough to actually fight the communist organizations in Canada\(^{99}\) and accused them of being out of touch with what was going on in Ukraine.\(^{100}\) As one of the top members of the League

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\(^{94}\) See for example interviews 1, 2, 18, 19, 22, 23.

\(^{95}\) See for example: Myron Momryk, “Ukrainians in Ottawa,” in *Ukrainians in Ontario* ed. Luciuk, pages 83-95.

\(^{96}\) Interview 7.

\(^{97}\) Interview 15; see also interviews 11, 12.

\(^{98}\) Luciuk, *Searching*, pages 225-228. See also interview 5 (here a member of the established community supporting this view) or interviews 11, 20, 17 (members of the third wave).

\(^{99}\) Luciuk, *Ukrainians in the Making*, page 107ff (Luciuk bases this assertion mostly on interviews).

\(^{100}\) Luciuk, *Searching*, page 193ff. Yvonna Romanow, when examining the community in Windsor, observed that “the struggle to continue such efforts [liberation of Ukraine] would dominate and continues to dominate their organizational life. Therefore, they sometimes felt at odds with Ukrainian Canadians who had lived a peaceful normal life in freedom and who were considered to be cut off from the harsh realities of Ukrainians living in repressive, communist-ruled nations” (Romanow, “The Ukrainian Community in Windsor”, page 79ff).
reminisced in the late 70s: “The League was organized not because there was some physical need for the formation of yet another Ukrainian organization in Canada but because there was a spiritual need for such a development. We newcomers had come out of the cauldron of Ukraine in World War II and we brought with us a new idea of what it meant to be a Ukrainian in modern Ukraine.” 101 Many members of the third wave felt that they were ‘more in touch’ with what was going on in Ukraine. In a way, this was also an illusion, because their memories and thus their imagination of a liberated Ukraine were tied to their experiences up until the Second World War and camp life, and they too were physically removed from what was going on in Soviet Ukraine once they emigrated to Canada.

In contrast to the established community, the third wave saw themselves not as economic immigrants, but as a refugee wave,102 and hence more dedicated to the Ukrainian cause. To be active – diial’nyi – became one of the most important and most cherished characteristics of this wave. As one interviewee put it: “Our people have worked on a voluntary basis most of their lives. People would work 9-5, or ten, twelve hours a day, and then spent the rest doing whatever had to be done organizationally – from leadership to cleaning the floors in a building or building a building.”103 Members of the third wave treasured their organizational activism and devotion to the homeland; this becomes especially vivid when they compare themselves to other waves of immigration, and here especially the fourth wave.104 These kinds of disparities between the established community and the newcomers were not only confined to the Ukrainian case, as government observations illustrated. For example, the Canadian Citizenship Branch pointed out that great differences existed between the papers of the established communities and those founded in the postwar period. The latter were almost obsessed with homeland issues, and their “state of affairs poses a problem for the older groups and papers,

101 Luciuk, Ukrainians in the Making, page 100. (Interviewee quoted)
102 See also Luciuk, Searching, page 461, FN 74.
103 Interview 24, see also interviews 26, 4, 11
104 See for example: Interviews 3, 11, 24, 26. An in-depth study of the third wave and their reaction to independence (and with it the influx of the fourth wave) has yet to be done. However, many of the interviewees compared their situation in the 1940s and 50s to that of the fourth wave in the 1990s, and through that comparison their interpretation of themselves – as a politically active, dedicated wave – became most. These are, however, preliminary observations which need to be confirmed or refuted through an in-depth analysis of the community newspapers such as Homin Ukrainy and Novyi Shliakh.
whose readers emigrated under different circumstances, have not had the same political experiences themselves, and are many years removed in time from their home countries. They of course share the interests of the newcomers but can’t quite bring themselves to the same crusading pitch.”

Political divergence – which expressed itself in differences of opinion and the establishment of organizations such as the League – were one part of the friction; unfulfilled expectations on both sides also added to a feeling of uneasiness and dissatisfaction during the early years of settlement. Some of the newcomers were not prepared for what they encountered in the ‘new world’ – long hours of work in remote locations, simple accommodation, and a general ‘culture shock.’ The resulting dissatisfaction often evoked annoyance and disbelief among the established community. As one Canadian observer, who had been to the DP camps and could therefore compare the conditions in Europe and Canada, remarked to Kaye: “I cannot, for the life of me, understand why it is that so many are dissatisfied, now that they are here.” This kind of bitter feeling could also be observed among the Ukrainian-Canadian community. According to Panchuk, once a strong supporter of DP migration, apart from many good new immigrants “there are also a lot of ‘scum’ who have forgotten what work means and who feel that somebody owes them a living. They are deeply disappointed that there is no UNRRA in Great Britain, as there are some in Canada who suffer from the same disappointment, and they are anxious to go anywhere wherever they can find milk and honey growing on the trees.” Luciuk points out that these bitter feelings were intensified because the DPs took over important roles in the community. Although the community was aware that not all DPs could be lumped together in this category, many felt that those dissatisfied newcomers cast a negative light on the

106 LAC MG 31 D 69, Reel H 2997 Vol. 6, File: 11, Kaye to Howson, 16 November 1948. Through oral interviews Barry Broadfoot gives an insight into occurring problems such as language difficulties, harsh weather, manual labor for intellectuals, loneliness, and homesickness. Many DPs were not well prepared because there was not much information in the DP camps (Broadfoot, The Immigrant Years, pages 57-99. Broadfoot also points out that there were some positive aspects – the newcomers were, for example, impressed by the friendliness of Canadians, the abundance of goods and the general prosperous economic condition in the country). For an example of Ukrainian Catholic priests, see Wojtowicz, Geschichte der Ukrainisch-Katholischen Kirche, page 85f.
107 LAC MG 31 D 69, Reel H 2997 Vol. 6, File: 11, Howson to Kaye, 1 November 1948.
remaining DPs. Overall, the community was disappointed because not only did the newcomers not fulfill their expectations, but they also seemed ungrateful. They probably seemed ungrateful because they did not join existing organizations but established many of their own, thereby dominating many spheres of community life particularly in Toronto. Clashes between newcomers and existing ethnic communities were a common phenomenon in postwar Canada; although according to Vladimir Kaye it was “not a serious matter.” For example, Angelika Sauer has shown in the case of the German community that the newcomers did not live up to the expectations placed on them by the existing community, thereby causing disappointment in the latter. Avery also makes us aware that many Canadians had underestimated the newcomers and became rather apprehensive once the DPs wanted to move up the ladder.

Much of the division in the Ukrainian nationalist community was due to incompatible political ideologies. The resulting conflicts also have to be understood in the broader context of international Ukrainian ‘diaspora politics’ that were expressed through either UNRada or UHVR allegiance. This aspect will be examined in more depth in part 4.2. which deals with the LVU and the UCC. On the lower levels of the community, the differences between the established community and newcomers were probably less sharp. Not all newcomers were strict Bandera adherents, and many of the existing community did not even know who Melnyk was. Even among the small selection of interviewees from the third wave questioned for this paper, the variety of opinions stands out. There were those who were fervent supporters of the League and saw the liberation of Ukraine as their primary cause and goal. There were those who were convinced UNF members and saw the League and their approach as too radical. But then there were those who had never belonged to either group; they mostly identified with the Ukrainian community through the church or Plast and who subscribed to both Homin Ukrainy and Shliakh Peremohy. More research is needed to determine to what degree the

108 Luciuk, Searching for Place, page 193f (quote from page 193). See also page 214 for ‘unwillingness’ of DPs to work and page 195 for the take-over of important positions. For an example of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, see Wojtowicz, Geschichte, page 86.
109 LAC MG 31 D 69 Reel H 2997, Vol. 6, File: 11, Kaye to Howson, 16 November 1948.
111 Avery, Reluctant Host, page 166f.
ideological clashes also permeated the lower community levels. In any case, although friction between the existing community and the newcomers was a phenomenon of the early immigrant experience, it did not lead to an insurmountable rift within the community, as part 4 will show. However, the situation was quite the opposite with regard to the Ukrainian Communists.

3.2. Clashes between DPs and Communists

During their lobbying process with the government, Ukrainian-Canadian representatives had stressed the strong anti-communist attitude of the third wave as their most valuable characteristic. The community and the government alike expected that the well organized, highly anti-communist third wave would take up a fight with the Communists. And, as an RCMP officer observed at the time, “the Communists realize this and fear possible repercussions in their organization. Consequently, since DPs have been arriving in Canada, the Ukrainian Communists, openly, have done everything in their power to discredit these people in an effort to nullify their accusations against the Communist Regime.”

As chapter 4 has shown, Ukrainian Communists had already lobbied against DPs prior to their immigration. The arguments put forward were along the lines of official Soviet propaganda, depicting the third wave as Hitler’s supporters, as war criminals, and as a potential danger for Canada. Once the third wave was in the country, the pro-communists continued their defamation campaign, so that these two groups were bound to clash.

Although most of the negative propaganda on both sides was restricted to their respective newspapers, actual physical encounters that could lead to violence also took place. In this context government officials as well as the Ukrainian nationalist community saw the DPs as being at an advantage because

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112 LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: 3-33-34 (Ukrainians - Admission to Canada), Letter by S.T. Wood (RCMP) to MacNamara, 27 December 1948, page 1. In a different report, Wood stated that the Communists “foresaw the ultimate repercussions even prior to Displaced Persons immigrating to Canada and did everything in their power to stop it. Unsuccessful in this endeavour, the problem of Displaced Persons is now probably their most important, and exhaustive measure have been taken to counteract the adverse influence” (LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: 3-33-34 (Ukrainians - Admission to Canada), Secret Report from S.T.Wood (RCMP) to Mr. MacNamara, Department of Labour, 23 January 1950, page 3).


114 Kolasky, Shattered Illusion, page 101ff. For example, the communist press included letters from the Soviet Union which reported atrocities allegedly committed by ‘Bandera gangs.’
they were “intimately and personally aware of the situation in the Soviet Ukraine”115 and thus able to provide evidence of the ‘evils of Communism.’ Indeed, many of the active members of the third wave felt that they had to “spread the truth” about the Soviet oppression of Ukraine because they had experienced it first hand. In their eyes, Russian Communists were “human animal[s], or human being[s] without religion or the Ten Commandments, with no respect for life, property, morals,” and they were certain that communists in Canada would be appalled once the ‘truth’ was revealed by the DPs.116 Meetings and rallies organized by the newly created AUUC, the successor organization to the ULFTA, offered the third wave an opportunity to address these issues. For example, William Teresio, the national president of the AUUC, used a lecture tour through Canada “to glorify the Soviet Ukraine under its Communist regime almost to idolatry and by virtue of the fact that he claims to have been in personal contact with relatives of Canadian Ukrainians whilst in the Soviet Ukraine, solidify the membership of the AUUC and attract new members to the Communist fold.”117 These gatherings attracted many newcomers and members of the established nationalist community who wanted to use this forum to convince Communists of the evils of Communism or who simply wanted to interrupt the meetings. In some cases these interruptions even led to physical violence between the two groups.118 On one occasion, a gas

bomb exploded at a meeting in Edmonton and disrupted the proceedings.\textsuperscript{119} Although bomb attacks were the exception than the rule, the incident in Edmonton was not the only one. The most outstanding, and apparently rather isolated violent incident, was the explosion of a bomb during an AUUC concert in Toronto on October 8, 1950, which left eleven people slightly injured. Although the AUUC suspected members of the newly arrived Galician Division to be behind the attack, the bomb explosion was never solved.\textsuperscript{120}

In this climate of clashes and conflicts, the AUUC – as the major Ukrainian pro-Communist organization – turned to the Canadian government with their protests about the DP ‘attacks,’ also complaining that the Canadian police did not do anything to put an end to these violent interruptions. For example, John Horbatiuk, Vice President of the AUUC, warned that the DPs – “Nazis” in his eyes – were exploiting the democratic environment “for their sadistic purposes” and strongly demanded that they had to be punished for their actions.\textsuperscript{121} However, pro-communist complaints did not find many sympathetic listeners among the RCMP or the Canadian government. In reference to the gas bomb incident in Edmonton, the RCMP officer in charge remarked that it was “simply a tear gas bomb,” accusing the AUUC of building incidents into catastrophes.\textsuperscript{122} The belittling of the pro-communist complaints has to be seen in the context of international politics. With the onset of the Cold War, the Canadian government had changed its attitude towards communists. Whereas the Soviet Union had been an important ally during the war, Canadian officials were particularly determined to keep communists out of the country during their 1947-1952 immigration program; mere ‘communist

\textsuperscript{119} LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: 3-33-34 (Ukrainians - Admission to Canada), Letter by S.T. Wood (RCMP) to MacNamara, 27 December 1948, page 2.

\textsuperscript{120} Gregorovich, “The Ukrainian Community,” page 53; Kolasky, \textit{Shattered Illusion}, page 105.

\textsuperscript{121} LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: 3-33-34 (Ukrainians - Admission to Canada), Letter by John Horbatiuk, Vice President of the AUUC, to the Honourable Minister of Justice, 24 November 1948, pages 1-2, quote from page 2. The Folder: LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: 3-33-34 (Ukrainians - Admission to Canada) contains government correspondence with the AUUC and complaints about incidents of DPs attacking ‘law-abiding’ citizens. The respective AUUC representatives demanded that the government should act on these incidents.

\textsuperscript{122} LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: 3-33-34 (Ukrainians - Admission to Canada), Letter by S.T. Wood (RCMP) to MacNamara, 27 December 1948, page 2.
tendencies’ were enough to reject a potential immigrant at the time. In this climate, nobody was really interested in communist complaints within the country.

Clashes between communists and newcomers did not take place only among Ukrainians in Canada, as the example of the Lithuanian experience in Canada has shown. Conflicts already began in the new workplace, for example in the mining and lumbering camps in northern Ontario where newly arrived DPs of different backgrounds clashed with Canadian communist supporters. When it comes to clashes between the pro-communist faction and the DPs, it is important to point out that these conflicts probably stirred more reaction and seemed more common than they actually were. Although on occasion the former displaced persons were successful in motivating some 100 people to disrupt a communist meeting, we should bear in mind that these people were still a minority within the overall group. Indeed, not many violent clashes were actually listed with the RCMP. And the interviews are another indicator that direct (violent) confrontation with communists was not so widespread. Some of the interviewees stressed that they personally never had any contact with communists and that they only heard about fights going on in the community. Others stated that they were actively involved in ‘convincing’ communists in Canada that the Soviet system was wrong and oppressive, but stressed that this interaction did not include violence.

In the end, the DP efforts were crowned with success – at least in the eyes of the RCMP. As one official observed “Communist functionaries are acutely aware their mass language organizations are losing membership and support because of the factual knowledge being brought to this country by Displaced Persons having actually lived under Soviet Domination.” And indeed, the AUUC’s membership and activities plummeted once the war was over and never reached the heights that the ULFTA had maintained during the Depression or

124 Danys, DPs, page 100ff.
125 LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: 3-33-34 (Ukrainians - Admission to Canada), Secret Report from S.T. Wood (RCMP) to Mr. MacNamara, Dept of Labour, 23 January 1950, page 2.
126 Interviews 3, 11, 16, 15.
127 Interviews 17, 5.
128 LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: 3-33-34 (Ukrainians - Admission to Canada), Secret Report from S.T. Wood (RCMP) to Mr. MacNamara, Department of Labour, 23 January 1950, page 3.
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War. The DPs and their radical anti-Soviet stance were part of the reason for the demise of this organization. In addition, Kolasky points out that “Khrushchov’s revelations, in 1956, of the crimes of Stalin and the visits of members of the pro-communist organizations to their native land disillusioned many with Soviet reality. The Ukrainian communist leaders faced the problem of holding members who were realizing that there could be truth to what the displaced persons had been saying.” However, the wider Canadian context also has to be considered to gain a fuller picture. Once the Cold War was in full gear, the Canadian government had no sympathy for the pro-communist groups and their struggle with the DPs. Furthermore, during the Second World War Canada had turned into a welfare state where unions had gained a stronger position. And in the postwar period Canada experienced a lasting economic upswing, so that three factors that had usually attracted members to pro-communist organizations – lack of representation, unemployment, and a difficult economic situation – no longer existed for the majority of Canadians.

Clashes between the established community and the newcomers mostly centered around ideological issues. Although the former had hoped that the third wave would rejuvenate their organizations and community life, they were discontented that the third wave either took over important positions or, even worse, created flourishing organizations of their own. Nonetheless, despite the disappointment and misunderstandings, clashes within the nationalist Ukrainian community were not as fervent as the ones between nationalists and communists, and the frontlines were also not as clearly defined. Furthermore, the hatred of the communists and their activities in Canada acted as a common denominator for the nationalist community and the newcomers, offering them opportunities for cooperation, as the following section will show.

129 Kolasky, Shattered Illusion, page 177ff. The decline of the organization set in during the immediate postwar period and was first expressed through the fact that the organization had difficulties in recruiting new members. Formerly popular events such as the annual festival held on Dominion Day weekends also failed to attract the masses of previous years (see for example: Kolasky, Prophets and Proletarians, page 295f).
130 Kolasky, Shattered Illusion, page 106.
131 Ukrainians were not the only group whose pro-communist organization experienced a decline in the postwar period. A portion of ethnic organizations ceased to exist once the war was over because there was no need for them any longer due to the abovementioned reasons (Burner, Palmer, “Coming Canadians,” page 191ff).
4. Community Development during the 1950s (1951-1959)

4.1. “Fighting the Soviet Union”

Although the third wave was very busy during the immediate settlement period – getting a job, finding accommodation, learning the language, and getting into contact with the wider Ukrainian as well as Canadian society took up time and energy – one other topic continued to occupy the minds of many of them: the fate of Ukraine and the wish to return home one day. For the existing community in Canada, the desire to return to Ukraine one day was not immediate as many of them had been born in the country or had come decades ago. However, for the DP wave that came in the late 1940s, the question of returning was still more prominent. Two streams among the DPs could be detected in oral interviews – the ones who hoped for a third World War, the eventual liberation of Ukraine, and with it the possibility to return to Ukraine itself,¹³² and those who knew right from the start that Canada was and always would be their new home.¹³³ The latter is at least an opinion which they stated in retrospect, stressing that it was not because they did not miss Ukraine, but rather because they realized that returning was not feasible. An age gap becomes obvious between these two groups, because it was mostly the older generation that harbored a desire to return home. As one interviewee put it: “I think that was all my mother talked about when we arrived.”¹³⁴ For those interviewees who saw the return to an independent Ukraine as a primary goal, the underlying explanation was their background as refugees, the fact that they had never willingly planned to come to Canada. One of the expressions of the desire to return ‘home’ was a toast made at special events (such as Christmas or Easter) – “Next year in a free Ukraine.”¹³⁵ Others, however, pointed out that this kind of toast was a Jewish, not a Ukrainian tradition.¹³⁶ Over time, the desire to return declined as life in Canada took precedence and the Cold War did not develop as

¹³² As one of Luciuk’s interviewees put it in the late 1970s: “We had to regroup in north America – ready ourselves for what we thought was going to soon enough develop into a war between the Communists and the democracies of the west” (Luciuk, Ukrainians in the Making, page 98).
¹³³ Interviews 11, 15.
¹³⁴ Interviews 16, 17. Another interviewee confirmed that the wish to return was ‘always there’, that it was often discussed in the community (Interview 8).
¹³⁵ Interview 8, 11, 14, 16, 13 (Interviewee 8, for example, remembered that this toast were made, but stressed that he did not make it himself).
¹³⁶ Interview 17.
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many had hoped. For example, disillusionment set in when the United States of America did not response to the Hungarian Crisis in 1956.\textsuperscript{137} However, whether the wish to return existed or not, all interviewees stressed that they took a lively interest in Ukraine’s destiny and future.

Many immigrant groups take a deep interest in their homeland, especially those who fled for political reasons.\textsuperscript{138} In the case of Ukrainians, this interest almost took on forms of a ‘mission’ due to the fact that their homeland – and for the first time ever all territories of Ukraine – was part of the Soviet Union and therefore subject to oppression.\textsuperscript{139} In this context the idea of “fighting” the Soviet Union gained wider acceptance in postwar Canada and actually served as a tool to unite the established nationalist community and the newcomers. Some physical fights could take place with the communists, as section 3.2. has shown. However, the word ‘fight’ also took on different meanings. In the following part, these different ideas and ways of ‘fighting’ the Soviet Union will be examined and the uniting effect will be explored. The strategy of lobbying, a subject already examined in chapters 3 and 4, has to be kept in mind when studying the different ways of ‘fighting’ the Soviet Union.

4.1.1. “Spreading the Truth” about the Soviet Union

Propaganda is one of the most important means of moving the masses, especially during times of war. During the Cold War, propaganda became one of the few means to actually attack the opposite side; and all participants – the western countries, the Soviet Union as well as the émigré groups – made use of it. As the examination of the Ukrainian community in Canada during the Second World War has shown, the zeal to inform the free world about Ukraine and demands for the country’s liberation existed prior to the arrival of the third wave; in fact, many

\textsuperscript{137} There were several indicators for this decline – for example, the toasts ceased, interviewees remember not talking so much about returning, and they started to concentrate on their life and position in Canada (especially during the multiculturalism debate in the 1960s). Two interviewees stated that the wish declined once they became comfortable with life in Canada (during the 1960s/70s) (Interview 14/13). Decline also came along with general disappointment in international developments (for example the Hungarian crisis (Interview 15)). The wish to return had been especially strong in the camps and many DPs were already disillusioned there (see for example: Luciuk, Ukrainians in the Making, page 98).

\textsuperscript{138} Burnet, Palmer, “Coming Canadians”, page 151.

\textsuperscript{139} For more information about Ukraine’s situation after WWII and the topic of Russification, see Subtelny, Ukraine, pages 492-495, 521-524.
Ukrainian-Canadian organizations considered it to be one of their most important goals. With the arrival of the DPs, the overall focus on Ukraine and its liberation intensified even more. Homin Ukrainy, the mouthpiece of the League for the Liberation of Ukraine and hence large parts of the organized DP community, stressed that Ukraine’s liberation was on the top of the agenda. In its first issue, the editors of Homin Ukrainy stated that “in light of the strengthened and concentrated Russian advance, as well as those events which are before the Ukrainian community, new problems and responsibilities confront us. We must not only do all we can to weaken the blows, but take advantage of all possibilities to impair the strength of Russian imperialism.” The editors made their readers aware that “every one of us carries with him – willingly or unwillingly – a certain amount of responsibility for the future of his nation and his homeland.” The DP wave and the existing community were convinced that the Soviet Union had ambitions to ‘annihilate’ the entire world and therefore posed the greatest threat to world peace and freedom. Furthermore, they suspected communist parties in the western world of planning an overthrow of the democratic political system in which they operated.

Since direct clashes with Communists were neither widespread nor feasible, propaganda was seen as an effective way of fighting the Soviet Union. Homin Ukrainy emphasized the importance of propaganda to spread political information to make allies and raise understanding in the West. The newspaper wanted to spread the ‘truth’ about Ukraine, and not only about the ongoing oppression of the

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140 Apart from UCC statements listed in chapter 3, see for example Swyripa, Wedded to the Cause, pages 192-198 for the women’s organizations.
144 As Homin Ukrainy stated, Ukrainians had to interest the free world in Ukraine and the Ukrainian struggle, for example in forums such as the United Nations, where the Ukrainian emigration had to stand up and stress that the official Soviet Ukrainian delegates were not representing the Ukrainian people, but Moscow occupation (Homin Ukrainy, 2 July 1955, page 6, Ukraina i Ob’iednani Natsii).
language and academia. Reference to historical events was meant to demonstrate that Moscow’s oppression of Ukraine was a continuous phenomenon. And the League was not alone in this campaign. The UCC declared at its third congress that Ukrainian academic research was falsified in the USSR and that it was possible to develop a ‘true’ Ukrainian culture and academia only outside the USSR. Academic organizations such as UVAN and the growing number of professors in various fields (of whom many had come with the third wave) helped to spur this movement. Hence, during the 1950s and 60s, Slavic Studies with a focus on Ukrainian issues were broadened at universities across Canada. Furthermore, events of the 1950s offered the established community and the newcomers ample opportunities to continue their condemnation of the Soviet government, its treatment of Ukraine, and its interpretation of historical events.

The 300 year anniversary of the treaty of Pereiaslav in 1954 marked a very significant historical event and evoked a great deal of activity in the diaspora. In 1654, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, the famous Cossack leader, had signed a treaty with the Muscovite Tsar that linked the fate of Ukraine and Russia closely in the future; the interpretation of this treaty led to one of the biggest controversies in Ukrainian history. Orest Subtelny makes us aware that five major interpretation of the Pereiaslav Agreement exist: the treaty is seen as a personal union between Muscovy and Ukraine, as a subjugation of Ukraine to the tsar, as a vassalage of Ukraine that wanted to gain protection from the tsar, as a military alliance, or as “the natural culmination of the age-old desire of Ukrainians and Russians to be united.” The latter was the official interpretation propagated by the Soviet Union around the time of the 300 year anniversary, an interpretation that was much opposed in the Ukrainian diaspora. As they saw it, it was the ‘duty’ of Ukrainian emigrants to fight such propaganda because “the Ukrainian people in Ukraine today

145 Homin Ukrainy, 3 September 1955, page 1, Ukraїns’ka knyzhka i hazeta. For other examples of suppression of Ukrainian language and culture as a historical phenomenon, see Homin Ukrainy, 23 July 1955, page 1, Valuiiev’s’kyi Ukas; Homin Ukrainy, 23 January 1954, page 1, Iednym frontom proty obmanu i fal’shuvannia istorychnoi pravdy (This is a manifest issued by the head council of the LVU).
146 Hence the recommendation to broaden work of the cultural and academic sector (UCC, Tretii vse-kanadiis’kyi kongres, page 108).
147 Yuzyk, Ukrainian Canadians, pages 57-61.
148 Subtelny, Ukraine, pages 134-136, quote from page 135.
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do not have the power to openly stand up for themselves; Ukrainian academics and
historians cannot openly come forward with the correction of the biggest lies about
the Pereiaslav agreement.” Homin Ukrainy made it clear that “at public meetings,
in manifestations, on the pages of the existing press, in special editions – with all
these we manifest the national solidarity in the face of the enemy.” The UCC
also published pamphlets to spread the ‘truth’ about the treaty of Pereiaslav. In
the 1950s “spreading the truth” was an underlying aspect of many Ukrainian
activities, either expressed through direct confrontations with communists in
Canada, through disclosures of discrimination and oppression in Ukraine, or
through the presentation of the ‘correct’ interpretation of events such as the treaty
of Pereiaslav. Another important aspect in this context was the commemoration of
historical events and ‘great Ukrainians.’

4.1.2. Commemoration of Important People and Historical Events

As John Armstrong points out, national movements pay particular attention to
heroes who are meant to inspire future generations. The Ukrainian community in
Canada honored famous Ukrainians during celebrations and festivities, thereby
generating opportunities for members of different waves to meet and celebrate
together. The following are a few examples of these events to illustrate this point.
The all Ukrainian mourning service for Taras Chuprynka, the supreme commander
of the UPA who died in Ukraine in 1950, was initiated by the League but also

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149 Homin Ukrainy, 23 January 1954, page 1, Iednym frontom proty obmanu i fal’shuvannia
istorychnoi pravdy (This is a manifest issued by the head council of the League). The argument here
was that Ukrainians had demonstrated through historical events and figures (such as Mazepa,
Shevchenko, 22 January 1918, the OUN and UPA) its willingness and interest in independence and
that Moscov was distributing lies.

150 UCC, Bastion of Resistance; Comments on the Treaty of Pereyaslav between Ukraine and Russia
(Winnipeg: UCC, 1954); UCC, Three Centuries of Struggle: Addresses on the Occasion of the 300th
Anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav between Ukraine and Russia, 1654-1954 (Winnipeg: UCC,
1954).

151 John Armstrong, “Heroes and Human: Reminiscences Concerning Ukrainian National Leaders
during 1941-19944,” The Ukrainian Quarterly LI (2-3) (1995), 212-227. (In his article Armstrong
examines whether Ukrainians such as Taras Bulba, Iaroslav Stetsko, Mykola Lebed, Andrii Melnyk,
or Volodyymyr Kubilovyh can serve as role models for the community).

152 Taras Chuprynka was one of several aliases of Roman Shukhevych and became widely used
within the community. Among other positions, Chuprynka had been the president of the UHVR and
the Commander-in-Chief of the UPA (see Kaminsky, “On the 60th Anniversary,” page 26).
attended by organizations that adhered to the UCC. On May 23, 1954, the community held a mourning service for the President of UNRada, Andrii Livyts’kyi (Andrij Livyts’kyj), who had died in Germany on January 17 of the same year. Services for other famous Ukrainians—such as the ten-year anniversary of Metropolitan Andrii Sheptyts’kyi’s (Andrij Sheptyts’kyj) death in 1954—drew thousands of community members into Massey Hall. On May 22, 1955 the League and other organizations gathered in the “House of Prosvita” to honor the “great sons of Ukraine,” Petliura and Konovalets, who had lost their lives fighting for an independent Ukraine. This memorial service was accompanied by speeches by representatives of different groups. Aside from political and religious leaders, the community focused much of their attention on cultural icons such as Taras Shevchenko or Ivan Franko. Apart from honoring important historical figures and famous Ukrainians, the community also seized the opportunity to express their heritage through the celebration of important historical events.

Religious holidays and historical dates are important for a diaspora community because they offer an opportunity to come together as a group and celebrate its heritage. Prewar organizations such as the UNF or the UCC had celebrated national holidays prior to the arrival of the third wave and continued to do so during the 1950s. Apart from religious holidays such as Easter or Christmas, some historical events were celebrated by the entire community, whereas others were only commemorated by the newcomers. A date that was

154 “Korotkyi istorii,” page 100.
156 Homin Ukrainy, 28 April 1955, page 6, U pam’iat’ Heroiv; Petliura was also commemorated in a big community event in 1955 in Massey Hall (“Korotkyi istorii,” page 104).
157 “Korotkyi istorii,” page 104. For example, throughout the 1950s the Ukrainian Community in Kitchener held Taras Shevchenko Concerts to honor the great poet (Wynnyckyj, Litopys, pages 51, 54, 56, 57). For another mentioning of the commemoration of great Ukrainians, see: Romanow, “The Ukrainian Community in Windsor,” page 77.
widely acknowledged and which held the potential to unite the two nationalist factions was the Day of Independence, January 22.\textsuperscript{159} As the example of Toronto shows, Independence Day celebrations took place annually with a broad program including speeches, resolutions, as well as choir and dance performances. This historical date generated such resonance in the community that the organizers were able to fill venues such as Massey Hall, attracting 2,000 – 2,500 participants. Apart from representatives of Ukrainian community organizations, envoys of the local as well as federal government were invited to participate in this joyous event and to accept resolutions dealing with the fate of Ukraine.\textsuperscript{160} Independence Day was an important date not only for the Toronto community but for all Ukrainians throughout Ontario, as events in cities such as Sudbury, Thunder Bay, and Windsor show.\textsuperscript{161} Traditionally, this important event was celebrated out west as well, thereby attracting hundreds of community members to the Ukrainian National Federation Hall in Winnipeg, for example.\textsuperscript{162} The LVU also observed January 22 as one of the most important dates in Ukrainian history, often in cooperation with the established community.\textsuperscript{163} In addition, June 30 also held special meaning for the pro-Bandera faction because leaders of the OUN (B) had proclaimed a Ukrainian

\textsuperscript{159} For background information about the Central Rada’s break with Bolshevik Russia and the declaration of independence, see Subtelny, \textit{Ukraine}, page 352.

\textsuperscript{160} \textit{“Korotkyi istorii"}, pages 99-104; \textit{Homin Ukrainy},, 5 February 1955, V rokovyny Nezalezhnosti i Sobornosti. The UNF branch in Sudbury, for example, stressed its close relationship with Canadian politicians (among them Prime Minister Diefenbaker) who actually visited the branch (Fedorowycz, “The Ukrainian National Federation,” page 138).

\textsuperscript{161} Mary Stefura, “Sudbury Ukrainian Time Line,” in \textit{Ukrainians in Ontario}, ed. Luciuk et al., 66-74, page 71; Kozyra, \textit{Ukrainians in Thunder Bay}, page 229; Romanow, “The Ukrainian Community in Windsor,” page 77 (these events also attracted local and federal representatives).

\textsuperscript{162} For examples from the UCC in Winnipeg, see: \textit{Winnipeg Free Press}, 29 January 1951, page 3, Prof. Bilecky Urges West Aid East’s Underground (Leonid Bilecky was a former professor at the University of Kiev. As a guest speaker at this event, he “described Russia as the land of concentration and forced labor camps”); \textit{Winnipeg Free Press}, 26 January 1953, page 6, Ukrainian Still Fighting Tyranny, City Meeting Told; \textit{Winnipeg Free Press}, January 22, 1954, page 3, City Ukrainian Canadians Celebrate Republic Sunday.

\textsuperscript{163} See for example \textit{Homin Ukrainy}, 24 January 1953, page 1, Suverennist’ Ukrainy bude vidnovleno; \textit{Homin Ukrainy}, 23 January 1954, page 1, Suverenna volia narodu (here \textit{Homin Ukrainy} stated that January 22, 1918 and January 22, 1919, were dates that were close and dear to every Ukrainian heart because they were representative of the sovereign freedom of Ukraine. Ukrainians all over the world celebrated these dates and thus manifest in the face of the free world that both these actions obligate every Ukrainian. \textit{Homin Ukrainy} stressed that the celebrations would be even bigger in 1954 because they coincided with the 300 year celebration of the treaty of Pereiaslav in the Soviet Union; \textit{Homin Ukrainy}, 22 January 1955, page 7, U rokovyny derzhavnosty i sobornosti Ukrainy: Toronto.
state on that date in L’viv in 1941.\textsuperscript{164} Especially the 10\textsuperscript{th} anniversary in 1951 was widely celebrated by the community.\textsuperscript{165} The mere commemoration of historical events was often not enough for the community, because their eagerness to inform the world about the Soviet oppression shaped these commemorative events as well.

4.1.3. Anti-Soviet Demonstrations

The commemoration of holidays and political events often went hand in hand with anti-Soviet demonstrations, as the following cases illustrate. For example, Ukrainians in Canada made their interpretation of the Treaty of Pereiaslav and their rejection of the current ramifications for Ukraine known not only in their papers, but also through demonstrations. The Toronto branch of the UCC, for example, co-organized a mass demonstration with the LVU in June of 1954. According to the UCC, almost 10,000 participants – a mix of different organizations and age groups – made their way through the city to Queen’s Park. In the context of the demonstration, resolutions were drafted and sent out to the Canadian government and the United Nations.\textsuperscript{166}

Another historical event that stirred the diaspora into activity was the famine of 1932/33. According to Orest Subtelny “the famine was to be for the Ukrainians what the Holocaust was to the Jews and the Massacres of 1915 for the Armenians.”\textsuperscript{167} The man-made famine – induced through the massive confiscation of grain – caused millions of deaths and became one of the major emblems of Ukrainian fate and Soviet oppression in the diaspora and an important occasion for demonstrations and protest resolutions. The UCC held a congress in Winnipeg in 1953 and organized protest manifestations to commemorate the 20\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the famine.\textsuperscript{168} In 1958, at the 25\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the famine, the combined forces of the UCC Toronto branch as well as the League and SUM called upon the Ukrainian community to join them in a mass demonstration at Queen’s Park to commemorate the famine, to protest against Moscow, and “to show the world that there cannot be

\textsuperscript{164} See for example: Homin Ukrainy, 2 July 1955, page 1, Aktual’nist’ chervnevykh dniv. The OUN (B) had proclaimed a Ukrainian state in Lviv on 30 June 1941, however, their attempt failed due to the interventions of the Germans (See Golczewski, “Die Kollaboration,” page 163f).
\textsuperscript{165} LVU, \textit{Narys}, page 68.
\textsuperscript{166} “Korotkyi istory,” page 100.
\textsuperscript{167} Subtelny, \textit{Ukraine}, page 413.
\textsuperscript{168} “Korotkyi istory,” page 100. See also: Homin Ukrainy, 20 June 1953, page 1.
peace without a free Ukraine.”169 Similar demonstrations took place in other cities throughout Canada; for example, a participant of the demonstration in Hamilton recalled it was an event that “galvanized the Ukrainian community.”170 In addition, the liberation of Ukraine – symbolized in the Day of Independence (January 22) – became not only one of the biggest festivities for Ukrainians in Canada, but also another chance to send protest letters to the Canadian government.171 Other demonstrations by both the League and UNF were sparked by visits of Soviet officials to Canada; smaller ones were sometimes just the outcome of anti-Bolshevik meetings within the community. Some demonstrations were also jointly held with other national groups from behind the Iron Curtain.172

It is important to note that the League and the UCC as the most active community forces often co-organized these demonstrations in different cities, stressing in reports that they were carried out in harmony. Early on, the League had realized the value of cooperation in this field. Roman Malashuk, the national president of the League from 1949 until 1975,173 stated at the third League conference in 1951 in reference to the established community “We know how to cooperate with them where necessary (for example in the context of the 60 year anniversary of Ukrainian settlement in Canada, anti-Moscow meetings, all-national anniversaries) and we also know how to oppose them where necessary.”174 The hatred towards the Soviet Union and the communists within Canada united the community. One interviewee’s comment aptly illustrates this feeling: “There was a

169 Flyer in Didiuk, Narys istorii Kongresu, page 187.
170 Interview 5; for general mentioning of demonstrations in other cities see Kozyra, Ukrainians in Thunder Bay, page 229 (here in context of a Prosvita Society); Mary Stefura, “Sudbury Ukrainian Time Line,” page 70 (both UCC as well as League protests); Romanow, “The Ukrainian Community in Windsor,” page 80 (here mentioning that the League was generally at the forefront of these demonstrations, here the 25th anniversary of the famine stood out in particular).
171 “Korotkiy istorii,” page 98f.
172 Homin Ukrainy, 3 September 1955, page 1, Protybol’shevytska demonstratsiia v Montreali; Interview 15 (here the interviewee remembered a particular incident: “…there came the orthodox bishops from [the] SU, we organized some kind of counter demonstration…We were distributing counter propaganda against the bishops, saying that they were members of [the] KGB”); Homin Ukrainy, 22 October 1955, page 6, Protybol’ shevyts’ke Vishe v Oshavi; LVU, Narys Istorii, pages 70-73; Fedorowycz, “The Ukrainian National Federation,” for example page 135 (Hamilton branch); LAC RG 26 Vol. 12, File: Pamphlets and Information Bulletins relating to Canadian Citizenship and Communism, Resolutions of the Mass Meeting: “No Peace Without Freedom For all Nations and Individuals,” Massey Hall, Toronto, 26 November 1950.
174 LVU, Narys Istorii, page 84.
common enemy for both of us, that was 300 Bathurst Street ..., the Communists. If it was the question of fighting communists, then we were together.”

Demonstrations turned out to be the most active way to ‘fight’ the Soviet Union; and for some, they even seemed to be the only way. As one interviewee put it: “Oh, sure, we participated in that, I participated in those, but really, that is all you could do, it was not much.” There was only one more way of ‘fighting’ the Soviet Union, and this was the subtlest one of all.

4.1.4. General Preservation of Heritage

Apart from spreading the truth, commemorating political and historical events, and holding demonstrations, one other aspect of ‘fighting the Soviet Union’ gained ground during the postwar period – the preservation of heritage for the day when Ukraine would be an independent country. Many immigrant groups are interested in the preservation of their cultural heritage, and Ukrainians prior to the Second World War had been no exception to the rule. However, the desire to maintain one’s language and cultural heritage seemed like a mission for many Ukrainians after the war. As Homin Ukrainy pointed out, raising the younger generation was so much more important (and difficult) for a stateless and oppressed people like the Ukrainians, because they had fewer means at their disposal. Ukrainians in Canada – and here again especially the third wave – saw their brethren in Soviet Ukraine as victims of Russification and therefore as unable to express and preserve their Ukrainian heritage, especially the Ukrainian language. Therefore it is not astonishing that especially the third wave – whether they were members of the League, which was very adamant about language preservation, or not – cherished the preservation of the mother tongue as the most important part of culture. As one interviewee, who was not affiliated with the League, explains: “Our son used to say – why can’t I play hockey, why do I have to go to Ukrainian school. And it was the obligation, they had to learn Ukrainian, because in Ukraine, people were not

175 Interview 15. For similar observations, see also interview 5.
176 Interview 16. Others stress the importance of demonstrations for the community without necessarily seeing them as the only practical way to ‘fight’ (Interviews 5, 17)
177 Burnet, Palmer, “Coming Canadians”, pages 212-222.
178 Homin Ukrainy, 28 February 1953, page 3, Spilka Ukrain’koi Molodi v oblichchi novoi diisnosti.
179 Interviews 13, 15, 5; Homin Ukrainy, 3 September 1955, page 1, Ukrain’ska knizhka i hazeta.
allowed to speak Ukrainian, or to study Ukrainian subjects, and they had to know history exactly as it was, not as it was under the Communist system.”\textsuperscript{180} However, the existing community also recognized the value of the mother tongue. For example, in 1953 Ukrainian journalists passed a resolution at a conference – initiated by the UCC – that stressed the importance of the preservation of the Ukrainian language and appealed in particular to Ukrainian students not to neglect their mother tongue.\textsuperscript{181} The UCC also dedicated much of its 1951 budget to print Ukrainian textbooks for high-schools and universities.\textsuperscript{182}

Indeed, community representatives considered the children and the youth as crucial when it came to the preservation of language and culture, because “the youth – that is our future, the future of the Ukrainian people.”\textsuperscript{183} Therefore Ukrainians in the emigration had to fight for the ‘soul’ of the Ukrainian youngsters so that they would later continue the liberation fight.\textsuperscript{184} Many of the Ukrainian churches such as St. Vladimir Cathedral, the Holy Protection Catholic Church, St. Josephat’s Ukrainian Catholic Church, or St. Nicolas Ukrainian Catholic Church in Toronto organized Saturday schools, youth clubs, as well as dance and choir groups to involve the younger members of the community and to make the youth “conscious of who they were.” These church activities reached the height of their enrolment during the 1950s and 1960s.\textsuperscript{185} Organizations of the existing community (including church or women’s groups) also focused on cultural-educational activities such as choir, dance, and theatre groups as well as Ukrainian arts and

\textsuperscript{180} Interview 14; see also interview 13.
\textsuperscript{181} Homin Ukrainy, 16 May 1953, page 1, Stverdzhennia 1-shoi Kraiovoi narady ukrains’koi presy Kanady. For community insight, see also interviews 12, 5.
\textsuperscript{182} Winnipeg Free Press, 22 January 1951, page 3, “Stewart Tells Ukrainians Russia Threatens Peace.”
\textsuperscript{183} “Molod’ – tse nashe maibutnie, maibutnie ukrains’koho narodu” (Homin Ukrainy, 27 August 1955, page 1, Na porozi shkil’noho roku. (This article advises that an overall plan for Ukrainian schooling, good textbooks, and help for Ukrainian university students (that would later form the intelligentsia) were needed in Canada. The article further points out that time, money, and attention were crucial factors in the context of raising the youth)
\textsuperscript{184} Homin Ukrainy, 28 February 1953, page 3, Spilka Ukrains’koi Molodi v oblichchi novoi disnosti.
\textsuperscript{185} Quote from interview 1. Other smaller denominations such as the Ukrainian Baptist Church also benefited from the influx of the third wave and focused much of their attention on the youth, see for example interview 2.
crafts (such as embroidery and *Pysanky* (Easter Egg painting)) to keep Ukrainian traditions alive.\(^{186}\)

Another sector of the community that also had Ukraine, its language, and traditions at the core of their program were the Ukrainian youth associations; and here the two newcomers – SUM and Plast – stand out. For example, SUM, the Bandera youth organization whose Canadian wing was created in Toronto in 1948,\(^{187}\) stated to the Canadian government that their motto was ‘God and Country’ and that one of their major goals was to “stand for Ukrainian national ideas” and to foster Ukrainian culture and traditions.\(^{188}\) As the organization grew in Canada, educational programs for children and young adults moved to the forefront, always keeping the “national and spiritual persecution” of Ukraine in mind.\(^{189}\) Activities included singing, sports, arts and crafts, as well as field trips. Discussion groups were meant to “prepare the youth for examinations which review the children’s knowledge in areas such as history, geography, literature and traditions,” and most branches started out with a cultural group, mostly a choir or a dance ensemble.\(^{190}\) The success of SUM’s overall activities can be judged by an observation by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in the early fifties that “during one year these groups have held about 50 concerts, 70 dramatical [sic] plays, 10 youth gatherings, 80 sport events, 25 chess tournaments, and about 200 lectures and other activities.”\(^{191}\) The same upsurge of development was also visible in the context of summer camps. The Ontario branches of SUM, for example, bought their first camp in 1954, SUM of Montreal followed in 1955, and in later years branches from

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Alberta and Manitoba followed. In 1954, 36 children had started out at a SUM summer camp, by 1958 there were 807 children in total.192

Although Plast was less political in outlook and not bound to any particular party, the organization also focused the majority of its activities on homeland issues, summarized under the idea of *samovykhovannya*.193 Plast headquarters were also located in Toronto; and the organization experienced a tremendous expansion during the 1950s, with branches being created in Edmonton, Regina, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Hamilton, St. Catharines, Toronto, Oshawa, Ottawa, and Montreal. Plast organized regular weekly meetings, hikes and tours, staged sporting events and competitions and conducted their popular winter and summer camps and the Plast jamborees. In its program, Plast “emphasized the importance of perpetuating Ukrainian cultural traditions.”194 As one Plast member reminisced: “Again, many of the activities reflected the fact that you had to participate in such a way, that you were aware of Ukraine’s history, of Ukraine’s aspirations for freedom, it was always there, particularly since Plast, although it was an outcrop of the scouting movement, in Canada did not belong to the scouting movement, because it would have had to totally subjugate itself to the Canadian scouting ideals, [would not have had] so much [of a] Ukrainian focus. So even that it kept away from [the] national scouting movement is a manifestation of being concerned about Ukraine.”195 Plast membership grew rapidly during the 1950s, requiring the organization to move their Toronto headquarters three times to accommodate the increasing numbers.196

Despite differences in approach to the topic of independence and life in Canada, the existing community and the newcomers found a common ground in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The Soviet Union and communists within the country were a common enemy, and activities to fight this ‘menace’ - including the joint

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192 Mycak, *The Ukrainian Youth Association*, page 8. However, the first summer camp of the Toronto branch was already held in 1953 (page 41).
193 In reference to this term, Roman Waschuk states that “Plast defined itself, and still does, as an ‘organization of Ukrainian youth for comprehensive patriotic self-training’” (Waschuk, “Plast,” page 170).
195 Interview 16.
The Settlement of the Third Wave and Community Development during the 1950s

celebration of at least some holidays and historical events and also demonstrations
against Soviet actions either in Canada or abroad – created a common ground for
the two groups. This uniting effect also became visible on an organizational level –
especially if we examine the changes in membership of the Ukrainian umbrella
organization, the UCC.

4.2. The Third Wave and the Ukrainian Canadian Committee

Despite its difficulties during the later war years due to the fact that the Soviet
Union had become a wartime ally, the UCC emerged from the war quite strong. At
the second UCC congress in 1946, the initial idea of maintaining the UCC only for
the war effort was abandoned in favor of continuing its work, first on behalf of the
displaced persons in Europe 197 and later to organize and coordinate Ukrainian life
in Canada. 198 The Ukrainian Canadian Veterans’ Association (UCVA) joined the
UCC after the war, thereby becoming the UCC’s sixth dominion-wide
organization. 199 The UCC represented the most important community organization
in the postwar period; and once the third wave arrived in Canada, its members tried
to infiltrate the UCC, initially with some success as Panchuk observed. However,
an official ‘take-over’ of the UCC could be prevented at the third UCC congress,
which saw some conflict between established UCC members and new immigrants
who had attended the congress as BUC representatives and were subsequently
ousted from the congress. 200 Some organizations of the third wave – such as
UVAN, the Shevchenko Scientific Society, or Suzhero – joined the UCC early on;
however, the major organization of the third wave, the League for the Liberation of
Ukraine, did not join the UCC until 1959 – 10 years after the League was founded
in Canada. The reasons for this will be outlined shortly.

The UCC had proved itself during the war and had become an established
factor of Canadian life in the postwar period with which the League had to reckon.
The newcomers had to find a way to deal with this established force, but the task

197 For proceedings of the second congress see: UCC, Second Ukrainian Canadian Congress,
Toronto, June 4, 5, 6, 1946 (Winnipeg, Ketchen Printing 1946).
198 UCC, Tretii vse-kanadiis’kyi kongres, page 20.
199 Marunchak, Ukrainian Canadians, pages 594-596.
200 Luciuk, Searching, page 227ff. Luciuk’s statement that the UCC was ‘infiltrated’ by the third
wave is based on community members’ observations, foremost that of Panchuk. More research is
necessary in this area to determine to what degree newcomers were able to penetrate the UCC.
was not an easy one. Although the League consisted mostly of adherents to the UHVR, the OUN (B), and former members of UPA, it was not a homogeneous group. This was revealed in diverging attitudes towards its dealings with the established Ukrainian-Canadian community. On the one hand, there were those members who saw their purpose solely in the context of Ukraine’s liberation, anticipated a quick return to Ukraine and therefore did not see any need in cooperating with their counterparts in Canada. They were opposed by those – according to Luciuk, a minority group – that favored joining the UCC and influencing their brethren in Canada as well as the government from within the existing community structure. Initially, this latter approach was rejected, but informal talks between representatives of the League and the UCC were held as early as 1951. After having been ousted at the third UCC congress, many League members were even more opposed to the UCC, and according to Luciuk the general line taken was to ignore the committee. Nonetheless, some members were still convinced that the League would have a better standing if it were a member of the UCC.

Especially during the initial settlement years of the third wave, the League questioned the position of the UCC as the sole representative organization in Canada. One of the points of criticism was the UCC statute which regulated the membership of the presidium. For example, the president of the UCC was always recruited from within the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics, the vice-president from the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League, and so on. In a letter in 1953 to the UCC, the League stressed that changes would have to be made to the statute of the umbrella organization so that the League could consider joining. Furthermore, the League stated that it could not accept the UCC’s position that saw UNRada as the only representative international Ukrainian body, and demanded recognition for organizations of the revolutionary liberation fight in the emigration, especially of UPA. The differences between the UCC and the League, especially during the

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201 Luciuk, Searching, pages 236-238.
202 See for example UCC Statute, in: UCC, Tretii vse-kanadiis’kyi kongres, page 100.
203 Letter from League to UCC, 20 June 1953, printed in LVU, Narys Istorii, pages 178-180. Early on the League stated that the UCC could serve as a basis for an all-representative centre, but demanded “free elections” for all Ukrainians to fill the posts so that the UCC could become “a true national center” (Homin Ukrainy, Christmas 1950, page 3 Do pytannia ukrains’koho natsional’noho
early 1950s, have to be seen in the broader context of “Ukrainian politics.” The League was a member of the broader “Ukrainian Liberation Front;”204 it supported the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN)205 and the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR).206 The established Ukrainian-Canadian community, represented through individuals such as Panchuk and organizations such as the UCC, saw UNRada as the only representative body of Ukrainians.207 The differences over the statute and the general question of representation ring a familiar bell – almost exactly the same discussion took place around the potential membership of the OUN (B) in the CUC and UNRada in Germany.208

According to the League’s historical account, the question of joining the UCC became topical once again in 1956 when the Pan-American Ukrainian Conference (PAUK), held by both the UCC and the UCCA, issued a statement saying that UNRada “can become the Ukrainian political centre in the emigration, if it can find a platform for the unification of all Ukrainian political forces in the emigration.” However, a letter sent to the UCC by the League addressing this issue received a negative response from the umbrella organization, and it took another three years until the UCC presidium passed a resolution concerning the admission of the League.209 By the time the League joined the UCC, both the UHVR and UNRada had lost a considerable portion of their significance, “the former eliminated by force of arms, the latter fading into émigré…irrelevance.”210 Furthermore, after the OUN (B) split in Germany in the mid-50s, not the OUN (B), but the newly formed OUN (Z) (OUN abroad) continued to support the Foreign Representation of the UHVR.211 The LVU joined the UCC in 1959 and was listed

at the sixth UCC congress in July 1959 as one of seven dominion-wide organizations that dominated the UCC and could send up to five delegates to the presidium. However, the president continued to be recruited from the BUC. In its constitution of 1959, the UCC stressed its determination to act as a spokesman for the community, to strengthen and coordinate the participation of Ukrainian Canadians in the Canadian social and cultural life, “to safeguard the justifiable aspirations of the Ukrainian nation in Europe for independence and self-determination on its ethnic territories,” to maintain mutual respect among member organizations, and to plan and develop Ukrainian-Canadian community life.212 Although the League joined the UCC, this did not mean that tensions or differences in opinion subsided. Internally, the struggle for dominance would continue within the UCC during the 1960s,213 a topic that still needs further research. However, once the League joined the UCC, the Ukrainian-Canadian nationalist community had at least outwardly achieved unification, a fact that would turn out to be important in their lobbying efforts during the following decade.

As the examination of the demonstrations and celebrations of holidays has shown, the League was willing to combine forces in this context if it meant attracting more people to the event. During the 1950s, representatives of the League also worked together with the UCC in a Canadian context, for example in celebrating the 60 year anniversary of Ukrainian settlement in Canada. The League’s head administration informed its branches about the participation, stating that the anniversary of Ukrainian settlement in Canada had an “all-national character” and that this was the reason why the League was participating in the event.214 Under the tutelage of the UCC, the 60th anniversary was observed all across Canada. A highlight of these celebrations were an exhibition of Ukrainian culture in Winnipeg that included a parade and an unveiling of a memorial plaque at the Legislative Building.215 *Homin Ukrainy* also encouraged its readers to

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participate in cultural festivals that were sponsored and organized by the existing community, for example a Music and Dance Festival hosted by the UCVA in Toronto in 1953.\textsuperscript{216} And when the UCC organized a conference of the Ukrainian press in Canada in 1953, a representative of \textit{Homin Ukrainy} was among the 12 participants who decided that an association of Ukrainian journalists should be founded. The preparatory commission of 5 members that were elected at the meeting included the representative of \textit{Homin Ukrainy}.\textsuperscript{217} Although the executive of the League tried to maintain an air of indifference towards the UCC during the 1950s and although the organization itself joined the umbrella organization only in 1959, on a local level the League cooperated with other Ukrainian-Canadian organizations and the UCC in particular throughout the decade.

4.3. Ukrainians and the Wider Canadian Context

We have to keep in mind that the Ukrainian-Canadian community with its institutions and services was only one milieu in which Ukrainians operated; there was also the wider Canadian society and the interaction with the government. This section will offer a few examples to show that, during the 1950s, Ukrainians in Canada continued to make their way into a better position in the country, thereby suggesting that they were more accepted than originally believed. This fact becomes obvious in the context of lobbying.

Lobbying usually needs a direct purpose, and therefore it is not astonishing that the correspondence and contact between the Ukrainian community and the government were very intensive during the late 1940s, when the fate of the displaced persons was at the top of the agenda. Once the major wave of immigration had passed, direct contacts and the number of appeals subsided, but never died down completely. Ukrainian organizations – both the UCC and the League – continued to send petitions to the Department of Foreign Affairs, drawing the authorities’ attention to the desperate situation in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{218} However, while Ukraine’s liberation remained on the agenda, a few other issues also sparked the

\textsuperscript{216} LAC MG 28 V 119 Vol. 9, File: 38, Official Syllabus, Second Annual Canadian Ukrainian Music and Dance Festival sponsored by the Ukrainian Branch no. 360 Toronto, Toronto, May 8, 9, 10 1953, page 21f. (Commentary \textit{Homin Ukrainy}).
\textsuperscript{217} \textit{Homin Ukrainy}, 9 May 1953, page 1, Persha kraiova narada ukrains’koi presy v Kanadi.
\textsuperscript{218} Luciuk, \textit{Searching}, pages 256-263.
community’s interest and action. And community leaders had grown bolder in their dealings with the government. The contribution to the Second World War and the – in the eyes of the community – successful lobbying efforts of the 1940s contributed to the development of self-confidence among the community leaders.\textsuperscript{219} One incident from the 1950s can serve as an example of the UCC’s increased poise.

Although the immigration wave had reached its peak in 1948/49 and essentially came to a standstill once the IRO was dissolved in 1951, the issue of Ukrainian refugees in Germany and especially the fate of the ‘hardcore’ cases continued to concern the organized community.\textsuperscript{220} In order to inspect the situation of those Ukrainians “left behind” in Germany and Austria and their prospects of emigration, the UCC developed a plan to send a Canadian representative to Europe; Dr. Kaye was their person of choice, as the UCC informed Minister of Citizenship and Immigration John Whitney Pickersgill in July 1955. The phrasing of the letter was quite bold, as the UCC made it clear that it would forward the names of other suitable candidates if the Department could not spare Kaye.\textsuperscript{221} The Department of Citizenship and Immigration – represented through Deputy Minister Laval Fortier – was initially apprehensive about this idea. On the one hand, Fortier did not see the need for such a survey; on the other hand, he also feared that sending a government official as a representative of one particular ethnic group could provoke criticism and set precedents for other ethnic groups which then could not be denied.\textsuperscript{222} When faced with these reservations, Pickersgill pointed out in a letter to Fortier: “I have considered the point you make about other ethnic groups but I think it would be even more difficult to meet their [the Ukrainians’] criticism if we chose an outsider for this purpose. Your objection is really more to the proposal itself than to having Dr Kaye perform the mission.” Pickersgill felt that it would be better to have “the final control” over the mission and suggested sending Kaye to Europe along with “one of our officers.” It would be their task to examine the

\textsuperscript{219} Frances Swyripa supports this view, stating that the Ukrainian women’s organizations (the nationalist ones) had more confidence after WWII; they were also more accepted by the outside (Swyripa, \textit{Wedded to the Cause}, page 198).

\textsuperscript{220} Resolutions passed at UCC congresses testify to this commitment (UCC, \textit{Tretii vse-kanadiis’kyi kongres}, page 109f; UCC, \textit{Chetvertii Kongres}, page 39f (here in context of UCRF).

\textsuperscript{221} LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: 3-33-34 (Ukrainians-Admission to Canada), Letter from Yaremovich, UCC, to J.W. Pickersgill, July 13, 1955.

\textsuperscript{222} LAC RG 26 Vol. 110, File: 3-24-12 part 1, Memorandum to the Minister, 15 July 1955.
situation of all former displaced persons, not only of Ukrainians. In the end, Dr. Kaye went to Germany, Austria, and Italy between November 14 and December 14, 1955; and in his final account he reported on former displaced persons in general, but with special reference to the Ukrainian case. Although the Department of Citizenship and Immigration had initially been skeptical of a tour like this, the UCC was able not only to get the trip itself accepted, but also their preferred candidate. That immigrant groups and their activities were taken more seriously is also shown in the following example. In a memo to the Deputy Minister, Eugene Bussiere referred to a meeting between the minister and seven ethnic groups (among the Ukrainians) that was to take place in Toronto. Bussiere assured the minister that “the invitation has been couched in such a way as to give the impression that plans were afoot for such a meeting long before the anti-Soviet demonstrations.” This comment can be taken as a sign that the ongoing anti-Soviet activities were not only sharply observed by the Department, but also considered influential.

The Ukrainian-Canadian community continued to be active and outgoing during the 1950s, and so it is not astonishing that government officials were present at Ukrainian events such as the celebration of Independence Day (see part 4.2.). Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent even visited the third UCC Congress held in Winnipeg in July 1953, a fact that received mention in a short UCC history. Furthermore, the UCC was successful in establishing “Ukrainian Days” throughout Canada. At the first one in Winnipeg 7 September 1952, 600 people attended and the president of the local UCC branch stated “the ‘Ukrainian Days’ are an outward manifestation of the unity of the Ukrainians in Canada and that they will annually

223 LAC RG 26 Vol. 130, File: 3-33-34 (Ukrainians - Admission to Canada), Letter from Pickersgill to Fortier, 18 July 1955.
224 LAC RG 26, Vol. 110, File: 3-24-12, part 1; Letter from Dr. V.J. Kaye to the Deputy Minister, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, 27 December 1955; LAC RG 26, Vol. 110, File: Report on the Visit to Germany; Kaye: Report on the Visit to Germany, Austria, Trieste and Italy November 14 to December 14, 1955.
225 LAC RG 26 Box 75, File: 1-1-8 part 1, Memorandum by Eugene Bussiere to Deputy Minister, 30 November 1955.
226 UCC, United Community, page 7.
The postwar period also saw the emergence of closer cooperation between Ukrainian-Canadian institutions and other Canadian organizations. A few examples adequately illustrate this point. For example, once it was established in Canada, the Women’s Association of the LVU started to cooperate with non-Ukrainian Women’s organizations to “sensitize other women in Canada and abroad to the plight of Ukrainian women.”\(^{228}\) This step was in line with the overall development of the Ukrainian-Canadian women’s movement that saw more cooperation during the decade.\(^{229}\) Plast worked together closely with the Canadian scouting movement, although it never joined the movement to preserve its autonomy.\(^{230}\) Ukrainian papers such as the *Ukrainian Voice* (*Ukrains’ke Holos*), a weekly paper from Winnipeg with Greek-Orthodox background, belonged to the Canada Press Club in which it cooperated with different ethnic newspapers.\(^{231}\) Overall, Ukrainians worked in a Canadian framework with groups that were not necessarily of a refugee background and therefore had different goals and aspirations.

Not only had the Ukrainian-Canadian community grown bolder during the 1940s and 50s, but the overall Canadian context had changed in their favor as well. The 1950s saw a rise in immigrant groups and their activities, a fact that could no longer be overlooked by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. The Canadian Citizenship Branch further tried to keep in touch with ethnic groups – and here with special focus on the newcomers – through Liaison Officers who toured the communities and met with representatives. Their goal was to “to develop a feeling of belonging, of being a member of one common family” among the new immigrants and to guide the citizenship training activities of voluntary agencies. Since a lot of community life revolved around the church and the ethnic newspapers, it was important to keep close contacts with these institutions as

\(^{227}\) Both the youth organizations of the UNF and the League participated in this event and competed against each other in sports games (LAC MG 32 C 67 Vol. 15, File: 29, Ukrainian Day in Winnipeg, Report for the Ukrainian Section, International Service CBC (1952)).

\(^{228}\) Romanyshyn, “The Canadian League,” page 166.

\(^{229}\) Swyripa, *Wedded to the Cause*, page 198

\(^{230}\) Waschuk, “Plast,” page 172.

\(^{231}\) LAC RG 26 Vol. 16, File: 1-5-11, part 2, Department of Citizenship and Immigration from the Director to the Deputy Minister, 9 January 1958, pages 1-2.
well. One of the liaison officers who called on the ethnic press in Toronto remarked in his report in 1951: “The editor of *Homin Ukrainy* felt it desirable that the foreign language press be supplied with background material regarding life and customs in Canada…He gave as an example the coming opening of Parliament and felt that pictures and articles regarding the procedure involved and the traditions behind them would be most valuable to newcomers as they would convey to them the spirit of the country.” As part 3.2. has shown, these articles were an element of the Canadian outreach program to familiarize newcomers with the country.

The closer contact with Canadian institutions and agencies was also easier because Canadian society underwent changes in the postwar period. As Owram has shown in his in-depth study of Canada in the 1950s, this decade was a period of growth and prosperity in the country. The parents of the ‘baby boomer’ generation cherished family values and economic success, hence the increased focus on education. Furthermore, the fear of Communism and the threat that the Cold War could turn into a ‘hot war’ were widespread in the country. The majority of Ukrainian DPs and the existing Ukrainian-Canadian community shared these values engrained in the society. Many of them were very well educated, having received this education in the camps or in Canada. Although Darcovych only provides overall numbers for the growth of the white-collar and educational professions and no break down for individual waves, it is still remarkable that the percentage of Ukrainian teachers and business professionals rose from 2.1% in

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1941 to 3.4% in 1951 and 6.6% in 1961. The number of Ukrainian doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, and dentists also rose during the 1950s, especially in Toronto. Given the background of the third wave and their high level of education in the camps, it is safe to say that they contributed to this rise after their arrival in Canada.

5. Conclusion

Although the third wave was the smallest of all three waves of Ukrainian immigration that came to Canada prior to the independence of Ukraine, it was still a very important addition to the existing community. 35,000 Ukrainians settled in the country between 1947 and 1952, the majority of them in cities in southern Ontario. Whether members of the third wave came as part of a sponsorship or a bulk-labor program, once they were in Canada they were largely responsible for establishing their life in the country. This meant fulfilling work contracts in fields that were often not their profession, finding a job and housing, and moving up the ladder to secure a better life for themselves and their families. During this process, the Canadian side offered some initial aid through language and citizenship classes, often in cooperation with other voluntary organizations. Unfortunately, more research is needed to determine how widespread and effective these programs really were. Nonetheless, during this process it was very important and helpful that Canada offered its newcomers a society that was open towards migrants and that saw the acquisition of citizenship as a high priority. Furthermore, due to their high level of education, their youth, and their stout anti-communism, Ukrainians also fit the values held by many Canadians in the 1950s, a fact that eased the acculturation process as well.

The third wave is generally characterized as a group of people that valued organizational activity and dedication to Ukraine’s liberation. And indeed, in the immediate postwar period these newcomers invigorated and built a wide network of community organizations, particularly in Ontario. And most importantly – the community was able to finance these organizations themselves. Although the government was interested in approaching the community, contact was often

235 Darcovych, “The “Statistical Compendium,”” page 14. Darcovych also points out that the diversity of occupations had broadened.
236 Yuzyk, Ukrainian Canadians, page 21.
established through liaison officers and did not center around any kind of financial support. What kind of an impact the third wave had on the Prairies still needs more research, but preliminary findings suggest that community life in cities such as Edmonton, Winnipeg, and Saskatoon also intensified during the postwar period. However, this upsurge in activities also caused friction between the newcomers and the established community as well as the newcomers and the pro-communists. In the first case the problems were due to high expectations on both sides and conflicting political ideologies. Conflicts between Ukrainians nationalists (both from the third wave and the existing community) and the Ukrainian pro-communists were also ideological, but took more violent forms. The nationalist faction was very adamant in their condemnation of the ‘evils’ of the Soviet Union, and this was expressed not only through clashes with the AUUC, but also through their community activities. Many members of the third wave harbored a deep desire to return home once Ukraine became independent, and in order to achieve this goal felt they had to ‘fight’ the Soviet Union, for example through ‘spreading the truth’ about communism, through demonstrations and protest notes submitted to the government. The preservation of heritage or the commemoration of Ukrainian holidays and famous Ukrainians also served as a way to raise awareness within the community. The drive to ‘fight’ Communism actually served as a tool to unite the existing nationalist community and the newcomers, because even before the League officially joined the UCC in 1959, the two organizations cooperated on a local level, for example in the context of demonstrations and commemorations.

Although the third wave had a considerable impact on the established community, they did not arrive in a vacuum. Two preceding waves of Ukrainian immigrants had established a life in the country, and the community could boast a third generation of Ukrainians born in Canada. Structures that this community had developed during the war (such as the UCC) were strengthened during the postwar period, and the newcomers had to deal with them and adjust to them. The League, for example, was never able to completely take over the UCC, but finally joined the umbrella organization in 1959. This move does not come as a surprise if one takes wider Ukrainian politics and internal Ukrainian-Canadian developments into consideration. By the end of the 1950s, disagreements between the UHVR and
UNRada had died down and paved the way for an intensified cooperation of the OUN (B) faction with other political groups in the diaspora. Even more important, cooperation between the UCC and the League had been successful even before the official joining of the organization. Although a history of the UCC and its internal struggle still has to be written, it is a fact that up until today, Ukrainian Canadians have only had one umbrella organization – in contrast to Ukrainians in the US, where the differences between newcomers and existing community led to the formation of a second such organization.\textsuperscript{237}

Furthermore, through the lobbying efforts of the existing community and the self-interpretation of the newcomers, it was established in the postwar period what a ‘true Ukrainian’ was all about – active, dedicated to the liberation of the homeland, Ukrainian speaking, anti-Soviet, and devoted to the preservation of heritage. Furthermore, early on the goals of ‘fighting’ the Soviet Union united the nationalist factions of the community. This does not mean that the clashes and tensions usually mentioned in the context of the arrival of the third wave were not an important aspect of the community experience. This study does not want to downplay these conflicts; it rather shows that despite these tensions the community early on found common ground in some aspects of community life. Thus the joining of the UCC by the League also seems less surprising. The ideal of an independent Ukraine and ideas of how to fight for it would remain in the community for decades to come. However, already in the 1960s, a new aspect occupied the minds of Ukrainians in Canada – the multiculturalism discussion and their place in Canada and Canadian history.

\textsuperscript{237} Satzewich, \textit{Ukrainian Diaspora}, pages 131-133.
Chapter 6: The 1960s in Canada – the Decade of the Multiculturalism Discussion

1. Introduction

The 1960s were a decisive decade for Canada. During this period the foundations of multiculturalism – the concept that shaped Canada during the second half of the 20th century and turned it into one of the world leaders in the realms of intercultural cooperation – were laid. According to John Munroe, the Minister responsible for Multiculturalism in the early 1970s, “the Ukrainian Canadian Community, through the leadership of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee…established itself as one of the most vibrant and cohesive social, cultural and political groups within Canada” and had been a “constructive voice” in the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (hereafter B&B Commission) and in the development and implementation of the Federal Government’s Multiculturalism Policy. Indeed, Ukrainians submitted the largest number of briefs to the B&B Commission, discussed the topic widely in their newspapers, and are generally hailed as the most vigorous proponents of the policy and its implementation. This chapter

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2 LAC MG 31 E 55 Vol. 10, File: Multiculturalism 1971-1975, Notes for an address to be delivered by the Honourable John Munro Minister responsible for Multiculturalism, to the Ukrainian Canadian Committee Congress in Winnipeg, October 12th, no year given, page 1. According to the B&B Commission, Ukrainians were also the best organized and most active group and capable of taking the lead in the discussion. (LAC MG 31 E 55 Vol. 10, File: Secretary of State, Résumé of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book Four. The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups, pages 8-15).


4 In a discussion on multiculturalism in 1991 (“Session I: A Question of Identity: Canada’s Ukrainians and Multiculturalism, Manoly R. Lupul,” in Multiculturalism and Ukrainian Canadians: Identity, Homeland Ties, and the Community’s Future, ed. Lubomyr Luciuk and Stella Hryniuk (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1993), pages 8-13) Manoly Lupul stated that the “multicultural movement was spearheaded largely by Ukrainian Canadians.” (page 8),
analyses the Ukrainian nationalists’ contribution to the multiculturalism discussion and focuses in particular on their lines of argumentation. Before we proceed with an overview of the chapter and the guiding questions, we have to take a closer look at the terminology and the existing literature, because both influence the method of analysis.

1.1. Terminology

When dealing with a topic like multiculturalism, a thorough analysis of the terminology becomes necessary. In his book *Destination Canada* Peter Li has demonstrated with the example of the word “immigrant” that the deconstruction of terminology provides the base for a better understanding of the subject itself. Different authors have drawn attention to the ambiguity of the label ‘multiculturalism.’ Will Kymlicka makes us aware that terms like multiculturalism, citizenship, federalism, or cosmopolitanism “are all normatively-laden, and while we often think we know what they mean, they are surprisingly ambiguous and vulnerable to misuse and inconsistent application.” Furthermore, multiculturalism is not a neutral term; many associate equality, the commitment to a more just society, and the breakdown of hierarchies with it because it “indicates to human
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rights [and] egalitarianism.”

8 Anton Pelinka, “Zu den Fallstricken des Multikulturalismus. Wider der Vereinfachung des
Kulturbegriffs,” in Die Demokratie und das Fremde. Multikulturelle Gesellschaften als
demokratische Herausforderung des 21. Jahrhunderts, ed. Erna Appelt (Innsbruck, Wien, Munich:
Studien Verlag, 2001), 153-166, page 163.

9 Berry and Laponce, for example, state that the abovementioned terms were not used consistently
throughout their article collection (John W. Berry, and Jean A. Laponce, “Evaluating Research on
Canada’s Multiethnich and Multicultural Society: An Introduction,” in Ethnicity and Culture in
Canada: the Research Landscape, ed. John W. Berry, and Jean A. Laponce (Toronto, Buffalo,

John W. Berry, 293-321, pages 294-297.

11 Evelyn Kallen, “Multiculturalism: Ideology, Policy, and Reality,” Journal of Canadian Studies 17
(1) (1982), 51-63, page 51. Other authors refer to this ‘social reality’ as a country being ‘multi-
ethnic’ (Günther Pallaver, “Ist Südtirol ein multikulturelles Land? Probleme und Perspektiven einer
mehrsprachigen Gesellschaft,” in Die Demokratie und das Fremde, ed. Appelt, 134-152, page 135f).

12 Pallaver, “Ist Südtirol,” page 136. He further points out that certain basic values have to be
accepted by all members of society.
They can be intertwined, thereby influencing each other.\textsuperscript{13} Some authors try to tackle one of the fundamental problems of the ambiguity of the term multiculturalism by adding a new term which describes the ‘fact’ of multiculturalism – multiculturality.\textsuperscript{14} This chapter only deals with two of the three components of multiculturalism – the ideology and the policy, or rather with their roots that are embedded in the discussion of the 1960s. That was a time when multiculturalism was a very modern concept and Canadians were searching for their meaning for multiculturalism, their ideology and eventually policy.

1.2. Secondary Literature and Source Base
The examination of the term multiculturalism gives us an idea of how to approach the historiography. Like the term itself, the literature on multiculturalism is ambiguous and wide-ranging. Multiculturalism is not a historical topic per se; it contains more contemporary than historical features because of the ongoing discussion surrounding the issue. The policy of multiculturalism continues to have an impact on contemporary Canadian society, and therefore it is not astonishing that the historical aspects of multiculturalism are mostly neglected in popular as well as academic discussions. A lot of the literature that dominates the discourse today concentrates on the contemporary aspects and questions of multiculturalism, studying them from different angles such as the literary, sociological, philosophical, and juridical.\textsuperscript{15}

In the early 1990s, the question whether multiculturalism was still a concept for Canada was raised, and it is still widely discussed today. Although the recent discussions have been very diverse, two main opposing positions have unfolded. On the one hand, those who oppose multiculturalism as a concept for Canada are of the opinion that it hampers the integration of minority groups and encourages them


\textsuperscript{14} Pallaver, “Ist Südtirol,” page 136 (Pallaver uses the term multiculturality (Multikulturalität) to describe the ideology); Dieter Haselbach, “Multicultural Reality and the Problem of German Identity,” in Multiculturalism in a World, ed. Haselbach, 210-228, 211 (Here Haselbach takes multiculturality as the make-up of society and multiculturalism as the ideology/policy).

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to live apart.\textsuperscript{16} Others criticize it because in their eyes it leads to a division of people and to a marginalization of culture.\textsuperscript{17} On the other hand, those who consider multiculturalism as a successful concept for Canada (despite criticisms of some aspects) point out that it has led to a rejection of racism and a breakdown of hierarchies in Canadian society.\textsuperscript{18}

Apart from its particularities such as the bilingual framework and the question of First and Founding Nations, Canada also sets itself apart internationally through the fact that it is one of the few countries that is guided by an official multiculturalism policy. Many authors nowadays complain that the multiculturalism policy in Canada was not clearly defined, thereby leading to confusion during its later implementation,\textsuperscript{19} that the concept of multiculturalism evoked hopes which could not be kept,\textsuperscript{20} and that there were no clear cultural expectations defined in the policy.\textsuperscript{21} An examination of the multiculturalism discussion reveals the roots of the policy, and this chapter focuses on the Ukrainian position in particular. Although a general overview of Ukrainians in the context of the multiculturalism discussion exists,\textsuperscript{22} the focus is usually on the implementation of the multiculturalism policy and not so much on the line of argumentation – the subject for this chapter.

\textsuperscript{16} Kymlicka, \textit{Finding our Way}, page 8.
\textsuperscript{18} Kymlicka is the most influential voice of this faction (See for example: Kymlicka, \textit{Finding our Way}; Kymlicka, \textit{Politics in the Vernacular}). See also: Elliot L. Tepper, “Immigration Policy and Multiculturalism,” in \textit{Ethnicity and Culture}, ed. Berry, 95-123; Adam, “German and Canadian Nationalism,” page 193f.
\textsuperscript{20} Berry, Laponce, “Evaluating Research,” page 9f.
\textsuperscript{21} Bibby, \textit{Mosaic Madness}, page 10.
\textsuperscript{22} For example: Lupul, \textit{Multiculturalism, Separatism}, here especially the article by Bociurkiw, “The Federal Policy;” John Jaworski, \textit{A Case Study of the Canadian Federal Government's Multiculturalism Policy} (MA Thesis, Dept. of Political Science, Carleton University, 1979); Luciuk et al, \textit{Multiculturalism and Ukrainian Canadians}. The contributions in this collection were presented at a conference held in 1991 shortly after Ukraine had declared its independence. Therefore a lot of the contributions are more concerned with the future of the community than the historical aspects of multiculturalism. Another article of interest is Isajiw, “Multiculturalism and the Integration.” Memoirs also give us an insight into the discussion at the time and the impact on the future. See for example: Manoly Lupul, \textit{The Politics of Multiculturalism. A Ukrainian Canadian Memoir} (Edmonton: CIUS Press, 2005); Manoly Lupul, “The Establishment of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta: A Personal Memoir,” \textit{Journal of Ukrainian Studies} 18 (1-2) (1993), 1-31.
1.3. Approach
An examination of the discussion at the time and the position of the Ukrainians in it can provide us with insights to an array of questions. Why were Ukrainians so actively involved in the discussion, and what does their line of arguments reveal about their position in Canada and their self-understanding of their role as Ukrainians? What were the underlying questions of the multiculturalism discussion in general and what aspects were special to Ukrainians? Multiculturalism was discussed on different levels – within the community, at government hearings, and within the government. There was also a part of the discussion that transcended the personal level and took place mostly in and through the media – an important vehicle for any kind of discourse, as Raymond Breton has pointed out. This chapter concentrates on the external discourse of the organized Ukrainian community, that is to say their communication with the government, either through submissions to the B&B Commission, letters to government officials, or speeches given at conferences and meetings. These records form the major source base and are complemented by issues of the Ethnic Scene (a government examination of the ethnic press), selected newspaper articles, as well as some internal correspondence, all of which can be found at the Library and Archives Canada. An in-depth analysis of the internal aspects of the multiculturalism debate has yet to be done, and memoirs such as Manoly Lupul’s The Politics of Multiculturalism are a first step toward a broader picture. However, the discourse that developed in the newspapers and a comparison between Ukrainian communities in the Prairie Provinces and Ontario still have to be examined and could shed more light on the motivation as well as internal struggles regarding the stance on multiculturalism. In order to contextualize the multiculturalism discussion, this chapter provides in its second part an overview of developments in Canada and within the Ukrainian community during the 1960s. The third part analyzes the language and symbolism of the debate in general and the fourth section outlines the Ukrainian position during the

23 Breton stated that “people do not meet or talk to each other, they talk to each other through the media”(Raymond Breton in “Session I: A Question of Identity: Canada’s Ukrainians and Multiculturalism, Discussion,” in Multiculturalism and Ukrainian Canadians, ed. Luciuk, 23-28, page 23).
24 Lupul, The Politics.
multiculturalism discussion. The fifth part deals with the proclamation and initial implementation of the multiculturalism policy, and the conclusion summarizes the findings of this chapter and gives an outlook of the community’s development during the 1970s, 80s, and 90s.

2. The Context of the 1960s

2.1. The 1960s in Canada and the Creation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism

Throughout the western hemisphere, the 1960s were a decade of revolution and change. In the US, for example, the Vietnam War ignited protest movements which were further influenced by the civil rights and women’s movement as well as a whole new youth culture. As Doug Owram points out, “perhaps the most important impact of the civil-rights movement was the way it legitimized resistance to governmental authority. For the parents of the baby boom, the Second World War and the Cold War had imposed deep traditions of loyalty to the state. The civil-rights movement broke the hold of these obligations and brought issues of personal morality versus the law to Western democracies in a way the end-of-war Nuremberg trials could not.”

These developments also swept across the border into Canada where they had a profound effect, especially on the younger generation. The economic upswing in Canada that virtually eradicated unemployment for a short period also strengthened this trend – Canadians did not have to worry about the basic necessities of life and could concentrate on other issues with greater fervor.

The discussion on bilingualism and biculturalism (which later evolved into a debate on multiculturalism) was triggered by one of the major events of the 1960s specific to Canada – the Quiet Revolution in Quebec. During the 1960s, a French Canadian elite emerged in Quebec that was – in contrast to its predecessors – better educated, urbanized, younger, of more diverse professional backgrounds, and, even more important, not tied to the church. This elite developed a new kind of nationalism that was no longer defensive of the existing way of life, but aimed to modernize French Canadian society to enable it to compete in the North-American

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context. These new ideas gained ground especially among the French Canadian middle class that was not only better educated than their worker counterparts, but also felt the competition with English Canadians more deeply. Although separation was not necessarily at the forefront of this movement, it nonetheless became its symbol, thereby alarming much of English Canada. The Quebec question gained strong attention from the media due to the rise of violence, in particular in connection with the emergence of the Front de Libération du Québec and disruptive student protests in the province.

In order to tackle the rising problems of Canadian society – the threat of secession and the unrest in Quebec in general – the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (B&B Commission) was established in 1963. Its task was to examine the state of bilingualism and (initially) biculturalism in Canada, focusing on the federal administration, public and private organizations as well as opportunities for bilingualism in Canada. After the first round of hearings had been passed, the B&B Commission stressed that it would examine these questions “taking into account the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution.” In order to initiate a nationwide discussion on the aspects of multiculturalism, the B&B Commission met with provincial premiers and held meetings that were open to the public to get a sense of the discourse in the country. Later these actions were supplemented by conferences and workshops.

28 Owran, Born at the Right Time, pages 280-307. The author cites an incident from the Sir George Williams University in Montreal to illustrate student protest. However, he also stresses that violent student protests could be found across the country.
dealing with issues surrounding multiculturalism.\textsuperscript{31} As the preliminary report of the Commission observed, “journalists, and people of Ukrainian origin, for instance, were relatively more numerous at the regional meetings; whereas…farmers, or Canadians of German descent,” attended less frequently.\textsuperscript{32} And Ukrainians were particularly outraged about the aspect of biculturalism which originally was at the centre of the discussion. Due to their size and position in the country, they were bound to be heard.

\textbf{2.2. The Ukrainian Community during the 1960s}

By 1961, Ukrainians in Canada had almost reached the half-million mark.\textsuperscript{33} The rural-urban shift that had begun during the postwar period continued during the 1960s, and therefore it is not astonishing that the largest Ukrainian populations could be found Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Toronto, with Toronto being particularly dynamic and rapidly growing among the three. But other urban centers such as Saskatoon, Vancouver, Hamilton, Windsor, and Thunder Bay also boasted a considerable Ukrainian community. Although a large number of Ukrainians was still employed in farming (20.9\%, compared to 9.9\% of the overall Canadian population),\textsuperscript{34} the ongoing agricultural-professional shift indicated changes in the community. By 1961, Ukrainians had penetrated all other fields of employment such as the service industries, teaching, professional and technical occupations. Nonetheless, Ukrainians still lagged behind the general Canadian average, for example in the area of university enrollment and in the higher levels of business or management.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{31} In the context of the multiculturalism debate, conferences like the “Thinkers’ Conference” provided participants with a forum to voice their ideas about Canada (see for example: Thinkers’ Conference on Cultural Rights, \textit{Canadian Cultural Rights Concern…A conference to study Canada’s multicultural patterns in the sixties, December 13, 14, 15, 1968, Toronto} (Ottawa: Canadian Cultural Rights Committee, 1968). The Ukrainian Student Union (SUSK) was particularly active in such conferences, as one of the organization’s report indicates (LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 24, File: 17, Zvit (SUSK report to UCC), November 1969. Folder LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 11 can serve as an example of the variety of conferences the topic of Multiculturalism sparked, here with the example of SUSK involvement).

\textsuperscript{32} Government of Canada, \textit{Preliminary Report}, pages 21-32, quote from page 29. For an impression of how these regional meetings were carried out, see pages 37-41.

\textsuperscript{33} According to the 1961 census, there were 473,000 Ukrainians in the country at the time (Darcovich, “The ‘Statistical Compendium,’” page 8).

\textsuperscript{34} Darcovich, “The ‘Statistical Compendium,’” page 10f.

Ukrainians had not only expanded into the wider Canadian society, but also broadened their own community structures. In 1960, the UCC counted 25 member organizations, including new members such as the LVU, UVAN, the Ukrainian Canadian University Students’ Union, and the Ukrainian Technical Society. The organizational spectrum during the 1960s was further enriched by the formation of the Ukrainian Canadian Professional and Business Federation (UCPBF) which was a conglomerate of already existing clubs from cities throughout Canada. By the end of the decade, the UCC and hence organized Ukrainian life was dominated by those organizations that had managed to expand successfully since the Second World War: the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics (BUC), the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League (USRL), the Ukrainian National Federation (UNF), the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine (LVU), the Ukrainian Canadian Veterans’ Association (UCVA), and the Ukrainian Canadian Professional and Business Federation (UCPBF), all of which received two seats in the UCC Presidium (compared to the one seat held by all other member organizations). Indeed, community life had grown, as statistics further illustrate. By 1966, there were at least 60 community credit unions in Canada, some of which could boast disbursements ranging in the millions. Out of their profits, these credit unions donated a considerable portion for cultural activities. With the help of credit unions and community support in general, summer camps and jamborees continued to flourish during this decade, and Plast in Toronto hit the pinnacle of its membership in 1968 with 835 children involved. Just like Plast, SUM was also particularly active during the decade. Some of its branches – like those in Saskatoon or Kitchener – were only created during the1960s; others, such as the branch in Thunder Bay or that in Etobicoke, were finally able to purchase a building, making

36 UCC, United Community (Winnipeg: UCC, no year given), pages 2-4.
38 LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 24, File: 5, Amendments to the Constitutions of the UCC adopted at the 10th Ukrainian Canadian Congress held in Winnipeg October 11, 1971.
39 Yuzyk, Ukrainian Canadians, page 22f.
an intensified community life possible. Several others attracted new members through the introduction of Ukrainian Studies courses, Ukrainian schools, or a variety of other cultural activities. The church also experienced some growth during this decade. Already in 1956, Pope Pius XII had declared Winnipeg the Metropolitan Seat of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Canada. Many of the churches established in the postwar period also prospered. Not only were they able to provide activities such as choirs, youth groups, and brotherhoods, but in some cases were even able to burn their mortgages during the decade. The Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church also recorded a substantial growth in the two postwar decades; by 1967 the number of parishes and mission stations had risen to 300 (compared to 200 in 1951).

Apart from general Ukrainian-Canadian life – dominated by institutions such as schools, summer camps, youth organizations, the church and activities such as the commemoration of holidays – Ukrainians experienced a number of important events during the 1960s. In 1961, a Taras Shevchenko monument – planned and organized since 1959 by the UCC to honor the “greatest son of Ukraine” on the 100th anniversary of his death was unveiled in Winnipeg on the grounds of the Manitoba Legislature by nobody less than Prime Minister Diefenbaker. Shevchenko was so important to the community because “he taught us to love our mother tongue, our songs, our ideas,” and now this historical figure held a prominent and noticeable position in Canadian life as well. At the unveiling Duff Roblin, the Prime Minister of Manitoba, announced that Ukrainian would be introduced in high schools, and would be further expanded from grade 9 into grade

41 Mycak, *The Ukrainian Youth Association*, pages 17-49.
42 See for example interview 18, 1, 19, 23.
43 Marunchak,, *Ukrainian Canadians*, pages 585-591.
44 See: UCC, *Zbirnyk materiialiv*, pages 45-55, quote from page 45. The AUUC was actually interested in participating in erecting the Shevchenko statue. However, their proposal to the UCC did not spark any favorable reaction, and once the monument was erected, the AUUC defamed the entire project (Kolasky, *Prophets and Proletarians*, pages 352-354 (Letter of the AUUC National Executive to the UCC, originally printed in *The Ukrainian Canadian* 1 August 1959; Article: The Monument of Taras Shevchenko in Winnipeg, originally printed in *Ukrains'ke Slovo*, 19 July 1961)).
45 This event marked an important episode in Ukrainian-Canadian history and is even commemorated today (see for example a picture of the unveiling in George Duravetz, *Ukrainian. Conversational and Grammatical. Level II. With an “Illustrated History of Ukrainians in Canada”, coauthored by Andrew Gregorovich* (Kiev, Toronto: Kobza International, 1993), page 219).
10, 11, and 12\textsuperscript{47} - another milestone for the community. Apart from the 100\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Shevchenko’s death, the 1960s brought other important historical milestones: the Ukrainian-Canadian community commemorated 75 years of settlement in 1966, Canada celebrated its centenary in 1967 with a variety of Ukrainian-Canadian contributions,\textsuperscript{48} and the first World Congress of Free Ukrainians (WCFU) was initiated that same year, with much participation from the Ukrainian-Canadian side.\textsuperscript{49} The centennial celebrations in Canada were accompanied by the Expo in Montreal, and the UCC seized the opportunity to present the community to the world with a brochure “Ukrainian Canadians 1967” in English, French, and Ukrainian. The brochure paid tribute to the contribution of Ukrainian pioneers to the development of Canada and to the general Ukrainian involvement in the realms of agriculture, politics, the arts, and the Second World War. It ended its synopsis with the following statement: “Through the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, Ukrainians in Canada preserve their identity within the mainstream of Canada’s life, furthering at the same time, as Canadian citizens, the historical goals of Ukraine.”\textsuperscript{50} The distribution of 50,000 copies of this brochure combined with other activities at the Expo “had a special significance in view of the limited participation permitted the Soviet Ukraine by the Russian Government of the USSR.”\textsuperscript{51}

The politics of the Soviet Union – at home and abroad – also played an important role during the decade. In 1959, the head of the OUN (B), Stepan Bandera, was murdered by a KGB agent in Munich, and in 1962 his assassin was put on trial in Germany.\textsuperscript{52} In reaction to this political murder, mass demonstrations were held in Edmonton, Port Arthur, Port Williams, Sault St. Marie, Ottawa, Montreal, Sudbury, Kapuskasing, Bradford, Calgary, Oakville, Timmins, Kirkland

\textsuperscript{47} LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 24, File: 32, John H. Symnick, \textit{The Ukrainian Canadian Committee: Its Significance in the Canadian Society} (Winnipeg: UCC, no year given, (folder says 67)).

\textsuperscript{48} The centennial celebrations saw a range of Ukrainian-Canadian participation – the different youth organizations, for example, organized a “Ukrainian Youth Day” (Mycak, \textit{The Ukrainian Youth Association}, page 13). For Ukrainian-Canadian contribution on a local level, see Kozyra, \textit{Ukraintsi v Tander Bei}, page 184.

\textsuperscript{49} Satzewich, \textit{Ukrainian Diaspora}, page 135.


\textsuperscript{52} This event will be dealt with in detail in chapter 8.
Lake, Kitchener, Regina, Toronto, Brantford, Saskatoon, Welland, Winnipeg, Kingston, Moose Jaw, Delhi (Ontario), Guelph, Hamilton, Oshawa, Vancouver, Waterford, and Windsor. Apart from this shocking international crime, the Ukrainian SSR and the persecution of their brethren abroad continued to occupy the minds of Ukrainian Canadians during the 1960s. As Satzewich has shown, the exposure of Russification in Ukraine remained an important aspect of the Ukrainian activities in North America, especially once the community concentrated on the support for dissidents. Submissions to the Canadian government on behalf of Ukraine in general and the dissidents in particular appealed to the authorities to take up this matter internationally. However, the focus had shifted from liberation of Ukraine to cultural and human rights in the Ukrainian SSR. One letter from the UCC to the Prime Minister, written in March 1971, only two months before Trudeau’s visit to the Soviet Union, will be taken to illustrate these pleas. In it the UCC urged Trudeau “in view of the menacing situation in Ukraine…to kindly present an official demarche to the Government of the Soviet Union in favour of the Ukrainian writers, artists and intellectuals, sentenced for such alleged crimes as having expressed an opinion on conditions in the prison camps or having defended constitutional rights for using the Ukrainian language on the territory of the Soviet Ukraine, or for having expressed comments on human rights legislation in the Soviet Union and having quoted articles of the Soviet constitution in which human liberties are guaranteed.” However, Trudeau did not comply with this particular request, and his visit to the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian reaction to it will be analyzed in part 5.1.

Despite an intensified focus on Ukrainian dissidents and human rights, general Soviet foreign policies continued to spark the interest – and protest – of the Ukrainian diaspora during the 1960s. However, up until 1968, the decade had been

54 Satzewich, Ukrainian Diaspora, pages 153-157.
pretty quiet behind the Iron Curtain, and only the Prague spring changed this. When Dubcek came into power early in 1968, Czechoslovakia experienced a short thaw period with improved freedom of press and attempts to create socialism “with a human face.” However, this blossoming transformation was crushed once the troops of the USSR and their satellite states invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968. This offensive sparked protests from Ukrainians in Canada that were directed to the Canadian government. The Secretary of State for External Affairs assured the Ukrainian Student Union, one of the protesting groups, that “the Canadian Government fully appreciates the feelings expressed in your message and has considered them carefully in its continuing condemnation of the Soviet Union’s use of force against the Czechoslovak people.” However, in an age of détente, the newly established Trudeau government saw its priorities in creating better international ties with the eastern superpower, and therefore “the original rebuke to the Soviets was soon set aside.” In the realms of international politics, there was nothing else for the community in Canada could do but to carry on with their demonstrations and protest letters, hoping that they would have an impact some day.

Despite the signs of growth, stability, and activity, Ukrainian life in Canada also faced some serious challenges during the 1960s, foremost in the areas of membership and knowledge of the language. A few examples taken from community organizations are enough in this context to illustrate this point; and the churches – often considered as bulwarks against the ‘forces of assimilation’ – are particularly good examples. During the 1960s, the Catholic Church encountered difficulties recruiting new, young priests into their orders and began to lose members to the Roman Catholic or other Churches. Mixed marriages and the close connection between the two rites were often blamed for this trend. In the case of the

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57 For a concise overview of the Prague Spring from the point of view of Radio Free Europe, see Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom, pages 142-152.
58 LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 23, File: 57, Letter from Mitchell Sharp to Mr. Serbyn, President of the Ukrainian Canadian University Students’ Union, 9 September 1968), page 1. For the official Canadian condemnation of “this use of force,” see: LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 23, File: 57, Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 21 August 1968.
Orthodox Church, although the number of parishes grew, the overall percentage of members declined as well during the 1960s. Overall, by 1961 only 58.5% of all Ukrainians in Canada were affiliated with one of the traditional Ukrainian denominations.

The same trend toward stagnation or even decline was mirrored in other areas such as the youth sector. For example, the Canadian Ukrainian Youth Association (CUYA), affiliated with the Greek Orthodox Church, had the odd 50 branches throughout Canada in the late 1960s. However, each of them was fighting for survival, with dwindling resources and an overall membership that hovered between 600 and 1000. Although the membership of Plast had not yet begun a downward trend, numbers stabilized at around 1,300 active boys and girls; the impressive upsurge of the 1950s had come to a halt. On the whole, Ukrainian-Canadian organizations noticed with concern that statistics “reveal an alarming rate of assimilation which, if permitted to continue, could easily result in the extinction of Ukrainian culture.” It became apparent to quite a few leaders that “without government aid, our culture may be limited to superficial displays of dancing, Easter egg writing [sic] and perhaps baking.”

At the time when Ukrainian Canadians entered the multiculturalism discussion, four crucial realizations had surfaced in the community. Despite a shift from agriculture to professional occupations that had taken place during the decades following the Second World War, Ukrainians still lagged behind the Canadian average in many higher business and managerial positions. Like other

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60 Marunchak, *Ukrainian Canadians*, page 58ff.
63 In 1951, 348 boys and 322 girls were enrolled in the organization, by 1962 567 boys and 612 girls were Plast members, and in 1969 the numbers had stabilized at 702 boys and 670 girls (age 7-11, 12-18, 19-25, plus an additional 218 alumni) (LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 21, File: 32, Submission to the Joint Parliamentary Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada by Plast, Ukrainian Youth Association of Canada, March 31, 1971, pages 14-16, Appendix: Background information on Plast). Waschuk points out that Plast experienced a deterioration of its activities starting in the late 1960s due to the declining birth rate and the decision only to accept Ukrainian speaking children into the organization (Waschuk, “Plast,” page 174).
groups with a high ‘ethnic connectedness’, they faced more obstacles and discrimination in reaching a higher socio-economic status. Furthermore, although the community was still growing numerically, it was shrinking in comparison to the overall Canadian population, and more and more of its members were Canadian born. And on an internal level, the community started to see the first symptoms of strained funds and shrinking membership, thereby facing the first signs of an assimilation process that many groups before them had seen. To make matters worse, the situation in the Ukrainian SSR showed no signs of improvement, and an actual Ukrainian-Canadian influence on the developments was not possible. During these trying times, many Ukrainians had high hopes in the concept of multiculturalism and therefore participated in the discussion of the 1960s.

3. The Language and Symbolism of the Discussion

In the context of the multiculturalism discussion it is important to analyze the language used at the time. Only through this analysis can we see what the different factions were talking about, because using the same words does not necessarily mean that they were talking about the same things, as a closer analysis will show. Furthermore, the discussion was shaped by symbols which laid the grounds for an understanding of what Canada was all about.

3.1. Definitions of the Terminology of the Multiculturalism Discussion

An exploration of the term ‘bilingual’ illustrates how inconsistent the interpretation of terms was in the multiculturalism discussion. For members of the Canadian government, the terminology was clear and did not have to be explained any further – bilingualism implied the ability to speak English as well as French. Ukrainian-Canadian representatives who were members of the government (such as Senator Paul Yuzyk) officially did not reject this concept of bilingualism. However, for many other members of the so-called third force, the case was not that clear. Ukrainian-Canadian activist Iaroslav Rudnyckyi (Jaroslav Rudnyckyj), for

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66 In 1961, Ukrainian Canadians made up 2.6% of the overall Canadian population, compared to 2.8% in 1951. In 1971, 81.7% of all Ukrainians had been born in Canada, compared to 57% in 1931 (Darcovich, “The ‘Statistical Compendium,’” page 8f).

67 The B&B Commission stressed that they examined the state of bilingualism (English/French) in Canada (Government of Canada, A Preliminary Report, pages 143-144).
example, pointed out at a meeting of the Ethnic Press Club that they could accept bilingualism in the interpretation of a world linguist who understood bilingualism as the ability to speak two languages – any two languages.68

Apart from bilingualism, the term ethnic also deserves our attention. At the time of the debate, the B&B Commission divided Canadian society into three categories: the Founding Nations consisting of British and French Canadians, the other ethnic groups, and the First Nations. The B&B Commission dealt only with the first two categories.69 Nowadays the term ‘founding nation’ evokes at least doubt70 or is unequivocally rejected; however, it was a widely used concept at the time, giving the French and the English a special position at least in the context of language rights. Many Ukrainians, as members of the ‘other ethnic groups,’ saw the term ‘founding nations’ as implying a hierarchy in society, as bestowing a sort of ‘second class’ status on all those groups of non-French, non-British background.71 For many of them, all groups were ethnic, including the French and the English.72 Whereas government officials acknowledged that the term ‘ethnic’ had been used mostly to describe any cultural institution or activity in Canada, and “in that sense, every Canadian belongs to an ethnic group and has an ethnic origin,” they still observed that “it is not often that the word is used to designate a French or Anglo-

68 LAC MG 31 D 58 Vol. 5, File: 7, Letter by Hans Hermann Roeder, President of the Canada Ethnic Press Club, to Mr. Davidson Dunton and M. Jean-Louis Gagnon, Co-Chairmen, B&B Commission, 19 May 1970. See also Lupul, The Politics, 119 (Here Lupul cites a paper from 1969 which stated: “Bilingualism understood merely as French-English bilingualism is completely unacceptable to thousands of other Canadians who have nothing against the French language and are not interested in unilingualism. Bilingualism confined merely to French-English bilingualism is unacceptable because it means the eventual extinction of other languages and the subcultures they support.” The paper presented by Lupul further suggested that there should be opportunities for three possible language choices – unilingualism, bilingualism (English plus another language) or trilingualism – depending on the wishes of the individual).
70 Tepper, “Immigration Policy,” page 98f.
72 LAC MG 31 E 55 Vol. 9, File: Multiculturalism 1964-1971, Brief submitted to the attention of those assembled at the meeting held March 19, 1971, “YHO” Hall, Saskatoon, between representatives of the Saskatoon Ukrainian Community and Mr. A. Lapchuk, Secretary of State’s Office (Brief prepared by National Executive Canadian Ukrainian Youth Association), page 3. See also: Lupul, “Ukrainian Canadians,” page 281f.
Saxon organization or activity.” According to Jean Boucher, a representative of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, it was appropriate to talk of ethnic organizations, but not to use the term ethnic as a synonym for immigrant.⁷³ Although term ethnic – often in the form of ‘other ethnic’ – was mostly used for all those groups of non-French and non-British background,⁷⁴ the government did not regard this group as a ‘third force’. The B&B commission argued that “the only feature these groups hold in common is a negative one: that of being of neither French nor British origin.” For the commission, the groups that constituted the so-called third force were too scattered and of too many different opinions to form one cohesive group.⁷⁵ Nonetheless, although the ‘third element’ or the ‘third force’ might not have been a unified group, they were still an important factor in the discussion and often used as a strong argument.

### 3.2. The Symbolism of the Multiculturalism Discussion

During the 1960s, one image became popular in Canada, even representative of the country – the mosaic. Although this symbol had been used earlier to refer to Canada,⁷⁶ it was only during the multiculturalism discussion that it gained its full popularity.⁷⁷ Many Ukrainians and Canadian politicians of non-Ukrainian origin used the metaphor of the mosaic to describe their vision of Canada.⁷⁸ John Munro,

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⁷³ LAC RG 26 Vol. 76 File: 1-5-11 part 4, Jean Boucher, Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 24 October 1962, pages 1-3, quote from page 1.
⁷⁷ John Porter was one of the first authors to shape this term in the mid-1960s (John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: an Analysis of social class and power in Canada* (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1965)).
for example, stated in a speech presented to a Ukrainian-Canadian audience: “Your attachment to other language and spirit of Shevchenko linked with your deep religious beliefs have assisted you in nurturing a dynamic community which has immeasurable impact on the development of the Canadian multicultural mosaic.”  

The mosaic as a symbol of unity in diversity appeared not only in speeches, but also lent its name to congresses and conferences.  

Other participants in the discussion (both of non-Ukrainian and Ukrainian background) did not regard the mosaic as an appropriate symbol for Canada and looked for alternatives. During a speech at a meeting commemorating the Ukrainian settlement in Canada as well as Taras Shevchenko, Prime Minister Diefenbaker chose to compare Canada to a garden, because in his eyes a mosaic was a static thing “with each element separate and divided from the others.” In a garden, however, each plant retains the best of qualities for which it was loved and prized in its native land, yet also adapts itself to the new soil and climate.  

On another occasion, Canadian culture was compared to a symphony or a master painting “which owes its beauty to the fact that the artist has harmonized the various colours to form a mural which portrays a distinctive Canadian pattern.”  

Other symbols to describe Canada were not necessarily original. Earlier Canadian leaders were frequently cited to suggest that the idea of a multicultural Canada was not new. In this context, Henry Joly de Lothbiniere, a member of the Canadian government in 1865, was quoted because he had suggested that the rainbow should

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79 LAC MG 31 E 55 Vol. 10, File: Multiculturalism 1971-1975, Notes for an address to be delivered by the Honourable John Munro Minister responsible for Multiculturalism, to the Ukrainian Canadian Committee Congress in Winnipeg, 12 October, no year given, page 2.

80 For example: LAC MG 31 D 58 Vol. 9, File: 13 (8), Manitoba Mosaic Congress, Winnipeg 1970.

81 LAC MG 32 C 67 Vol. 17, File: 6, Notes of Speech by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker, Q.C., M.P., on the Anniversary of the Ukrainian Canadian Settlement in Canada and in Commemoration to Taras Shevchenko, Winnipeg, July 9, 1961, page 1f.

82 LAC MG 31 E 55 Vol. 10, File: Multiculturalism 1971-1975, Notes for an address to be delivered by the Honourable John Munro Minister responsible for Multiculturalism, to the Ukrainian Canadian Committee Congress in Winnipeg, October 12th, no year given, page 9.

be adopted as an emblem for Canada. Former Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his comparison of Canada to a cathedral were also particularly popular. According to Laurier, the cathedral “is the image of the nation I would like to see Canada become. For here I want the marble to remain the marble; the granite to remain the granite; the oak to remain the oak; and out of all these elements I would build a nation great among the nations of the world.”

When we examine these symbols, differences and similarities become obvious. On the one hand, all these symbols have their differences – some are static such as the mosaic, the painting, the cathedral (even, to a certain degree, the rainbow), whereas the garden contains a dynamic element of vitality and growth. Some contain an element of equality as the rainbow, where all colors are equally strong, as opposed to metaphors such as the garden, where you have big and small plants, the painting, where some colors are just more vibrant than others, or the cathedral, where some pillars support the entire structure whereas smaller elements are mere decoration. On the other hand, an element which is common to all of them becomes obvious. They all describe unity in diversity, the cooperation of various elements to form a harmonious whole. Although only the mosaic survived the initial discussion of the 1960s to be used in the discourse on multiculturalism in

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84 LAC MG 31 D 58 Vol. 9, File: 13 (9), Remarks and Opinions on B&B Report Volume IV expressed at the meeting of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee held in Winnipeg, 1 July 1970, page 1f; LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 24, File: 18, Presentation of Views to Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the Canadian Constitution, Thursday, 10 September 1970, presented by the UCC, page 2.


86 The mosaic, where some stones are just more colorful than others, or the symphony, where some instruments dominate the music, also belong to the latter category.
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decades to come, all of these symbols served a purpose at the time of the discussion. As Jean Burnet pointed out in 1976:

“Prior to 1971, the ideology concerning ethnic relations in Canada was summed up in the term mosaic, and its floral and gustatory analogues – bouquet, flower garden, salad, vegetable soup, stew. The mosaic was proudly contrasted with the American melting pot…The mosaic was lent support chiefly in speeches by governors general and by politicians”.

The comparison between the United States and Canada is often made, and for quite obvious reasons. They are two of three countries on the North-American continent, they are both immigration countries, and their societies are made up of diverse elements. The symbolism used at the time served the purpose to set Canada apart from its powerful neighbor, because the melting pot was an image that many groups – including Ukrainians – strongly rejected.

Howard Palmer has shown in his article “Mosaic versus Melting Pot” that the comparison of Canada and the US to a mosaic and a melting pot is an oversimplification of the phenomenon. Palmer lists similarities between the two countries to illustrate his point, for example eruptions of nativism during times of crisis, an immigration policy that for a long time contained restrictions and favored

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87 For example: Bibby, *Mosaic Madness*. Dieter Haselbach, for example, deals with the question whether Canada is a mosaic or not (Dieter Haselbach, “Introduction,” in *Multiculturalism in a World*, ed. Haselbach, 7-29, page 11ff).


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European immigrants, and attempts to establish conformity, for example during the First and Second World Wars. However, proportionally more immigrants had come to Canada after the Second World War, laying the basis for a more visible diversity in the country during the 1960s and onward. Palmer makes us aware that “it would seem that although immigration and immigrants are more a part of the national symbolism and national consciousness of the United States, postwar Canada has had a greater sense of openness and unfulfilled expectations and, hence, has been more open to immigration. For most Americans, the basic contours of their society had already been formed, while Canadians have had a greater sense of a nation in the making. This may be one of the reasons for Canada’s greater willingness to accept immigrants.”90 And where Canada had multiculturalism in the 1960s, the US had the discussion of ‘New Ethnicity.’ Distinguishing between the mosaic and the melting pot would neglect these common features of the two countries; it would ignore Americanization and Canadianization efforts of both governments and could further imply that Canadians have always been more tolerant towards immigrants than the US, which, according to Palmer, is doubtful.91

Palmer’s assessment of the mosaic versus melting pot phenomenon is convincing and has to be taken into consideration in connection with the multiculturalism discussion. Nonetheless, for many participants of the discussion it was not so important whether there were grounds for this kind of a comparison between Canada and the US. It was deemed necessary to use these sometimes simple, yet powerful symbols to convey the alleged differences between the two countries. Ukrainians were particularly adamant in their conviction that the third element, which at the time of the discussion was mostly of European background, was not only an important contributor to the discussion, but also an important argument in itself. For example, the Ukrainian Professional and Business Club of Edmonton stated in a brief submitted to the government of Alberta that “there can

90 Palmer, “Mosaic Versus Melting Pot,” page 515.
91 For a full assessment see Palmer, Mosaic, pages 523-528. However, this should not give the impression that Palmer neglects the differences between the two countries, such as, for example, the dual character of Canada, the lack of a durably developed Canadian ethos due to Canada’s colonial past, or the different economic situations in both countries. Nonetheless, he does make a point in showing that presenting Canada and the US as a mosaic and a melting pot is an oversimplification of reality.
be no doubt that the Canadian mosaic has been for several centuries an important defence against the cultural encroachments of our southern neighbour and has helped to keep Canada separate and independent."92 Many Ukrainians were convinced “of the great value of ethno-cultural groups as a counteracting force which offsets many of the negative and dehumanizing influences of our post-industrial society.”93 The contribution of the third force was seen as a “basis for the development of a truly distinct Canadian culture incorporating the finest values of all ethnic groups now making Canada their home.”94 It was a widely held belief that “we Canadians are proud of our ancestral origin. Unlike the American break with and rejection of European values, the Canadian has always affirmed his tie to Europe and its values.”95 However, it has to be pointed out that Ukrainians were not the only ones to stress the importance of traditions and heritage to set Canada apart. Remarks by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson can be taken as an example from a Canadian government representative. He stated that “in the Canadian way, the heritage and culture and traditions brought from older lands are preserved while they blend in the original strains of Canadian society.”96 Contribution here not only had a ‘past’ aspect (i.e. a contribution that had already taken place), but even more a future aspect – contribution to come.

94 LAC MG 31 E 55 Vol. 9, File: 27, Brief submitted to the Board of Education for the City of Toronto requesting the introduction of the Ukrainian Language as an elective accredited subject in the primary and secondary schools of the city of Toronto by the Canadian Ukrainian Parents’ Committee, Toronto, September 1967, page 1.
96 LAC RG 26 Vol. 76, File: 1-5-11, part 4; Remarks by the Prime Minister, the right Honourable Lester B. Pearson at the Third Freedom Festival O’Keefe Centre, Toronto, 10 May 1964, page 3.
Although the multiculturalism discussion took place in Canada and concentrated on Canadian issues, it had an underlying agenda. The discussion took place at a time when Trudeau expressed his concern about the “overpowering presence” of the United States in Canadian life, describing it as a force that posed a “danger to our national identity from a cultural, economic and perhaps even military point of view.”

Part of the multiculturalism discussion was a more or less conscious effort to set the country apart from the US. Some members of the third force argued that the so-called ‘other ethnic groups’ played a vital role in this process, and members of the Canadian government inadvertently repeated the argument by subscribing to the model of Canada as a mosaic. The concept of the third force is an interesting one for this study, because the case for the importance of the contribution of groups other than the British and the French was made especially by Ukrainians.

4. The Ukrainian Position in the Discussion

When examining the Ukrainian position in the multiculturalism discussion, we have to keep in mind that the debate took place on different levels. The interviewees questioned for this project remembered a strong interest in the matter and lively discussions on the community level, for example at school, club, or church meetings. The debate and the resulting multiculturalism policy are identified as important issues for the community, and many take great pride in the Ukrainian contribution to the discussion. We will get an insight into the official Ukrainian position through their interaction with the government, and in this context the community organizations are the centre of attention. Those who undertook to represent the community were its chosen (or sometimes self-designated) leaders. Leadership, specifically community representation, takes places on different levels. There is, for example, the political arena, the educational level (including universities and schools) and the community level. Often these different areas are intertwined, meaning that a university professor might as well head a community committee or the local politician might be a member of the UCC. In the submissions made in the name of the Ukrainian community, several community

97 This remark was made at a press conference in Moscow in 1971 (Farr, “Prime Minister Trudeau’s Opening,” 108).
98 For example interviews 5, 17, 8.
leaders from different spheres turn out to be particularly prominent. The 1960s were a decade when men still dominated the higher levels of community organizations. Dr. Vladimir Kaye (Kysilevsky), who immigrated to Canada in the 1920s and became a public servant, author, and university professor, retired from public service in 1962. Even after his retirement he continued his interest in Ukrainian-Canadian history and prepared several studies on Ukrainian pioneer history. Dr. Iaroslav Rudnyckyi was a member of the third wave who had come to Canada in 1949 and taught as a professor at the department of Slavic Studies at the University of Manitoba until 1977. Apart from his academic contributions (among other things he was associated with UFU, UVAN, and the Canadian Association of Slavists), Rudnyckyi was the only Ukrainian member of the B&B Commission and in the eyes of the community “made an important contribution to Canada’s policy of multiculturalism.” Bohdan Bociurkiw, a political scientist and professor at the University of Alberta and Carlton University (starting in 1969), had come to Canada with the third wave during his early 20s. Bohdan Krawchenko, born in Germany and also a member of the third wave (although he came to Canada at a very young age), was the president of SUSK between 1969 and 1970 and in this position an active participant in the multiculturalism discussion. Dr. Manoly Lupul, who was born in Alberta during the interwar period, was a historian and taught educational history at the University of Alberta. Canadian-born Paul Yuzyk, a professor of Slavic Studies and History at the University of Manitoba from 1951 until 1963 and a professor of Soviet and Eastern European studies at the University of Ottawa from 1963 to 1978, was appointed to the Canadian Senate as a Progressive Conservative in 1963. Yuzyk took a particular interest in the issue of multiculturalism, as his maiden speech “Canada: a multicultural nation”

99 LAC MG 31 D 69, Reel 2997, Short Biography of Dr. Kaye.
103 For an account of Manoly Lupul’s life, see Lupul, The Politics. However, Manoly Lupul was not constantly involved in the multiculturalism discussion, because he spent two years on sabbatical in Eastern Europe (chapter 3), and even after his return he was not immediately involved in the Ukrainian-Canadian community (page 110f).
indicated. Walter Surma Tarnopolsky, born in Gronlid, Saskatchewan, was a professor of law at several Canadian Universities, a writer on multiculturalism and the law, and an expert on the legal aspects of human rights.

When examining the background of these representatives, an interesting thread becomes apparent – apart from a few very young members of the third wave, most of the prominent contributors to the discussion were either born in Canada or had immigrated prior to the Second World War. As Isajiw points out:

“The three most distinguished initiators and leaders of the multicultural movement in the Ukrainian-Canadian community, including Lupul himself, have been of the third generation. The first generation, especially the postwar first generation, might have formed, or brought over, more organizations numerically and might have revitalized the language and knowledge of history and culture, but when it comes to the influence on the Canadian government or on the power elite, it has been completely ineffective. Whatever effectiveness the Ukrainians have had in regard to the federal government or to governments on all levels can be attributed mainly to the third, and partly to the second generation.”

Wsevolod Isajiw’s preliminary assessment supports the view that the Canadian-born Ukrainians, most often children of the first or second wave, were particularly active during the multiculturalism discussion. Nonetheless, the Ukrainian-Canadian contribution was still an effort that encompassed members of different waves and generations; differences of opinion existed, for example with regard to the question of trilingualism. In 1964, Manoly Lupul assessed three major tendencies of opinion among Ukrainians in Canada. According to him, Ukrainian immigrants

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107 Isajiw, “Multiculturalism,” page 110f. In this context, generation must not be mixed up with wave.
108 For a report of differences between, for example, Lupul and Bociurkiw in 1964, see Lupul, The Politics, page 51. Oleh Gerus, for example, pointed out that for some community activists, the submission to the B&B Commission were too ‘mild,’ whereas others found them embarrassing (Gerus, “Ukrainian Canadian Committee,” page 209).
who had come after the Second World War favored bilingualism on the federal level; “with respect to Western Canada, however, they envisage it as implying a knowledge of English and the mother tongue of any other ethnic group.” This group of people also supported demands of the French minority in Western Canada, thereby hoping to win over Quebec. Furthermore, Lupul stated that “those persons who immigrated to Canada prior to the Second World War concur with the views of the post-war newcomers in respect of bilingualism. They do not count too heavily, however, on French Canadian support in the quest for recognition of their own language and culture.” The third – and largest – body were those who were born in Canada. “They are proud of their origin but are confused as to the stand they should adopt regarding the preservation of the Ukrainian language.” Lupul maintained that this group did not want the language to disappear, but also did not want to be accused of disloyalty to Canada, therefore often favoring no special rights for anybody. This is a preliminary appraisal of the diverse opinions among Ukrainian Canadians at the time, and more research is needed to confirm or disprove this observation.

This chapter focuses on the official (that is the external) Ukrainian-Canadian presentation and is therefore bound to give an impression of unity and shared focus. Indeed, besides contributions made by individuals in the name of the community, a lot of briefs were submitted on behalf of entire organizations (such as the UCC or the Ukrainian Canadian Professional and Business Club) and did not bear an individual’s signature, thereby obliterating the dividing lines between the different waves and revealing a common line of argumentation. As a consequence, these submissions can give us an insight into an ‘end product’, namely into the official Ukrainian position in Canada and the community’s perception of its situation in the country. The ideas – one could even call them demands – which are revealed in the representations can be classified in the following categories – demands for participation, recognition, and equality.

4.1. Demands for Participation, Recognition, and Equality

Demands in the area of participation were often connected to the political sphere. At the end of the 1950s, the Diefenbaker government had already taken first steps to incorporate women or members of the third force into the government. For example, the Minister of Labor Michael Starr was the first Ukrainian appointed to the federal cabinet.110 Encouraged by these first successes, Ukrainians in Canada demanded more political representation for the “smaller ethno-cultural groups,” often arguing that “only a person from a given cultural milieu can properly present his group’s case, because of his total association and acquaintance with it.”111 In this context they wanted the community’s umbrella organization – the UCC – to be acknowledged as the official voice of the Ukrainian-Canadian community. As such, the UCC could advise the Canadian government and have more influence on day-to-day politics. As this proposal shows, the quest for more political influence was often related to the achievement of greater recognition by the government.

Recognition was another catchphrase at the time, and this was a very broad term linked to several areas. Some proposals were rather far-reaching like the one made by Iaroslav Rudnyckyi. He agreed that Canada should be officially bilingual English/French on the federal level. However, in a separate statement to the First Report of the B&B Commission he called for consideration of the so-called regional languages, among them Ukrainian, German, and Italian, as also deserving protection. He proposed an amendment to the B.N.A. stating that “notwithstanding anything in this section, any language other than English and French used by 10 per cent or more of the population of an appropriate administrative district of a province or territory shall have the status of a regional language; the legislation of the provision for regional languages shall be vested in the governments concerned.”112 In the context for the demands for language rights, the UCC made

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the interesting argument that all languages and cultures “rooted in Canada as Canadian and therefore entitled to growth and development as part of Canada’s national growth and development” must be unequivocally recognized. Other recommendations were often made in the sphere of education – one of the major foci of the discussion due to its connection to language development and preservation. Demands were made that Ukrainian (or languages of the other ethnic groups) should be offered as an accredited subject in schools where the demand existed and should receive matriculation status in universities. The recognition of languages other than French and English was an important issue because language itself was commonly regarded as the vehicle of culture, and especially important for the preservation of religious identity. Having Ukrainian recognized in schools was often seen as one way of ensuring the survival of the language and with this the survival of traditions as well.

Language was not the only factor considered important in education. School curricula and textbooks were criticized for their western European focus: it was argued that they should have a more international outlook. Especially when it came to writing Canadian history, Ukrainians insisted that the contribution of the other ethnic groups should be taken into consideration. This would, of course, make more research necessary and go beyond the realms of the school. Apart from educational issues, media recognition was also seen as important. Groups

116 LAC MG 31 E 55 Vol. 9, File: Multiculturalism 1964-1971, Brief submitted to the attention of those assembled at the meeting held March 19, 1971, “YHO” Hall, Saskatoon, between representatives of the Saskatoon Ukrainian Community and Mr. A. Lapchuk, Secretary of State’s Office (Brief prepared by National Executive Canadian Ukrainian Youth Association), pages 8-9.
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recommended that the contribution of the third force should be more visible in the media, so that the community could be visible to the wider Canadian public. The media was a topic widely discussed in Canada since the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (hereafter CBC) continually refused to broadcast in any language other than French or English. All these demands in the sphere of language, education, and the media had one thing in common: they aimed at a general recognition of the contribution of the other ethnic groups to the development of Canada.

Another central aspect of such demands was the quest for equality. Ukrainians feared that they were not on quite the same footing as members of the Founding Nations. They were afraid that their aspirations were not accepted as being equal to those of the British or French Canadians. Walter Tarnopolsky eloquently expressed this feeling of inequality and the hope that the new policy of multiculturalism might change the situation for Canadians of non-British, non-French origin. Referring to an editorial in the Toronto Telegram in which he (as a Canadian of non-British descent) was criticized for urging the ending of the monarchical tradition, Tarnopolsky stated:

“The editorial in typical fashion said: “Why doesn’t he go home where he came from?” Well[,] home, of course, is Gronlid, Saskatchewan – and I do go home as frequently as I can. The point that I want to emphasize is that until the multiculturalism policy was adopted, and until this policy is effectuated, the fact that I was born in Canada would never put me on quite the same basis as someone

who might have been born in the United Kingdom, and who had just immigrated to Canada.”\textsuperscript{121}

In the eyes of many Ukrainians, the terminology in which the discussion was couched further underlined the inequality of status between the Founding Nations and the other ethnic groups, because the latter were often referred to as “new Canadians” or “immigrants,”\textsuperscript{122} terms that did not recognize that many of these people had been born in the country. Ukrainians in Canada did not want to be new Canadians.\textsuperscript{123} They strove for equality, recognition and participation, and they underlined these demands by a variety of arguments.

4.2. The Pioneering Argument

From the time of first Indian-European contact in 1497 to confederation in 1867, two groups determined Canadian history – the British and the French, who explored and settled the country.\textsuperscript{124} Due to this history the B&B Commission saw the term “founding races” as “an allusion to the undisputed role played by Canadians of French and British origin in 1867 and long before Confederation.”\textsuperscript{125} During the 1960s it became obvious that parts of the organized Ukrainian-Canadian community intended to jump on the bandwagon. They tried to make the case that they also had a special position in Canada due to their experience as settlers and pioneers. This argument – put forward by organizations encompassing members of all waves and generations – could be made only by linking the entire community to the first wave that had settled predominantly in dense compact blocks on the Prairies, leaving an impact on the land and the surroundings. During the debate on multiculturalism, the early settlement experience was used as an argument to

\textsuperscript{121} LAC MG 31 E 55 Vol. 10, File: Multiculturalism 1971-75, The New Policy of Multiculturalism for Canada, an address delivered in Winnipeg at the Conference of Ukrainian Canadian Business and Professional Men’s Clubs on Sunday, October 10, following the Prime Minister’s elaboration of the Federal Government’s Multiculturalism Policy given at the Congress of Ukrainian Canadians the evening before, by W.S. Tarnopolsky, page 2.

\textsuperscript{122} LAC MG 31 D 58 Vol. 9, File: 14, New Canadians and the Schools, Conference sponsored by the Citizenship Branch, Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship, The Dante Society of Toronto, The Federation of Italo-Canadian Associations and Clubs, Speech by Michael Wawryshyn (UCC), page 1f.

\textsuperscript{123} As the B&B Commission observed: “The term ‘New Canadian,’ which was used so often, did not satisfy the desire for distinctive recognition which was felt especially by Ukrainian Canadians, whose grandfathers had been among the first to plough the open lands of the Prairies” (Government of Canada, Preliminary Report, page 51).

\textsuperscript{124} Kelley and Trebilcock, Making of the Mosaic, page 21-60.

\textsuperscript{125} Government of Canada, Report of the Royal Commission, Book 1, page XXII.
support claims for recognition, participation and equality. One could even say that the Ukrainian-Canadian community created a ‘pioneer myth’ at this time.

The pioneer myth that dominated Ukrainian-Canadian literature after 1970 pointed to the initial hardships of settlement, the isolation of the early settlers, the discrimination they faced, as well as their constant efforts to succeed in the new country.\textsuperscript{126} The roots of this pioneer myth can be seen during the debate on multiculturalism. In the opinion of the Ukrainians of the 1960s, the early Ukrainian settlers were role models, even heroes, and the idea of Ukrainians as pioneers was evoked and perpetuated throughout the discussion.\textsuperscript{127} Ukrainians were often referred to as having pioneered the prairies: they had turned wilderness into fertile land through hard physical work. Emphasis was given to the Ukrainian contribution in the area of agriculture, such as the cultivation of prize-winning wheat.\textsuperscript{128}

Characteristics attributed to Ukrainian pioneers – such as “a long and intimate contact with the soil” or the “love for freedom” – were often celebrated\textsuperscript{129} and sometimes even transferred to the present community. For example, John Iaremko (Yaremko), a lawyer and politician of Ukrainian descent, stated that “if there is a single characteristic common to those of us of Slav descent in this country, it is a burning love of freedom and democracy.”\textsuperscript{130} In the eyes of many Ukrainians, the pioneering qualities and the hard work of the early settlers put Ukrainians on the same footing as the British or French Canadians.\textsuperscript{131} Iaroslav Rudnyckyi went so far

\textsuperscript{126} Sonia Mycak points out that the perpetuation of this myth was dependent on government funding through multicultural programs as well as the multicultural ethic in general (Sonia Mycak, ”’A Different Story” by Helen Potrebenko: The Prairie-Pioneer Myth Re-visited,” \textit{Canadian Ethnic Studies} 28 (1) (1996), 67-88, page 68ff).

\textsuperscript{127} As Frances Swyripa has shown, the Ukrainian peasant immigrant pioneer woman was a figure within Ukrainian-Canadian society that was also romanticized in the decades following the Second World War (Swyripa, \textit{Wedded to the Cause}, page 225ff).


\textsuperscript{130} LAC MG 31 E 55 Vol. 9, File: Multiculturalism 1964-1971, An address by the Honourable John Yaremko to the inter-University Committee on Canadian Slavs Conference, 23 May 1971, page 1.

\textsuperscript{131} Paul Yuzyk, for example, pointed out that Ukrainians in Canada had cultivated more land mass than the French Canadians and that Ukrainians had also made a strong contribution to public life.
as to state that at least some Ukrainians saw themselves as the “founding races” of the Prairies; however, as Rudnyckyi himself pointed out, this view could not be generalized for the entire community. Nonetheless, as Sonya Mycak states, “this national role – their ordination as a founding people of the Canadian nation – is the fourth motif which marks the prairie pioneer myth.” In addition to the mostly agricultural work on the prairies, the Ukrainian involvement in the early Russian exploration missions was also cited to create a picture of “true pioneers.” As the historiography has shown, features of this myth, such as the hardship of settlement, the struggle to succeed in the country and the discrimination that early settlers faced were rooted in the historical experience of Ukrainians in Canada. However, it became a myth once it was generalized for all Ukrainians in Canada and once certain demands were connected to this pioneering experience (at least by part of the community). This implies an exclusive claim that does not take into consideration that Ukrainians were not the first nor the only ones to settle the Prairies.

The 1960s saw an upsurge in publications on Ukrainians in Canada, further perpetuating the pioneer myth. A general aim of these contributions was to celebrate the Ukrainian cultural heritage, shed light on the historical roots of Ukrainian settlement in Canada, and reveal the Ukrainian contribution to the

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Therefore he came to the conclusion: “All these and other achievements, which I have elaborated in my recent book on the Ukrainian Canadians, are proof that they are builders of Canada and qualifying partners with the British and the French” (LAC MG 31 D 58 Vol. 9, File: 12 (1), Paul Yuzyk: The Emerging new Force in the Emerging New Canada, at the Thinkers’ Conference on Cultural Rights, Dec. 13, 14, 15 1968, pages 3-4).

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132 LAC MG 31 D 58 Vol. 6, File: 8, Rudnyckyj: Remarks regarding the texts of Dunton, Dion and Hawkins - and additional comments regarding interim report, 19 September 1964, page 1f.

133 Mycak, “A Different Story,” page 68.

134 LAC MG 31 D 58 Vol. 6, File: 8, Rudnyckyj: Ethno-Lingual Groups in Canada, 30 January 1964, page 3f; LAC MG 31 D 69, Vol. 6, File: 14, Vancouver Sun, 6 December 1973: Ukrainians earned rights in Canada (letter to the editor by Michael Huculak). It is true that Ukrainians were involved in the Russian exploration missions on the North-American continent. However, one has to keep in mind that the numbers were extremely small (see Subtelny, Ukraine, page 539).


The development of the country. The third Ukrainian-Canadian senator Paul Yuzyk, for example, wrote *Ukrainian Canadians: Their Place and Role in Canadian Life* in order “to provide Canadians and visitors in Canada during the Centennial Year with all the important, authoritative information, in concise treatise form, about a leading dynamic Canadian ethnic group – the Ukrainian Canadians.” Dr. Vladimir Kaye contributed a study on the early settlement period, thereby providing the first scholarly examination of Ukrainians in Canada. Publications such as booklets (often based on MA or Ph. D. theses) came from Ukrainian Canadians in different parts of the country. They dealt with the contribution of Ukrainians to Canada and also with aspects of identity and the struggle to maintain it. Different aspects of Ukrainian-Canadian community life were brought to the attention of a wider audience; for example, the church, political life, or the development of particular communities. In addition to publications focusing exclusively on Ukrainian Canadians, information about them could also be found in the general context of “the contributions of the other ethnic groups.” One example is the publication of the proceedings of the First National Conference on Canadian Slavs where the Ukrainians also took a leading role.

In addition to the history of Ukrainians in Canada, Ukraine itself remained important to the community. And here the Ukrainian-Canadian University students – active like many of their non-Ukrainian counterparts all over Canada and the US – made their fellow Ukrainians aware of the need for ‘outreach’ into the wider

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137 A concise overview of major publications by and about Ukrainians issued during the multiculturalism debate can be found in Frances Swyripa, *Ukrainian Canadians: A Survey of their Portrayal in English-language Works* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1978), pages 88-117.
138 Yuzyk, *Ukrainian Canadians: Their Place and Role*, preface.
141 Odarka Savella Trosky, *The Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church in Canada*. Winnipeg: Bulman Bros Limited, 1968.
Canadian society. Stating that Ukrainians, despite their activities and the strength of their community, were still a “people without a voice,” the following argument was made:

“If we cannot talk to our fellow Canadians in English, how can we hope to gain their understanding and respect? When we have a problem, such as the recent burning of the Kiev Library, we should have a UKRAINIAN CANADIAN QUARTERLY or a monthly UKRAINIAN CANADIAN CHRONICLE in English in which we can speak out. But let us not forget that it is not only our fellow Canadians who would value such publication. Many Ukrainians who have been deprived of learning their ancestral language would be intellectually nourished by such a publication.”145

In this context it was further lamented that “not one satisfactory history of Ukraine (such as Hrushevskyj’s, Doroshenko’s or Manning’s)” was available in English. The question was posed how “we [can] really expect our fellow Canadians and the Western World to understand and sympathize with us when even the simplest, most basic facts are inaccessible to them?”146 The reference volume *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia* was seen as a first step in the direction of informing Canadians (and the world) about Ukraine’s fate. In addition, Ukrainian literary achievements were the focus of attention. In this context, Taras Shevchenko was particularly important as the unveiling of the Shevchenko monument has demonstrated. In order to reach the general non-Ukrainian audience in Canada, a translation of *The Kobzar*, Shevchenko’s most famous work, was initiated under the auspices of the UCC.147 The Anglo-Canadian audience could further get an insight into Ukrainian literary

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achievement through a translation of Ukrainian poems covering a time period from 1189 to 1962 (again under the auspices of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee).\footnote{148 The Ukrainian Poets, 1189-1962. Selected and translated into English verse by C. H. Andrusyshyn and Watson Kirkconnell (Toronto, Buffalo, London: Published for the Ukrainian Canadian Committee by University of Toronto Press, 1963).}

The 1960s saw a very diverse range of publications by the Ukrainian-Canadian community, and many of these books and articles were published in English. This can either be interpreted as a growing interest in reaching a wider Canadian audience, or it can be seen as a sign that English was more increasingly becoming the primary language among Ukrainians in Canada. These publications were often seen as a tool “to fight for the truth about Ukraine and to take credit for our part in Canadian history.”\footnote{149 LAC MG 31 D 58 Vol. 6, File: 7, Andrew Gregorovich: Ukrainian Canadian University Students, page 2.} Indeed, for the first time ever, the community researched and published its history in Canada on a larger scale, thereby focusing on the Ukrainian pioneering experience and the contributions to Canadian society.

Ukrainians were not the only ones to use the argument of the pioneering experience. Canadian government officials\footnote{150 Important members of the Canadian government such as Prime Minister Trudeau, Prime Minister Diefenbaker, the Premier of Alberta, Harry Strom, and others visited Ukrainian-Canadian conventions and met with community leaders. This could be seen as a sign that the Canadian government took an interest in the affairs of the community.} of non-Ukrainian background also frequently referred to them as pioneers. The early settlers were labeled the “unsung heroes” and they were presented as people with a vision of and aspirations for the future who overcame hardships to secure a future in Canada.\footnote{151 For a selection see: LAC MG 31 D 58 Vol. 7, File: 5, An Address to the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, Edmonton Branch, by the Honourable Harry Strom, Premier of Alberta, 24 April 1971, page 10; LAC MG 31 E 55 Vol. 10, File: Multiculturalism 1971-1975. Notes for an address to be delivered by the Honourable John Munro Minister responsible for Multiculturalism, to the Ukrainian Canadian Committee Congress in Winnipeg, October 12th, no year given, page 10 (Here Munro stated: “Your parents and grandparents made an indelible contribution to the Canadian scene by building their lives, building our countrysides [sic], towns and cities by pulling themselves up by their own bootstraps amid difficulties and personal sacrifices”); LAC MG 32 C 67 Vol. 17, File: 6, Notes of Speech by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker, Q.C., M.P., on the Anniversary of the Ukrainian Canadian Settlement in Canada and in Commemoration to Taras Shevchenko, Winnipeg, 9 July 1961, pages 1ff, 6.} Other depictions such as Ukrainians as “freedom loving” people were also appropriated. In this context officials often cited the poet Taras Shevchenko, who was and is very much admired by the Ukrainian-Canadian community\footnote{152 LAC MG 31 E 55 Vol. 10, File: Multiculturalism 1971-1975. Notes for an address to be delivered by the Honourable John Munro Minister responsible for Multiculturalism, to the} and to whom Lester B. Pearson
referred as the “Bobby Burns of Ukraine.”\textsuperscript{153} Although government officials often referred to Ukrainians as pioneers, they rejected the idea of a special position for Ukrainians in Canada. Using the same line of argument, Canadian government officials could acknowledge the contribution of Ukrainian settlers and still argue against special rights for them. Additional arguments had to be found to support the demands made on behalf of the Ukrainian-Canadian community.

4.3. The Importance of the Situation in the Homeland

A frequent argument made to underline the need for the preservation of the Ukrainian heritage was the situation in the homeland. Community leaders, especially, saw activities in Canada in reference to what was going on in Ukraine. As Senator Paul Yuzyk said: “Ukrainians cherish Canadian freedom and democracy, as they are conscious of Ukraine’s subjugation and bondage.”\textsuperscript{154} Indeed, Ukrainians in Canada, whether they had been born in Canada or had emigrated from abroad, had never been able to look back to a free homeland. Furthermore, all of Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union after 1945 and its inhabitants were subject to measures of Russification.\textsuperscript{155} As the UCC stated on one occasion “as descendents of 50 million Ukrainians who are exposed to a drastic Russification under the present Soviet rule, we in Canada have an opportunity and a sacred duty to preserve the Ukrainian language and culture outside out native land.”\textsuperscript{156} The members of the community felt that they had to preserve what they

\textsuperscript{153} LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 10, File: 49, Advance Text not complete check against delivery, Notes for Address by the Honourable Lester B. Pearson, to the 6th all-Canada Congress of Ukrainian Canadians at a mass rally in Winnipeg, 12 July 1959.

\textsuperscript{154} LAC MG 31 E 55 Vol. 9, File: Multiculturalism 1964-1971, Debates of the Senate, Maiden Speech of the Honourable Paul Yuzyk, Senator: Canada: A Multicultural Nation, 3 March 1964, page 6f. In this context Yuzyk quoted one of Shevchenko’s poems to illustrate the love of Ukrainians for freedom.

\textsuperscript{155} Subtelny, \textit{Ukraine}, pages 521-526.

\textsuperscript{156} LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 23, S. J. Kalba, to Mr. Richard Burton/John Heyman, London, 8 July 1969. Both Burton and Heyman were strong defenders of the Welsh language in Britain, and Kalba assured the two men that they “would be enthusiastically received as an inspiration” if they were to visit Canada.
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had in Canada, and it was often pointed out that this task was so much more important to Ukrainians than to other ethnic groups (such as the Italians or Germans), because these groups had the opportunity “to go back” if they desired, an option that did not exist for the Ukrainian community.

This “mission” to preserve Ukrainian culture in the diaspora was complicated by the facts that there had been no new wave of immigration of Ukrainians since the late 1940s and early 1950s and that Ukrainian language use and community participation were declining in Canada. The preservation of language and heritage was only possible, it was argued, if there was enough money to fund organizations, language classes, and other activities. It was often assumed that the number of people speaking Ukrainian as their mother tongue, for example, would not decline further if there were more interest in minority languages in general and if greater encouragement were given. In addition to preserving their language and culture in Canada, Ukrainians also hoped to influence Canada’s foreign policy regarding the Soviet Union, so that the country would “do everything to support and encourage the struggle of the captive nations for liberation.” The closest Ukrainians ever came to having this hope acknowledged was when Prime Minister John Diefenbaker openly criticized the Soviet Union in his speech at the United Nations in 1960. Although there were other groups in Canada who had their homeland behind the Iron Curtain and who also fought for

157 LAC MG 31 D 58 Vol. 8, File: 10 (Multiculturalism), Panchuk on Multilingualism and Multiculturalism, no date given (Ukrainian Canadian Veterans Association), page 4; LAC MG 31 E 55 Vol. 10, File: Multiculturalism 1971-75, The New Policy of Multiculturalism for Canada, an address delivered in Winnipeg at the Conference of Ukrainian Canadian Business and Professional Men’s Clubs on Sunday, October 10, following the Prime Minister’s elaboration of the Federal Government’s Multiculturalism Policy given at the Congress of Ukrainian Canadians the evening before, by W.S. Tarnopolsky, page 3.


160 Woycencko, Canada’s Cultural Heritage, page 13f.


recognition and the liberation of their homeland. Ukrainians still saw their position as unique in Canada. Manoly Lupul made this clear when he stated: “In Canada the Baltic peoples are not numerous, and so it is to Canadians of Ukrainian descent that a phrase made popular by French Canadians in recent years best applies: ‘We are not a people like the other[s].’ For truly we are not.”

4.4. Parallels to the French Canadians

In these arguments, parallels to the French Canadian case are obvious. Geographical density, the concept of French Canadians as a nation, coupled with the displayed desire and task to survive as a nation were important arguments for the French Canadians during the multiculturalism discussion. One line of argument presented by Ukrainian Canadians was to indirectly compare their case to that of French Canadians. Thus Ukrainians were presented as pioneers and their strong bloc settlements in the Prairies were given as a reason for special language rights; furthermore, it was stressed that they had a strong desire to survive (due to the situation in the homeland) and that language was highly important for this. However, the comparison to the French was seldom made in a direct way. Very few people openly asked that those “who have also concretely contributed to the building, development and defence of Canada” should receive the same rights as the French Canadians or stated that the preservation of language was as important to Ukrainians as it was to the French Canadians. Nonetheless, whether a direct comparison to the case of French Canadians was made or not, many Ukrainians directed their arguments and demands at group rights as opposed to

163 For an example of the Lithuanians, see Danys, *DP*.
167 LAC MG 31 D 58 Vol. 7, File: 3, Mr. V. Solman, Grand Knight, St. Josephat Council 4138, Knights of Columbus, to the Manitoba Committee on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, page 2.
168 LAC MG 31 D 58 Vol. 7, File: 12, UNF, Montreal Branch, to the Commission of Inquiry on the Position of the French Language and on Language rights in Quebec, September 1969, page 3. These are first observations of the parallels between the arguments of Ukrainians and French Canadians in the discussion. More research is necessary to make a thorough comparison possible and to examine the motives.
individual rights, and focused on the importance of the survival of language, thereby appropriating the discourse of Quebec nationalism.169

4.5. Arguments against a Special Status

Although there were demands for a special position for Ukrainians in Canada, another line of argument went in the completely opposite direction, and many Ukrainian Canadians cooperated directly with members of the other ethnic groups to make it. The underlying argument was that special status – for anybody – was unconstitutional and contrary to human rights. It was deemed unfair to select only two groups for survival, with the other groups consigned to eventual assimilation. The argument was made that “in democracy one cannot apply one set of standards and moral principles to one group of citizens, and a different standard for another group of Canadians”170 because that would eventually lead to discrimination and devaluation. It was further argued that “a child who sees that the language of his ancestors is not important enough to be studied as a subject will inevitably feel that his forefathers were not quite equal.”171 Furthermore, the question of discrimination often came up in the context of civil service and other employment opportunities. Community activists feared that people of non-French, non-British background would be disadvantaged in public employment because they would have to learn two additional languages, both English and French.172 This fear particularly struck home with Ukrainians in Canada since they as a group depended greatly on the public sector for their upward social mobility. And although Ukrainians managed

170 LAC MG 31 D 58 Vol. 7, File: 12, UNF, Montreal Branch, to the Commission of Inquiry on the Position of the French Language and on Language rights in Quebec, September 1969, page 3. The argument in regards to human rights was also made in other submissions, see for example: LAC MG 31 E 55 Vol. 9, File: Multiculturalism 1964-1971, Brief submitted to the attention of those assembled at the meeting held March 19, 1971, “YHO” Hall, Saskatoon, between representatives of the Saskatoon Ukrainian Community and Mr. A. Lapchuk, Secretary of State’s Office (Brief prepared by National Executive Canadian Ukrainian Youth Association, page 3).
during the 1960s to broaden their representation in the white collar occupations (by 1971, the percentage for Ukrainians was 33%), their positions were restricted to the lower and middle level and they were still underrepresented in managerial, financial and higher business occupations.\textsuperscript{173} Essentially, Ukrainians in Canada were afraid of being reduced to “second class citizens”\textsuperscript{174} and demanded opportunities equal to those of the Anglo and French Canadians.

5. The Introduction of the Multiculturalism Policy

5.1. 1971 – a Crucial Year for Ukrainians in Canada

1971 turned out to be an important year for Canada and for Ukrainians in particular, but it did not start as a good year for the latter group. Two events upset the organized Ukrainian-Canadian community and brought a whirlwind of protest letters and media attention. 1971 was another census year, and on the forms that were to be distributed among the population, Ukrainian had been omitted in the section pertaining mother-tongue and Ukrainian Greek-Orthodox was not listed among the religious affiliations. These exclusions sparked “waves of protest” and were “considered discriminatory against the Ukrainian Canadian community.”\textsuperscript{175} The Ukrainian Canadian Professional and Business Club even went so far to interpret the omission of the Ukrainian language from the census forms – whereas English, French, Italian, and German had been kept on the questionnaire – as a “deliberate deletion...calculated to influence statistics...[and] these statistic will be crucial in determining the future linguistic, cultural and educational politics of Canada, as, for example, Bilingual Districts.”\textsuperscript{176} The explanation provided by the government – stating that there was not enough space on the forms – was discarded as preposterous; but despite all appeals to withdraw and reprint the forms, the Ukrainian-Canadian protests were fruitless. In a last attempt to rectify the situation, a leaflet was created which advised Ukrainian Canadians to specify their ‘other’ mother tongue as Ukrainian and to write in the comment section “I protest the deliberate deletion of the Ukrainian language from question No. 5 referring to

\textsuperscript{174} This term often appears in the submission to the B&B Commission.
\textsuperscript{176} LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 28, File: 5, Resolution by the Ukrainian Canadian Business and Professional Men’s Club, May 1971.
The other event that generated waves of protest among the community was Trudeau’s visit to the Soviet Union in May 1971 and his interpretation of the Ukrainian liberation struggle. Not only had the Prime Minister failed “to intervene on behalf of the Ukrainian intellectuals unjustly imprisoned by Soviet authorities” and thereby caused “deep disappointment” to the UCC; but Trudeau had further drawn a comparison between the federal constitutions of the Soviet Union and Canada and had equated the Ukrainian intellectuals imprisoned in Ukraine with members of the FLQ in Canada. The UCC was outraged by this comparison and did not accept an initial explanation that cited lack of relevant information as a reason “in view of the many briefs and representations made to you and your office prior to your departure to the USSR.” At a press conference held on June 1, 1971, only three days after his return from the Soviet Union, Trudeau attempted to explain his situation with the following remarks:

“I made it clear that I wasn’t putting them on an equal footing and I also added that the countries weren’t the same. That we had a democracy here with forms of freedom of speech which I believe are unusual in the USSR. Therefore, there was no indication that they were on a parallel basis. The point I was making and which I made…was that I found it a bit difficult to intervene in another country’s internal affairs and discuss the seeking of independence by

177 LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 28, File: 5, Leaflet ‘Informatsiia.’
178 For a detailed overview of Trudeau’s visit to the Soviet Union and the Canadian foreign policy, see Farr, “Prime Minister Trudeau’s Opening,” 102-118. For more information on Trudeau and his relationship to the Soviet Union as seen through Soviet writing, see J.L. Black, Canada in the Soviet Mirror, pages 263-294. For a personal insight into Ukrainian Canadian reaction to Trudeau’s visit and statement, see Lupul, The Politics, pages 161
179 LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 23, File: 57, Telegram to Prime Minister Trudeau from UCC, 1 June 1971. At another occasion, the UCC stressed that Ukrainian dissidents such as Moroz were not jailed for kidnapping, but for voicing criticism of being deprived of basic human rights. “Consequently, the comparison between the Canadian democratic and federal form of government and the totalitarian system of the Soviet Union was received by the Ukrainian Canadians with great indignation, and the comparison between Ukrainian nationalists and the FLQ terrorist was met with strong public protest” (LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 23, File: 57, Letter from Kushnir to Trudeau, 7 June 1971).
any part of that country in return to discuss those who in Canada are trying to break up the country. And this is the reason why I didn’t discuss it on this visit but what I did say, both in the House of Commons and here, is that by establishing a good rapport, a good climate of confidence and exchange with the Soviet authorities, we would perhaps be in a better position to make representation on, not a legal or constitutional basis, but on a humanitarian basis about some individual cases which might be brought to our attention in the future.”

This approach towards peaceful coexistence and improved cooperation was further expressed through the Soviet-Canadian Protocol on Consultations which was signed May 19, 1971. This document left the UCC “deeply concerned with the new course of Canadian foreign policy aimed at flirtations with the totalitarian regime of the USSR.” Therefore the umbrella organization pressed for a meeting with Trudeau and other cabinet ministers to discuss not only the Prime Minister’s remarks, but also “other urgent matters pertaining to the Ukrainian-Canadian community.” Indeed, the Ukrainian-Canadian community used this incident as an opportunity to call the government’s attention not only to the human rights situation in the Soviet Union, but also to the requests and wishes of Ukrainians within Canada. Apart from demanding constitutional guarantees for the Ukrainian language and culture in Canada, the UCC requested sufficient Government personnel that could be advised on Ukrainian-Canadian matters and more bilingual Ukrainian Canadians in senior advisory positions. In order to be able to counsel the government “on the complex and sensitive problems relative to the Ukrainian community in Canada and their interests abroad,” these people would have to spend

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180 LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 23, File: 57, Telecommunications, Dr. Kalba UCC, Remarks by the Prime Minister to the Press Following Question Period, 1 June 1971.
181 Black, Canada in the Soviet Mirror, 268f; Farr, “Prime Minister Trudeau’s Opening,” pages 107-110. The protocol also caused stir among the opposition in parliament, whereas the external affairs minister stressed that the signing of the protocol had not influence on Canada’s standing within the North Atlantic Alliance.
182 LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 23, File: 57, Telegram to Prime Minister Trudeau from UCC, 1 June 1971.
some time at the UCC head office and attend some Ukrainian national conferences.\textsuperscript{184}

Although the community had demanded an “immediate apology” from the Prime Minister for his remarks,\textsuperscript{185} the matter was resolved more amicably than initially seemed possible. After a meeting with the Prime Minister,\textsuperscript{186} the UCC representative Iaremovyvych was rather reserved at the following press conference, avoided testing questions by journalists, and stated that “perhaps some of his [Trudeau’s] statement was distorted.”\textsuperscript{187} Despite the community’s outrage, Ukrainian Canadians did not effectively influence Canada’s foreign policy. The topic of Ukrainian dissidents – with Moroz as one of the most important among them – would surface again in 1974, this time accompanied by a broad newspaper campaign and a hunger strike in front of the Soviet embassy in Ottawa. As a response, “an embarrassed government would…[instruct] Canada’s ambassador in Moscow to enquire about Moroz’s health…[however] official protests would not be made.”\textsuperscript{188} Referring to a case of Trudeau’s intervention on behalf of prospective Jewish immigrants, Nesdoly wondered in 1981 whether “Ukrainian Canadians might begin to wonder if their able efforts in the cultural and human rights fields were doomed to failure, as their campaign for Ukraine’s independence had been. They might also wonder, despite status gains made as a result of the government’s adoption of the policy of multiculturalism, if Ukrainian-Canadians were doomed to remain second-class citizens in foreign policy matters.”\textsuperscript{189} Indeed, in future years many Ukrainian Canadians would question whether multiculturalism had brought them the results they had asked for.

\textsuperscript{185} This demand had been expressed by a Winnipeg lawyer on behalf of the Ukrainian community, i.e. the UCC (LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 23, File: 57, Letter from W.M. Swystun, on behalf of the UCC Winnipeg, to Trudeau, 1 June 1971, page 1).
\textsuperscript{186} As Lupul reminisced about the meeting, “Trudeau read extracts form his earlier remarks and yielded nothing in substance on the comparisons he had drawn. He appeared genuinely concerned, however, that the Ukrainian-Canadian community was, as the memorandum put it, “deeply hurt” by his recent statements” (Lupul, \textit{The Politics}, page 165).
\textsuperscript{187} LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 49, File: 12, Press Conference held in Ottawa on Monday, June 7th, 1971, following meeting of representatives of Ukrainian Canadain [sic] Committee and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, page 1.
\textsuperscript{188} Nesdoly, “Changing Perspectives,” page 122.
\textsuperscript{189} Nesdoly, “Changing Perspectives,” pages 122, 127 FN 79.
5.2. The Implementation of the Multiculturalism Policy

When examining the implementation of the multiculturalism policy, one has to keep in mind that one cannot see the policy as a direct result of what Ukrainians in particular asked for. Nonetheless, one can draw an indirect connection between the demands made and the policy that was implemented. One of the dominating aspects of the discussion had been the language question, and it found its answer in 1969 with the Official Languages Act which made English and French the official languages in all federal institutions.190 The idea of regional languages, brought up by the Ukrainian community during the discussion, was not adopted by the Canadian government which did not guarantee the survival of any languages other than English and French. However, in 1971 the multiculturalism policy acknowledged that Canada was a bilingual country with a multicultural character. The government saw its task in assisting all groups to overcome cultural barriers so that they would have the opportunity to “share their cultural expression and values with other Canadians.” In order to reach this goal, the government would support the promotion of cultural encounters and help members of all cultural groups to acquire at least one of the official languages. Furthermore, support would be given to research proposals, art displays, and projects to fight racism.191 Comparing this policy and the first steps taken during the 1970s to the demands of the Ukrainian-Canadian community, it becomes obvious that the biggest changes and developments had taken place in the field of recognition. This was especially true for school curricula, textbooks, the media, and research on the contribution of ethnic groups to the development of the country.192 However, the new multiculturalism policy had confined the preservation of heritage to the private

190 “This legislation also created the commissioner of official languages to oversee the implementation of the law, promoted the bilingualization of federal civil service, and, most importantly, ensured that the institutions of the federal government would provide services in either French or English, depending on the consumer’s preference” (Tanguay, “The Politics,” page 150f).
191 LAC MG 31 E 55 Vol. 10, File: Secretary of State, Statement by the Prime Minister, House of Commons, 8 October 1971, pages 1-6.
sector. Groups had the chance to preserve their heritage through government programs, but they had to apply for grants and all the effort to mobilize their members had to come from within the community itself. Hence minority groups had no right to protection, only an opportunity. The multiculturalism policy did not guarantee survival for the ‘other ethnic groups’, but focused more on inter-group relationships.

At first, many Ukrainians were content with, one could even say excited about, the multiculturalism policy. First of all, something was finally implemented: it was officially stated that Canada was a multicultural country and the contribution of the other ethnic groups to Canada was officially recognized. Furthermore, the community now had the possibility of acquiring funds from outside their own community, thereby widening their opportunities for survival. On the day of Trudeau’s appearance at the UCC congress, only a day after the policy was announced, the UCPBF summoned an urgent meeting at which it was made clear that “the time is NOW for us to strike resolutions and present them to the Minister in charge because funds are available. We must look in the areas of aid for research, education and publications. The funds are there, and we must take positive steps immediately or the funds will disappear.” And indeed, the funds were not around as long as the community had hoped for. As the years went by and the make-up of Canadian society changed due to a large influx of visible minorities, the focus of multiculturalism in Canada changed as well. Combating racism and helping people to find their place in Canadian society (for example, through language courses) gained importance while cultural encounters were not a

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193 Manoly Lupul can serve as an example for the reaction to the new policy, stating in retrospection that he had been very exited once the policy was released because there finally was an answer and an answer that affirmed multiculturalism (LAC MG 31 D 58 Vol. 8, File: 17, Lupul: The Federal Government, Multiculturalism, and Education in Canada, page 1f). However, in his memoir (published in 2005), Lupul takes a more cautionary stand on his reaction to the multiculturalism policy (Lupul, The Politics, page 168f).

194 Trudeau attended the 10th Congress of the UCC only a day after the policy was announced. He had been invited to the 9th congress but had declined his participation (LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 23, File: 57, Letter from Sarchuk, Secretary General UCC, to Trudeau, 27 August 1968). Trudeau turned down the invitation with a bilingual (English/Ukrainian) telegram to the committee, which was “received by the delegates and guests of the congress with the greatest enthusiasm” (LAC MG 28 V 103 Vol. 23, File: 57, UCC to Trudeau, November 5, 1968, page 1).

195 LAC MG 31 E 55 Vol. 10, File: 2 (Multiculturalism), Ukrainian Canadian Professional and Businessmen’s Federation; Afternoon Session, 9 October 1971.
top priority any longer. Many Ukrainians were dissatisfied with these changes, especially since they meant a shortage in budgets for cultural festivals and encounters. Ukrainians were more interested in preserving the status quo, whereas the multiculturalism policy adapted to changes in Canadian society and thus shifted its focus.

6. Conclusion and Outlook

6.1. Conclusion

The 1960s were a crucial decade for Ukrainians in Canada, and three major realizations underscored this fact. First, despite a previous decade of growth and expansion, Ukrainian Canadians were faced with serious threats of assimilation, which were evident in declining knowledge of their ancestral language and shrinking participation in community organizations. Ukrainians realized that their community was at a crossroads. Without official support and some sort of recognition, the community leaders feared that ‘survival’ of the group would be impossible. Furthermore, in the overall Canadian context, Ukrainians still lagged behind in achieving higher business and managerial positions. Second, international developments, such as the Prague Spring or Trudeau’s visit to Soviet Ukraine, made them realize their powerlessness in regard to homeland issues. Third, in a Canadian context, Ukrainians faced a developing discussion on bilingualism and biculturalism. The latter turned out to be the dominant aspect for the organized community life.

During the discussion, Ukrainians argued against biculturalism (and in some cases also against bilingualism), demanding participation, recognition, and equality for the ‘other ethnic groups.’ Ukrainians wanted to be more represented in government affairs so that their concerns and wishes would be heard. They asked that the contribution of the other ethnic groups to the founding and development of Canada and their languages be recognized; and they strove for equality with the English and French-Canadians. Arguments that were used to underline these demands were the Ukrainians’ historical contribution as pioneers and the special situation in the homeland. Outwardly the multiculturalism discussion served as a

196 Burnet and Palmer, “Coming Canadians”, 226f; Avery, Reluctant Host, pages 213-218.
tool to unite the community. The organized community tried to link the experience of all Ukrainians in Canada to the settlement period of the early 20th century when Ukrainians came to the country as ‘pioneers’. However, we also have to keep in mind that many members of the first and second wave and their descendants were especially active in the debate. Due to the discussion, the focus of the community (with regard to lobbying) shifted during the 1960s. Although the community continued to submit briefs on behalf of Ukraine’s liberation and imprisoned Ukrainian writers and activists, the position of Ukrainians in the country was now at the top of the agenda. Ukrainians started to focus on their beginnings in Canada, because that was the only way they could argue for community support as a culture that was ‘rooted’ in Canada.

The multiculturalism discussion was an interactive, changing process that dominated the minds of many Ukrainian Canadians during the 1960s. The announcement of the multiculturalism policy seemed like the end of the discussion and the solution to many problems facing the non-British, non-French communities in Canada. However, the proclamation of the actual policy was only the door to the next phase, the process of implementation that had to adjust to the ever-changing realities of Canadian society. Over time, the concept of multiculturalism became an accepted part of a common Canadian identity, although it was and still is not always clear what is understood by multiculturalism. Furthermore, the discussion offered a forum for all Canadians to voice their ideas and concerns; and through the multiculturalism policy of 1971 and through sections 15 and 27 of the Canadian Charter of 1982,198 all Canadians received a legal and political framework to fight for their interests.199 Nonetheless, the multiculturalism discussion had raised hopes

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198 Section 15 stressed the “equality before and under the law…without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disabilities” and section 27 affirmed: “This Charter will be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians” (Constitution Act 1982, http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/const/annex_e.html, Stand January 22, 2006). For an implementation of the Charter, see Tanguay, “The Politics,” page 155.

199 Jean Burnet and Howard Palmer support this interpretation, stating “Multiculturalism has not made possible the preservation of cultures and languages brought to Canada from all parts of the world…Nor has multiculturalism brought about equality of opportunity for all Canadians, regardless of time of arrival, cultural and linguistic differences, and colour. But the policy would not have been proclaimed if Canada had not been moving away from its Anglo-conformist and racist past into a more egalitarian pluralism, and the policy has given impetus to that shift. It has made symbolic
and expectations in many of its participants (for example in the context of survival of language) that could not be kept. Although many Ukrainian-Canadian representatives might not have gotten what they had hoped for – they still had achieved one important thing: Canada officially became a multicultural country. It had submitted itself to an agenda that would shape the future of the country. And the Ukrainian-Canadian community had made a vital contribution to shifting the focus of the discussion from biculturalism to multiculturalism, while at the same time recapitulating their own position in the country.

6.2. Outlook

Once the multiculturalism policy was officially initiated, the major focus of the government and the Ukrainian group alike was on implementing the new guiding principle. Apart from heritage and cultural festivals, one of the biggest success stories of that decade was the establishment of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS) at the University of Edmonton in the summer of 1976, which offered an institutional framework for the improvement of Ukrainian cultural and academic studies.200 Apart from specific Ukrainian institutions, classes in Ukrainian language, literature and history were also broadened at other Canadian universities, thereby integrating Ukrainian studies into a broader Canadian academic framework.

After preliminary accomplishments in the realms of academia and education during the 1970s, Ukrainians faced some serious challenges in the following decade. In the 1980s, the majority of Ukrainians had been born in the country as members of the second and third generations, and Ontario and especially Toronto were established as the biggest magnet for Ukrainians.201 Nonetheless, Toronto – where Ukrainian life concentrated mostly around High Park or the so-called Bloor West Village – started to lose members since many Ukrainians who had prospered in the postwar period moved to suburbs such as Mississauga or Etobicoke, where

ethnicity a matter of pride, and it has given victims of discrimination arms with which to fight” (Burnet, Palmer, “Coming Canadians”, page 227f).


201 For the migration movement, see Luciuk et al., Creating a Landscape, map 13. For example, Novy Shliakh, the newspaper of the UNF, moved its headquarters to Toronto in 1977 (Bolubash, “Ukrainian Press,” page 217).
church life, for example, was continued. Nonetheless, the 1980s saw an overall decline in membership and activities as well as significant language loss within the Ukrainian-Canadian community. And although commemorations of holidays and anti-Soviet demonstrations continued, it became harder and harder to motivate the youth. One journalist of *Homin Ukrainy* lamented in the spring of 1991: “And when will our youth finally begin to take mass interest in such public manifestations? The only way Ukrainian-Canadian youth could have been drawn to Maple Leaf Gardens on May 2 is if the Maple Leafs had made it to the playoffs.”

One interviewee blamed the low numbers of motivated youth on lack of inspiration: “There is no history of Ukraine that a teenager would enjoy, no resources for inspiring, literature, arts, culture…They have an interest in their heritage, but they have nothing to feed it on. No resources to learn about their heritage.” The organized Ukrainian-Canadian community realized that they needed a specific plan to counter these assimilation tendencies because “multiculturalism policies and programs are largely insensitive to the magnitude of our problem.” The major points of criticism were that multiculturalism was not a fully developed federal policy, that it did not have enough funding, that minority groups did not have full access to agencies such as the National Art Gallery or the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and that the federal government focused on funding some ethno-cultural groups and not others (i.e. the “older ethnic groups”). However, developing an agenda to counter language and culture loss in

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204 *The Ukrainian Echo*, 29 May 1991, Less Talk, more Unity. At another incident, a journalist from *The Ukrainian Echo* criticized the Ukrainian-Canadian community for not making use of the opportunity to when Gorbachev visited Canada (*The Ukrainian Echo*, 24 June 1990, Something is rotten in the state of Denmark).
205 Interview 5.
206 Bohdan Krawchenko et al., eds., *Building the Future: Ukrainian Canadians in the 21st Century. A Report Presented to the Ukrainian Canadian Committee – National Headquarters – by the Ukrainian Community Development Committee – Prairie Region* (Edmonton 1986), quote from page 3, criticism concerning multiculturalism policy pages 22-32. This brief stressed the importance of Ukrainians as a “founding settler people,” the dangers of assimilation they faced in Canada, and suggested solutions for the future, such as strengthening local UCC branches, focusing on arts and education, and cooperation with other minority groups (Krawchenko, ed., *Building the Future*, pages 1-35). Manoly Lupul, once an adamant advocate of the multiculturalism policy, warned
the community proved to be difficult especially since the community faced a
delicate discussion concerning war criminals in Canada.

The major event that rocked the Ukrainian-Canadian community during the
1980s was the search for war criminals in Canada, which was initiated by the
“Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals” (headed by Jules Dêschenes) in the
spring of 1985. Many Ukrainians in Canada felt that their previously immaculate
record was being threatened, and especially community leaders were under the
impression that Ukrainians were singled out during the investigation. Over the next
two years, the discussion about war criminals in general and allegations against
Ukrainians in particular sparked a series of activities within the organized
community, all to ‘save the good name’ of Ukrainians in the country. Apart from
feeling singled out, Ukrainian representatives criticized the use of Soviet archival
material to investigate the issue of war criminals in Canada. For example, the Civil
Liberties Commission (CLC) was founded to represent Ukrainian Canadians before
the Dêschenes Commission. The CLC’s “underlying message was that before
Canada accused a broad section of its Ukrainian citizens of war crimes committed
outside its borders, it should examine its own actions carried out in the name of
freedom and democracy.”207 Indeed, “clearing the name of veterans of the SS
Waffên Division Galizien, and by implication all postwar Ukrainian immigrants,
consumed the nationalists, especially displaced persons immigrants in Ontario” and
thus sparked a controversial and intense discussion which eventually led to another

207 Quote from Swyripa, “The Politics of Redress,” page 362. For a selected bibliography on war
criminals and the discussion during the 1980s, see: Morris Ilyniak, “Still Coming to Terms:
Margolian, Unauthorized Entry; David Matas, (with Susan Charendoff), Justice Delayed: Nazi War
Criminals in Canada (Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1987); Harold Troper, Morton Weinfield, Old
Wounds. Jews, Ukrainians and the Hunt for Nazi War Criminals in Canada (Markham: Penguin
Books, 1989). Matas accuses the Canadian government of having harbored war criminals in their
midst, whereas Margolian comes to the conclusion that the majority of war criminals (and the
number was not so large to begin with) had been “admitted inadvertently, either as a result of the
absence of information on their wartime activities or its inaccessibility” (Margolian, Unauthorized
Entry, page 187).
topic that became the focal point for the community and academic study during the
1980s – the internment of Ukrainians during the First World War. Swyripa sees the
redress campaign for the WWI internment as being tightly linked to the movement
to counter accusations concerning war crimes. Furthermore, community activities
were sparked by the positive example of the Japanese Canadians who were
successful with their redress campaign. During the 1980s, lobbying the Canadian
government had once more diverted from the homeland itself to the situation of the
Ukrainian community in the country. All in all, the 1980s were not a pleasant
decade for Ukrainians in Canada – a trend that would at least temporarily change in
the early 1990s.

On August 24, 1991, Ukraine declared its independence, a step that was
publicly confirmed through the referendum held on December 1, 1991. These
unexpected developments sparked a wave of enthusiasm in the diaspora, and the
Canadian community was no exception to the rule. Independence affected a key
feature of the diaspora – the relationship to the homeland – and initially all of the
community’s energy and resources were focused on “how the diaspora
[can]…assist in the rebuilding of Ukraine.” However, the intense donation
drives, book fundraisers and public awareness campaigns drained the North-
American community of energy and money. And since Ukraine and its people did
not immediately turn out as the diaspora had expected, the result was frustration
within the community. For the first time in decades, Ukraine was an accessible
country and travel to one’s old homeland or the country of one’s forefathers was
possible for the diaspora. And what they encountered during their travels – an
economy in shambles, a lifestyle so different from Canada’s, and a political regime
that still featured many of the old communist guard – appalled many Ukrainian
Canadians. Furthermore, in the eyes of the Ukrainian-Canadian community, those

209 The period after independence and the reaction of the wider diaspora to independence is still a
field that needs more research. Unless otherwise indicated, the following observations are based on
Julia Lütsch, “Ethnic Identity in the Context of Homeland Perception and the Importance of
Diaspora: Reactions to the Independence of Ukraine and its Impact on the Ukrainian Diaspora in
North America, with Special Focus on Toronto.” Major Research Paper, York University, Spring
210 Ukrainian Weekly, 7 June 1992, pages 1 and 6, Ukrainian delegation from US, Canada meets
with Kravchuk.
members of the fourth wave who immigrated to Canada during the 1990s were not dedicated enough to the Ukrainian cause. The community was further disappointed to find out that many of them spoke Russian and not Ukrainian and seemed uninterested in the existing community life. Enthusiasm quickly turned into disappointment and led to a reorientation towards North American issues. The North American focus might have also had something to do with the fact that a return movement did not set in after independence. Nowadays, after almost 15 years of independence, the community has come to terms with Ukrainian independence. The orange revolution and the installment of Victor Iushchenko, a long time favorite of the Ukrainian diaspora, as President of the country also stirred enthusiasm within the community. However, the difficulties which Iushenko encountered during the fall of 2005 were once more evidence that Ukraine has more difficulties shedding its past than initially anticipated.
Chapter 7: The 1950s in Germany – the Slow Transition Process

1. Introduction

Turning our attention to the case of Ukrainians in Germany, our examination starts once again in the DP camps of the late 1940s. At this time emigration was high on the agenda of the majority of displaced persons. However, not everybody could be resettled because of the strict requirements of receiving countries such as the US, Canada, or Australia. It is generally assumed that “the most unfortunate DP’s were those remaining, who, for one reason or another, had been unacceptable for resettlement,” the so-called hard core.¹ This negative outlook is also expressed in the Ukrainian terminology. Those who stayed in Germany were labeled *zalyshentsi*² which is derived from the word *zalyshati* – to leave behind. The characteristics of this group were summarized in a report by the German Federal Ministry of Health from March 1953, which stated that those DPs who came under German administration were marked by “health or moral defects or old age.”³ As


³ Quoted in: Hans Harmens et al., *Die Integration heimatloser Ausländer und nichtdeutscher Flüchtlinge in Westdeutschland. Ergebnisse einer sozialbiologischen Strukturanalyse der 1954-55 noch in Lagern, Wohnheimen sowie in Heimen und Krankenhäusern erfaßten 53.642 nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge* (Augsburg: Hofmann Druck, 1958), page 28. For other examples that characterized the group as being dominated by old age, sickness, and invalidity, see: Bundesarchiv (hereafter BA) B150 3637 Heft 1, Alfons Makarskas, *Zum Problem der Heimatlosen Ausländer, 13 April 1951*, page 2 (Makarskas was a representative of the Lithuanian Red Cross); BA B 106 9316, Württembergisch-Badischer Städteverband (Der Geschäftsführer) an Herrn Ministerialdirektor Dr. Kitz, Bundesministerium des Innern. Betrifft: Flüchtlingswesen, endgültige Seßhaftmachung von Displaced Persons (DPs) in Deutschland bezw [sic] Württemberg Baden, 23 Mai 1950, page 1; Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (hereafter BayHStA) Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 2241, Ukrainischer Medizinischer Charitattiver Dienst, München, an das bayerische Staatsministerium des
this quote indicates, these people were usually not considered to be a contribution to Germany, but a burden. The group of former displaced persons was rather small, and therefore it is not astonishing that their transition into the German economy and society has never been studied in detail. An in-depth study of this phenomenon goes beyond the scope of this chapter, which will examine the fate of Ukrainians in Germany after 1951 in the broader context of the former displaced persons, who after April of 1951 were called homeless foreigners. What kind of measures did the government take to deal with this group and in what way did their transition into the German society and economy take place? What kind of contact existed between the German government and homeless foreigners in general and Ukrainians in particular? What was the focus of Ukrainian (organized) life in Germany during the 1950s? Chapter 7 will concentrate more on the general situation for Ukrainians in Germany, drawing primarily on the common experience of homeless foreigners and the German way of managing this group. Since homeless foreigners as a group were more prominent during the 1950s, Chapter 8 – dealing with the 1960s in Germany – will have the Ukrainian experience at the forefront. Some aspects such as political or academic activities will only be mentioned in chapter 7 and will be analyzed in depth in chapter 8 with reference to both the 1960s and 1950s.

1.1. Secondary Literature and Source Base

The fate of the homeless foreigners in Germany has not received the attention among historians that it deserves. Even books such as the article collection 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik – 50 Jahre Einwanderung, which deals extensively with the life of foreigners in Germany after the Second World War, or ground breaking studies such as Ulrich Herbert’s Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland ignore the homeless foreigners and their special fate. On the federal level, only certain aspects of the life of homeless foreigners have been examined. Wolfgang

Innern, 15 Januar 1952, page 1; Gregor Prokopchuk (Prokoptschuk), Ukrainer in der Bundesrepublik (Munich: Verlag Ukraine, 1959), page 13.

4 The term “homeless foreigner” is the direct translation of the German term Heimatlose Ausländer. Maruniak refers to the group as “stateless foreigners” (Maruniak, “Ukrainians in the Federal Republic,” page 254).

5 Jan Motte, Rainer Ohliger, and Anne von Oswald, eds., 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik – 50 Jahre Einwanderung (Frankfurt am Main, New York: Campus Verlag, 1999).

6 Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik.
Jacobmeyer and Michael Pegel give an insight into the transformation of displaced persons into homeless foreigners and their legal standing when the German government proclaimed the Homeless Foreigners Act in 1951.7 Angelika Eder examines the economic integration of homeless foreigners and shows that no systematic approach existed to address the problem of unemployment among this group. As a result, the homeless foreigners did not benefit from the economic upswing in Germany. Furthermore, Eder points out that homeless foreigners no longer appear in later employment statistics, which illustrates once more the meager source base that exists for this group.8 This is true for the field of employment, but there were other areas where the homeless foreigners, and in this context Ukrainians as well, still found a niche, as chapter 7 and 8 will demonstrate.

Not much has been written about federal measures concerning homeless foreigners, and the state of historiography is only slightly better concerning the German states’ approach to this group. Gabriele Dietz analyzes measures taken in North Rhine-Westphalia to integrate homeless foreigners and concludes that the state and federal level succeeded in integrating homeless foreigners by offering them a legal framework.9 In contrast to this, Patrick Wagner examines the fate of homeless foreigners in Hamburg and comes to the conclusion that any form of ‘integration’ was a rather half-hearted attempt by the German government.10 Stanislaus Stepien, who studies the postwar life of former Polish forced laborers in Germany, sees the displacement of this group as an alienating experience that influenced their future in the country. Due to their uprooting and the long time in the camps, these Poles became a destabilized, dissocialized group.11 Although these

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11 Stanislaus Stepien, *Der alteingesessene Fremde. Ehemalige Zwangsarbeiter in Westdeutschland* (Frankfurt am Main, New York: Campus Verlag, 1989), pages 201-258.
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sources are helpful for the broader context, it is important to note that Ukrainians do not play a prominent role in Dietz’s, Wagner’s, or Stepień’s accounts.

Since we are dealing in particular with the situation of Ukrainians in Germany in the context of homeless foreigners, literature dealing with Ukrainians in the Federal Republic of Germany is important to us. Unfortunately, not many studies exist in this field, and they are generally written by community members. In his book, Ukrains’ka Emigratsiia, Volodymyr Maruniak provides us with an overview of the developments in the Ukrainian community in Germany after the Second World War. His study, however, does not contain any footnotes or references to secondary literature and the author does not contextualize the Ukrainian experience in the broader German framework. Nonetheless, Ukrains’ka Emigratsiia is still valuable as a source of statistical information about Ukrainian organizations in Germany that only he as an insider in the community could provide. Gregor Prokopchuk (Prokoptschuk), another member of the community, outlines Ukrainian organizations in Munich and vicinity as well as Ukrainian life in Germany. Apart from these early works, Gregor Prokopchuk edited the Festschrift der Deutsch-Ukrainischen Gesellschaft, which gives an insight into the activities of the association as well as a summary of German-Ukrainian relations.

For many Ukrainians, the church was – and still is – one of the most important contributors to community development, as Bernadetta Wojtowicz has shown in her study of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Germany until the end of the 1950s. Henrike Anders supports this assessment through her analysis of the Ukrainian-Catholic parishes in Berlin, Hannover, and Hamburg-Neugraben in the postwar period. Although the church was a magnet for the homeless foreigners living in these cities and a vehicle not only of religious, but also national customs,

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13 Gregor Prokopchuk (Prokoptschuk), Ukrainer in München (Munich: Verlag Ukraine, 1958); Prokopchuk, Ukrainer in der Bundesrepublik.
15 Wojtowicz, Geschichte der Ukrainisch-Katholischen Kirche. Bernadetta Wojtowicz’s study complements this work nicely. She deals primarily with sources unearthed in church archives and newspapers such as Khrystyians’kyi Holos. Thus, Wojtowicz shows that the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Germany was particularly important in the context of coordinating charitable relief work in Germany.
many of the parishes still struggled because of shrinking memberships and difficulties in recruiting new priests. Nonetheless, due to Cardinal Iosef Slipyi’s support, Hamburg-Neugraben received a church building of its own in 1980, and Hannover as late as 1984. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union and the ensuing migrant stream from Ukraine the parishes have blossomed once more.\textsuperscript{16} Apart from the church, Ukrainian life in Germany was dominated by organizations such as the Central Representation of Ukrainian Emigration in Germany (CRUEG) or the Association of Ukrainian Women (Ob’iednannia Ukrains’kykh Zhinok, hereafter OUZh), and their publications outline the developments and activities of the community in Germany, including areas such as education.\textsuperscript{17} Furthermore, academic institutions such as the Ukrainian Free University, the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute (UTHI), or the Shevchenko Society were influential factors in Germany; and a variety of background literature – often including primary sources – put out by the institutions themselves is available.\textsuperscript{18}

The primary source base for this chapter is broad and varied. The starting point is the Federal Archive in Koblenz which houses the records of the Federal Ministry of Expellees, Refugees and War Victims (Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, hereafter Ministry of Expellees or BMVt), which was responsible for the homeless foreigners as well as the German expellees, as well as records of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesinnenministerium), the Federal President’s Office (Bundespräsidialamt), the Federal Agency for Inner German Affairs (Bundesanstalt für gesamtdeutsche Fragen), and the Office for Issues Relating to the Occupation (Institut für Besatzungsfragen). In these records, one can find internal discussions concerning homeless foreigners within the respective ministries as well as correspondence with Ukrainian and other organizations of

\textsuperscript{16} Anders, \textit{Ukrainisch-katholische Gemeinden}.
\textsuperscript{17} Zelenets'kyi, \textit{Na hromads'kii nyvi}; Rebet, \textit{35 rokiv}; Kosak, \textit{5O-littia}.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ukrainian Free University. Short Review} (Munich: Ukrainian Free University, 1958); Volodymyr Ianiv (Wolodymyr Janiw), \textit{Rolle und Aufgabe der Ukrainischen Freien Universität in der Gegenwart} (Sonderdruck aus: \textit{Mitteilungen der Arbeits- und Förderungsgemeinschaft der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften e.V.} 5 (1968); Volodymyr Ianiv, \textit{Ukrainische Freie Universität} (München, 1976); Hryhorii Komaryns'kyi, “50-rokiv Ukrains’koho tekhnichno-hospodars'koho Instytutu Bavaria (Nimechchyna),” \textit{Naukovi Zapysky} XXX (1995), 6-19; \textit{30 Jähriges Jubiläum der Ukrainischen Technischen Hochschule im Ausland} (Sonderdruck aus: \textit{Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart} 3 (Juli-September 1952)).
homeless foreigners. Publications by the Ministry of Expellees,\textsuperscript{19} a government guide for homeless foreigners from 1953 (second edition 1958), and legal commentaries of that period are important in the context of the Homeless Foreigners Act of 1951,\textsuperscript{20} a law that regulated the status of this group in Germany. Since there are no recent studies available that deal with the integration of homeless foreigners, we have to consider some contemporaneous reports. A good example is Hans Harmsen’s “social-biological analysis” that provides a wealth of statistical material as well as suggestions for integration measures for the homeless foreigners who still lived in camps in the mid-1950s.\textsuperscript{21}

Apart from the federal level, Bavaria as a state is of particular interest, because the majority of homeless foreigners in general and Ukrainians in particular lived here.\textsuperscript{22} The records of the State Refugee Administration (Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung) and the Bavarian Minister-President’s Office (Staatskanzlei) as well as publications of the Ministry of the Interior (Innenministerium)\textsuperscript{23} give us an insight into the state’s approach to handling homeless foreigners. All these sources were obtained at the Bavarian Central State

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{20}] BMVt, Ratgeber für heimatlose Ausländer und sonstige Flüchtlinge. Rechte und Pflichten nach der Internationalen Konvention über die Rechtsstellung der Flüchtlinge vom 28. Juli 1951 und dem Gesetz über die Rechtsstellung heimatloser Ausländer im Bundesgebiet vom 25. April 1951. Second edition (Bonn: BMVt, 1958). The first edition from 1953 was not available to the author; however, information about the initial version of the guide was found in the federal archives in Koblenz (BA B150 4201 Heft 1 and 2). For commentaries regarding the law see for example: Alexander N. Makarov, “Das internationale Flüchtlingsrecht und die Rechtsstellung heimatloser Ausländer nach dem Bundesgesetz vom 25. April 1951,” Zeitschrift für ausländisches und öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 14 (3) (1952), 431-462.
\item[\textsuperscript{21}] Harmsen, Die Integration heimatloser Ausländer.
\item[\textsuperscript{22}] In 1953, 240,000 homeless foreigners and foreign refugees were listed in Germany, 70,000 of them lived in Bavaria (BA B 106 9916, Kleine Anfrage 80 der Abgeordneten Dr. Rinke, Schütz und Genossen, Deutscher Bundestag, 2. Wahlperiode 1953). According to a report by Dr. Kaye, in 1955 22,000 Ukrainians lived in Germany, and 12,000 of them in Bavaria (LAC RG 26 Vol. 110, File: Report on the visit to Germany, Kaye: Report on the visit to Germany, Austria, Trieste and Italy, 14 November to 14 December 1955, page 35.) This trend continued; according to Maruniak, in 1965 20,097 Ukrainians lived in Germany, 8,705 (or 44%) of them in Bavaria (Volodyymyr Marunik, Tom II, page 14).
\item[\textsuperscript{23}] Theodor Oberländer, Bayern und sein Flüchtlingsproblem (Munich: Staatsministerium des Innern, 1953).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
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Archive (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, hereafter BayHStA). The Ukrainian perspective is represented through issues of *Shliakh Peremohy* (1954-1959), the newspaper of the OUN (B) in Germany. Interviews with community members in Munich, pamphlets and publications of community organizations, and the abovementioned secondary literature supplement the source base for the Ukrainian angle. In addition, reports submitted to the Canadian government by a Ukrainian-Canadian mission that traveled through Germany in the 1950s to inspect the camps offer a different perspective of the situation. Together with reports and recommendations from the UNHCR as well as the IRO they confront us with an outsider’s critical perspective of what was going on in Germany during that decade.

The source base is dominated by German and international sources, simply because many Ukrainian sources were inaccessible to the author. Furthermore, the archives in Munich and Koblenz do not have Ukrainian-specific source-collections like the ones housed at the Library and Archives Canada. Thus the sources available reflect only a certain perspective. We get a glimpse into developments specific to the Ukrainian case through the abovementioned community publications, through *Shliakh Peremohy*, and through interviews. However, some general aspects of life will be examined in the wider context of the homeless foreigners because Ukrainians were part of this bigger group. By looking at general measures taken by the German government towards homeless foreigners we get an idea of what life was like for Ukrainians as well.

1.2 Terminology and Outline

Dealing with the topic of Ukrainians in Germany in the 1950s, we have to be aware of the terminology that was used at the time and that which is applied nowadays. In academic studies, homeless foreigners are sometimes referred to as refugees or displaced persons even after their status had officially changed in 1951, a trend that also became apparent in government correspondence of the time. In the early

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24 LAC RG 26 Vol. 110, File: Report on the visit to Germany, Kaye: Report on the visit to Germany, Austria, Trieste and Italy, 14 November to 14 December 1955.
25 Which are mostly from the Federal Archive in Koblenz.
26 For example, at the time of research the archives of the Ukrainian Free University were reorganized, making direct access to the sources impossible.
27 See for example: Dietz-Görrig. *Displaced Persons*. The following are selected examples from correspondence, see for example: BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1908, Dr. K. Winkler:
1950s, the German government had to deal with all kinds of refugees, and the
terminology was not always specific. The problem is further intensified since the
terminology has to be translated into English. In this work Ukrainians and all those
foreigners who fell under the category of IRO refugees (or equivalent, as explained
in section 2.1.) will be called by their legal status after 1951 – homeless foreigners
(Heimatlose Ausländer). In referring to the period before 1951, they will be called
displaced persons. All those Germans who had fled from territories that were under
“foreign occupation“ after 1945 (Status: borders of 31.12.1937) or who had come
from foreign countries due to the war are called expellees (Heimatvertriebene). All
those Germans who fled from the Soviet occupied zone after 1945 are called
refugees (Flüchtlinge28). This categorization is in accordance with the official
definition given by the Ministry of Expellees.29 All those foreigners who fled to
Germany from the Eastern Bloc (for example, Hungarians in 1956) will be referred
to as foreign refugees (ausländische Flüchtlinge). It is important to keep these
differences in mind, because often the term ‘refugees’ was applied to all of these
groups interchangeably. This is why one can easily get the impression that there is
a lot of information pertaining to the situation of homeless foreigners in Germany
after the end of the war; however, on second glance it often turns out to be
literature that deals mostly with the fate of expellees.30 Although this chapter
focuses on homeless foreigners with special reference to the Ukrainian case, the
broader framework of expellees, refugees, and foreign refugees will be taken into

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28 Sometimes they were also called migrants/immigrants (Zugewanderte) in German. See for
example: Oberländer, Die Überwindung, p. 43, FN 2; Dietz-Görrig, Displaced Persons.
29 Lothar Wieland, Das Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte
(Frankfurt am Main, Bonn: Athenäum Verlag, 1968), page 24.
30 Often expellees were also called refugees, a fact that contributes to the confusion. See for
example: Die Flüchtlinge in der britischen Zone (Lemgo: Zentralamt für Arbeit in der Britischen
Zone, 1948). The article collection Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in der westdeutschen
Nachkriegsgeschichte also contains several contributions were the terms Flüchtling and Vertriebene
are used interchangeably (Rainer Schulze et al, eds, Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in der
westdeutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte. Bilanzierung der Forschung und Perspektiven für die
zukünftige Forschungsarbeit (Hildesheim: Verlag August Lax, 1987)); Oberländer, Bayern.
consideration when necessary, especially in the context of government policies.

First this chapter gives a short overview of the law of 1951 and the legal status of homeless foreigners in Germany, followed by an outline of their living situation, the camp abolishment program, and government support for this group. Ukrainians will feature as the main example in all of these parts. The fifth part will analyze aspects specific to the Ukrainian case. All strands are brought together in the final part, the conclusion.

2. The ‘Official’ Transition into the German Economy and Society

As elaborated in chapter 2, the German authorities had neither administrative nor police authority over the displaced persons while they were still under UNRRA or IRO care. However, the German administration was very much interested in receiving such powers because it was convinced that this would be the only way to handle problems such as the black market situation or foreign criminality – aspects that were high on the government agenda because the image of displaced persons was still predominantly negative.31 Gaining control of the camps also meant being able to utilize them for other government purposes.32 The growing German interest in receiving control over the DPs coincided with a search for a solution to the DP problem by the international community. At the end of the 1940s, the IRO and allied authorities realized that not all DPs would be able to emigrate, and they saw a solution to this problem in the permanent settlement of displaced persons in Germany. This step required a rapid transition to German administration, which was scheduled for 1950/51. The IRO was to continue the care for those DPs who were in the process of resettlement. All others were to pass into the German administration, a process that was to be regulated between the allied authorities and the respective German states.33 However, in order to safeguard the legal, political, social, and economic future of the DPs, the allied authorities reserved some control over this transition process. For example, a law that would regulate the status of displaced persons in Germany was a prerequisite for the implementation of the

32 BA B 106 9316, Der Schleswig Holsteinische Ministerpräsident an den Bundesarbeitsminister, das BMI, das BMVt, Kiel, 2 Juni 1950, page 2.
33 For an example of the state of Hamburg, see Wagner, *Displaced Persons*, 61-66. See also Stepien, *Der alteingesessene Fremde*, page 204.
German treaty \((\text{Deutschlandvertrag})\).\(^{34}\) In a nutshell, the German government had to find a solution for the DP problem that was satisfactory to the allied authorities to receive sovereignty.\(^{35}\)

### 2.1. The Homeless Foreigners Act

In early 1951, the Foreigner Police Decree (\(\text{Ausländerpolizeiverordnung (AVPO)}\)) from 1938 was revived in order to re-establish a tool for the federal government to deal with and control foreigners in the country.\(^{36}\) However, since the former displaced persons were protected by the international community, they had to receive special status in Germany. A law was devised to address this issue, and the Homeless Foreigners Act (hereafter HFA) came into force on April 25, 1951.\(^{37}\) The law defined as homeless foreigners all those people who could prove that they had been under IRO care, that they were not Germans, and that they had been on the territory of the FRG (including West Berlin) on June 30, 1950. However, other foreign refugees could be included in this status by the government,\(^{38}\) and in 1953 the Federal Minister of the Interior officially put all those foreign refugees who had been on German territory before June 30, 1950 and fulfilled the other conditions on a par with homeless foreigners, even if they had not been under IRO care.\(^{39}\) The HFA put homeless foreigners on a par with Germans in the areas of acquisition of property, freedom of movement, school system, taking and acknowledgement of exams, exercise of free-lance professions, exercise of salaried professions, social and unemployment insurance, labor welfare, public welfare, as well as taxation.

\(^{34}\) The Deutschlandvertrag, which was drafted in 1952 and implemented in 1955, ended the Allied occupation and further regulated relations between Germany and France, Great Britain, as well as the US.


\(^{37}\) The full version of the law can be found in: “Gesetz über die Rechtsstellung heimatloser Ausländer im Bundesgebiet vom 25. April 1951,” \textit{Zeitschrift für ausländisches und öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht} 14 (1951/52), 544-548. There were many legal commentaries on this law, see for example: Makarov, “Das internationale Flüchtlingsrecht.”

\(^{38}\) “Gesetz über die Rechtsstellung” §1 und § 2 \textit{(Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht} 14 (1951/52), page 544f.

\(^{39}\) Oberländer, \textit{Bayern}, page 6. See also: BA B 106 24935, Schreiben von Dr. Riedel an den Zentralrat der Nationalkomitees ausländischer Flüchtlinge in Deutschland e.V. zu Händen des Vorsitzenden Pirkmajer, 29 August 1955.
The government could only expel homeless foreigners for reasons of public safety; and homeless foreigners could not be deported to a country where they would have to fear political persecution. On the other hand, this group was not to be prohibited from emigrating or returning to their homeland. Applications for naturalization had to take the ‘special fate’ of homeless foreigners into consideration. The state governments were responsible for carrying out the law and taking appropriate measures to integrate homeless foreigners into the German economy.40

The law turned out to be broader than the German government had initially intended, and this fact is attributed to Allied pressure and demands made by the national committees. However, despite the abovementioned provisions, the status of the homeless foreigners was not equal to that of the expellees, who enjoyed special benefits thanks to emergency aid and equalization of burdens programs.41 Furthermore, homeless foreigners faced restrictions on the founding of political organizations, and they also needed special permission for street sales42 – a provision that can probably be attributed to the government’s fear of black market activities. In addition to the Homeless Foreigners Act, the German government also agreed to the permanent presence of a UNHCR representative in Germany, whose task it was to look after the refugees and homeless foreigners and give assistance if needed.43 Although the HFA placed homeless foreigners under German administration, the international community continued to monitor the situation in Germany. However, the most important step had been taken, and in the beginning the law received mostly positive reviews.

In assessing the HFA, the German government stressed the liberal character of the law, stating that “with regard to foreign affairs the law gained unanimous recognition, because there is no state in the world that could exhibit an accordingly liberal refugee law. Therefore it contributed to the reduction of prejudices and

41 Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, pages 218-231. For an example of lobbying efforts of the National Committees with the Federal Government see: BA B150 3637 Heft 1, Brief von Dr. Grau an den Bundesminister für Vertriebene, 24 November 1950.
42 Gesetz über die Rechtsstellung, §13,1 und §17,2 (Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 14 (1951/52), page 546f.
43 BMVt, Der Ratgeber, page 3f.
resentment.”\textsuperscript{44} And indeed, at first the HFA was well received internationally. The UNHCR stated that this law provided a “clear and satisfying legal basis“ for the integration of the homeless foreigners,\textsuperscript{45} and even the IRO, which had felt left out during the negotiations concerning the new law, appraised it positively, stating that it was probably the best solution they could achieve under the circumstances.\textsuperscript{46} These positive comments should not divert attention from the fact that the act was soon criticized, especially in regard to its implementation. The IRO, for example, expressed its disapproval of the act only half a year after its initiation. According to the organization, the equality of treatment that had been one of the aims of the law was not being realized. Apart from demanding compensation for former Concentration Camp inmates, the IRO further pointed out injustices especially on local administrative levels – for example lack of job placement for homeless foreigners, high rent, difficulties of communication (for example in courts), and no accreditation for DP doctors.\textsuperscript{47} Vernant affirmed this point of view, stating that the weak spot was not the law itself, but discriminatory practices especially on lower administrative levels.\textsuperscript{48} Institutions such as the UNHCR, national committees, or Red Cross committees joined in the criticism, citing cases of discrimination where children had not been accepted in German schools, homeless foreigners had been refused in hospitals or had experienced rejections from banks when it came to granting loans.\textsuperscript{49} Further flaws became apparent in the application of the law, for

\textsuperscript{44} BA B 150 3531 Heft 2, Gesetz über die Rechtsstellung heimatloser Ausländer im Bundesgebiet (Haus1G) vom 25. April 1951 (BGBl I S. 269) (Abschrift rumgeschickt am 23 Dezember 1966), page 2. For a similarly positive judgment see: Bundesminister für Vertriebene, \textit{Vertriebene}, page 9. State governments, for example the Bavarian one, also stressed the liberal character of the law, see for example: BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1891, Niederschrift über die Sitzung vom 6/7 Juni 1955, auf der Fragen der Eingliederung der heimatlosen Ausländer und nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge beraten wurden. Zur Frage der nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge in der souverären Bundesrepublik, page 3.

\textsuperscript{45} BA B 106 9919, Übersetzung, Aide-Memoire des Hohen Kommissars für Flüchtlinge der Vereinten Nationen über die Lage der Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, die dem Mandat seiner Dienststelle unterstellt sind, Genf, 19 Januar 1954, page 3.

\textsuperscript{46} Jacobmeyer, \textit{Vom Zwangsarbeiter}, page 228; Pegel, \textit{Fremdarbeiter}, page 80.

\textsuperscript{47} BA B 150 3637 Heft 1, MID vom 5.10.51, Nr. 40, Bonn. Ausländer fühlen sich benachteiligt (this letter refers to a report filed by the IRO); BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, Dr. von Hoffmann, Vermerk, 17 April 1952, page 2. For an elaboration of the issue of compensation and the difficulties with which the former displaced persons were faced, see Pegel, \textit{Fremdarbeiter}, pages 92-125.

\textsuperscript{48} Vernant cited in Pegel, \textit{Fremdarbeiter}, page 80f.

\textsuperscript{49} For criticism by the UNHCR (stating the homeless foreigners did not receive the same kind of help as expellees), see for example: BA B 106 9919 Übersetzung, Aide-Memoire des Hohen Kommissars für Flüchtlinge der Vereinten Nationen über die Lage der Flüchtlinge in der
example in the realm of education – the matter of school attendance as well as the acknowledgment of exams had not been satisfyingly regulated.\(^{50}\) Despite criticisms and evident flaws, the HFA continued to provide the basis for a future treatment of the former displaced persons.

### 2.2. The Change in Terminology through the Homeless Foreigners Act

Apart from defining the legal status of homeless foreigners, the HFA also brought a change in terminology, one of the most important aspects of the law as Jacobmeyer points out.\(^{51}\) The former displaced persons were now called homeless foreigners; and in the eyes of many German politicians and legal commentators they had become political refugees. In retrospect the German government stated: “In 1950 the Federal Republic of Germany took over the responsibility for those people who had neither returned to their homeland of their own free will nor had emigrated to another country and who therefore now wanted to live in the FRG as political refugees.”\(^{52}\) This change in terminology was often justified by arguing that there were not many former forced laborers left among the group of homeless foreigners, that their status had changed due to the onset of the Cold War, and that their unwillingness to return to their respective homelands had annulled their status as displaced persons.\(^{53}\) Unfortunately, there are not many statistics available which

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\(^{50}\) BMVt, *Der Ratgeber für heimatlose Ausländer*, 26 (§15); BA B 106 9916, An Abteilung V z.H. des Ministerialrates Scheffler, Betrifft kulturelle Lage der heimatlosen Ausländer, 28 April 1952, page 1f; BA B150 3531 Heft 2, Vermerk, Betrifft Gleichwertigkeit solcher Prüfungen, die heimatlose Ausländer in ihren Heimatländern abgelegt haben, 21 Oktober 1955. As Harmsen pointed out, initially the children of homeless foreigners were not subject to compulsory school attendance; their school attendance was voluntary and therefore not always regulated (Harmsen, *Integration*, page 57). As late as 1960, school attendance was not compulsory for homeless foreigners in the states of Baden-Württemberg, Saarland, and North Rhine-Westphalia (BA B 106 25402, Granzow an den Bundesminister für Vertriebene, 19 Dezember 1960).


\(^{52}\) *Die Betreuung der Vertriebenen, Flüchtlinge*, page 26.

\(^{53}\) See for example: Harmsen, *Die Integration*, pages 15f, 23; BA B 106 9916, Schreiben vom Staatsministerium Stuttgart an Bundeskanzler, BMI, BMVt, 25 Oktober 1950, page 1; Makarov,
could shed light on the proportion of former forced laborers among the group of homeless foreigners. According to a survey by the Federal Statistical Office from 1953, 40.5% of homeless foreigners belonged to the group of “displaced persons,” the rest was composed of newly born children, other foreign refugees, foreigners who had already sought asylum in another country, foreigners who had left Germany in between, and German women who had married a “foreign DP.”

Even if responsibility on part of the federal government for the fate of these people was acknowledged, it was still seen as “reduced responsibility” due to the fact that “these people stayed in Germany of their own free will.” The HFA thus became a deliberate break with the Nazi past, an attempt to cut ties with a dark chapter of German history.

The majority of the German administration did not see the homeless foreigners as victims of the Nazi regime who deserved compensation, as the following example aptly illustrates. The Bavarian State Refugee Administration stated in reference to anti-German behavior in camps that were predominantly inhabited by homeless foreigners:

“The manners of all camp inmates show that they are guided by a wrong [vision], that is to say they feel as victims of the Nazi state. Their manifold demands went so far that they did not only see care for them, but also the allocation of clothing as mandatory tasks that formed part of the compensation for what they had allegedly lost due to the Nazi state. If such demands were rejected, they would become radical, use insulting terms and would sometimes get aggressive…”

In general, studies concerning displaced persons as a group or Ukrainians in particular end with 1951, the year the displaced persons officially received legal

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“Das internationale Flüchtlingsrecht,” pages 436, 441; Wieland, *Das Bundesministerium für Vertriebene*, page 37f. For an in-depth analysis of Eberhard Jahn’s *DP Problem*, which also fits this category, see Michael Pegel, *Fremdarbeiter*, pages 81-89.

54 Stepien, *Der alteingesessene Fremde*, page 225f.


56 This argument is also emphasized by Pegel (*Fremdarbeiter*) and by Wagner (*Displaced Persons*). Wagner, for example, states that especially during the early 1950s Germans did not want to be confronted with the Nazi past, and foreigners – especially those recognizable as former forced laborers – were often seen as an unwelcome reminder of the past (Wagner, *Displaced Persons*, page 80f).

57 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 687, Drescher an die Bayerische Staatskanzlei, 17 August 1950. V 8a 8063,9 II 26308.
status in Germany. This date implies a break with the past, a change in status and therefore life for the people who were now called homeless foreigners. However, for many of them the actual transition did not come in 1951, but rather between 1951 and 1955, when the German government finally took the issue of camp abolition seriously. Thus in the early 1950s, the homeless foreigners were faced with many challenges and a rather lengthy transition process. Those who managed to establish themselves often worked in areas other than their qualifications and had a difficult time competing with German expellees and refugees. But for many others life was even harder because it did not offer a break with the reality of camp life.

3. The ‘Unofficial’ Transition into the German Economy and Society

3.1 The Persistence of Camp Life

One has to be aware that the official change in the German legislation did not mean an instant break with the reality of camp life for many homeless foreigners. Although some camps were abolished soon after the HFA was enacted, not all their inhabitants were able to start a ‘normal’ life in Germany. For many, a frustrating process of transfers started. As local studies have shown, those camps that were not abolished often had to admit additional residents from other camps, which could lead to overcrowding. In other cases, homeless foreigners – or expellees and refugees for that matter – were relocated in settlements, but their space in the camps was immediately filled again by new refugees and people from other camps. In the eyes of the National Catholic Welfare, the shift from camp to camp wasted much time and energy and dispirited the inhabitants. Generally, the

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58 Stepien, *Der alteingesessene Fremde*, pages 230-235 (many homeless foreigners found a niche working for the US military, one of the major employer for this group).
59 Continuing camp life was a reality for many people in postwar Germany, as a study by Mathias Beer has shown (Mathias Beer, “Lager als Lebensform in der deutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft. Zur Neubewertung der Funktion der Flüchtlingswohnlager im Eingliederungsprozeß,” in *50 Jahre Bundesrepublik*, ed. Motte, 56-75).
61 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 434, Auszug aus Ministerialamtsblatt Nr. 39, 1 Dezember 1951, page 593; See for example: BA B 150 4703 Heft 3, Regierungsrat Dr. Walsdorff im Ministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und Vertriebene, Die Lager Schleswig Holsteins im Jahr 1954, page 2f.
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atmosphere as well as the living conditions in the camps cannot be compared to the peak of UNRRA care in 1946/47. As chapter 2 has shown, at that time camps in Germany were vibrant places of learning, living, and recreation, centers of hope for a better future – a hope that was tightly connected to emigration. Many of those who could not emigrate with the masses were trapped in a stagnating camp structure, unable to organize a life in the German economy for themselves. If there was movement immediately after the initiation of the HFA, it was rather backward than forward as a closer examination of the camps shows.

In many ways testimonies concerning the camps in the early 1950s resemble those from the immediate postwar period, when administrators were often overburdened by the tasks that awaited them. As an observer of the situation remarked in 1951: “I see from month to month, from week to week and from day to day how the care for the remaining homeless foreigners gets harder and harder. Visiting the camps for foreigners one sees more and more misery, desperation, hopelessness, and helplessness where once was vital life.” In October 1951, John Schmidt, Senior Representative of the Lutheran World Federation, made it clear to John McCloy, the US High Commissioner, that the conditions in Western Germany were not approaching normality as McCloy had assumed, but rather that “unemployment, lack of housing and slow starvation are still a reality for a very large percentage” of these people. 6,000 jobs had been tied to the IRO and were lost due to the transition into the German economy, which was a major setback for the group of homeless foreigners. In addition, those camps that came under German administration were entirely run by Germans, leaving the homeless foreigners with little influence over their daily lives. And the management of the camps was not particularly successful. The IRO reported in the early 1950s that standards of food intake were particularly low once the camps had come under

61 BA B 150 3637 Heft 1, Alfons Makarskas, Zum Problem der Heimatlosen Ausländer, 13 April 1951, page 2f.
64 BA B 150 3637 Heft 1, John Schmidt, Lutheran World Federation, to John McCloy, US High Commissioner, 31 October 1951.
65 BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, Bericht an den Hochkommissar für Flüchtlinge Herrn Dr. van Heuven-Goedhart über die Eingliederung nichtdeutscher Flüchtlinge in das deutsche Wirtschaftsleben von Dr. B. Lincke (Zürich), 8 Januar 1952, page 8.
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German administration. Apart from the food situation, other aspects also recalled the desperate situation that had existed in the summer of 1945. Reports complained that there were not enough priests for all national groups to ensure religious care in the camps. And these priests were badly needed because camp inhabitants suffered from depression, frustration, and lethargy caused by a monotonous life without many creative outlets and a dwindling hope of escaping the situation through emigration. Suggestions to install workshop facilities or common kitchens in the camps indicate that the standard of living had declined in comparison to the height of UNRRA and IRO care when these kinds of services had been widespread.

The desperate economic situation drove many homeless foreigners to seek help from within their group. For example, the Ukrainian Medical Charitable Services noted a considerable rise in the number of needy petitioners once the IRO had pulled out of Germany. Part of the reason was the fact that those who were left in the camps were mostly old or sick and therefore unable to work, which left an overall impression of despair on outside observers. And those who were not old and sick often did not fare much better, because problems arose especially in the realm of schooling. Many camp schools and kindergartens had to be shut down because there were not enough pupils to keep them running, but this did not necessarily mean that the remaining children received access to German institutions. Once more, camp officials considered erecting “emergency schools”

67 See for example: BA B 150 3637 Heft 1, IRO, Food Standards in Camps and Institutions under German Administration, 10 August 1951, page 1f.
68 From the Ukrainian (Catholic) group, the majority of priests emigrated between 1948 and 1952, leaving only 20 in Germany (Wojtowicz, Geschichte, pages 70, 78-87).
69 BA B 106 9916 National Catholic Welfare Conference: Service to the Residual DPs of the US Zone in Germany. Zusammenfassung der Berichte über die Monate November/Dezember 1950 und Januar/Februar 1951, pages 1-9; BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, J.B.Konchius, National President of the United Lithuanian Relief Fund of America, an Lukascheck, Oktober 1952, pages 1-6; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1892/I, National Catholic Welfare Conference, Service to the Residual DPs in the US Zone, Bericht für die Monate August bis Dezember 1951; Stepien, Der alteingesessene Fremde, page 233f. Camp institutions such as schools or hospitals were often lost through abolishment or merger of camps (Jacobmeyer, Vom Zwangsarbeiter, page 223).
70 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 2241, National Catholic Welfare Conference, Service to the Residual DPs in the US Zone, 15 Januar 1952, page 2.
71 Stepien, Der alteingesessene Fremde, pages 225-230. For a local example see: BA B 150 4703 Heft 3, Regierungsrat Dr. Walsdorff im Ministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und Vertriebene, Die Lager Schleswig Holsteins im Jahr 1954, page 12f.
(“Notschulen”) in the remaining camps to ensure some kind of education. In a nutshell, many observers judged that the situation had gotten worse after the IRO had left, and the former displaced persons were once again faced with a struggle for food, recreation, education, and (mental) health.

The deterioration of living standards was also observed in the Ukrainian case. Dariia Rebet points out that although life in the DP camps had been hard, especially during the early stages, in a way it had been complete. A mix of generations, the presence of entire families as well as qualified personnel had facilitated a rich community life. Once the active and mostly young part of the community had emigrated, the situation for those “left behind” was worse than ever. And it was difficult for many of the community organizations to continue to extend relief to their members because they themselves were struggling, having lost a considerable part of their financial basis due to the monetary reform. In 1948, the monetary reform introduced the German Mark to spur an economic upswing. For a short period of time, the old Reichsmarks could be converted into German Marks at a ratio of 10:1 (historians have proven that the money was actually converted at a ratio of 10:0.65). All those people and institutes who had no property to rely on were the ‘losers’ in the reform, and Ukrainians (as members of the homeless foreigners) suffered even more because they were not eligible for any compensation or any money distributed through the equalization of burdens programs. In retrospect community leaders criticized the lack of foresight displayed by the postwar Ukrainian community that was stationed in Germany. As

72 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1854, Stellungnahme von Maurer zum Bericht der Regierung von Oberbayern vom 22.8.1952 (28 August 1952); BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1856, Maurer, Stellungnahme des Sachgebietes 8b, 24 November 1952 (more correspondence concerning the schooling issue can be found in folder 1856). The matter of schooling was quite important, especially when considering that there were still 9,400 children in the camps as of June 30, 1955 (Stepien, Der alteingesessene Fremde, page 244).
73 Rebet, “Roky zanepadu,” page 44f.
76 Zelenets’kyi, Na hromads’kii nyvi, page 44. For financial difficulties of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, which only really improved after 1957, see Wojtowicz, Geschichte, pages 87-95.
Volodymyr Ianiv, long time head of the Ukrainian Free University, pointed out in 1982, the community in the early postwar period had “missed the opportunity to secure the economic basis for future work of the existing institutions, for example through acquisition of suitable premises, which would have been absolutely possible under the circumstances of the time.”\textsuperscript{77} The monetary reform, the lack of resources, and the continuing decline in its membership posed a serious threat to the Ukrainian community in Germany during the early 1950s. Therefore it is not astonishing that these years of the transition are usually labeled a ‘time of crisis’ in the Ukrainian discourse.\textsuperscript{78} Since the Ukrainians were no exception among the group of homeless foreigners, finding a solution for this situation became more and more pressing for the federal government as the years went by.

3.2. Abolishing the Camps

As time went by, the living conditions in the camps deteriorated markedly,\textsuperscript{79} and the authorities could not help but realize that they had to get the inhabitants out of the camps as quickly as possible. The old and sick were to be put up in retirement or nursing homes, while the rest was “to be absorbed into the German population through employment,”\textsuperscript{80} because the Minister of Expellees realized that there was some potential in the camps that was simply “lying idle.”\textsuperscript{81} Since homeless foreigners and foreign refugees were often combined in federal and state statistics, it is hard to obtain accurate numbers on either group.\textsuperscript{82} Nonetheless, preliminary figures can still give us an impression of the dimension of the problem. The


\textsuperscript{78} Zelenets’kyi, Na hromads’kій nyvi, pages 36-38. Maruniak points out that the 1950s were a period of severe crisis for UFU (Maruniak, Tom II, page 32); Komaryns’kyi, “50-rokiv,” pages 6-19.

\textsuperscript{79} BA B 150 4701 Heft 1, Nahm an die Landesflüchtlingsverwaltungen, 11 August 54, page 1f; BA B 150 4703 Heft 3, Regierungsrat Dr. Walsdorff im Ministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und Vertriebenen, Die Lager Schleswig Holsteins im Jahr 1954, pages 10-13. For a particular example of a camp in Hamburg, see Wagner, Displaced Persons, pages 66-71 (Wagner gives the example of the camp “Zoo” in Hamburg. During the early 1950s, nothing was invested into the camp because the authorities wanted to get rid of it as quickly as possible in order to convert the premises into an exhibition place. Since the camp was not properly maintained, the barracks were inadequately heated, the houses were rotting, and the sanitary equipment was simply appalling).

\textsuperscript{80} BA B 106 9916, Entwurf, Bundesminister des Innern, Ref. MR Dr. Scheffler, an den Bundesminister der Finanzen, 20 Januar 1951, page 1.

\textsuperscript{81} BA B 106, 9916, Der Bundesminister für Vertriebenen (im Auftrag gezeichnet Middelmann) an den Bundesminister für Wohnungsbau, BM des Innern, BM der Finanzen, 4 August 1953.

\textsuperscript{82} Stepien, Der alteingesessene Fremde, page 225.
Ministry of Expellees estimated in the spring of 1952 that there were between 150,000 and 180,000 homeless foreigners in Germany, of whom 45,000 (between one third and one fourth) were still residing in camps.\textsuperscript{83} Other reports from the same year estimated that there were 55,000 homeless foreigners in the camps;\textsuperscript{84} and in February 1953 the number of homeless foreigners in the camps was given as 28,578.\textsuperscript{85} However, in 1954 the number of foreign refugees and homeless foreigners in Germany was given with 240,000, with 37,000 of them living in camps.\textsuperscript{86} These figures indicate that the proportion of homeless foreigners still residing in camps was significant and virtually stagnant for the three years following the enactment of the HFA.

In theory, emptying the camps seemed a simple enough solution; however, the abolition of the camps and the transition of their inhabitants into the German economy did not go as smoothly as hoped for. Authorities soon understood that “the integration of these foreigners causes greatest difficulties” because they were often unable to build a lasting existence for themselves.\textsuperscript{87} The situation was further complicated through the fact that homeless foreigners and foreign refugees were by far not the only group that occupied camp space. The abolition of the camps took a long time because the German government had to deal with a constant stream of new refugees from the Soviet occupied zone that augmented the already existing group of expellees and refugees. In 1953, there were approximately 200,000 homeless foreigners in Germany, but 8.2 million expellees and 1.8 million refugees.\textsuperscript{88} Furthermore, the number of expellees, refugees, and homeless

\textsuperscript{83} BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, Wussow: Struktur, Eingliederungsstand und Eingliederungsaussichten der nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge, 5 November 1952, page 1.
\textsuperscript{84} BA B 106 9916, Niederschrift über die interministerielle Besprechung am 13.5.1952 im Bundesministerium für Vertriebene über die Umsiedlung heimatloser Ausländer.
\textsuperscript{85} BA B 106 9916, BMVt an Bundesminister für Wohnungsbau, 4 August 1953, page 2.
\textsuperscript{86} BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1891, Prof. Dr. Otmar Pirkmajer, Zur Frage der wirtschaftlichen Eingliederung der Nicht-Deutschen Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 8 März 1954, page 3f; BA B 106 9916, Kleine Anfrage 80 der Abgeordneten Dr. Rinke, Schütz und Genossen, 19 Juni 1954. Lower Saxony led the statistics with 11,410 homeless foreigners in the camps in 1954 (BA B 150 4702 Heft 1, Oberländer an den Niedersächsischen Ministerpräsidenten Hinrich Kopf, 2 Juli 1954, page 2).
\textsuperscript{87} BA B 106 9916, Kleine Anfrage 80 der Abgeordneten Dr. Rinke, Schütz und Genossen, Deutscher Bundestag, 2. Wahlperiode 1953, page 1 (quotation); BA B 150 4703 Heft 3, Regierungsrat Dr. Walsdorff im Ministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und Vertriebene, Die Lager Schleswig Holsteins im Jahr 1954, page 10f.
\textsuperscript{88} Bundesminister für Vertriebene, Vertriebene, page 4f.
foreigners was not evenly distributed throughout the country. The states of Bavaria, Lower Saxony, and Schleswig Holstein were practically swamped with these groups and were therefore unable to provide housing opportunities or jobs for all of them. Transfers from one state to another were meant to spur economic integration; however, it was not always an easy matter because some of the other states were unwilling to take in a huge number of unwanted people.

Under the new Minister of Expellees, Theodor Oberländer, the problems of the camps were finally targeted. While Oberländer had been the Bavarian Minister of Expellees, the abolition of the camps had been one of his major aims, and once he became the federal Minister of Expellees in 1954, he continued this policy on the federal level. The subsequently organized camp abolition program originated at a time when the German government was faced with criticism from the international community. The UNHCR closely followed the fate of the homeless foreigners and was appalled by the fact that such a high number of

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89 For example, the majority of expellees had been accommodated in these three states because they had been the least devastated by the bomb ordeal. But this also meant that masses of people were situated far away from major city centers and job opportunities (Bundesminister für Vertriebene, Vertrieben, page 3f).

90 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1169, Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, Bericht über die am 12.4.1951 auf Einladung des Bundesministeriums für Vertriebene im Stuttgarter Innenministerium durchgeführte Besprechung, 13 April 1951, pages 1-4; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1169, Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern an den Bundesminister für Vertriebene, 11 Mai 1951, pages 1-4; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1169, Bayerns Überlastung mit Ausländern. Staatssekretär Dr. Oberländer: Ein Egoismus, der einzigartig ist, 28 April 1951; BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, Wussow: Struktur, Eingliederungsstand und Eingliederungsaussichten der nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge, 5 November 1952, page 1f.

91 Theodor Oberländer (1905-1998) was a very controversial political figure of postwar Germany. He was a Professor of Agrarian Economy and a member of the NSDAP and the German armed forces; he also participated in military activities in the east during the Second World War. Between 1950 and 1953 he was responsible for the expellee affairs in Bavaria, and between 1953 and 1961 he was the Minister of Expellees for the federal government. He resigned as Minister of Expellees due to accusations of having participated in war crimes in L’viv (for more information on Oberländer see Siegfried Schüt, Theodor Oberländer. Eine dokumentarische Untersuchung. Mit 61 Abbildungen und Dokumenten (Munich: Langes Müller, 1995). For an account of Germany’s dealing with the Nazi past, referring to the subsistence of Nazi personalities in political and public life, see Detlef Siegfried, “Zwischen Aufarbeitung und Schlußstrich. Der Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit in den beiden deutschen Staaten, 1958-1969,” in Dynamische Zeiten. Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften, ed. Axel Schült, Detlef Siegfried, and Karl Christian Lammers (Hamburg: Hans Christians Verlag, 2000), 77-113, for Oberländer in particular see pages 81-83).

92 Oberländer, Bayern, pages 3, 8.

homeless foreigners still lived in camps. The international press also critically observed the situation of homeless foreigners in Germany and augmented the pressure on the German government. In a feature article the Manchester Guardian, for example, criticized the German way of dealing with homeless foreigners and foreign refugees, especially condemning the deplorable living conditions which these people endured and the psychological problems that came along with them. In general, England was one of the countries most critical of Germany and its dealings with the homeless foreigners. Since the German government was struggling to gain some standing in the international community, it felt compelled to react to the criticism.

One of the aims of the camp abolishment program was to divert money that so far had been used to maintain camps into social housing programs to build apartments. The money was primarily directed toward the states of Schleswig Holstein, Lower Saxony, and Bavaria, since the majority of the camps – most of them badly maintained – were located there. A mix of expellees, refugees, foreign refugees, and homeless foreigners lived in the camps, and the federal government aimed to concentrate its resettlement program on the two main groups – expellees and homeless foreigners. However, the federal government did not have the administrative power to influence the states’ choice of whom to include in the resettlement scheme, as an example from Lower Saxony shows. The authorities in Hannover were interested in whether homeless foreigners had to be included in the

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95 BA B 150 5009, Dr. Nahm an das Auswärtige Amt, Betr: Film über nichtdeutsche Flüchtlinge, 4 Juli 1958, page 1.
96 BA B 150 4706 Heft 1, Abschrift eines Artikels im Manchester Guardian vom 28.6.1954, pages 1-3 The fact that a translation of this article was found in the BMVt files points to the interest of the German government in this matter.
97 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1891, Niederschrift über die Sitzung vom 6/7 Juni 1955, auf der Fragen der Eingliederung der heimatlosen Ausländer und nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge beraten wurden. Die internationalen Aspekte der Frage der heimatlosen Ausländer und nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge, Vortrag des Herrn Min. Dirigent Middelmann (BMVt), page 4.
98 BA B 150 4701 Heft 1, Vermerk: Betr die Besprechung über das Lagerräumungsprogramm 1954 mit den Vertretern der Abgeländer am 8.7.54 in unserem Haus, Bonn, 9 Juli 1954, page 1f.
99 BA B 150 4701 Heft 1, Nahm an die Landesflüchtlingsverwaltungen Baden Württemberg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Nordrhein Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz, 11 August 54.
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camp abolishment program. The Ministry of Expellees clarified in its reply that it
did not have the power to dictate who had to be included, however, the law made it
possible for the states to include homeless foreigners if they wanted to.\textsuperscript{101} Earlier,
Lower Saxony had made it clear that in their opinion the expellees clearly deserved
preference, stressing that the expellee organizations would have little understanding
if the homeless foreigners were included in the resettlement program.\textsuperscript{102} For the
federal government it was important that homeless foreigners be included
proportionally, because “according to experience international resources can be
opened up more easily if German accomplishments in the integration of homeless
foreigners can be shown.”\textsuperscript{103} However, an examination of the program illustrates
that the government’s wish was not fulfilled.

The camp abolishment program was scheduled for implementation in two
phases. Phase one was set for 1954 when the government directed money towards
abolishing those camps in Bavaria, Lower Saxony and Schleswig Holstein that
were not fit for human living. The second phase was planned for 1955; in this year
the KFH\textsuperscript{104} camps in other states were to be eliminated as well. All this was to be
achieved through an expansion of the social housing program. According to the
Minister of Expellees, the first phase was fully realized with the closure of 377
camps in total. The second phase, however, did not turn out as planned because the
KFH funds were now given as a lump sum to the states – this meant that the federal
government did not have any influence at all on how the money was spent. The
process was further slowed down because the government had to take care of a
continuous stream of refugees from the Soviet occupied zone.\textsuperscript{105} Therefore it is not

\textsuperscript{101} BA B 150 4701 Heft 1, Middelmann an das Referat III 8, Betr: Anruf von Mr. Patterson-Morgan,
 Hannover, 5 August 1954.
\textsuperscript{102} BayHSStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1169, Niedersächsischer Minister für Vertriebene an
Bundesminister für Vertriebene, 23 Februar 1953. For other examples of homeless foreigners being
excluded from the resettlement program, see Steprien, Der alteingesessene Fremde, page 237f.
\textsuperscript{103} BA B 150 4702 Heft 1, Oberländer an den Niedersächsischen Ministerpräsidenten Hinrich Kopf,
\textsuperscript{104} KFH stood for Kriegsfolgehilfe (war impact funds).
\textsuperscript{105} BA B 122 2162 Fiche 3, Der Bundesminister für Vertriebene, Stellungnahme zu einer
Denkschrift des Bundes der vertriebenen Deutschen, 17 November 1955, page 17f; BA B 150 2767
Heft 2, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Grosse Anfrage der Fraktion der CDU-CSU,
Drucksache 1961, Gemäss Kabinettsbeschluss vom 27.1.1956, page 12. The incoming refugees had
also slowed down resettlement measures taken by the government in the early 1950s. (BA B 106
9919, Protokoll über eine interministerielle Besprechung am 18. Februar 1954 im
Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte. Betr: Aide Memoire des

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astonishing that one of the few surveys indicating the numbers of homeless foreigners in camps and institutions in all states in the summer of 1955 still lists 27,712 homeless foreigners in camps and 1,813 in institutions. Lower Saxony, which had displayed little interest in including homeless foreigners in the camp abolition program, led the list with 9,882 homeless foreigners still in camps. If we compare these numbers to the ones given for the period before the camp abolition program, it becomes obvious that the program of 1954 had not targeted homeless foreigners. By the mid 1950s, roughly 27,000 homeless foreigners were still desperate to get out of the camps – at least the majority of them. And Germany was not necessarily the preferred destination, as the following examination will show.

3.3. The Wish to Emigrate or “Life in the Waiting Room”

On the one hand, the huge number of expellees and the constant stream of refugees from the Soviet Union slowed down the abolition of the camps and the transition of homeless foreigners into the German economy. On the other hand, the homeless foreigners themselves have to be taken into account as a factor in this process. Some of the homeless foreigners did not want to leave the camps. Almost a decade in the camp environment had had an enormous influence on their attitude, and some actually preferred life in the camps where rent was low and one was allowed to keep small domestic animals. Administrators blamed the lack of motivation either on a general trend of ‘demoralization’ or on the people’s “unwillingness to

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work” (an interpretation that was widespread at the time). However, for the majority of homeless foreigners there was actually another issue that played the most important role in their reluctance to make that step out of the camps and into the German settlements.

Those homeless foreigners in the camps who had some motivation and energy left often did not focus their hopes on a future in Germany, but on emigration, as examples from the Ukrainian community illustrate. Once the Homeless Foreigners Act was passed in 1951, the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration quickly realized that the majority of those Ukrainians still left in the country would have to build an existence in Germany. A reorientation took place in the organization that was outwardly expressed through a change of name – the organization started to call itself “Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany” (CRUEG/TsPUEN), thereby officially including Germany (Niméchchyna) in the title of the organization. At least outwardly the organization received a new focus and also new tasks that included creating ties with the German government to represent Ukrainians in the country. Since the situation of many Ukrainians was rather desperate in the early 1950s, one of the first resolutions of the ‘new’ CRUEG was to help these people out of their predicament, to get them out of the camps and into steady employment. The German government was willing to cooperate with CRUEG on this matter, stating that the umbrella organization ought to collect information about those staying in Germany so that they could be placed in jobs. As a response CRUEG issued an appeal to Ukrainians in Germany, asking them to report to the organization and provide information about their employability. However, CRUEG only received 150 answers and the plan was thus doomed to failure. The organization itself tried to excuse this weak response with the fact that many community members were incapable of working, such as invalids, the old and sick or young children, and that

110 BA B 150 4706 Heft 1, Walter Stain, Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Arbeit, an den Bundesminister für Vertriebene, 18 Oktober 1956; BA B 150 4706 Heft 1, Fischer (Landeshauptstadt München) an das Bayerische Staatministerium des Innern, Staatssekretär für Vertriebene, 26 Juni 1954.

111 Zelenets’kyi, Na hromads’kii nyvi, pages 37-39. Furthermore it has to be pointed out that CRUEG was only legally registered (“rechtlich eingetragen”) in Germany in 1953 (Ciuciura, “Die ukrainische Exilgemeinschaft,” page 69).
many others still had their heart set on emigration. The latter aspect was especially important in this context. In retrospect all interviewees stressed that it was a common desire among displaced persons and later homeless foreigners to emigrate as quickly as possible. Those who eventually stayed in Germany stated that they had nurtured the hope to find a better life abroad well into the 1950s. An article featured in *Shliakh Peremohy* further indicated how wide-spread this tendency was. In an appeal to Ukrainian aid organizations abroad (such as ZUADK), the paper emphasized that thousands of Ukrainians were still waiting to emigrate and were in dire need of support, especially those whose family members had already emigrated and who were waiting to join them. Indeed, for many the United States, Canada, or Australia still represented the destination for a better future, and living conditions in Germany compared rather unfavorably to a bright (and often imaginary) future abroad. Ukrainians were not alone in their desire to leave their lives in Germany behind, as a study among homeless foreigners conducted in Bavaria during the 1950s indicated. Johannes Maurer, member of staff of the Bavarian State Refugee Administration, aptly characterized the strong will to emigrate compared to a rather weak will to integrate into German society as a ‘waiting room’ (‘Wartebahnhof’) phenomenon - people being stuck in a waiting mode with all their energy focused on emigrating. Indeed, for many

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112 Zelenets’kyi, *Na hromads’kii nyvi*, pages 39-41 (CRUEG also wanted to organize four Ukrainian *gimnazii*, however, only 50 students replied to an appeal to the community – that was not even enough to fill one *gimnazia*). Woytowicz points out that the majority of Ukrainian Catholic priests wanted to emigrate abroad as quickly as possible (Wojtowicz, *Geschichte*, page 105).

113 *Shliakh Peremohy*, 16 May 1954, page 6, Potribna dopomoha. See also: Schlach Peremohy, 8 August 1954, page 1, Skil’ky shehe ukraintsiv vyide do SShA?

114 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1893, Dr. med. Hans-Günther Middelhaue: Das Problem der Eingliederung heimatloser Ausländer - dargestellt auf Grund sozialhygienischer Untersuchungen in einem Lager, einem Altersheim und fünf Wohnsiedlungen heimatloser Ausländer des Landes Bayern, pages 12f, 42-45. On another occasion, the German authorities remarked that many homeless foreigners had a desire to emigrate and hence focused their attention on life in the camps and predominantly relied on ethnic institutions such as schools if they still existed in the camps (BA B 106 9919, Der Niedersächsische Minister des Innern, Vermerk, Betr: Schulen für Kinder der heimatlosen Ausländer in den Lagern des Landes Niedersachsen, 2 April 1951, pages 1-5; BA B 150 3637 Heft 1, Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland an BMI, BMVt, AA, 26 Mai 1952; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1169, V15/8063, 113, Aktenvermerk, Umsiedlung heimatloser Ausländer, page 3).

115 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1891, Vortrag gehalten am 16.6.1954 vor dem Ausländerbeirat des Staatssekretärs für die Angelegenheiten der Heimatvertriebenen und Flüchtlinge in München, Johannes Maurer: Zur sozialen Eingliederung der nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik, page 7f.
homeless foreigners it was not idleness or exhaustion that kept them from actively seeking work, but their wish to find a better life somewhere other than Germany.

Others – especially the Slavic groups – were further spurred in their desire to emigrate by an innate fear of the Soviet Union and a potential outbreak of another world war, as the Canadian delegate Dr. Kaye observed during his visit to Germany in 1955. Emigration seemed so much more appealing since many families were “talking about where to escape to once the Third World War and the Russians came. There was this fear what to do when they come.” The importance of geographic location was appropriately expressed by a Ukrainian journalist whose home base had become Munich once the war was over. While visiting Toronto in the summer of 1955, Volodymyr Lenyk mused in the local Ukrainian-Canadian newspaper Homin Ukrainy about the differences between Toronto and Munich, two cities that were so vitally important to the Ukrainian diaspora, but still so diametrically opposed. The journalist came to the conclusion that “if one were to travel today from Toronto to Munich, the first impression would be as if you traveled from the rear to the front. Moreover, in Toronto nobody ever feels that in the world exists such a tension of forces, that in the world goes on a fight between two blocks of states, between two ideological-political systems. In Munich, nobody knows that there is such quiet, peaceful life.” And it was not only the awareness that the “Bolshevik tanks” were so close that weighed heavily on many Ukrainians in Germany. A Soviet propaganda campaign initiated during the 1950s also caused anxiety among exiles in Germany.

116 LAC RG 26 Vol. 110, File: Report on the visit to Germany, Kaye: Report on the visit to Germany, Austria, Trieste and Italy, 14 November to 14 December 1955, pages 16, 24f, 27f. In rural settlements where employment opportunities were not great the wish to emigrate was immediately stronger (page 27). For a similar observation see Harmsen, Integration, page 72; Wojtowicz, Geschichte, page 81.
117 Interview 30. See also interview 29.
118 Volodymyr Lenyk, a journalist for Shliakh Peremohy and a member (and president) of the AFP was the permanent European correspondent for Homin Ukrainy since 1953 (Ion Emilian et al., Fünfzehn Jahre Verband der Freien Presse (Munich: Verband der Freien Presse, 1962), page 21).
119 Homin Ukrainy, 27 August 1955, Mizh Miunkhenom i Torontom (by V. Lenyk). For another assessment of Germany as the battleground between “the forces of liberty and communism,” see Freie Presse-Korrespondenz, Juni/Juli 1964, page 1f, Großer Erfolg der Exilpresse.
120 Kosak, 50-littia, page 7. Other Eastern Europeans shared this fear of the Soviet Union. The Bavarian government stated that this was one of the reasons why many of them refused to be resettled if it meant living close to the border with East Germany (BayHSStA
3.4. Communist Activities and Propaganda among Homeless Foreigners

Starting in March 1955, the “Committee for the Return Home” – under the leadership of the General Major a.D. Mikhailov (Michajlow) and in cooperation with the Soviet satellite states – conducted an intensive propaganda campaign to motivate former displaced persons to return back east. The Committee conjured an image of a western establishment afraid of losing the source of its cheap labor. It also accused the FRG of imprisoning sane people in mental institutions and hindering the return of homeless foreigners to their native land. The Soviet propaganda also tried to smear the émigré activities by arguing that one could only help to rebuild a country if one was physically present in the country itself. Through this argument the Soviet side tried to undermine the status and credibility of the émigré organizations. The federal government made it clear that all homeless foreigners were free to go wherever they wanted and stressed that the recent Soviet propaganda “has triggered anxiety among part of the homeless foreigners and refugees despite the reassuring assertions made by the federal government.”

Apprehension among the homeless foreigners was further stirred once Germany became sovereign in 1955, because many of them feared that they could become mere “barter objects” in Germany’s dealing with the East. In this context it should be noted that German POWs were still in Soviet camps during the mid-1950s.
The Soviet propaganda campaign that was accompanied by visits of Soviet officials in the camps and settlements\textsuperscript{126} had an effect on some of the homeless foreigners, especially the sick and destitute ones. In May 1956, the \textit{New York Times} estimated that 330 homeless foreigners had followed the call by the Soviet authorities and returned home – most likely only to be shipped off to another camp. The paper accused the German authorities “of falling short of making any efforts to protect the refugees in their custody from the communist approaches.”\textsuperscript{127} However, some homeless foreigners stood up to the Soviet endeavors and actually defended the federal authorities in this matter, as one émigré did in the \textit{Süddeutsche Zeitung}. In a letter to the editor, Alexander Cordzaya stated that the federal authorities had treated the homeless foreigners very well; in his opinion the thing that worried émigrés from Eastern Europe was not the German conduct, but the fact that Soviet propaganda reached the émigrés even after they had moved away from the camps – a fact that in his mind strongly indicated the existence of a spy network.\textsuperscript{128} Although Soviet activities frightened many homeless foreigners, they also stirred others into action. Many active Ukrainians, for example, felt that they had to take up the fight against the Soviet representatives and their propaganda to protect their fellow countrymen and strengthen their own position. A team of 13 Ukrainian exile organizations instructed Ukrainians throughout the German camps how to act around the Soviet representatives.\textsuperscript{129} The German government was also interested to counteract the “pull from the East” through reassurances.\textsuperscript{130} Nonetheless, nobody who had definite plans to return to the Soviet Union or one of its satellite states was

\textsuperscript{126} BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1245, Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern an die Bayerische Staatskanzlei, 18 April 1956.
\textsuperscript{127} BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1245, New York Times, International Edition 9 May 1956, deutsche Übersetzung: Flüchtlinge geben ihr zielloses Leben in Deutschland auf um in ihre Heimat zurückzukehren, von Arthur J. Olsen. [The whole folder BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1245 deals with the attempts made by the Soviet authorities to entice Soviet citizens to return; some cases where this return actually took place are also listed].
\textsuperscript{129} BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1245, Bayerisches Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz, März 1957/I, pages 13-14.
\textsuperscript{130} BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1891, Niederschrift über die Sitzung vom 6/7 Juni 1955, auf der Fragen der Eingliederung der heimatlosen Ausländer und nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge beraten wurden. Die internationalen Aspekte der Frage der heimatlosen Ausländer und nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge, Vortrag des Herrn Min. Dirigent Middelmann (BMVi), page 4.
hindered from doing so. By June 1956, some 3,000 people had returned to the
Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (no numbers were available for
Ukrainians in particular), mostly because they were either disappointed in the West
or they suffered from homesickness.131 In many of those who continued to stay in
Germany, the Soviet propaganda campaign left a feeling of profound uneasiness
that was further deepened by the negative attitude that the German local authorities
and population displayed towards homeless foreigners.

3.5. German Attitudes toward Homeless Foreigners

During the process of transition into the German economy, the German government
expected a certain degree of individual initiative from the homeless foreigners,
especially in the area of finding employment. Failure to find work was often
associated with unwillingness to work at all. According to the German government
“the will to work unfortunately dwindled in many homeless foreigners due to camp
life and the – sometimes not really fortunate – care through the IRO.”132

Employment was considered a precondition for successful integration; and since
the majority of the group was regarded as lethargic,133 in the eyes of the German
government the slow transition process was at least partially their fault. Of course,
the government’s perception was tainted by its prejudices towards homeless
foreigners in general.

Negative stereotypes of DPs had existed both in German society and
government throughout the 1940s, and they were often a direct extension of
prejudices about the group of forced laborers during the Second World War.134

131 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1245, Bayerisches Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz,
März 1957/I, page 11f; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1245, New York Times,
International Edition 9 May 1956, deutsche Übersetzung: Flüchtlinge geben ihr zielloses Leben in
Deutschland auf um in ihre Heimat zurückzukehren, von Arthur J. Olsen.
132 B 106 9919, Brief von Middelmann an den Vertreter des UN Flüchtlingskommissars in
Deutschland, August 1954, page 4.
133 See for example: BA B 150 5009, Vermerk von Kugland (niedersächsisches Ministerium für
Vertriebene), Betr: Lager für nichtdeutsche Flüchtlinge; BA B 150 5009, Dr. Nahm an das
Auswärtige Amt, Betr: Film über nichtdeutsche Flüchtlinge, 4. Juli 1958; BA B 150 5009 Brief von
Dr. Nahm an Dr Lindt (UNHCR, PR Abteilung) 4 Juli 1958; BA B 150 5009, Brief von A.R. Lindt
(UN) an Dr. Nahm, 18 August 1958. For accounts of lethargy of those camp inhabitants who were
still in camps in the mid 1950s, see LAC RG 26 Vol. 110, File: Report on the visit to Germany,
Kaye: Report on the visit to Germany, Austria, Trieste and Italy, 14 November to 14 December
1955, pages 16, 37.
134 For an example of aggressive behavior of German youth towards displaced persons in the
immediate postwar period, see Alfons Kenkmann, “Wenn die Messer blitzen und die Polen
Jacobmeyer points out that this negative attitude changed in the German press in the late 1940s/early 50s, especially once the former displaced persons were labeled political refugees, because this new status made a different interpretation and more positive presentation of the group possible. However, improved press coverage did not necessarily mean an end to prejudices and negative judgment, especially among the broader public and on lower administrative levels. As elaborated above, the composition of the group of homeless foreigners had changed in comparison to the vibrant camp years of the UNRRA period – it was now dominated by old, sick, or very young people. Furthermore, many of the most active elements of the group were still looking abroad for a better future. Therefore German authorities often lamented that those who were left in the country were a “negative selection” that lacked the initiative to organize their own lives. They further characterized the collective group of homeless foreigners as ‘lazy’ and ‘clumsy’ in administrative matters. Homeless foreigners were frequently labeled as being “afraid of hard work,” a characteristic that was equated with criminal behavior; the wish to emigrate and the consequent lack of interest in German affairs were often interpreted as laziness.

137 BA B 150 4706 Heft 1, Fischer (Landeshauptstadt München) an das Bayerische Staatsministerium des Innern, Staatssekretär für Vertriebene, 26 Juni 1954, page 1; BA B 150 4706 Heft 1, Walter Stain (Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Arbeit), an den Bundesminister für Vertriebene, 18 Oktober 1956. In general there was a fear of demoralization, black market activities and criminal tendencies (BA B 106 9316, Bemerkungen für ein DP Gesetz).
138 This kind of negative interpretation could also be found in the local press, especially in those regions where camps with a high ratio of foreign refugees and homeless foreigners had existed for a long time. Especially the intelligentsia among the homeless foreigners felt “dishonored” by such negative generalizations (BA B 137 1281, Brief von Prof. Mende, Büro für heimatvertriebene Ausländer, an das Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 30 März 1955. For an example of such a negative generalization see article included in BA B 137 1281, *Westfalenblatt* 9 Januar 55, “Das Märchen vom ‘Armen DP’” (The Fairy tale of the ‘poor DP’)).
Reasons for such negative attitudes were manifold. On the one hand, old prejudices towards Eastern Europeans had survived the Second World War and were nurtured during the postwar years when DPs were separated from the general German public and enjoyed a better standing of living than the average German. On the other hand, the criminality rate had been slightly higher among DPs right after the end of the war, and although it dropped quickly, the image of a looting DP who profited from black market activities lingered on for much longer. In the eyes of international observers the “German public was not prepared enough to execute the assimilation of the non-German refugees.” Indeed, during the early 1950s, this negative stereotype was further reinforced through some unfortunate incidents that occurred when DPs had to leave houses that had been confiscated from Germans for their use. In some cases the homeless foreigners destroyed the furniture and fixtures of the premises that they had to vacate, thereby causing resentment among the German tenants and the local authorities. However, no accurate statistics exist for this phenomenon, and the available evidence does not suggest that it was a widespread occurrence. Furthermore, the negative judgment of homeless foreigners was also increased by frustration over the obligations that society had towards this group, as the following example aptly illustrates. Reacting to a report by the IRO that had criticized some of the living conditions of homeless foreigners in Rheinsheim, the local authorities sent an outraged response to the
district office in charge. After explaining that the conditions in the camps had improved, the author of the letter stated:

“In the IRO report I miss the question where the community got the money from to create such lodgings. The joke cost us roughly 13,000 marks. Furthermore I miss the question what kind of work these people do and whether they like to work. I would like to let you know – to avoid possible enquiries – that these people do not work at all. They are bone-idle, [and] some are ill... These people can rightfully be considered pensioners, and if there is no fundamental change initiated from above, they will remain pensioners with us forever.”

As Stepien has shown, even when they were relocated in settlements, many of the ‘hardcore’ cases had a difficult time adjusting to a ‘normal’ life, thereby drawing suspicion and aversion from the local authorities and their new German neighbors, which also contributed to a continuation of the negative stereotypes.

It has to be kept in mind that the German government and society after the end of the war were very eager to cut ties with the Nazi past. Since homeless foreigners were generally presented as political refugees, the connection to the war experience was masked and the group was seen as a burden, not a responsibility. Furthermore, negative attitudes not only existed towards homeless foreigners, but towards foreigners in general. For example, local authorities especially called for stricter legal regulations to facilitate surveillance of foreign “radical” and “dangerous” elements. A more detailed study than this first effort is needed to analyze German attitudes on different administrative and public levels. However, preliminary results suggest that negative attitudes towards homeless foreigners

144 BA B 150 3637 Heft 1, Abschrift, Gemeindeverwaltung Rheinsheim an das Landratsamt Bruchsal, Betriff die Besichtigung von DP Lagern durch die IRO, 14 März 1951. Another example comes from the city of Rosenheim, where the schooling for the children of homeless foreigners was in limbo because the local authorities refused to build a school – they did not feel responsible for it and received considerable support from the press (BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1854, Stellungnahme von Maurer zum Bericht der Regierung von Oberbayern vom 22.8.1952 (28 August 1952); BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1854, Oberbayerisches Volksblatt 4.10.1952, Rosenheim soll eine Ausländer-Schule bauen; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1854, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4.2.1953, “Staatsstreich” um DP Siedlungen).
145 Stepien, Der alteingesessene Fremde, page 242f.
146 Schönwälder, “Ist nur Liberalisierung Fortschritt?” page 130f.
(who were often not differentiated from other foreigners) had not been overcome in the early 1950s.

### 3.6. Emigration Fails as a Solution

Since German authorities, especially on the lower administrative levels, saw the homeless foreigners as a burden, some were eager to rid themselves of the problem through emigration. State governments were particularly interested in helping homeless foreigners in this matter. North Rhine-Westphalia’s Social Welfare Office, for example, paid for the processing fees, medical exams, and other emigration expenses if an applicant was destitute, and in some cases even released homeless foreigners from debt so that it would be possible for them to emigrate. Voluntary organizations also helped to expedite the emigration process, for example by helping with the paper work. Despite all these efforts it was soon generally accepted that emigration was impossible for the majority of homeless foreigners, and indeed the emigration that took place during the 1950s could not compare to the mass resettlement scheme of the previous decade. Although accurate statistics are difficult to obtain, some data exists for the Ukrainian case. Maruniak explains that individual migration took place in the 1950s, especially to the US through the United States Escape Program. He estimates that between 1952 and 1958, another 10,000 Ukrainians left Germany to seek a better life abroad, thereby draining the ranks of the community leadership even further of young, energetic people. These numbers must be considered an inflated estimate, because

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147 Schönwälder, “‘Ist nur Liberalisierung Fortschritt,’” page 133.
148 BA B 106 9316, Württembergisch-Badischer Städtetverband (Der Geschäftsführer) an Herrn Ministerialdirektor Kitz, Bundesministerium des Innern. Betrifft: Flüchtlingswesen h.i. endgültige Seßhaftmachung von Displaced Persons (DPs) in Deutschland bezw [sic] Württemberg Baden, 23 Mai 1950, page 1; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1891, Prof. Dr. Otmar Pirkmajer, Zur Frage der wirtschaftlichen Eingliederung der Nicht-Deutschen Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 8 März 1954, page 1; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1169, 28 April 1951, Bayerns Überlastung mit Ausländern, Staatssekretär Dr. Oberländer: Ein Egoismus, der einzigartig ist.
150 BA B 150 2627 Heft 1, Caritasverband an das BMVt, 12 Mai 1951, page 2f.
151 BA B 106 9916 Stellungnahme zu der Frage, ob den fremden Volksgruppen (Heimatlosen Ausländern, Asylberechtigten) in der Bundesrepublik eine über den bisherigen Rahmen hinausgehende kulturelle Betreuung ermöglicht werden soll, page 3.
152 Maruniak, “Ukrainians,” page 256.
elsewhere Maruniak states that it is difficult to obtain statistics for this case.\textsuperscript{153} Furthermore, the number of Ukrainians in the country was never reduced to 15,000 as the above estimate would imply. Those who could not emigrate were mainly rejected on account of their health, most often because of TB. Other reasons for rejection were specific political leanings (such as pro-communist), a criminal record, or too many applications to emigrate.\textsuperscript{154} Rejection for emigration could affect entire families, for example when the children were allowed to emigrate while the parents or one parent had to be left behind. Under these circumstances, life in Germany could not really be planned, as an example of one of the interviewees appropriately illustrates. The interviewee and her husband planned to emigrate in the early 1950s, and since she would have had to finish her medical exams in the US anyway, her professor recommended to do an internship instead of her final exams in Germany. However, their application did not come through because her father suffered from a severe case of asthma and she and her husband did not want to leave him alone in Germany; and therefore, her exam took a lot longer.\textsuperscript{155}

Over time the strong will to emigrate declined among homeless foreigners; and external as well as internal factors were responsible for this development. Many homeless foreigners feared so-called “split family” cases, like the above case, and opted to stay together in Germany. Homeless foreigners also became disillusioned because receiving countries such as the US, Canada, or Australia were only interested in manpower and therefore carefully selected prospective immigrants.\textsuperscript{156} The lack of an American response to the Hungarian crisis in 1956

\textsuperscript{153} Maruniak, \textit{Tom II}, pages 17-19.
\textsuperscript{154} Harmsen, \textit{Integration}, page 28. See also: LAC RG 26 Vol. 110, File: Report on the visit to Germany, Kaye: Report on the visit to Germany, Austria, Trieste and Italy, 14 November to 14 December 1955, page 29. The RCMP, for example, had strict guidelines not to admit anybody to Canada who was a known Communist, a member of the SS or the German armed forces (prior to January 1, 1943), member of the NSDAP, a criminal, professional gambler, prostitute, black market racketeer, collaborator, member of the Italian fascist party, the mafia, Trotskyite or member of any other revolutionary organization, who responded evasively and untruthful under interrogation or failed to produce acceptable documents regarding their time in Germany (Whitaker, “A Secret Policy,” page 358f).
\textsuperscript{155} Interview 34.
\textsuperscript{156} BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1891, Niederschrift über die Sitzung vom 6/7 Juni 1955, auf der Fragen der Eingliederung der heimatlosen Ausländer und nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge beraten wurden. Das aussenpolitische Moment bei der Lösung der Fragen der nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge, page 4. See also Harmsen, \textit{Integration}, page 72.
caused further disappointment among many exiles, as Puddington has shown for
the example of Radio Liberty. And while the international community started to
disappoint homeless foreigners in Germany, the German government tried to
improve their situation during the mid-1950s, for example through the camp
abolition program that was initiated in 1954. Starting in 1955, the United Nations
also allocated a considerable amount of money to spur the abolition of camps in
Germany, and over the next six years roughly 20,000,000 DM were spent to help
another 7,682 homeless foreigners out of the camps and into apartments of their
own. By 1958, the camp abolishment program was virtually complete; only
Lower Saxony still handed in reports every six months. As soon as a member of
a family or an individual had a steady job and a home outside the camps, the wish
to emigrate diminished because people were “reluctant to exchange their
achievements for something entirely unknown,” as Dr. Kaye observed during his
visit to Germany. A survey conducted in Shliakh Peremohy in 1956 confirmed this
interpretation and can serve as an example for the Ukrainian case, although one has
to keep in mind that this is not a representative sample. The newspaper asked its
readers what they expected from 1956, and the answers represented the spectrum of
different situations in Germany. Many of the jobless ones saw their only hope to
“somehow sneak through” and immigrate to the US, whereas another part of the
community said that Ukrainians would have to face the fact that they would have to
stay in Germany. By the end of the 1950s, the transition period which had
dominated homeless foreigners’ life for so long came to an end. Not only had the

157 Arch Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom: the Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and
Korrespondenz also cited 1956 as a year of great disappointment with international western politics
(Freie Presse Korrespondenz, 1/2 (1962), page 1f, Resolution zur weltpolitischen Lage).
158 Stepien, Der alteingesessene Fremde, page 239ff. The United Nations carried out different
building programs that were sponsored through means out of federal as well as UN funds (page
241f).
159 BA B 150 6263, Der Bundesminister für Wohnungsbau: “Lagerräumung; Räumungsprogramm
160 LAC RG 26 Vol. 110, File: Report on the visit to Germany, Kaye: Report on the visit to
Germany, Austria, Trieste and Italy, 14 November to 14 December 1955, page 24f. Although almost
all homeless foreigners had left the camps by the end of the 1950s, a few continued to live in
unofficial camps well into the 1960s (Pegel, Fremdarbeiter, page 129).
161 Shliakh Peremohy, 22 January 1956, page 5f, Choho my achikuiemo vid 1956 roku?
Interviewees also stressed that they started to learn German once they realized that they would not
be able to emigrate, once they had established themselves in Germany (see for example interviews
29, 34, 27).
majority of them found a decent living environment for the first time in more than 12 years, but the employment situation also started to improve. Homeless foreigners could now focus on their life in the new settlements.

3.7. (Community) Life in the Settlements

During the 1950s, three types of accommodation existed for homeless foreigners – the camp, the retirement/nursing home, and the settlement. Since life in the camps has already been discussed, this part focuses on the latter two. We get an insight into life in retirement homes and settlements through contemporaneous reports from voluntary organizations and social studies. All those reports chosen feature Ukrainians as a group, and the picture is further elaborated through issues of *Shliakh Peremohy* that feature Ukrainian life in Germany.

The care for the old and sick homeless foreigners in homes and institutions did not find much criticism among foreign and German observers, who stressed that these people received good food, treatment, and accommodation. Many of the retirement and nursing homes were under the auspices of the church; and although the financial situation was rather gloomy, sanitary conditions were generally impeccable - an important aspect after life in the often unhygienic homeless foreigners’ camps. Since the majority of the older camp residents went directly into homes, part of the community life was transferred to these institutions as well. For example, some branches of organizations such as OUZh passed directly into retirement homes, and through the commemoration of holidays, exhibitions and talks, the Ukrainian community tried to provide entertainment for their elder members.

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162 Wagner identifies 1957 as the year where most of his interview partners found steady employment in the German economy and hence a starting point for an actual life in the country (*Wagner, Displaced Persons*, page 72f). The unemployment statistics list 4,150 homeless foreigners as unemployed for 1958.

163 BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, J.B.Konchius, National President of the United Lithuanian Fund of America, an Lukascheck, Oktober 1952, page 2.


165 BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, J.B.Konchius, National President of the United Lithuanian Fund of America, an Lukascheck, Oktober 1952, page 2.

166 Dariia Rebet, “Roky zanepadu,” page 46f.

The young and healthy homeless foreigners hoped to start a ‘normal life’ by moving from the camps to the newly built settlements. The state governments were responsible for resettling camp inhabitants within their respective states or initiating a (voluntary) move to another state. The abolition of the camps and the building of new housing led to a widespread scattering of the homeless foreigners. Some Ukrainian camp committees tried to influence the future destinations of their members, as an example from the camp Feldafing in Bavaria illustrates. The Ukrainian camp committee there tried to arrange with the Bavarian government that 200 of its members be transferred to Neu-Ulm where a larger Ukrainian settlement already existed. Unfortunately, nothing is known about the outcome of this attempt. However, the authorities generally did not comply with requests from homeless foreigners. On another occasion, the Bavarian State Refugee Administration stressed that transfers from one settlement to another which had been proposed by national committees were rather the exception than the rule and only carried out if they were in the interest of the German administration that wanted to ensure “respectable tenants” for their premises. In most cases the states themselves arranged the allocation of people to the settlements, aiming at a mix of nationalities. A good example for such a procedure is the formation of an early DP settlement – Munich-Ludwigsfeld.

3.7.1. The Settlement Munich-Ludwigsfeld

The settlement Munich-Ludwigsfeld was established in the winter of 1952/53. During the process of occupying the suburb, an average of 40 families – chosen by the Bavarian government – were admitted to the new premises on a daily basis. The new inhabitants – 756 families and 164 individuals or 2908 individuals in total – were composed of 21 nationalities; Germans formed the biggest group with 873 individuals. The settlement Munich-Ludwigsfeld was actually one of the few settlements that managed a more active cultural life with a strong Saturday school during the 1950s (Shliakh Peremohy, 19 February 1956, page 5, Z zhyytia ukrainstiv na chuzhyny, Plastova stantsiia v Novomu Ul’mi).

168 See for example: BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1892/I, Ukrainisches Komitee in Feldafing an Deiniger, 4 September 1952. Neu Ulm was actually one of the few settlements that managed a more active cultural life with a strong Saturday school during the 1950s (Shliakh Peremohy, 19 February 1956, page 5, Z zhyytia ukrainstiv na chuzhyny, Plastova stantsiia v Novomu Ul’mi).

169 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1892/I, Oberregierungsrat an die Regierung von Oberbayern, Oktober 1952, page 2. (And in this case it was only one couple and a single man that were being transferred). For further examples, see also BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1856, Zentralstelle an Regierung Oberbayern, 17 Oktober 1952.
people, followed by Poles (450), stateless people (417) and Ukrainians (381).\footnote{BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, Blank: Erfahrungsbericht über die Belegung der DP-Grosswohnsiedlung München-Ludwigsfeld, 12 März 1953, page 6.} Simply filling the settlements was not a problem, but establishing a community life was harder than the authorities had expected. Many of the new residents had not lived under ‘normal’ conditions for years, and therefore “for the most part flush lavatories, gas, washhouses and attics are something unknown for those admitted to the settlement,”\footnote{BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, Blank: Erfahrungsbericht über die Belegung der DP-Grosswohnsiedlung München-Ludwigsfeld, 12 März 1953, page 2. (Many of the tenants also did not know that they were responsible for paying for gas – this sometimes led to a rude awaking once the first bill came up).} as a report stated. The German settlement authorities felt that they had to lecture the new tenants on a variety of subjects, such as new technologies or the rules of the community, especially since the former camp inhabitants seemed not well prepared for life in the settlements. Although the federal government had printed and distributed information leaflets prior to the abolition of the camps, the authorities quickly discovered that only a fraction of the homeless foreigners had actually read them. In addition, many homeless foreigners lacked the material basis such as furniture or lamps to set up their apartments. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the general supply situation was rather bad: there were no stores or schools available because the settlement had been hastily erected. Two provisional shops and strong police action were quickly introduced to counteract any black market activities and an ‘emergency school’ (Notschule) took on the task of educating the children. Over time, the church and voluntary agencies brought organized entertainment into the settlement, and the local community center, movie theatre, and pub were soon heavily frequented.\footnote{BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, Blank: Erfahrungsbericht über die Belegung der DP-Grosswohnsiedlung München-Ludwigsfeld, 12 März 1953, pages 1-5.}

Other new settlements with similar make-up noted comparable problems while settling in. Communities in Rosenheim, Augsburg, Stettenhofen, or Treuchtlingen, where Ukrainians were among the strongest groups, further noted fights between different national groups. The author of the report found the situation particularly alarming because there were no integration measures such as activities for the youth or a short-term employment program offered by the German government. Unemployment, apathy, and the continuing wish to emigrate (at least
among some of the homeless foreigners) were cited as the biggest problems among the residents. These tendencies were further strengthened through the fact that the settlements were rather isolated, and in the eyes of some observers this unsuitable location (far away from any kind of employment opportunity) contributed to ‘demoralization’ of the tenants. Interviewees also remembered the isolation of the settlements (here the example of Ayingerstrasse in Munich, where mostly Ukrainian families lived), but did not necessarily see it as a negative feature. “We never knew anything different. We knew each other in our bloc, and I did not think of it as a ghetto because we always had the opportunity to communicate with other people.”

Many of the new settlements bore a strong camp character, and their inhabitants, especially Ukrainians, displayed a strong interest in the survival of their heritage. In Munich Ludwigsfeld they were actually able to realize this wish. As a report about Munich-Ludwigsfeld in Shliakh Peremohy revealed in 1956, the settlement had turned into a community where Ukrainian life could thrive. An observer noted that the children were healthy and dressed in nice and new clothing and shoes. Plast, SUM, and two Saturday Schools with 60 children offered a variety of activities where Ukrainian children could explore the Ukrainian language and culture. The author of the article further stated that the Ukrainian children from Ludwigsfeld were not “swallowed” by the German school, but that they brought their background into the institution, for example reminding their classmates that Gogol was indeed a Ukrainian and not a Russian writer, and that Dnepr ought to be spelled Dnipro. Other community reports also featured

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175 Interview 30.
177 Shliakh Peremohy Easter 1956, page 9, Dity odniei oseli.
Ludwigsfeld as one of the exemplary Ukrainian settlements in Germany which could still assemble a sizeable number of people for community events;\(^{178}\) and by 1958 it had established itself as one of the ten remaining branches of OUZh in Germany.\(^{179}\) Ludwigsfeld was an exception in Germany, because it was able to generate a certain amount of activity. In this context it must not be overlooked that Ludwigsfeld was located in Munich, a city that became the centre of Ukrainian and other émigré life after the Second World War\(^{180}\) and that boasted four Ukrainian subdivisions – Munich city, Munich Moosach, Munich Ludwigsfeld, and Munich retirement home. Many other Ukrainians were not so fortunate in their new surroundings.

### 3.7.2. The Difficulty of Instigating Community Activities

During the insecure times of emigration, camp abolition, and transition into the German economy, it was difficult for the homeless foreigners to organize a life for themselves that went beyond the mere securing of everyday needs. Therefore it is not astonishing that especially the early 1950s are generally described as the “years of crisis”\(^{181}\) (perelomovi roky), as a period of decline and problems, but also of reorganization for many of the organizations such as OUZh.\(^{182}\) Those who were unable to emigrate were “thrown” from city to city, scraping by in a temporary existence which made the organization of community life rather hard as the historical accounts of the different organizations stress. In addition, some resettlement schemes still continued which contributed to the unsettled existence of many Ukrainians in Germany.\(^{183}\) This phenomenon also became apparent in the

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\(^{178}\) Rebet, “Roky zanepadu,” pages 52, 55. *Shliakh Peremohy*, 27 November 1955, page 3 and 5, Do pytannia vykhovannia molodi. Dity emigratsii. For example, celebrating the Holy Mykola, *Shliakh Peremohy* reported that Ludwigsfeld was able to congregate 70 children and thus held a festive commemoration (*Shliakh Peremohy*, Christmas 1959, page 11, Hostyna sviatoho Mykolaia).

\(^{179}\) Rebet, “Roky zanepadu,” page 47.


\(^{181}\) Zelenets’kyi, *Na hromads’kij nyvi*, page 36.


\(^{183}\) Rebet, “Roky zanepadu,” pages 42f, 46 (many active leaders also emigrated, which made the (re)organization of community life so much harder); Zelenets’kyi, *Na hromads’kii nyvi*, pages 34f, 42.
local press. Although *Shliakh Peremohy* mostly concentrated on international politics and their relevance for Ukraine and its future, it featured some reports about Ukrainians in Germany, and one of their stories aptly illustrates their situation. Among other settlements in Northern Germany there had been 230 Ukrainians in Lingen at the end of the 1940s. Their cultural activities came to a halt through mass migration and had to be reinvigorated by some active community members who started to organize talks and anniversary celebrations once the main wave had left. However, the German government resettled many of these people in other camps, and left Lingen with only 50 individuals who were also mostly ill – a fact that made cultural activities almost impossible. In January 1954, a priest, Kul’chytskyi, came to visit the community, which was a joyous event because it meant the first religious service for a long time. In context of this visit a reinvigoration of cultural activities started once more through the founding of a local branch of the CRUEG and the initiation of a kindergarten and school through OUZh.  

However, as this example illustrates, for many communities the transition into the German economy meant starting from scratch again and again, because the situation in the early 1950s was neither settled nor secure in Germany. Since many Ukrainian activities were further concentrated on Munich, some of the smaller communities became frustrated because they felt that they were ‘forgotten’ in Germany, pointing out that not all energy ought to be directed towards Munich. The federal government affirmed that the organization of a meaningful community life (for example in the important area of schooling) was extremely difficult once the camps were abolished because homeless foreigners were even more scattered than before. The geographical dispersal was accompanied by an apathetic attitude among the few remaining Ukrainians, another factor that hampered community life. However, this should not give the impression that there were no other communities in Germany outside of Munich. Ukrainians had settled in

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185 See for example reports from different communities in Germany: *Shliakh Peremohy*, 11 April 1954, page 5, Inteligentsiia ne povynna zalyshaty “nyziv”; *Shliakh Peremohy*, 11 August 1957, page 5, Nam pys hut’: Pro nas zabuly.
186 BA B 106 9916, Stellungnahme zu der Frage, ob den fremden Volksgruppen (Heimatlosen Ausländern, Asylberechtigten) in der Bundesrepublik eine über den bisherigen Rahmen hinausgehende kulturelle Betreuung ermöglicht werden soll, page 3.
187 Ciuciura, “Common Organizational Efforts,” page 103.
Hannover, Hamburg Neugraben, Neu Ulm or Heidelberg, and actual parishes were located in the bigger cities. The twenty Ukrainian Catholic priests that worked in Germany during the 1950s usually managed to visit the smaller communities once a month. Community life was not entirely non-existent, but considerably less vibrant. And the more difficult the situation grew for homeless foreigners in Germany, the more they turned towards the German government for support.

4. Support for the Homeless Foreigners

During the 1950s, the German government was mainly occupied with organizing the transition of the former displaced persons to German administration, focusing on their resettlement within Germany, social housing, and employment opportunities. However, it is also important to examine whether the federal or the Bavarian government provided additional funds for homeless foreigners in general and Ukrainians in particular, for example for schooling or cultural organizations, and how any financial assistance was motivated. In Germany, the question of support for minority groups was tightly connected to the general concept of integration; the topic has to be examined in the context of the expellee and refugee phenomenon and with reference to pressure from the international community. The topic of support also raises the question of lobbying and general contact between the government and Ukrainians.

4.1. General Support and Integration Measures by the German Government

Once the legal status of homeless foreigners was determined through the Homeless Foreigners Act of 1951, the government had to find a general approach to managing this group. In the beginning, the economic integration of homeless foreigners was at the forefront of government policies and at the top of the international agenda. In a way, this was a continuation of IRO policies, because

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188 Maruniak, Tom II, page 70; Wojtowicz, Geschichte, page 70. Wojtowicz lists 17 parishes in Germany, located in Augsburg, Augstordorf, Bamberg, Crailsheim, Hamburg-Neugraben, Hannover-Buchholz, Ingolstadt, Krefeld-Traar, Kriftel, Landshut, Ludwigsburg-Grünbühl, Neu-Ulm, Pinneberg bei Hamburg, Rosenheim, Schongau am Lech, Seedorf, and Munich. The community in Neu Ulm stressed that they had an active Saturday school in the 1950s (Shliakh Peremohy, 19 February 1956, page 5, Z zhyttia ukraintsiv na chuzhyni, Plastova stantsiia v Novomu Ul’mi).
189 BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, Brief von Wussow an die Sozialbehörde-Flüchtlingsfürsorge, 24 Oktober 1952; BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, Wussow: Struktur, Eingliederungsstand und Eingliederungsaussichten der nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge, 5 November 1952, page 1; BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, Lukaschek an “Hard Core”, 13 May 1952, page 1; BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, Lukaschek an den Hessischen Minister des Innern, 28 Juni 1952; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1891, Prof. Dr. Otmar Pirkmajer,
the “resettlement into the German economy” had become a key issue once the IRO realized that the emigration programs were not sufficient to satisfactorily solve the DP problem.\textsuperscript{190} The UNHCR also saw the job market as the “economic force field that in the end defines integration.”\textsuperscript{191} In order to spur the transition into the German economy, the federal government initiated a series of measures such as the camp abolition program and social housing plans. In addition, the government employed “integration consultants” (Eingliederungsberater), whose major task it was to place people in jobs,\textsuperscript{192} and also gave out loans to create employment opportunities or to buy furniture.\textsuperscript{193} The primary aim of all these measures was to create a living for homeless foreigners in Germany and to draw them closer into German society through work. However, once the homeless foreigners realized that they would stay in Germany, wishes arose that went beyond the fulfillment of their basic needs.

Early on, many national committees turned to the state or federal authorities with their requests for cultural support, and these appeals required a clear government agenda. A federal government statement from 1951 in regard to cultural support of homeless foreigners gives insight into the situation and the government position at the time.\textsuperscript{194} Since different national groups had voiced


\textsuperscript{191} And in this context it was stated that all measures that aimed at the integration of Germany into the international community would also benefit homeless foreigners in the end (BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, Bericht an den Hochkommissar für Flüchtlinge Herrn Dr. van Heuven-Goedhart über die Eingliederung nichtdeutscher Flüchtlinge in das deutsche Wirtschaftsleben von Dr. B. Lincke (Zürich), 8 Januar 1952, pages 9-11, quote from page 9).

\textsuperscript{192} BA B 106 9919, Richtlinien für die Tätigkeit der Eingliederungsberater, page 2. These integration counselors worked in the context of UNREF programs; their work was also coordinated through voluntary organizations such as Caritas, the Lutheran World Council and the World Council of Churches. Ukrainians had their own integration counselor, Dr. Rothalz. (BA B 106 9919, Eingliederungsberatung; BA B 106 9919, Brief von Middelmann an den Vertreter des UN Flüchtlingskommissars in Deutschland, August 1954, page 3).

\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Der Ratgeber für heimatlose Ausländer}, pages 94-98; BA B 150 3637 Heft 1, Angaben über die bewilligten Kredite, 10 September 1951. And here Ukrainians are mentioned in particular, out of 44 approved loans, 6 had gone to Ukrainian applicants, altogether 30,000 Marks.

\textsuperscript{194} BA B 106 9916, Stellungnahme zu der Frage, ob den fremden Volksgruppen (Heimatlosen Ausländern, Asylberechtigten) in der Bundesrepublik eine über den bisherigen Rahmen hinausgehende kulturelle Betreuung ermöglicht werden soll (no date given, however, there is a reference to a meeting that took place on November 9 and 28, 1951).
wishes for a certain degree of cultural activity, the government now had to decide whether it wanted ‘minority politics’ or not. In support of such a move were considerations of ‘optics’ – that is to say a better standing in the international community as a state that supported its minorities – as well as a certain concern for the future shape of the East (Gestaltung des Ostraums). However, there was one counter argument that weighed heavily in this discussion. The government regarded the preservation of cultural heritage a matter of personal interest, an attitude that was prompted by the general fear that cultural activities could easily turn into political activities. This was evident in the drafting of the official statement dealing with the question of minority cultural support, which concluded that “It cannot be in the interest of the federal government – even if the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution currently does not assert any objections to cultural activities of foreigners – to carry out a more generous support of foreign (political) folk cultures with federal funds that could cause…a minority problem within the next two or three generations.” It is important in this context that the statement had originally used the term ‘political’ to characterize this group of foreigners, which was later crossed out and replaced by the term ‘folk’. This change in terminology indicates that, overall, the group of homeless foreigners was perceived to be political, but that in public not the political, but the ethnic character of the group was to be stressed.

Although government officials were not in favor of supporting the cultural ambitions of homeless foreigners, they were eager to stress that they had no intentions of ‘Germanizing’ foreigners through any kind of pressure. However, it was considered “politically wise” not to work against the “natural forces of assimilation.” In the early 1950s, it was an unspoken policy for the federal government that if a minority group itself was unable to provide the framework for

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195 BA B 106 9916, Stellungnahme zu der Frage, ob den fremden Volksgruppen (Heimatlosen Ausländern, Asylberechtigten) in der Bundesrepublik eine über den bisherigen Rahmen hinausgehende kulturelle Betreuung ermöglicht werden soll, page 2; see also: BA B 106 9916, Vertrauliche Niederschrift über die interministerielle Besprechung im Bundesministerium für Vertriebene am 6. November 1951 über DP Organisationen, page 2f (especially the AA was of the opinion that the government ought to “make use of the foreign groups in favor of Germany,” suggesting to grant them some support without bestowing any rights upon them).

196 At the time authorities were rather afraid of political activities of these groups (BA B 106 9916, Vertrauliche Niederschrift über die interministerielle Besprechung im Bundesministerium für Vertriebene am 6. November 1951 über DP Organisationen, pages 1-3).
cultural preservation, the German government would do nothing to counteract this trend. In the realm of education, the state governments could make funds available since education was the responsibility of the states; however, the federal government was not planning to grant any money for cultural activities. Bavaria supported organizations of homeless foreigners early on. Among Ukrainians, for example, the Ukrainian Medical Charitable Service, UFU, or the UTHI received some sporadic funds for projects in Germany. As a general rule, there was no actual policy behind this initial, irregular state support, and the federal government remained aloof in this matter. However, this attitude was to change over time.

Broader support for cultural institutions came to the fore once the economic condition of homeless foreigners was on roughly the same level as that of the German population, which is to say in the mid- to late 1950s. For example, 1955 was the first year when the Bavarian government noted that there was money available to support supra-regional organizations of homeless foreigners. On the federal level, a change of attitude took place as well; the idea that support for minorities could have a positive effect on Germany’s international standing and esteem – the ‘optical reasons’ already mentioned in 1951 – became more interesting in the second half of the 1950s. Furthermore, although direct reference is rare, the influences of international developments should not be underestimated.

197 BA B 106 9916, Stellungnahme zu der Frage, ob den fremden Volksgruppen (Heimatlosen Ausländern, Asylberechtigten) in der Bundesrepublik eine über den bisherigen Rahmen hinausgehende kulturelle Betreuung ermöglicht werden soll, pages 2-5. Long quote from page 3f. 
198 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 2241, Ukrainischer Medizinischer Charitativer Dienst (UMCD), München, an das bayerische Staatsministerium des Innern, 15 Januar 1952; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 2241, Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern an den UMCD, 12 Dezember 1952; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 2241, 30 Jähriges Jubiläum der Ukrainischen Technischen Hochschule im Ausland, Sonderdruck aus Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, 3 (1952), page 4; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 2241, Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Unterricht (Elmenau) an das Bayerische Staatsministerium des Innern; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 2241, BMVt (Wussow) an das Bayerische Staatsministerium des Innern, 17 Januar 1953; Prokopchuk, Ukrainer in München, page 19f; Wojtowicz, Geschichte, page 152.
199 BA B 106 25041, Sprechzettel für den Herrn Minister, Betr: Förderung der kulturellen Belange der nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge, 18 November 1965. See also: Wieland, Das Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, page 65. Wieland stresses that this had also been the case for the expellees – first their economic status had to be secured, then the government could start thinking about cultural support (page 84f).
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in this context. Only four days after the outbreak of the Hungarian crisis in 1956,201
the Ministry of Expellees held a meeting with the state refugee administrations as
well as federal departments to discuss future support of homeless foreigners.
According to the notes of the meeting, one of the major observations in the
discussion was the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany had seen a change of
attitude towards homeless foreigners during the past years. Furthermore, the
foreign press often interpreted measures taken by the government as attempts to
‘Germanize’ foreigners, and the report of the meeting stated that “both observations
led to the consideration of whether the policies towards homeless foreigners
followed so far were still up to date and whether they should be reassessed.”202
Although economic integration was still on top of the agenda, the meeting stressed
that assimilation or “Germanizing” were not desirable – in itself this was not a new
line, because the Ministry of Expellees had made such statements before. However,
the really new outcome of this meeting was the assurance that each group was to be
supported “in their attempts to preserve their folklore, their self-reliance, their
cultural goods, and their religion” if that was what the particular community
wanted.203 The government repeated this line in its guidebook for homeless
foreigners in 1958, which stated that the federal government saw homeless
foreigners as a group that wanted to be integrated, but not assimilated. Therefore
the government’s policy was to spur economic and social integration, however, not
assimilation.204 This definition shows that integration was understood as bringing
the homeless foreigners to the same standard of living as Germans. Assimilation

201 The Hungarian revolution broke out October 23, 1956, and was bloodily crushed by Soviet
forces in the following weeks (For an overview of the Hungarian crisis from the perspective of
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, see Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom, pages 89-114).
203 BA B 106 9919 Niederschrift, 27 Oktober 1956, page 2f. Oberländer affirmed this belief in the
guidebook that informed homeless foreigners about their status in Germany, stating that each of the
non-German refugees (i.e. homeless foreigners) had the right to preserve their cultural heritage and
mother tongue (quoted in: BA B 150 4201 Heft 1, Courier 12 Februar 1959, page 5, Julius Pfeiffer,
“Juristische Neuerscheinungen”). Already a year earlier the Bavarian government had expressed
similar views, stressing that the folk and national heritage were a very important part of a human
being and therefore had to be respected. This was given as an argument to explain the support of
ethnic organizations (BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1891, Niederschrift über die Sitzung
vom 6/7 Juni 1955, auf der Fragen der Eingliederung der heimatlosen Ausländer und nichtdeutschen
Flüchtlinge beraten wurden. Zur Frage der nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge in der souveränen
Bundesrepublik, page 4).
204 Ratgeber, 1958, page XIX.
was seen as an attempt to ‘Germanize’ them – something that had to be avoided by all means, so that the international community was not offended and Germany’s international demands remained credible. Part of the motivation to actively support the preservation of heritage of these groups was the realization “that the politics pursued by the government in regard to the expellees must not become questionable.”205 For the German government, considerations towards homeless foreigners were tightly connected to their policies towards expellees and their demands on the international stage.

4.2. The Context of German Expellees

Answers to the question why the German government decided to fund cultural organizations of homeless foreigners can be found when examining the situation and general context of the expellees, refugees, and homeless foreigners in Germany. The question of homeless foreigners was a topic that never stood completely on its own in the country. Early on, Hans Harmsen pointed out that the difficulties of integrating the remaining homeless foreigners in West Germany could only be judged correctly when taking the background of the German refugee and expellee problem into consideration.206 The interconnection of the two or rather three groups (homeless foreigners, expellees, and refugees) was reinforced through the fact that they were joined under the Ministry of Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims.207

In the Ministry of Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, the expellees dominated all measures and efforts, because not only was the group huge, but their integration had seemed impossible in the beginning and therefore so much more pressing.208 A radicalization of these people who had lost everything – their houses, their possessions, their home (Heimat) – seemed very likely and was feared by a

205 BA B 106 9919, Niederschrift, 27 Oktober 1956, page 2.
206 Harmsen, Integration, page 19. For a concise overview of the situation of expellees in Germany and their influence on politics, see: Chapin, Germany, pages 29-39.
207 For information on the background of the ministry see: Wieland, Das Bundesministerium für Vertriebene.
208 Wieland, Das Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, page 21f. The anniversary booklet 1949-1969. 20 Jahre Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte can serve as an illustrative example that the measures taken by the German government focused primarily on the expellees and refugees. Homeless foreigners are only mentioned briefly in this booklet (Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte, 1949-1969. 20 Jahre Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte (Heidelberg: BMVt, 1969), see for example pages 5f, 8).
large portion of the administration. Theodor Oberländer expressed a commonly held belief when he stated in 1953 that German democracy depended on the successful integration of the expellees within the next five years.\textsuperscript{209} And this integration could not be restricted only to economic life as the federal government realized very quickly. The preservation of cultural heritage was officially anchored in the Law of Expellees (§96) which, among other things, included aspects such as the preservation of libraries, archives, and other institutions to keep expellee culture alive.\textsuperscript{210} The federal government and state governments (for example, Bavaria) were committed to safeguarding the expellee legacy not only for the sake of the expellees and refugees themselves, but for the entire German people.\textsuperscript{211} The protection of cultural heritage was connected to a deep wish to return once again to one’s home (Heimat). And “home” here meant not only the former German territories (which were now considered to be under ‘foreign occupation’) but also regions in Czechoslovakia where a lot of the expellees had lived. A statement by the German government from 1959 illustrates this point: “But all this help is only patchwork if the cause of the misery is not removed and if these people and their children do not receive the opportunity to return to their old, ancestral home. This will remain one of the aims of the German endeavors.”\textsuperscript{212} However, the West German government also stressed that only an all-German government could reach this step through negotiations, and not violence.\textsuperscript{213}

This desire to return was internationally defended with the argument that people had a “right to homeland.”\textsuperscript{214} The German government further underscored

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\bibitem{209} Oberländer, Bayern, 3. See also BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1169, 28 April 1951, Bayerns Überlastung mit Ausländern, Staatssekretär Dr. Oberländer: Ein Egoismus, der einzigartig ist.
\bibitem{210} Wieland, Das Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, pages 72-76; Bundesminister für Vertriebene, Vertriebene, pages 46, 50.
\bibitem{211} See for example BA B 106 27337, Arbeitsbericht über die Sitzung des kulturellen Unterausschusses der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Landesflüchtlingsverwaltungen zur Beratung und Durchführung des § 96 (Kulturparagraph) des Bundesvertriebenengesetzes am 2/3 November 1953 im Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Bonn, page 30. See also: Oberländer, Bayern, page 12; § 96 in Werner Ehrenforth, Bundesvertriebenengesetz vom 14 August 1957, Kommentar (Berlin, Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Franz Vahlen, 1959), page 379f.
\bibitem{212} Die Betreuung der Vertriebenen, Flüchtlinge, page 3.
\bibitem{214} The German term is “Recht auf Heimat”. Although German – contrary to general assumptions – is not the only language that contains the term Heimat, its translation into English is difficult (see

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its point by not recognizing the Oder-Neisse frontier.\textsuperscript{215} This line of reasoning played into the hands of the homeless foreigners, and the discussion about the ‘right to homeland’ was an aspect with which the organized Ukrainian community in Germany could identify. As an article in \textit{Shliakh Peremohy} illustrates, the fight for the “right to fatherland”\textsuperscript{216} was seen as a goal that Germans and Ukrainians shared and it was used to argue the validity of the Ukrainian cause.\textsuperscript{217} The German side also used this line of reasoning to evoke a feeling of understanding and sympathy. The mayor of Landshut, for example, stated at a protest meeting organized by the Ukrainian community: “I know what it means to lose the fatherland and to live outside its boundaries, for I am myself a fugitive. I sincerely sympathize with your fight; I express my deep and sincere sympathy with your struggle, the struggle for the right to fatherland.”\textsuperscript{218} Ukrainians were probably not the only group identifying with the German approach,\textsuperscript{219} and by the mid-fifties it dawned on the German government that it would be easier to continue this policy of the ‘right to homeland’ if they allowed the homeless foreigners the same rights. Pairing the two also made sense when seeking not only understanding, but also funds from the international community. Already the first Minister of Expellees, Hans Lukaschek,\textsuperscript{220} had realized that “all our measures receive more meaning if the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{215} See for example: Chapin, \textit{Germany}, pages 34-39. For further reference to the declarations of the German government in regards to “Right to Home,” see also Otto Kimminich, \textit{Das Recht auf die Heimat}, Second Edition (Bonn: Verlag Omnipress, 1979), page 9. For reflections on the ‘right to homeland’ in the context of international law, see Gornig, “Das Recht auf Heimat,” pages 33-50. Gornig points out that there are two main demands connected to the “right to homeland”: the right not to be forcibly removed from one’s homeland, and the right to return whenever one wishes (page 38). However, Gornig also points out that the right to homeland is not anchored in the Convention of Human Rights (page 43f).
\item \textsuperscript{216} This article used the term “bat’kivshchyna”, the direct translation of which is “fatherland”.
\item \textsuperscript{217} See for example: \textit{Shliakh Peremohy}, 23 September 1956, page 4, Pravo na bat’kivshchynu.
\item \textsuperscript{218} \textit{Shliakh Peremohy}, 25 November 56, page 5, Z ukrains’koho zhyttia na chuzhyni, Dvi impresy v Liandshuti. For other example see: \textit{Shliakh Peremohy}, 2 March 1958, page 1, Velychave sviato richnytsi Derzhasnovstyi v Munkheni; The speech of Hans Koch with the title “Dolia dvokh narodiv” (The fate of two people) was printed, since it had been received in very positive light, as full text in the issue of \textit{Shliakh Peremohy}, 9 March 1958, page 3.
\item \textsuperscript{219} However, more research is needed on this subject.
\item \textsuperscript{220} Hans Lukaschek (born 22 May 1885 in Breslau, died 26 January 1960 in Freiburg), a jurist by training and former mayor of the town of Rybnik/Upper Silesia, was the first minister of expellees
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DP problem is coupled with the problem of German expellees when applying for international support on an international level.” Although the case of expellees practically dominated the work of the ministry and the efforts of the German government, and although homeless foreigners never gained parity with expellees, there were still attempts to unify these two categories when approaching the international community, because the international community had an eye on what was happening in Germany with the homeless foreigners. In a way, the international community spurred the measures for homeless foreigners taken by the German government.

4.3. Pressure from the International Community and German Reactions

As Hans Harmsen pointed out, the international community took a vital interest in the fate of foreigners in Germany. International organizations such as the United Nations, the World Council of Churches, or the YMCA not only monitored from 1949 until 1953. Under his tutelage, the equalization of burdens programs and the Federal Expellee Law were brought into being.

221 BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, Lukaschek an den Hessischen Minister des Innern, 28 Juni 1952, page 2. For other examples, see: BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1854, Riedel an das Bayerische Staatsministerium des Innern, 28 Februar 1953.

222 Expellees were advantaged through measures such as the emergency aid and equalization of burdens programs, and homeless foreigners never received access to such help, a fact widely criticized by the international community (BA B 150 3637 Heft 1, Aus dem Vermerk über die Besprechung auf dem Petersberg, Sub-Committee on Refugees and DPs, 2 Februar 1951; BA B 106 9919, Übersetzung, Aide-Mémoire des Hohen Kommissars für Flüchtlinge der Vereinten Nationen über die Lage der Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, die dem Mandat seiner Dienststelle unterstellt sind, Genf, 19 Januar 1954, page 4; see also: BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, Bericht an den Hochkommissar für Flüchtlinge Herrn Dr. van Heuven-Goedhart über die Eingliederung nichtdeutscher Flüchtlinge in das deutsche Wirtschaftsleben von Dr. B. Lincke (Zürich), 8 Januar 1952).

223 Harmsen, Die Integration, page 23.

224 For examples of the UNHCR monitoring the situation in Germany, see: BA B 150 3637 Heft 1, Aus dem Vermerk über die Besprechung auf dem Petersberg, Sub-Committee on Refugees and DPs, 2 Februar 1951; BA B 106 9919, Übersetzung, Aide-Mémoire des Hohen Kommissars für Flüchtlinge der Vereinten Nationen über die Lage der Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, die dem Mandat seiner Dienststelle unterstellt sind, Genf, 19 Januar 1954, page 1; BA B 150 3637 Heft 1, MID vom 5.10.51, Nr. 40., Ausländer fühlen sich benachteiligt; BA B 106 9919, Amt des Hohen Kommissars für Flüchtlinge der Vereinten Nationen, Information Bulletin No. 9, Dezember 1955, Weihnachts- und Neujahrsbotschaft; BA B 150 3637 Heft 2, Bericht an den Hochkommissar für Flüchtlinge Herrn Dr. van Heuven-Goedhart über die Eingliederung nichtdeutscher Flüchtlinge in das deutsche Wirtschaftsleben von Dr. B. Lincke (Zürich), 8 Januar 1952; BA B 106 9316, Abschrift, Der Hessische Minister des Innern an das Bundesministerium für Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen Bonn, Wiesbaden, Aktenzeichen MD II, Betreff: Aufnahme der Tschechen aus Bayern; BA B 106 24935, Brief von Arnold Rørholt, Vertreter des UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Deutschland, an das Bundesministerium des Innern, 15 Mai 1953 (this letter, for example, stresses that homeless foreigners have to be treated like Germans when it comes to marriage formalia).
the situation, but also gave advice and criticism when necessary. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to refer to all cases of international intervention in the context of homeless foreigners. However, five major issues – some of them already discussed in this chapter – can serve as illustrative examples. First of all, as mentioned in part 2.1., the international community – here especially the Allied Authorities – had been the driving force behind the initiation of the Homeless Foreigners Act, making it the prerequisite for the Deutschlandvertrag. Furthermore, it was the international community led by the UNHCR that campaigned for a guide for homeless foreigners in Germany – an undertaking that was carried out in 1952/53. This guide was meant to ease the integration process of homeless foreigners by providing information about the “rights and duties according to the Homeless Foreigners Act.” The focus was on the legal status of this group in Germany; however, the reader could also find valuable information and addresses of the national committees and voluntary organizations responsible for homeless foreigners. The handbook was available in three languages other than German – Ukrainian, Polish, and Serbian – and was to be distributed to the state governments and the homeless foreigners themselves. If necessary, the latter were to be reached through the respective national committees. Apart from the handbook, measures taken by the government to integrate homeless foreigners (or

Ausländer und der nicht-deutschen Flüchtlinge, 6 August 1953. For general correspondence between the German government and representatives of the UNHCR see folder B 106 9919 (for other international organizations see folder 9916).

225 The World Council of Churches made clear that “the integration of those DPs who remain in Germany is observed by the entire world public with great interest, and…this problem is high on the agenda and one of the most important tasks for the World Council of Churches” (BA B 106 9916, World Council of Churches an Staatssekretär Ritter von Lex, 26 November 1951, page 10).

Churches in general played an important role not only as observers and critics of the situation; they also did a lot of work in the context of actual integration of homeless foreigners, see for example: BA B 150 3637 Heft 1, Caritasverband an das BMVt, 12 Mai 1951; BA B 150 3637 Heft 1, Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland an BMI, BMVt, AA., 26 Mai 1952; BA B 106 9916, National Catholic Welfare Conference: Service to the Residual DPs of the US Zone in Germany. Zusammenfassung der Berichte über die Monate November/Dezember 1950 und Januar/Februar 1951.

226 BA B 150 4201 Heft 1, Vermerk, betr. Ratgeber für heimatlose Ausländer, 12 Dezember 1952, page 1f.

227 BA B 150 4201 Heft 1, Der Bundesminister für Vertriebene, Az 2617 I 2 d, 13 April 1953; BA B 150 4201 Heft 1, Maurach, Vermerk, Handbuch für DPs, 20 September 1951, pages 1-6. The Ukrainian version can be found in: BA B 150 4201 Heft 2).

228 BA B 150 4201 Heft 2, Der Bundesminister für Vertriebene (im Auftrag Kleberg) an die Bundesländer, 8 November 1952, page 1f.
the lack of such measures!) stirred interest and protest among international agencies, which again required a reaction from the government.

The camp abolition program of 1954 (elaborated in part 3.2.) is another example for an at least partial response to international pressure and criticism. In the same year, the federal government decided in a response to an Aide Memoire of the UNHCR to renew donations to the UNHCR fond, but demanded that the sum of 50,000 DM had to be invested in Germany.\textsuperscript{229} In another example, the international press and their tendency to interpret integration measures on part of the German government as “attempts at Germanizing” foreigners contributed to a reconsideration of financial support for homeless foreigners in 1956 (as elaborated in 4.1.).\textsuperscript{230} The German federal government reacted to international pressure and criticism because so shortly after the war gaining status within and respect from the international community were very important to the country. Dealing with the homeless foreigners and especially addressing the question of integration became a “political issue’ due to international pressure.\textsuperscript{231} The abovementioned cases were not isolated incidents in postwar German history. Peter O’Brien lists international influence and Germany’s fear for its worldwide reputation as contributing factors in government decision making, “for overt signs of resort of Nazi like trends could easily trigger greater intervention by the allies in Germany’s affairs.” For example, when Germany restricted the incoming flow of guest workers in the 1970s and attempted to scale down its foreign population, her NATO allies would not permit mass repatriation of the Turks to avoid destabilization of the country.\textsuperscript{232}

Although compliance with international requests and ‘recommendations’ was a common feature of FRG politics, occasionally outside intervention and especially criticism was also rejected. For example, in an appeal to the UNHCR in 1954, the government stated that they “would be thankful if you would – when soliciting international help – refer to the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany


\textsuperscript{230} BA B 106 9919 Niederschrift, 27 Oktober 1956, page 2.

\textsuperscript{231} BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1169, Der Präsident der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit an die Präsidenten der Landesarbeitsämter, 24 Januar 1953.

has gone to its limits in the context of providing for the homeless foreigners. Listing Germany’s contributions could...vividly illustrate the magnitude and complexity of the tasks."\textsuperscript{233} As the evaluation of the HFA has shown, the government was convinced that it was giving the homeless foreigners a better status than any other country and that it was doing anything possible for their (preliminary) integration. And initially their dealings with the homeless foreigners did not go beyond this; the government did not have much direct contact with individual groups of homeless foreigners at that time. A closer examination of the Ukrainian situation can give us an idea why that was the case and how it changed over time.

4.4. The German Authorities, Ukrainians, and Support from the Wider Diaspora

In most of the measures that were taken by the German government during the 1950s – abolishing the camps, providing housing, or trying to find jobs – homeless foreigners had been an almost indistinguishable, faceless mass. Homeless foreigners were generally not seen as separate ethnic groups, or even more, individuals in government circles. One point of closer contact became the topic of financial assistance. Although homeless foreigners had been interested in receiving support for their institutions from the federal or state government early on, these means of funding had not been pressing for the groups in the early to mid-fifties. During the period immediately following the mass emigration, many institutions of the homeless foreigners that still existed in Germany were sponsored from within the group – however, not necessarily from within Germany. According to Oberländer, these diaspora organizations operated programs such as evening schools of which the government often had no idea; and the sources and amounts of financial contributions were hard to determine, because community leaders were

\textsuperscript{233} BA B 106 9919, Brief von Middelmann an den Vertreter des UN Flüchtlingskommissars in Deutschland, August 1954, page 4f. The Bavarian government had similar attitudes towards this topic, see BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1891, Niederschrift über die Sitzung vom 6/7 Juni 1955, auf der Fragen der Eingliederung der heimatlosen Ausländer und nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge beraten wurden. Zur Frage der nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge in der souveränen Bundesrepublik, page 3.
generally not eager to reveal them. Some support, especially for schooling, came from the respective states (since schooling was the responsibility of the states); matters that went beyond state obligations were also partially sponsored by federal sources. However, as Oberländer pointed out in 1958: “So far, payments for schooling facilities by Americans and English as well as the fellow countrymen…abroad have been larger than the ones made by the states.”

The fact that many ethnic groups were sponsored from outside of Germany made direct contact between the various groups and the German government rather rare – this is at least the picture one gets when looking at the Ukrainian case. Government material examined for this study indicates that there was not much direct contact between the German federal government and Ukrainians in the early 1950s, and even the contact between the Bavarian State government and Ukrainians was rather limited. In contrast, the ties between Ukrainians in Germany and the wider diaspora, especially in North America, were particularly close, a trend which the Bavarian government observed in 1955 for other ethnic groups as well. Many of their brethren had immigrated to the US and Canada where they established their own institutions or joined existing communities that had a broad financial base – a fact that also had positive consequences for the communities in Germany. As Oberländer pointed out, it is hard to identify all the sources, amounts, and channeling of funds. However, it is important to give an idea of what was available to Ukrainians in Germany and where at least some of the money came from.

Officially political organizations such as the supra-national Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), in which Ukrainians formed the largest group, or the Bandera faction of the OUN (OUN (B)) stressed that they were determined to keep their organization completely independent from any outside financial influence.

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234 BA B 106 25042, Dr. Oberländer an BdB Baron von Manteuffel-Szöge, 2 Mai 1958, page 1 (front and back page).
235 BA B 106 25042 Dr. Oberländer an BdB Baron von Manteuffel-Szöge, 2 Mai 1958, pages 1, 3.
236 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1891, Niederschrift über die Sitzung vom 6/7 Juni 1955, auf der Fragen der Eingliederung der heimatlosen Ausländer und nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge beraten wurden. Das aussenpolitische Moment bei der Lösung der Fragen der nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge, page 1.
237 The Origin and Development of ABN. Sonderdruck aus ABN Nr. 4, Juli/September 1963, page 3; Shliakh Peremohy, 2 Januar 1955, page 1, Pid Novyi Rik. However, Frank Golczewski states that the ABN, for example, was at least partially financed by the Americans (Golczewski, “Die ukrainische Diaspora,” page 267).
In order to reach a level of financing that would allow the organization to remain active and prospering, the ABN and OUN (B) ran donation drives, for example in community papers such as *Shliakh Peremohy*, thereby making it clear to the readers how important it was to stay independent from financial support other than their own.²³⁸ In retrospect an OUN (B) representative stated in 1962: “Notwithstanding the political and social differentiation of the Ukrainian emigration, broad circles support the OUN and thereby also the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people back home. As evidence can serve the liberation fund which enabled the OUN to conduct a liberation policy during the last seventeen years that was independent of outside influences.”²³⁹ In order to acknowledge the contributions from within the community, *Shliakh Peremohy* published lists of donors to different funds – the ABN Fund, the Liberation Fund of the OUN, another fund that supported the invalids of the UPA, and the press funds of *Shliakh Peremohy* and the ABN. An examination of these donation lists clearly reveals that the majority of contributions were from abroad, here mainly from the US, Canada, or England.²⁴⁰ Sometimes funds were established for a specific purpose, such as the donation drive for the community home in Munich that was erected mostly through international financial support in 1955/56.²⁴¹

The dependency on outside support can also be found in the financing of Ukrainian schools and kindergartens in Germany. OUZh – predominantly

²³⁸ *Shliakh Pereomhy*, 21 March 1954, page 4, Rozbuduimo fond ABN.
responsible for the kindergartens and schools in the country – stressed that the bulk of financial assistance came from abroad. Apart from food and clothing packages, Ukrainians in Germany relied on money from Ukrainians all over the world, again especially from North America, to keep the different branches of the organization as well as the kindergartens and schools running. To acknowledge the generosity of the donors, OUZh took turns to name the schools and kindergartens after their benefactors from abroad. For example, different Ukrainian women’s organizations all over the world served as patrons for these institutions.\(^\text{242}\)

Ukrainians in Germany were, of course, very grateful to their brethren from abroad for their generous support. However, this trend did not have only positive side effects, as some community leaders observed early on. Ivan Mirchuk (Johann Mirtschuk), a professor at UFU who had already worked for the USI during the interwar period,\(^\text{243}\) warned Ukrainians in 1959 that they should not be astonished that they did not have too many friends in the world because they were not using all possible opportunities “to educate in a foreign, but not hostile milieu and to form friendships with personalities who are open to our ideas.”\(^\text{244}\) Indeed, Ukrainian life in Germany was rather isolated from the mainstream society and the German government in the 1950s,\(^\text{245}\) a tendency that caused the community a rude awakening once outside support was cut off. The Ukrainian Catholic Church already noticed serious financial difficulties and a lack of funding in 1956/7 which made charitable work on a local level rather difficult.\(^\text{246}\) Plast, the Ukrainian scouting organization, had to ask for support from the Germans in 1958 to continue with their summer camps because support from the Ukrainian communities abroad was dwindling.\(^\text{247}\) And these were not the only examples. The Minister of Expellees observed a change in the flow of donations by the end of 1958, stating that

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\(^\text{245}\) This isolation was a continuing trend. Maruniak, for example, observed that the older generation showed a tendency toward isolation, whereas the younger generation assimilated (Maruniak, “Ukrainians,” page 254).
\(^\text{246}\) Wojtowicz, *Geschichte*, page 157f.
\(^\text{247}\) BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1856, Ministerialrat Preuß an Bundesminister für Familien- und Jugendfragen, 16 Oktober 1958, page 2.
especially the Americans were in the process of cutting down funding for institutions in Germany. Oberländer was aware that if these financial resources ran out in 1958, the different groups would then turn with their requests to the Ministry of Expellees and the respective state offices. And one would then have to determine “which cultural, school, religious and social organizations as well as papers can be kept and which will have to be abandoned due to a lack of financial resources.”

By the end of the 1950s, the Ukrainian community in Germany had to begin a complete reorientation process, because it had been looking to North America not only for financial support.

5. Specifics of the Ukrainian Community in Germany

5.1. The Orientation of Ukrainians in Germany towards the Broader Diaspora

The broader diaspora, especially the North American communities, played an important role for Ukrainians in Germany after the Second World. As we have established in chapters 2 and 4, and partially in this chapter, their lobbying efforts helped to bring the desperate situation of Ukrainian DPs to the attention of a wider audience, and their support made possible the survival of the major institutions throughout the transition period. Furthermore, many Ukrainians in Germany turned their hopes for a better future towards the US and Canada. But these were not the only aspects in their orientation towards the wider diaspora. It is, of course, hard to speak of an orientation of an entire group. There were Ukrainians who early on adapted to life in Germany, who attended university, found a job, established a family. Nonetheless, the organized portion of the community oriented itself towards the wider diaspora, especially North America. Community leaders had to deal with the fact that many of their members had left Germany, and they often tried to conjure the image that it did not matter where one was geographically. Those activists who ‘stayed behind’ in Germany consoled themselves with the thought that the resettlement did not separate them ideologically, that Ukrainians throughout the world were still ‘one community’ working for the Ukrainian cause, and that wherever they were, they were united through this common objective.

And Ukrainians in Germany took pride in the fact that the North American
community could boast an impressive array of newspapers, which – in their opinion – was largely due to the fact that 80% of all former Ukrainian DPs had immigrated to the US and Canada, where they had added substantially to the already existing papers. The idea that geographical location did not matter was also taken up by Maruniak when examining the Ukrainian community in Germany between 1951 and 1971. In the context of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Maruniak states that the mass emigration did not hurt the substance of the church, because, although the numbers of believers in Germany were immensely reduced due to emigration, this trend strengthened the churches abroad in countries such as the US, Canada, Australia or Argentina. Academic institutions such as UFU also stressed that many of their alumni had settled in North America, thereby strengthening the academic community there. And the invisible link between the ones who had emigrated and those who had ‘stayed behind’ was to be kept alive through the newspapers, for example.

Ukrainians in Germany did not only depend on financial contributions from abroad. When it came to the preservation of cultural life or the ‘fight for an independent Ukraine’ in the diaspora, the communities in North America were often taken as role models. When reporting about the “front of active patriots” all over the world, Shliakh Peremohy frequently took on an ecstatic tone in reference to North American cases. In categories such as “Z kul’turoho zhytttia nashoi emigratsii” (About the cultural life of our emigration) or “Z zhyttia ukraintsiv na chuzhyni” (About life abroad), the communities in the US and Canada were cited for events that went beyond mere commemorations of holidays or great Ukrainians. Shliakh Peremohy gleefully reported about the advancement of Ukrainian studies at universities such as the University of Toronto or about the high organizational level of Ukrainian students in the US. Examples of Ukrainian Canadians, who

251 Maruniak, Tom II, page 69.
255 The United States had the highest number of Ukrainian students in the diaspora (Shliakh Peremohy, 16 September 1956, page 4, Iz students’kykh obriiv Ameryky).
“although born and raised in Ontario, spoke clean Ukrainian” delighted community members traveling to the new continent and were often presented as good examples when lamenting the general horrible state of language knowledge and use in the wider diaspora.256

However, the North American communities not only served as a distant cultural stimulus, but also as direct influence. Looking back at 40 years of Ukrainian activities in Germany, CRUEG pointed out in 1985: “Our special thanks go to the Ukrainian vocal and dance ensembles which came from other countries, especially from overseas, to us in Munich, to show through their performances their spiritual connection with the Ukrainian communities in the diaspora and to strengthen them morally”257 The following incident is particularly interesting in the context of this outside influence. One of the biggest events in immediate postwar Bavarian history was the 800 year anniversary of the city of Munich, celebrated in 1958. According to the CRUEG, this event was extremely important to Ukrainians in Germany, because “maybe for the first time in the history of the city the Ukrainian flag blew among others from the building of the Deutsche Museum, in which the celebration event took place.” Ukrainians had gained some recognition and they were even invited to contribute culturally to the big event. Interestingly enough, the Ukrainian community was not represented through a group from Munich itself, but the dance ensemble “Orlyk” was flown in from England and the Byzantine choir “Antonovycha” was recruited from Holland to entertain the guests at the festivities.258 Indeed, there was no major Ukrainian choir left in Germany once the choir “Dnipro” was disbanded in 1956.259 This case not only shows how

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256 Quote from: Shliakh Peremohy, 23 November 1958, page 3, Naivazhlyvisha problema (Ivan Vodnaruk). For other positive examples, see: Shliakh Peremohy, 27 November 1955, page 3 and 5, Do pytannia vykhovannia molodi. Dity emigratsii. However, in this context it has to be stated that Shliakh Peremohy also drew attention to the fact that the North American communities had to battle language and culture loss, see for example Shliakh Peremohy, 20 October 1957, page 3, Molod’ atomovoi doby (by Yenon Tarnavs’kyi); Shliakh Peremohy, 27 September 1959, page 3, Bat’ky i ihni dity.

257 Dmytro Bilyi (Bilyj), ed., Ukrains’ki khory i solisty v Miunkheni. Zbirnyk kul’turnoho zhyttia ukrainsiv u Miunkheni (Munich: CRUEG, 1985), page 7f. It was always a highlight for the community when Ukrainian cultural organizations from abroad, such as the Bandurivtsi from the US, toured Germany (See for example Zelenets’kyi, Na hromads’ki Nyvi, page 51f).

258 Zelenets’kyi, Na hromads’ki Nyvi, page 51f.

259 Bilyi, Ukrains’ki khory, page 19. The choir was disbanded because his conductor emigrated to the US in 1956.
much community life had declined (even in such an ‘active’ city as Munich), but suggests that the community in Germany had more faith in the cultural performances of their brethren from abroad.

Apart from culture and education, Ukrainians abroad also seemed to be able to generate more significant activities in the political sphere. Demonstrations in cities such as New York that could easily bring together 3,000 people were seen as an inspiration and moral support for Ukrainians and other suppressed peoples in their fight for independence. These demonstrations were especially important because the community leaders could rally not only thousands of their own community members, but also influential representatives from the United States government, for example from the American Congress.\(^\text{260}\) And in the US, Ukrainians not only commemorated independence day (January 22) with assemblies and demonstrations in a “worthy way,” but “every year, both Chambers of the American Congress begin their work on January 22 with a prayer for Ukraine” and in some cases the Ukrainian flag was even displayed at government buildings.\(^\text{261}\) Furthermore, Ukrainians from Canada and the US often worked together to organize shared conferences, commemorations, and demonstrations that impressed their counterparts in Germany.\(^\text{262}\) Important events in North America – such as the inauguration of the archbishop Maksym Hermaniuk in Winnipeg or the swearing in of a Ukrainian (Michael Starr) as Minister of Labor to the Diefenbaker cabinet – were considered important events not only for the community in Canada,  


\(^{261}\) *Shliakh Peremohy*, 27 January 1957, page 1, Den’ Ukrains’koi Nezalezhnosti (see also: *Shliakh Peremohy*, 9 February 1958, page 1, Perydumovy dal’shykh uspikhiv). The commemorations of Independence Day in the US were seen as the most successful ones in the diaspora because they went beyond the template character that these events usually took and incorporated more political elements such as demonstrations. Apart from the American Congress, governors of different US states also acknowledged Independence Day and its importance for Ukrainians (*Shliakh Peremohy*, 3 February 1957, page 1, V Den’ Ukrains’koi Derzhavnosti). *Shliakh Peremohy* stressed that Ukrainians in Canada and the US celebrated Independence Day in a “worthy and excellent way” (*Shliakh Peremohy*, 2 February 1958, pages 1, 6, Den’ Ukrains’koi Nezalezhnosti). For an example of the raising of the Ukrainian flag at a government building, see: *Shliakh Peremohy*, 1 February 1959, page 1, Ukrains’ki prapory povivaiut’ na uriadovykh budynkah SShA.

\(^{262}\) *Shliakh Peremohy*, 30 June 1957, page 1, Na pravyl’nomu shliakhu; *Shliakh Peremohy*, 14 July 1957, page 1, Triiumfal’na manifestatsiia zaokhans’kykh ukrainsiv; *Shliakh Peremohy*, 19 July 1959, page 1, Rezoliutsii.
but for Ukrainians throughout the diaspora. And in the eyes of the Ukrainian spectators in Germany, Ukrainians in North America were able to “reveal before the entire free world the true will of the Ukrainian nation” through their demonstrations and cultural events. This analysis has shown that Ukrainians in Germany not only depended financially, but also culturally and emotionally on the wider diaspora. For many of the active members it was a reassuring thought that there were millions of other Ukrainians around the world that were not only ‘fighting the same cause,’ but doing it with a bit more success. The identification with the wider diaspora came so easily because of the common goals and aspirations.

5.2. Theoretical and Actual Goals of the Shrinking Community

Since the Ukrainian community in Germany in the 1950s was rather small and weakened, one of the primary aims was to reinvigorate community life in whatever way possible. And the circumstances were grave, as a break-down of the organizational structure demonstrated. With the drop in community members from roughly 1,000,000 in 1946 to 25,000 in the early 1950s, community life slipped out of the organizers’ hands – unless the organizers themselves packed their bags first to find a better life abroad. By the early 1950s, there was no Ukrainian gymnasiia left in Germany; only 19 out of 72 OUZh branches were still operating; and attempts of revitalization failed due to ongoing resettlement schemes and the scattering of the Ukrainian community in Germany. Due to the plummeting membership (and dues), CRUEG struggled financially and could no longer fund a number of cultural and educational projects. Smaller organizations also suffered from the mass exodus; for example, the Central Union of Ukrainian Students lost 75% of their members between 1948 and 1952.

263 Shliakh Peremohy, 17 March 1957, page 5, Z zhyttia Ukraintsiv na chuzhyni. Vrochysta intronizatsiia mytropolita v Kanadi; Shliakh Peremohy, 7 July 1957, page 1, Ukrainets’ – ministrom pratsi v Kanadi. For other examples, for instance in the realm of arts, see: Shliakh Peremohy, 16 May 1954, page 5, Kongres mysttsiv.
264 (Here in the context of the 300 anniversary of the treaty of Pereiaslav) Shliakh Peremohy, 9 May 1954, page 4, Za nezalezhnist’ Ukrainy.
266 Joukovsky, “Der Zentralverband,” page 307 (In 1948, the association had 1,950 members; in 1952, there were only 574 left).
Despite continuing problems in maintaining and reviving community life, the active leadership still formulated certain goals for their activities. One of them was to inform the world about Ukraine, its fate and history, because, unlike their counterparts back in Ukraine, Ukrainians abroad were actually able to write freely. In this context more academic works were needed to reach the community and the broader public on a higher level. This was particularly pressing since academic institutions such as the Ukrainian Free University, the UTWI, or the Shevchenko Society had virtually stopped functioning in the 1950s due to a lack of funds and staff. Apart from informing the wider world about Ukraine, Shliakh Peremohy, for example, found it was also important that Ukrainians knew what other press organs or institutions were writing about them. Therefore the paper appealed to its readers to send in news clippings about Ukraine and published extracts of international press coverage. Theoretically informing the world about Ukraine’s oppression went hand in hand with demonstrations against the Soviet Union and its politics. However, Ukrainians in Germany had neither the critical mass nor the organizational skill to organize demonstrations on a wider scale. If demonstrations – against the Soviet Union, the danger of communism in general or particular cases such as the crushing of the Hungarian revolution – took place, the numbers of participants reached maybe 200, 300 people (if that).

Apart from informing and staying informed about what was going on in Ukraine, the community focused on preserving their heritage. In this context the
active use of Ukrainian was the key factor. As one interviewee reminisced: “We always thought that Ukraine would eventually be free. And if the children have no knowledge of the Ukrainian language, then they will not become Ukrainians. Some people said, it does not matter, why should I force my children to learn Ukrainian. And now they say how sad it is that they did not do it; the children want to visit Ukraine but they cannot communicate.”

Apart from the language, preservation of heritage is closely tied to knowledge of the history and geography of the homeland as well as its traditions – in a nutshell an active community life and supportive learning environment. However, this was exactly what was missing in Germany during the 1950s. Continuing emigration, the abolition of the camps, and resettlement within Germany had diminished and scattered the community.

Furthermore, an active community life was hard to maintain because there were almost no financial means available. Due to the rather bleak situation it was even more important to organize community events and meetings to bring Ukrainians – wherever they existed in greater numbers – together. As Daria Rebet points out, what was celebrated were mostly anniversaries, as well as religious and national holidays. For these events OUZh, for example, prepared community lectures and speeches or supplied material for theatre performances.

An examination of *Shliakh Peremohy* paints a similar picture of the activities in Germany. When *Shliakh Peremohy* reported about Ukrainians in Germany, they were mostly reports about how different communities celebrated anniversaries such as January 22, religious holidays such as Easter, Pentecostal, or Christmas, and famous Ukrainians such as Shevchenko, Chuprynka, Petliura, or Konovalets. And again, many of

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272 Interview 28. For similar observation, see interview 27.
273 Although emigration only took place on a limited scale, it still hit the community hard because many of the active leaders took the opportunity to emigrate when it was offered to them, thereby initiating continuous phases of decline (*Shliakh Peremohy*, 4 August 1957, page 1, Bil’sh uvahy molodi).
274 Rebet, “Roky zanepadu”, page 51f. See also interview 29.
these events were possible only because the community received donations from abroad. When celebrating Christmas, the community was only able to distribute presents to the younger children because North American parishes or organizations such as the UCRF provided parcels and donations.\textsuperscript{276}

These holiday and anniversary celebrations often had a very formulaic structure – a talk on the particular event or person to be remembered formed the core of the event, often accompanied by a religious service. If the community was bigger, there could also be some choir or dance performances. This formulaic character led to criticism within the community, as one Shliakh Peremohy report on the 1956 Independence Day festivities in Munich illustrates:

“As usual, the program of the holiday was composed of a lecture and a cultural part, in accordance with our already established tradition. It is unfortunate that we only stick to a template. Wouldn’t it be better to celebrate the anniversary of independence day with a happier program? Wouldn’t it be more useful – after the official part – to give everybody involved the opportunity to spend this day in a friendly circle? After all, Independence Day is a holiday of joy…”\textsuperscript{277}

It is important to stress once more that community life as such was almost nonexistent in Germany in the 1950s. For many Ukrainians, the formulaic holidays and anniversaries formed the extent of their organized community life, because the church as well as academic and cultural institutions had essentially stopped functioning. The state of the community led many leaders and activist fear for the future of Ukrainians in Germany.

5.3. “Our Children are Our Future”

In the context of the homeless foreigners in Germany it is commonly assumed that “mostly sick, old, invalids, orphans, widows, prisoners and people unable to

\textsuperscript{276} For a selection of examples, see: Shliakh Peremohy, 29 January 1956, page 7, Sviato Rizdva v Lintorfi; Shliakh Peremohy, 9 February 1958, page 5, Rizdviani impresy. See also interviews 28, 30.

\textsuperscript{277} Shliakh Peremohy, 29 January 1956, page 1, Den’ derzhavnosti v Miunkheni. For a celebration of independence that finally diverted from the usual pattern, see Shliakh Peremohy, 2 March 1958, page 1, Velychave sviato richnytsi: Derzhavnosti v Miunkheni.
work” stayed behind in Germany. However, looking at statistics from the mid-1950s, it becomes obvious that there were a growing number of young people who eventually would be able to work and had to be integrated into the German economy and society. Harmsen points out that the group of 0-15 years grew steadily and comprised 31% of all homeless foreigners in 1954 (compared to 23.6% among the Germans). He attributes this fact to the “fecundity” especially of the Slavic groups and in the secure camp environment. Other reports on Germany (and the situation in the camps) support these findings. The State of Schleswig Holstein confirmed that the proportion of sick people among the homeless foreigners, especially those suffering from TB, was very high; but it also stated that one third of the homeless foreigners were under the age of 14; furthermore, there were not many people older than 65. Harmsen was convinced that “the growing percentage of children and youngsters forces us to address the problem of integrating this remaining group of homeless foreigners with new energy. Roughly on third of this group are young people who still have their future ahead of them!” Although the birth rate dropped once the homeless foreigners moved into the small apartments in the newly erected settlements, the percentage of young children and youngsters was still remarkably high during the 1950s.

Taking this statistical material into consideration, it is not astonishing that raising children was seen as one of the most important tasks of the diaspora. *Shliakh Peremohy* featured an entire series about children and their role in the Ukrainian community (Do problemy vykhovynnia molodi – About the problems of raising the youth). As an article in *Shliakh Peremohy* pointed out, it was not hard to cultivate love for the fatherland in those Ukrainian men and women who had grown up in Ukraine, because they knew it, loved it, and would never forget it. However, it was seen as a harder task to instill this love in “our small refugees, the majority of whom has never seen the fatherland and who have been wandering so much.”

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278 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 2241, Ukrainischer Medizinischer Charitativer Dienst, München, an das Bayerische Staatsministerium des Innern, 15 Januar 1952, page 1.
279 Harmsen, *Die Integration*, pages 35-37, see also pages 55-61.
281 Harmsen, *Die Integration*, page 36.
282 Harmsen, *Die Integration*, page 44. Harmsen takes here Ukrainians in settlements such as Neu-Ulm or Munich-Ludwigsfeld as an example.
Youth organizations such as SUM or Plast were regarded as important instruments in this educative process\textsuperscript{283} and especially the summer camps – organized by Plast, SUM, or the Ukrainian Caritas\textsuperscript{284} – were seen as the way reach these children and teach them something about their Ukrainian background.\textsuperscript{285} It becomes obvious how desperate the situation must have been within the community, because the summer camps were even seen by some community members as a substitute for the Ukrainian school, the Ukrainian community, and partially even the Ukrainian family – in a way they were the last bastion against the ‘denaturalization’ process so often lamented in the community.\textsuperscript{286} However, even this article in \textit{Shliakh Peremohy} made it clear that there were not enough camps available for the youth.\textsuperscript{287} Saturday schools were also seen as important especially for teaching Ukrainian to these children, and in this context it quickly became obvious that the ‘denationalization process’ was not an illusion. For example, in the initial stage of organizing Saturday schools in Munich in the early 1950s, three quarters of the children did not speak any Ukrainian when starting school.\textsuperscript{288} Summer camps also revealed how little many children knew about Ukrainian language, history, or geography.\textsuperscript{289} Since children were considered the key to community survival (the community went by the motto: “our children are our future”), their education and general upbringing were at the top of the agenda of many organizations, but, unfortunately not of all the parents. And the parents’ indifference was often blamed

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{283} \textit{Shliakh Peremohy}, 20 June 1954, page 5, My – malen’ki Ukraintsi; \textit{Shliakh Peremohy}, 29 August 1954, page 1, Shkola, dity, bat’ky i hromadianstvo.
\item \textsuperscript{284} For activities of the Ukrainian Caritas, see Wojtowicz, \textit{Geschichte}, page 156f.
\item \textsuperscript{285} \textit{Shliakh Peremohy}, 28 February 1954, page 5, Plastovi litni tabory v Nimechchyni.
\item \textsuperscript{286} Community activists were mainly concerned that the children would lose their Ukrainian background, that they would “drown in the foreign sea” (See for example: \textit{Shliakh Peremohy}, 23 November 1958, page 3, Naivazhlyvisha problema (by Ivan Vodnaruk); see also: Zelenets’kyi, \textit{Na hromads’kii nyvi}, pages 41, 55, 59).
\item \textsuperscript{287} \textit{Shliakh Peremohy}, 22 April 1956, page 3, Do problemy vykhovynnia molodi: Vsi nashi dity do litnikh taboriv.
\item \textsuperscript{288} \textit{Shliakh Peremohy}, 15 August 1954, page 5, Nam Pyshut’ zvidusil’: Zakinchennia shkil’noho roku. A documentary about the Ukrainian settlement in Munich-Ludwigsfeld also revealed that the majority of children did not know any Ukrainian when starting the school (\textit{Shliakh Peremohy}, Easter 1956, page 9, Dity odniei oseli).
\item \textsuperscript{289} \textit{Shliakh Peremohy}, 29 August 1954, page 1, Shkola, dity, bat’ky i hromadianstvo.
\end{itemize}
for the lack of knowledge of Ukrainian issues. One contributor to *Shliakh Peremohy* even went so far to accuse all those parents who instilled dislike for the mother tongue in their children just so that they would have an easier life in the new environment of being “national villains.” In his opinion, children sensed very well whether parents disliked their mother tongue or not; and therefore it was not astonishing if they renounced it as well. Parents and their contribution to education were so vitally important because once the children started school there was little chance that they would “return to the language” if they did not speak Ukrainian, as one observer remarked. According to Daria Rebet, indifference towards Ukrainian issues was especially visible among the less educated portion of the community and in mixed marriages. On other occasions, the poor health and economic conditions of the parents were also seen as obstacles to establishing Saturday schools for the children of the community. At community functions, teachers and other representatives urged parents to teach their children Ukrainian language and traditions, to send them to Ukrainian school, and to fully support the work of the Ukrainian teachers. Indeed, apart from summer camps, a lot of pressure was on schools and kindergartens to preserve and instill some level of Ukrainian heritage. However, the following numbers illustrate that even the school could not provide a stable environment for the children. Unfortunately, statistics for the late 1950s do not exist, but a comparison between 1956 and 1961 can illustrate that the school system, which had already been hurt due to the abolishment of the camps, experienced a further decline during the late 1950s. In 1956, there were 40

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290 *Shliakh Peremohy*, 29 August 1954, page 1, Shkola, dity, bat’ky i hromadianstvo. Parents’ lack of interest in general education was also observed by German teachers who taught Ukrainian students in a special high school in Xanten (Wojtowicz, *Geschichte*, page 118f.).


293 Rebet, Roky zanepadu, page 57f. Other organizations also stressed that the majority of the zalyshentsi had a rather low level of education (BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 2241, Ukrainischer Medizinischer Charitativer Dienst, München, an das Bayerische Staatsministerium des Innern, 15 Januar 1952, page 1). When conducting interviews in the Ukrainian community in Munich, it became apparent that those people who had come during the Second World War and were still active in church and community life were predominantly intellectuals – doctors, teachers, journalists etc. Bernadetta Wojtowicz confirms this observation, stating that mostly intellectuals were active in the Munich parish (Wojtowicz, *Geschichte*, page 78).

294 *Shliakh Peremohy*, 22 February 1959, page 5, Ukrainsi v Haidel’berzi.

Saturday schools with 910 children in the country. By 1961, OUZh, together with the educational branch of CRUEG, still counted 36 Saturday schools, but only 588 pupils.\textsuperscript{296} One of the last bastions of Ukrainian life in Germany was crumbling fast.

6. Conclusion

As the evaluation of camp life in the 1940s has shown, the DP camps under UNRRA and IRO administration had a transitional character, and the displaced persons’ lives were dominated by either repatriation or resettlement. For many of the displaced persons who became homeless foreigners in 1950, this state of change, of waiting and hoping did not end as quickly as one might assume. Their transition to German administration and their new status as ‘homeless foreigners’ imply a caesura date for this group. However, examining the case of Ukrainians in Germany more closely, it becomes obvious that we cannot speak of an actual turning point for many of the homeless foreigners in 1951. The transition into the German economy, which was tightly connected to the abolition of the camps and an improved housing policy, was a slow process that took years. One could therefore aptly describe the 1950s as a never ending waiting loop for the homeless foreigners in Germany.

The slow transition of homeless foreigners into the German society can be explained by different factors. On the one hand, homeless foreigners were not the focus of the German federal and state authorities’ attention. Priority was given to the millions of expellees and refugees whose revolutionary potential alarmed the German authorities and whose settlement process was spurred through measures such as the equalization of burdens program. Initially, homeless foreigners played only a peripheral role in this context, and their transition into the German economy received attention primarily due to pressure from the international community. In the mid-1950s, the German government took a deeper interest in the matter of homeless foreigners because it hoped to tie demands on the international stage with regard to expellees to the fate of the homeless foreigners. However, the actual outcome of the measures taken was far from satisfactory. This study does not agree with Gabriele Dietz who sees the integration of homeless foreigners as a successful

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process and the measures provided by the state and federal governments as sufficient, but rather concurs with the stance put forward by Wagner and other authors who see the integration of homeless foreigners as a half-hearted effort by the German government.

On the other hand, the homeless foreigners themselves were often not interested in their German surroundings. During the early 1950s, many of them harbored hopes to start a new life abroad, especially in the United States and in Canada. And for the organized Ukrainian community the orientation towards the wider diaspora did not stop there. The Ukrainian communities in the diaspora and especially on the North American continent served as a source of inspiration and as a positive example for their counterparts in Germany. This view was additionally strengthened by the fact that the Ukrainian organizations in Germany would not have survived the transition period without the considerable financial support from the wider diaspora. And even with this support maintaining cultural activities was hard. The “zaleshentsy” who were still in Germany after 1951 came from a very active organizational background; they had experienced a camp life with vibrant activities in the realms of religion, culture, and above all education. In theory, many of the former organizations still existed throughout the 1950s, but only a few were somewhat active. Emigration had deprived the community of its most active members; and although the transition from the camps into the settlement meant an improvement of living standards for the homeless foreigners, it also eliminated the strongest base for any kind of Ukrainian community life, because many schools or churches were abolished along with the camps. Repeated attempts to reinvigorate the community were unsuccessful due to on-going emigration of the leadership, a scattered community, internal political bickering, an enormous drop in membership and a desperate financial situation. This situation got even worse once the North American communities scaled down the flow of donations in the late 1950s. As a result the community organizations turned towards the federal and state governments to solicit support for their organizations, a request that was actually heard.

During the early 1950s the German authorities were occupied with managing homeless foreigners in Germany, and their measures had mostly an administrative character and focused on finding housing and job opportunities for homeless foreigners. Once the economic situation was rudimentarily secured, support for cultural institutions came to the forefront. In the climate of the Hungarian Revolution and a heightened international interest in the fate of the homeless foreigners, the German authorities discovered the merits of supporting cultural organizations of homeless foreigners, especially when it came to promoting their own formula of the ‘right to homeland’ within the international community. Accordingly, during the 1950s the basis was laid for future interaction with homeless foreigners during the 1960s – a basis that was rather fragile as the next decade would show.

By the end of the 1950s, an event shattered the Ukrainian community not only in Germany, but also in Canada and around the world. Stepan Bandera, the leader of the OUN (B) faction, died in his house in Munich – assassinated, as it later turned out, by a KGB agent. This event once more drew the attention to two facts which will be further explored in chapter 8 – the political nature of the group and the ongoing interest that the Soviet Union still took in the community and its affairs.
Chapter Eight: The 1960s in Germany – A Time of Trouble and Reconciliation

Reflections on the 1960s assumed “mythical proportions” not only in Canada, but also in Germany. As the article collection *Dynamische Zeiten* has shown, the 1960s in Germany were indeed a vibrant decade that should not only be judged by the 1968 revolution. Reforms in areas such as education, the first steps in coming to terms with the country’s Nazi past, and a seemingly unending economic boom were ongoing features of the decade. As vibrant as the decade was for Germans, existing documentation suggests that it was a rather dull period in the lives of the homeless foreigners. Indeed, most studies examining the fate of this group conclude with the end of the 1950s. However, the 1960s were still of importance for homeless foreigners in general and Ukrainians in particular, as this chapter will show. By the end of the 1950s, the situation of homeless foreigners in Germany had stabilized to some degree. The move from the camps into the settlements and the acquisition of jobs had been slow, but eventually successful for many of the group; and in the early 1960s Ukrainian life in Germany had the chance to flourish once again. This chapter explores the state of the community throughout the 1960s, focusing on the interaction with the federal and the Bavarian government.

1. Secondary Literature, Source Base and General Approach
As chapter 6 has shown, homeless foreigners in general and Ukrainians in particular do not feature prominently in German historiography. Facts about the Ukrainian experience during the 1960s – especially overviews of organizational developments and internal political disputes – can be found in Maruniak’s second volume of *Ukrains’ka emigratsiia*. Furthermore, community publications can provide context and also serve as primary source material. In the broader context

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1 Owram, *Born at the Right Time*, page 159.
5 Maruniak, *Tom II*.
6 In addition to the community publications mentioned in chapter 7, chapter 8 also takes the following articles into consideration: O. Sulyma-Boiko (Bojko), *Materialy pro diialnist’*
of émigré life in Germany, the development of Radio Free Europe and Radio Libery is of interest to us. These stations not only offered employment opportunities for many Ukrainians, but were also important in defining the émigré relationship with the Soviet Union.7

The majority of primary sources for this chapter come from the Federal Archives in Koblenz and the Bavarian Central State Archive in Munich. However, the sheer quantity of the source base does not compare to that accumulated for the 1950s in the same archives. The reason for this is quite simple. During the 1950s, the German government was occupied with finding solutions for urgent problems such as the abolition of camps or finding housing and jobs for homeless foreigners and expellees. In contrast to these broad programs, during the 1960s the German authorities targeted smaller, specific issues such as acquisition of citizenship or financial support for academic institutions. The latter turned out to be vital for Ukrainians in Germany. In 1963, the Ukrainian Free University (UFU), the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute (UTHI), and the Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh) were joined under one umbrella organization – the Association for the Advancement of Ukrainian Studies (AAUS). The publications of this conglomerate (Mitteilungen, Jahrbuch der Ukrainekunde) as well as publications of the learned societies8 allow an insight into the institutions’ activities and their own interpretations of the Ukrainian experience in Germany. Ukrainian journalists were also active in the Association of the Free Press (AFP, Verband der Freien Presse) which included newspapers of groups from behind the Iron Curtain. Their press organ Freie Presse Korrespondenz and other publications not only address general topics such as the new Foreigners Law of 1965, but also deal with the formation of the AAUS or Bandera’s murder in 1959, thereby providing us with

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8 In addition to the publications mentioned in chapter 7, the following source is of importance for this chapter: Pedahohichni problemy ta dydaktychni porady. Materiaily Vyshkil'noho Kursu dlia Uchyteliv Subotnikh Shkil (Miunkhen, 23-26 May 1969) (Munich: UFU, 1969).
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an analysis of these events. Due to the particularity of the source base, this chapter deals mostly with individual aspects of Ukrainian life in Germany and is not confined to the 1960s, but also refers to the 1950s when necessary. Part 2 addresses Bandera’s murder and the Stashynksyi trial, highlighting the political character of Ukrainians in Germany. Part 3 deals with Ukrainian community life in Germany and explores how different organizations developed (or declined) during the 1960s. In section 4, we discuss the creation of the AAUS and federal and state financial support for organizations of homeless foreigners. The conclusion evaluates which factors were important for Ukrainians during the 1960s and what role the German government played in this context.

2. Ukrainians in Germany – a Political Group

2.1. Bandera’s Murder and the Stashynksyi Trial

The 1950s ended with a shock for Ukrainians in Germany and the wider diaspora, when one of their leading political figures and an icon of the Ukrainian liberation fight – Stepan Bandera – was found dead in the stairway of his apartment building in Munich on October 15, 1959. From the very beginning, the organized Ukrainian community was convinced that Bandera had not died of natural causes. Only three days after his death, a special edition of Shliakh Peremohy announced the murder of Bandera to the wider community and lamented the terrible loss of the “great son of the Ukrainian nation.” Despite its initial shock and desperation, the organized Ukrainian community was not paralyzed. In accordance with their requests, the Bavarian authorities performed Bandera’s autopsy in the presence of a

9 The press organ of the AFP was the Freie Presse Korrespondenz. Publications include: Kristof Greiner, Wolodymyr Lenyk, and Zoltan Makra, eds., Kommunismus. Gestern Heute Morgen (Munich: Verband der Freien Presse, 1965).
10 For a concise overview of Bandera’s life (however, from a OUN (B)’s perspective), see Danylo Chaikovskyi (Tschajkowskyj), “Stepan Bandera, sein Leben und Kampf,” pages 44-58.
11 Shliakh Peremohy, 18 October 1959, page 1, Stepan Bandera.
12 See for example interview 28 (one of the leading OUN (B) members in Munich at the time). In an appeal to the Ukrainian community, the OUN leadership avowed that Bandera’s murder would be answered with “steadfastness, unity, determination, activity” (Leitung der Auslandsverbände der Organisation der Ukrainischen Nationalisten, “Benachrichtigung über Banderas Tod,” in Russischer Kolonialismus in der Ukraine. Berichte und Dokumente (Munich: Ukrainischer Verlag, 1962), 416). Members of the community who were not affiliated with the OUN (B) also stressed that Bandera’s death came as a shock (see for example interviews 30, 34).
Ukrainian doctor, and once glass splinters and traces of prussic acid were found, not only the Ukrainian community was convinced that this was a murder case.\textsuperscript{13}

For the next two years, a variety of rumors and speculations centered around Bandera’s death, including suspicions that Bandera had committed suicide or had been poisoned by his secretary.\textsuperscript{14} To counter the OUN (B) declarations that Bandera had been murdered by Moscow,\textsuperscript{15} the Soviet authorities spread the theory that Theodor Oberländer, the Minister of Expellees at the time, had ordered Bandera’s assassination because Oberländer feared Bandera as a witness for the 1941 massacre in L’viv and Oberländer’s alleged involvement in it.\textsuperscript{16} However, once Bandera’s murderer Bohdan Stashynskyi defected to West Berlin, surrendered to the Americans and was arrested by the German authorities on September 1, 1961,\textsuperscript{17} revelations started to surface that linked Bandera’s murder to high Soviet authorities, in particular to Alexander Shelepin, the chairman of the Committee for State Security in the Ministerial Council of the USSR at the time of the murder, and Nikita Khrushchev, the head of the Ministry Council.\textsuperscript{18}

While the Federal Republic of Germany started to prepare for its trial of Stashynskyi, the East German government did not take long to present its own version of the events. At a press conference on October 13, 1961, East Germany presented a ‘defector’ from the West, Stepan Lippholz (also operating under the pseudonym Liebholz), who claimed to have fled the FRG because he knew who had ‘really’ murdered Bandera. He accused an OUN member in Germany, the

\textsuperscript{13} For a Ukrainian community perspective see Interviews 28, 32. For local Munich coverage, see: \textit{8 Uhr Blatt}, 16 Oktober 1959, page 1, Agentenmord in München? Partisanen Chef tot aufgefunden; \textit{8 Uhr Blatt}, 17 Oktober 1959, page 1, Stefan Bandera starb durch Gift.

\textsuperscript{14} Stepan Lenkavskyi (Lenkawskyj), “Drei Leiter der ukrainischen Befreiungsbewegung durch Moskau ermordet,” in \textit{Petlura – Kowalez}, 7-24, page 14f. Lenkavskyi notes that rumors such as these were spread by the Soviet side to cause confusion and divert attention from the accusations of a politically motivated murder (Stepan Lenkavskyi (Lenkawskyj), “Sowjetrussische Morde im Ausland und ihre Tarnungsmethoden,” in \textit{Russischer Kolonialismus}, 343-360, page 350f.


\textsuperscript{16} Karl Anders, \textit{Mord auf Befehl. Der Fall Staschynskyj. Eine Dokumentation aus den Akten} (Pfaffenhofen: Ilmgau Verlag, 1963), pages 77-79; Lenkavskyi, “Sowjetrussische Morde,” pages 352-354. Lenkavskyi points out that Bandera was not present in L’viv at the time of the massacre because he was in a German prison.

\textsuperscript{17} BA B 131 201 (Unterordner 37), Bericht an den Präsidenten des BKA (z. Hd. von Herrn Präsident Dullien), Bad Godesberg den 15. September 1961, Betrifft Wochenmeldung für die Zeit vom 1.-7. September 1961.

Ukrainian Dmytro Myskiv (Myskiw), of poisoning Bandera and stated that Myskiv himself was later killed by agents of the German Federal Intelligence Service.\(^{19}\) According to Soviet and GDR statements, Myskiv had committed the murder under orders from the German Federal Intelligence Service and Oberländer, who wanted to get rid of Bandera because he refused to cooperate with the German secret service.\(^{20}\) According to the East German authorities, “from this and much other evidence presented to the public about the activities of Bonn’s Secret Service, it is evident that this secret organization, in its struggle against the GDR and other countries of the socialist camp, …[does] not hesitate to use provocation, sabotage, and even murder.”\(^{21}\) However, the Stashynskyi trial revealed that it was actually the other way around. And even before the trial took place, the Ukrainian side demonstrated that Myskiv could not have poisoned Bandera because Myskiv was in Rome at the time of the assassination. Furthermore, Bandera had not had lunch yet on the day that he was murdered.\(^{22}\)

The Stashynskyi trial took place between October 8 and 19, 1962, in Karlsruhe. It exposed not only the details of the Bandera murder, but also confirmed that Lev Rebet, the leader of a third OUN division (OUN abroad) and co-editor of Ukraїns’kyi Samostiinyk after the split within the OUN (B) in 1953/54, was also murdered by Stashynskyi himself.\(^{23}\) Both murders and the trial in Karlsruhe have been reported by Ukrainian, German, and American observers,\(^{24}\) and the following is only a short synopsis of the most important points. Born in 1931 in the village of Borschchiv, close to L’viv, Bohdan Nikolaevich Stashynskyi was recruited into the Soviet secret service at the age of 19. He first traveled to


\(^{21}\) Who Actually Killed, page 14.


\(^{23}\) Anders, Mord auf Befehl, page 20.

\(^{24}\) See for example Chaikovs’kyi, Moskovs’ki vyvytsi; Anders, Mord auf Befehl; Hearing before the Subcommittee, pages V-XV, 81-168.
West Germany in 1956 where he operated under different aliases during the next few years. In the spring of 1957 he received an order to spy on Rebet, a task that eventually led to the directive to assassinate the political leader. According to Stashynskyi, one rationale behind this instruction was the accusation that the OUN leadership intimidated and threatened Ukrainians in Germany and thus prevented them from returning home. Stashynskyi murdered Rebet on October 12, 1957 with a specially designed cyanide weapon which led authorities to believe that Rebet had died of a weak heart. Throughout 1958, Stashynskyi continued his undercover activities and started to focus on Stepan Bandera. His surveillance included, for example, the commemoration of the 20 year anniversary of Konovalets’ murder which took place in Rotterdam in May of 1958, an event at which Bandera gave one of the main speeches. After shadowing Bandera’s every move in Munich throughout most of 1959, on October 15 Stashynskyi finally killed the OUN (B) leader with the same weapon that he had used on Rebet. Upon his return to the Soviet Union he received the Red Banner from Shelepin as an official recognition of his service to the country.25 The German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) went to great lengths to verify Stashynskyi’s statement before the trial began, and, as internal correspondence with the president of the BKA emphasized, no clues emerged that would have raised reservations.26 The evidence collected during the investigation was presented at the trial, thereby leaving no doubt in the minds of western commentators that Stashynskyi’s testimony was genuine.27

On October 19, 1962, the Supreme Court of Germany sentenced Stashynskyi to eight years in prison on two counts of murder and one count of treason. Although the court stressed that it had no intention to acquit Stashynskyi of his crime, the verdict made it quite clear that the guilt of the Soviet regime was far greater because orders for these murders had been issued by a “Soviet highest

25 Anders, Mord auf Befehl, pages 9-42; Hearing before the Subcommittee, pages VIII-XII.
26 Stashynskyi was also questioned by BKA officers in his mother tongue to ensure the validity of his claims (BA B 131 201 (Unterordner 40), Bericht an den Präsidenten des BKA (z. Hd. von Herrn Präsident Dullien), Bad Godesberg, den 6. Oktober 1961: Betrifft Wochenmeldung für die Zeit vom 29.9-5.10.1961, page 5). The authorities came to the conclusion that Stashynskyi’s testimony could not be challenged (BA B 131 201(Unterordner 44), Bericht an den Präsidenten des BKA (z. Hd. von Herrn Präsident Dullien), Bad Godesberg den 3. November 1961, page 4).
27 See for example: Anders, Mord auf Befehl, pages 64-67; Hearing before the Subcommittee, pages 33-44.
authority.”

Hence Stashynskyi was depicted as a “tool” of the authorities, as a “poor devil” who had acted under threats, fearing for the lives of his close relatives back in Ukraine. The sympathy that the court expressed towards Stashynskyi arose from its interpretation of Germany’s past, as the following argument provided at the end of the trial illustrates:

“For two reasons, we in particular must show especial understanding for the scars and damage which such drill leaves on the human soul, - we, Goethe’s and Lessing’s fellow-countryman, who, in the heart of Europe, in the course of twelve years under the criminal influence of the likes of Hitler, Goebbels and their clique became the scourge of civilized humanity, - we, the people of whom 18 million members are at present still obliged to live in the Soviet sphere of power. For an almost equal period, namely for eleven years, the accused was the tool and subject of the MGB-KGB.”

Overall, Ukrainian representatives in the diaspora agreed with the Supreme Court’s verdict. For them it was important to stress that the murders had been ordered by the Soviet government officials, and therefore Stashynskyi could not be the only person held responsible for these crimes. Although many Ukrainians were content with the court’s decision, for some the final verdict was not enough. The Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), for example, demanded that those who had participated in planning the crimes should be extradited to Germany, or, if that was not possible, should be sentenced in absentia by a German court. These were

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30 Hearing of the Subcommittee, pages 82-95, quote from page 83. The verdict also assessed Stashynskyi to be “intelligent…and more inclined to be soft-hearted – a person who by nature is peaceable. Without the Soviet system, which like the national Socialist system, regards political murder by the state as justifiable and necessary, he would probably now be a teacher somewhere in Ukraine” (Hearing of the Subcommittee, page XIV).
31 Freie Presse Korrespondenz 10 (11/12) (1962), page 1, V. Lenyk, Das Urteil ist gesprochen.
32 “Protestresolution des ABN gegen die Mordtaten der Moskauer Regierung,” in Petlura – Konowalez, 73-78, page 77f. Protest notes from Munich or Ingoldstadt, for example, had the same tenor (“Protestresolutionen,” in Petlura – Konowalez, page 79). Bandera’s widow also stated that she planned to lay charges against Khrushchev before the United Nations (Chaykovsk’y, ed., Moskovs’ki vbyvtsi, page 341f, press conference held by ZCh OUN October 19, 1962, statement made by one of the lawyers representing Bandera’s widow).
requests for a response to the crime that put the federal government into a difficult situation.

Once the court had come to a decision, the German government had to address the fact that Soviet authorities had ordered murders to be carried out on Germany territory. Their response was eagerly awaited by many Eastern European homeless foreigners in the country. No reference was found to either Bandera’s murder or the Stashynskyi trial in the sources that were unearthed from the Federal Archives in Koblenz or the Bavarian Central State Archive in Munich for this project, and therefore we cannot draw any conclusions about the internal reaction to these events (within the BMVt, for example). This does not necessarily mean that this reaction did not exist, as further research could very well uncover such material. So far, we can only assess the external, that is to say the official, response of the German government. On April 23, 1963, the Foreign Office (AA) sent an official note to the Soviet embassy, recapitulating the facts of the two murders and the trial and stating that the court had come to the conclusion that both crimes had been committed under the order of Soviet authorities. The note further remarked that:

“The federal government feels impelled to point out to the government of the USSR that this kind of conduct stands in flagrant discrepancy with the generally accepted principles of law, especially of international law. The federal government requests that the government of the USSR to take appropriate measures to ensure that such incidents will not be repeated. The Foreign Office uses this opportunity to affirm its respect to the embassy of the USSR.”

The German government was clearly uncomfortable with this situation and tried to keep its response as moderate as possible. Nonetheless, to Ukrainians and other homeless foreigners, it was great “gratification that the German federal government…dares in today’s hard times to publicly unmask the eastern World Power No. 1 and to accuse it of deliberate murder of two Ukrainian exile politicians.”

33 Chaikovs’kyi, ed., Moskovs’ki vyvtsi, page 622.
34 Freie Presse Korrespondenz 11 (4) (1963), page 1, Protest gegen Sowjetmorde.
2.2. Ukrainians as Political Refugees

For the organized Ukrainian community in Germany, the Supreme Court’s verdict reaffirmed the notion that Ukrainians in the diaspora, particularly the group in Germany, were exclusively part of a political emigration. In a way, Bandera’s murder and the highly publicized trial gave credence to Ukrainian claims of the strength and importance of their group. As Volodymyr Lenyk, a journalist for Shliakh Peremohy and member of the AFP, stated in 1965, “the significance of the anti-communist emigration is expressed in the fact that Moscow and the satellite regimes spend such enormous financial means to fight the leading anti-communist emigrants and their organizations and that they do not shy away from murder attempts.”

The murder victims became symbols of freedom and independence and joined the ranks of Ukrainian political figures such as Konovalets and Petliura, who had also been assassinated by Soviet agents. Community leaders warned that there were more murders pending and listed Bandera’s immediate family, Danylo Chaikovskyi (the editor of Shliakh Peremohy), and OUN (B) member Ivan Kashuba as possible targets. According to insider information, Iaroslav Stetsko (Jaroslav Stetzko), head of the ABN and one of the most influential Ukrainian leaders in the diaspora after the deaths of Bandera and Rebet, had also been on the KGB’s black list. And Ukrainian representatives did not accuse the Soviet

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35 Volodymyr Lenyk, “Die antikommunistische Emigration,” in Kommunismus. Gestern Heute Morgen, ed. Greiner, 125-133, page 128. Once Stashynskyi’s arrest was announced to the press, OUN (B) officials made a statement that mirrors Lenyk’s interpretation: “The idea of national liberation of Ukrainians and other subjugated people represents a great danger to Moscow. This is why Moscow still commits terrorist acts against advocates of this idea who live in free countries of the western world” (“Widerhall auf die Verhaftung des Mörders,” in Petlura – Konowalez, 66-67, page 67).


38 Stetsko, Die Weltgefahr unserer Zeit, pages 23-26. However, Stashynskyi stressed during his trial that he had never actually received an order to murder Stetsko. Hearing before the Subcommittee, pages 164-168.
authorities only of murder. Bomb attacks that targeted Ukrainian institutions such as printing houses – sources of anti-communist brochures and newspapers – were quickly attributed to communist agitators, even if no suspects were ever arrested.\textsuperscript{39} In addition, attacks on political and societal leaders of other Eastern European groups as well as members of Radio Liberty\textsuperscript{40} contributed to the feeling of being a targeted group in exile.

\textbf{2.2.1. Germany as a ‘Hotbed’ of Eastern European Political Activities}

The notion held by the organized Ukrainian community that they were part of a larger political emigration was further strengthened through the broader context of émigré life in Germany that centered on Munich. According to a 1968 report of the \textit{Haus der Begegnung}, a German cultural institution that supported a variety of homeless foreigners’ activities, 36,735 out of 150,000 homeless foreigners lived in Bavaria and 19,596 of them in Munich alone. Therefore it was not surprising that the majority of organizations of homeless foreigners, such as the AFP, were located there.\textsuperscript{41} The Bavarian and Federal authorities attributed “high political importance“ to these émigré groups that had their umbrella organizations in the US, but kept their anti-communist subdivisions on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.\textsuperscript{42} Initially this part of émigré life was very much removed from the

\textsuperscript{39} For example, in July of 1959 an attack was made on the printing house of Peter Beleis, a Ukrainian in exile whose establishment focused on anti-communist propaganda brochures and newspapers (Verband der Freien Presse, \textit{Wir klagen an!}, page 2). In 1961, a bomb attack was made on the printing house “Cicero”, an associate of the OUN (B) group which was also located in the Zeppelinstrasse (\textit{Freie Presse Korrespondenz} 9 (4) (1961), page 1, Anschlag auf ukrainische Druckerei).

\textsuperscript{40} The Yugoslavian and the Slovak community lost exile leaders through assassinations and Radio Liberty lost at least two of its members under questionable circumstances that were related to Soviet agent activity (Verband der Freien Presse, \textit{Wir klagen an!}, page 1f; \textit{Freie Presse Korrespondenz} 17 (3/4) (1969), page 15, Mordserie schockt die Münchener Polizei; \textit{Freie Presse Korrespondenz} 17 (5) (1969), page 1, Weiteres Attentat auf Exil Serben; \textit{Freie Presse Korrespondenz} 9 (4) (1961), page 1, Anschlag auf ukrainische Druckerei; Puddington, \textit{Broadcasting Freedom}, page 228f. For victims of RFE, among them the famous Markov case, see pages 240-245.

\textsuperscript{41} BA B 106 28287, Brief von Gerda Richter, Leiterin des Haus der Begegnung, an das BMVt, Oberregierungsrat Appelius, 24 Oktober 1968, page 1f. The AFP moved their headquarters from Augsburg to Munich in the early 1950s because the majority of exile printing houses was active in the city (BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1911, Verband der Freien Presse (Lenyk, Makra) an das Bayerische Staatsministerium für Arbeit und Soziale Fürsorge, 15 Februar 1967, page 1).

\textsuperscript{42} BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1245, Bayerisches Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz, März 1957/l, page 4; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1891, Niederschrift über die Sitzung vom 6/7 Juni 1955, auf der Fragen der Eingliederung der heimatlosen Ausländer und nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge beraten wurden. Das aussenpolitische Moment bei der Lösung der Fragen der nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge, page 3.
German government and society due to the institutions’ background and overseas financial support. Three major multinational institutions – Radio Free Europe (RFE), Radio Liberty (RL), and the Institute for the Study of the USSR – shall serve as examples to illustrate this trend of political activity as being guided and sponsored by American intelligence services and at least initially removed from German influence.

RFE and RL were two CIA financed radio stations that aspired to bring about a peaceful demise of the Soviet Union and its satellite states through their broadcasts; these stations represented a new trend in US politics. Before the war, the US government had not been interested in getting involved in the “global war of the airwaves”; but after the attack on Pearl Harbor it realized radio’s potential and importance as a propaganda tool. This notion further developed with the commencement of the Cold War; and the idea of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty gained ground during the late 1940s. RFE went on air in 1950 and targeted all the Soviet satellite states. Radio Liberty (originally Radio Liberation from Bolshevism) started broadcasting March 1, 1953, and aimed at Russia and other republics of the Soviet Union. Both stations erected their headquarters in Munich in the early 1950s. The CIA and the State Department were involved in funding the two stations, a connection that was concealed from the public for twenty years.

Radio Liberty, for example, was officially sponsored through AMCOMLIB (American Committee for the Liberation from Bolshevism), and its representatives propagated the myth that funding came from public donations. Despite the secret CIA connections, Puddington stresses that the radio employees were not secret agents and points out that they eventually gained more influence over what was being broadcast. Most of the employees at the two stations were not trained journalists; and Radio Liberty experienced internal strife between Russian and non-Russian exiles over the content of the radio program. The major focus of RL lay in its name – Liberation. However, after the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 it dawned on many exile journalists that their efforts would take a long time. Nonetheless,

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many former displaced persons continued to dedicate their time and efforts to the stations and the aim of eventually overturning the Soviet Union.45

The other Munich-based organization that was financed by the CIA and staffed by former DPs was the Institute for the Study of the USSR (ISUSSR).46 Founded in 1950, the ISUSSR operated in Munich for 21 years with strong connections to British and American scholars through conferences and summer schools. Like Radio Liberty, the ISUSSR was also under the patronage of AMCOMLIB, and thus secretly financed by the CIA. Apart from researching and publishing to keep the western world informed about developments in the Soviet Union, the institute also introduced many Harvard scholars to displaced persons for the Harvard Refugee Interview Project. In his study on the Munich Institute, Charles O’Connell revealed that the majority of the founding staff members had been employees of US Army Intelligence service and had at one time collaborated with the Nazis. Furthermore, only two out of eight founding members could legitimately be called scholars. Essentially, O’Connell asserts that the institute produced anti-Soviet propaganda, a precondition for its funding through the CIA, and not scholarly research articles about the Soviet Union.47

American Intelligence Services used different tools to spread propaganda, and it employed active émigrés looking for jobs and “fulfillment” who were not necessarily trained as either journalists or scholars. These institutions were important for the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Germany because they were often the only opportunity for employment. In some cases they even enticed Ukrainians to return to Germany, as shown by the return of journalists Emma Andiievs’ka and Ihor Kachurovs’kyi to Munich once Radio Liberty was established.48 Ukrainian émigré scholars (such as Konstantin Feodosievich Shteppa and Aleksander Pavlovich Filipov) worked for the ISUSSR; and conferences hosted by the institute

46 The full title was “Institute for Research on the History and Institutions of the USSR”. All information given about the institute is taken from Charles T. O-Connell, The Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR. Origin and Social Composition (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Center for Russian and East European Studies, 1990), pages 1-46.
47 O’Connell, The Munich Institute, pages 9f, 28-32.
48 Maruniak, Tom II, page 40; Interview 29.
also brought Ukrainian scholars from different countries together. It is important to note that Germany did not exert any influence on what was going on within Radio Liberty or Radio Free Europe. Puddington, for example, does not mention relations between the two stations and the German government during the 1950s and 60s – this topic only became important once the SPD government came into power and started its new course in foreign policy. During the early 1970s, the two radio stations were seen as ‘Cold War anachronisms,’ as a sign of Germany’s lack of sovereignty, and during the debates regarding Eastern politics (Ostpolitik) and the future of Cold War institutions on German grounds, groups like the Jusos (youth wing of the SPD) or other left-oriented groups demanded the removal of these institutions from Germany. Although the German government would have liked to have seen the stations relocate to other countries, it was still not willing to revoke their broadcasting licenses as the Americans had made it clear that RFE as well as RL came as part of the ‘security package’ that was the American presence in Germany. RFE and RL survived and continued their broadcasting from Germany beyond the 1960s, despite the fact that their CIA connection was uncovered during the early 1970s. The ISUSSR, however, ended its work in 1971.

2.2.2. Ukrainian Political Activity in Germany

Not only the CIA had important connections in Munich. Soviet agent activity – with the murder of Rebet and Bandera as the most high-profile cases – took place in Germany because the entire Ukrainian political elite were located in the Bavarian capital. Besides the academic community (which struggled during the 1950s and 60s), the political sector was the only area that had survived the wave of mass migration that swept the community in the late 1940s. All Ukrainian political parties, UNRada, and the Foreign Representation of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (ZP UHVR) were located in Munich during the 1950s and 60s,

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51 Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom*, pages 182-186. However, the backing of the radios within the US was not unchallenged, especially once the connection with the CIA was uncovered. Their status was less than secure for a while as the discussions and hearings in the early 1970s illustrated. Eventually, the two stations continued under a non-CIA administration (Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom*, pages 187-213).
and their activity expressed itself by and large through a mass of publications.\textsuperscript{52} However, the Ukrainian community, especially the political sector, was far from being unified, as even the federal authorities observed.\textsuperscript{53} Instead of an overarching cooperation, life was overshadowed by antagonism and division – no more vividly expressed than through the split of the OUN (B) in 1953/4 which produced a third OUN group, the so-called Dviikari (OUN (Z)).\textsuperscript{54} Under the leadership of Lev Rebet\textsuperscript{55} and Z. Matla, the Dviikari took over the journal Ukrains’kyi Samostiinyk, which until that date had been the unofficial mouthpiece of the OUN (B). The OUN (B) took the matter to court where the group lost to their opponents, forcing the OUN (B) to continue their propaganda through the newly founded Shliakh Peremohy. The ongoing rivalry between all political parties not only bogged down the political sector, but also caused apathy among the ‘common’ Ukrainians in Germany and complicated the pastoral care of the church. Maruniak, for example, points out that the Ukrainian community in Germany showed signs of fatigue during the 1950s and 60s, because it was seriously disappointed with the political infighting.\textsuperscript{56}

Although Ukrainian political activities were characterized by internal strife, different groups nonetheless managed to cooperate with other political refugees to ‘fight against the Soviet Union.’ For example, Ukrainians were an important

\textsuperscript{52} BA B 106 24957, Mitteilungen über Exilpresse, (8714a, September 1970), 13: Ukrainische Nationalgruppe. For example, Shliakh Peremohy was one of the newspapers with the highest circulation (out of all the homeless foreigners’ publications) (BA B 106 24957, File: 8714, Schriftwechsel über Exilpresse, 592 Exil-Zeitungen, von Fritz Bucher (München), 18 Juli 1963). These publications were not necessarily geared towards Germany, but mostly towards the wider diaspora (For an example of Shliakh Peremohy, see interview 32).

\textsuperscript{53} See for example: BA B 106 28191, Wolfrum an das Bundespräsidialamt z. Hd. von Herrn Regierungsdirektor Dr. Spath, 25 August 1969, page 1.

\textsuperscript{54} The Dviikari officially formed the OUN (Z) (OUN za kordonom/OUN abroad) in 1956.

\textsuperscript{55} Lev Rebet was a professor at UFU during the 1950s and had been a Bandera supporter after the split in 1940.

\textsuperscript{56} According to Maruniak, the community would never recover from this (Maruniak, \textit{Tom II}, page 8). For a short reference to the split, see also Yurkevich, “Ukrainian Nationalists,” page 138 (Here Yurkevich points out that during the early 1950s, there was no longer a definitive authority able to smooth over ideological rivalries because all the leadership in Ukraine had been killed). See also Zelenets’ kyi, \textit{Na hromads’ kii Nyvi}, page 49; Wojtowicz, \textit{Geschichte}, pages 176-192 (During the 1950s, the discord between the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the political groups, especially the Dviikari, grew). The OUN (B) had already experienced discord in 1948 at a conference in Mittenwald, where major representatives of the opposition were ousted from its ranks. The majority of ideological conflicts referred to the OUN (B) conference of 1943, which had established a new program for the group (Bandera later interpreted this program as too left-leaning, whereas the OUN (Z) supported it).
member group of the globally operating Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), whose headquarters were located in Munich. Apart from the ABN, which was very much characterized by its strong Ukrainian leadership, Ukrainians were also active in the Association of the Free Press (AFP), an organization that united journalists from behind the iron curtain to inform the world about the Soviet Union and their respective home countries. This organization stressed that it “cherish[ed] the national cultural goods of the people oppressed by communism, so that it is preserved for the homeland until the restoration of freedom and rights.”

The CRUEG was also a member of political umbrella organizations such as the Central Association of Foreign Refugees (Zentralverband ausländischer Flüchtlinge, ZAF) in Germany. Ukrainians from Germany also participated in international conferences hosted by different umbrella organizations such as the “Federatyvnyi Ob’iednannya Ievropeis’kykh Natsional’nykh Hrup” (Federative Association of European National Groups) or the “Mizhnarodna Federatsiia Khrystyians’kykh Profspilok v Ekzyliiu” (International Federation of Christian Professional Syndicate in Exile), which gave them the opportunity to build a network with other representatives and present the case of Ukraine to the world.

Ukrainian political leaders were not the only ones who emphasized the political character of Ukrainians in Germany. Other community supporters such as Iosef Slipyi (Josef Slipyj), who resided in Rome since 1963 and was appointed

57 The OUN (B) section supported the ABN. A random observation of Stetsko’s activities illustrates the point that the ABN operated globally. Stetsko was the head of the ABN, and although his main quarters were in Munich, he conducted most of his lobbying work in the US or at international conferences in countries such as Mexico or England (For selected examples, see: Shliakh Peremohy, 2 March 1958, page 5, Try dni mizh Ukraintsiamy; Shliakh Peremohy, 30 March 1958, page 1, Iaroslav Stets’ko v Mekhiko (About Mexiko visit see also Shliakh Peremohy, Easter 1958, page 2, Svitovyi protykomunistychnyi pokhid); Shliakh Peremohy, 27 April 1958, page 1, Iaroslav Stets’ko v SShA; Shliakh Peremohy, 18 May 1958, page 5, Holova ABN v N’iu-Iorku; Shliakh Peremohy, 1 June 1958, page 2, Holova TsK ABN Ia. Stets’ko v Chikago; Shliakh Peremohy, 22 June 1958, page 2, Ia. Stets’ko v N’iu Iorku; Shliakh Peremohy, 6 July 1958, page 1, Rozmovy Ia. Stets’ka u Washingtoni; Shliakh Peremohy, 13 July 1958, page 1, Ia. Stets’ko v Pittsburgu; Shliakh Peremohy, 30 July 1958, page 1, Ia. Stets’ko v Ditroiti; Shliakh Peremohy, 10 August 1958, page 1, Zastrih holovy ABN, Ia. Stets’ka, z gubernatorom R. B. Mainerom; Shliakh Peremohy, 24 September 1958, page 1, Holova ABN pered Kongresovoiu Komisiieu SShA (also page 1, Ia. Stets’ko v Trentoni)).
59 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1908, Resolution des Zentralverbandes ausländischer Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland e.V., beschlossen auf der 5ten Generalversammlung am 18. November 1965 in München, page 1.
60 Zelenets’kyi, Na hromads’kyi Nyvi, page 49f.
Cardinal in 1965, or Platon Kornyliak (Kornyljak), the highest Ukrainian Catholic representative in Germany, also referred in their correspondence with the German government to Ukrainians in Germany as “Exilanten” (exiles), thereby stressing the involuntary and political character of their migration. For example, Platon Kornyliak outlined the situation for the members of his church as follows: “The political circumstances [in Ukraine] do not allow the believers to raise their voice to testify the suffering that they have to endure in the name of Christ. Although we in our safe exile can only guess the magnitude of the suffering back home, we still have the opportunity to raise our voice to let the world know about the inhuman torment.” Ukrainian journalists and other members of the AFP also saw themselves as “exile journalists” and their respective groups as political emigrants. They were proud of the fact that their major aim was the restoration of freedom and democratic institutions in their home countries through a free press that warned of the dangers posed by the Soviet Union. In the academic sphere, UFU maintained and stressed its status as a university in exile whose task it was to preserve a cadre of Ukrainian academics, because once Ukraine “is resurrected[, it] will demand from us exiles…that we should be able to provide experts trained in the humanities and possessing knowledge of the Ukrainian heritage.” In this

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63 Platon Kornyliak (Kornyljak), “Zum Geleit,” in Kirche zwischen Ost und West, by Madey, page 3f. (written 28 July 1969). The idea of Ukrainians in Germany as exiles survived well into the 1980s (it still has to be investigated what happened after the break-up of the Soviet Union). In a documentary from 1988, the Ukrainian Catholic priest in Munich referred to the shadowy sides of life in exile, stating that the focus on the national often infringed upon the religious aspect (Anders, Ukrainisch-katholische Gemeinden, page 101).

64 For Ukrainian examples see: Freie Presse Korrespondenz 10 (11/12) (1962), page 1, Volodymyr Lenyk, Das Urteil ist gesprochen; Freie Presse Korrespondenz 11 (4) (1963), page 1, Protest gegen Sowjetmorde; Freie Presse Korrespondenz 15 (3) (1967), page 1f, Lenyk, Berechnung, Naivität - oder?; For general examples, see: Freie Presse Korrespondenz 4 (15) (1955), page 1, Georg Noeff, Im Kampf gegen die Lüge; Verband der Freien Presse, Wir klagen an! page 2.

65 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1908, Die Freie Presse und ihre Bedeutung, page 3f.

context it was important to the university to publish textbooks about Ukraine and Ukrainian issues that could be used in Ukrainian high schools once Bolshevism was defeated.67 With these “exile” tasks in mind, UFU focused much of its activities and outreach program on the broader diaspora. Indeed, members of the organized Ukrainian community in Germany continued to cultivate close contacts with the wider diaspora. Representatives of CRUEG, OUZh, and UFU traveled to North America to solicit funds for projects in Germany. UFU tried to attract North-American students specifically for summer classes and stressed the fact that its alumni represented the institution abroad. For example, in 1969, the university counted 56 freelance members around the globe who maintained closed ties with their former alma mater.68

2.2.3. German Reactions to Political Activity

The political activity of homeless foreigners was not necessarily welcomed by the federal or provincial governments, especially in light of an improving German-Soviet relationship. As was pointed out in 1955 during a discussion concerning the integration of homeless foreigners and their political activities, this group was expected to be more considerate than before of German internal and external interests. Especially if diplomatic relations were to develop between the FRG and the East, the exile groups and their press were expected to do nothing to jeopardize a good relationship with Germany’s eastern neighbors.69 In the eyes of many German representatives, the homeless foreigners were mere ‘guests’ in the country who had to obey the country’s rules and were not to disturb foreign relations.70 This attitude continued into the 1960s. The first Foreigners Law (Australiengesetz) of the FRG71 contained a paragraph that offered the German authorities the opportunity to restrict or prohibit any political activities of foreigners in Germany if

67 Ukrainian Free University, page 19. This understanding of tasks of the institution survived for a long time (see for example Sokoluk, “Im Dienste der Freiheit,” page 127).
69 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1891, Niederschrift über die Sitzung vom 6/7 Juni 1955, auf der Fragen der Eingliederung der heimatlosen Ausländer und nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge beraten wurden. Zur Frage der nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge in der souveränen Bundesrepublik, page 5.
70 See for example: BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1910, Peter Paul Nahm: Status und Behandlung der heimatlosen Ausländer (Radio Vaticano, 12 February 1968), page 8. (Peter Paul Nahm had been the State Secretary of the BMVt from 1953 until 1967).
71 The law was created in 1965 and will be dealt with in detail in section 2.2.4.
it interfered with the interests of the country. And the German government enacted this legislation. In 1967, for example, Iranians were forbidden to leave their place of residence or to participate in demonstrations surrounding the visit of the Shah in Germany.\(^72\)

Understandably, the German government wanted to keep the homeless foreigners’ political activities and declarations to a minimum. However, the government itself did not do anything to divert the community’s focus away from their status as political émigrés. As Franz Gaksch, a CSU representative in the Bavarian Landtag, observed during the early 1960s: “Nowadays Munich is the spiritual capital of many eastern peoples. Many newspapers, journals, and books in many languages are being published here. Another nation would see it as its great task to develop friendly contacts with these groups. One cannot detect anything of the eastern “subhuman being” in them. Nonetheless, this Nazi defamation is still attached to them.”\(^73\) Other representatives of the Bavarian government were also of the opinion that the émigré element in the country, which could serve as a bridge between East and West, was not adequately valued.\(^74\) For Ukrainians, the political character of their group remained the dominant, if not the only narrative of their existence in Germany, a self-understanding that was further reinforced through the homeless foreigners’ legal status in the country.

### 2.3. The Precarious Status of Homeless Foreigners in Germany

Officially, the status of homeless foreigners in Germany was regulated through the Homeless Foreigner Act of 1951 which put them on a par with Germans in areas such as freedom of movement, social and unemployment insurance, or labor welfare. Technically, homeless foreigners only experienced restrictions in founding political organizations and street sale.\(^75\) The HFA granted its recipients certain advantages that other foreigners did not have: in the context of naturalization, the ‘special fate’ of the homeless foreigners had to be taken into consideration;

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\(^72\) Schönwälder, “‘Ist nur Liberalisierung Fortschritt?’“ page 134.


\(^75\) Furthermore, in 1953, foreign refugees who had been on German territory before June 30, 1950 were put on a par with homeless foreigners, even if they had not been under IRO care. Compare Chapter 7, part 2.1.
homeless foreigners also enjoyed unlimited right of residence\textsuperscript{76} and were eligible for pensions due to the foreigners’ pension law of 1953 and 1960.\textsuperscript{77} Thus, in theory the group enjoyed the advantages of a liberal legislation that was often praised as such by the German authorities themselves.

However, on a variety of occasions during the 1960s, the group experienced how insecure their status really was. Although the issue of pensions was officially regulated through the laws of 1953 and 1960, Zelenets’kyi asserts that it continued to be a major concern and problem for Ukrainians in the country.\textsuperscript{78} An example from Munich from the early 1960s can illustrate this dilemma. During this period, Bavaria continued to maintain the notion that it was being “swamped“ with foreigners, although it started to lag behind states such as Baden-Württemberg and Saarland in the summer of 1961.\textsuperscript{79} In order to counter this “foreigner problem,” some drastic measures were introduced. When reassessing their pension plans in 1962, the city of Munich revoked the status of “homeless foreigner” for those people who had not been under IRO care, even if they had received this status as a result of the Ministry of the Interior’s decision of 1953.\textsuperscript{80} The Bavarian Ministry of the Interior did not consider this step as a cancellation of status because in their eyes, these people had never legally possessed the status of homeless foreigner anyway.\textsuperscript{81} The initiative by the city of Munich caused considerable distress among homeless foreigners and led to protests to the federal government as well as the UNHCR representative in Germany.\textsuperscript{82} The federal Minister of Expellees also viewed critically what was going on in Munich and asserted that the Bavarian

\textsuperscript{76} BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 471, Schnellbrief an den Präsidenten des Deutschen Bundestages, betrifft Auswirkungen des Gesetzes über die Rechtsstellung heimatloser Ausländer und des Gesetzes betreffend das Abkommen über die Rechtsstellung der Flüchtlinge, 8 Juni 1965.
\textsuperscript{77} Dietz-Görrig, Displaced Persons, page 67; Wieland, Das Bundesministerium, page 64f.
\textsuperscript{78} Zelenets’kyi, Na hromads’kii Nyvi, page 94.
\textsuperscript{79} Schönwälder, “‘Ist nur Liberalisierung Fortschritt?’” page 131f.
\textsuperscript{80} Homeless foreigners needed their status either to apply for pensions or for compensation according to the agreement with the UNHCR from October 5, 1960. The Bavarian authorities insisted that IRO care was one of the underlying prerequisites for the status as a homeless foreigner and ordered the search service in Arolsen to obtain background information on the homeless foreigners involved (BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 471, Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Arbeit an den Bundesminister für Vertriebene, 21 Dezember 1962, page 1f).
\textsuperscript{81} BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 471, Ministerialrat Kanein (Bayerisches Innenministerium) an das Bayerische Staatsministerium für Arbeit, 24 Januar 1964, page 2.
\textsuperscript{82} BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 471, Ministerialrat Höh an das Bayerische Staatsministerium des Innern, 16 Januar 1964.
authorities interpreted the existing laws too narrowly, because even the UNHCR
did not consider IRO care a necessary prerequisite. In 1965, the federal
government even looked into creating legal regulations (Rechtsverordnung) meant to include other foreign refugees who had not been under IRO care.

However, the federal Minister of the Interior feared that “such a regulation would entail the danger of political misinterpretation because of the connection to the problem of collaboration during the Second World War.” Once the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior dropped its initial objections in the spring of 1966 and promised not to further question the status and benefits of those foreigners who had not been under IRO care, the federal government did not need to initiate the decree-law/statutory ordinance. However, it had taken more than three years to clarify the issue of pensions and status, a fact that highlights the chaotic state of regulations surrounding the HFA.

Difficulties in receiving pensions were only one of the problems with which homeless foreigners in Germany were faced, as the Central Association of Foreign Refugees (ZAF) remarked in its annual resolutions in 1965. The legal uncertainty that many homeless foreigners experienced in Germany was even more disturbing, as many Eastern Europeans especially feared deportation against their will – and not necessarily groundlessly, as the organization stressed. During the early 1960s the German authorities made an effort to ease the expulsion of ‘undesirable’ homeless foreigners, a move that was prevented through UN intervention after it sparked massive protests from the group itself. The issue of expulsion had been regulated in the HFA of 1951, and was reintroduced as a topic in the Foreigners

83 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 471, Bundesminister für Vertriebene an das Bayerische Staatsministerium für Arbeit, 29 August 1963, page 1.
84 In accordance with §1 Abs 2 HAus1G.
85 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 471, Satzgerer an das Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, 30 September 1965; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 471, Bundeminister für Vertriebene an das Bayerische Staatsministerium für Arbeit, 16 November 1965.
86 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 471, Bundesminister für Vertriebene an das Bayerische Staatsministerium für Arbeit, 9 Mai 1966. Nonetheless, there were still a few cases in the late 1960s where the authorities (BMI and BMVt) were not sure whether to extend the status of homeless foreigner to people who had not enjoyed IRO care during the 1940s (BA B106 24935, Correspondence concerning the case „Bronislaw Janda” (1968)).
87 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1908, Resolution des Zentralverbandes ausländischer Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland e.V., beschlossen auf der 5ten Generalversammlung am 18 November 1965 in München, page 1.
88 Schönwälder, “‘Ist nur Liberalisierung Fortschritt?’” page 135.
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Law of 1965. Until 1965, Germany did not have a specific law dealing with the
general situation of foreigners in the country. In 1965, the new Foreigners Law was
passed to fill this void, but was also created to enable the German authorities’
restriction of political activities by foreigners on German soil.\(^89\) The new law
asserted that the presence of foreigners in the country must not interfere with the
interests of the Federal Republic of Germany.\(^90\) Although it was initially hailed as a
very liberal approach, the law soon attracted criticism due to its arbitrary
phrasing;\(^91\) the interests of the German state were the sole decisive factor for the
German authorities on whether to admit a foreigner or not.\(^92\) The new law planned
in the early 1960s and implemented in 1965 also raised criticism among the
community of homeless foreigners, because many representatives of the group
feared that homeless foreigners would lose their special status. The ZAF, for
example, accused the government of forgetting the unique circumstances under
which homeless foreigners had come to Germany.\(^93\) As the organization correctly
pointed out, once implemented the new law from 1965 and the old HFA from 1951
overlapped and the legal situation for this specific group in Germany was now
unclear.\(^94\) Indeed, the Foreigners Law of 1965 also addressed the issue of expelling
homeless foreigners. The law stressed that this group could only be expelled
“because of grave reasons pertaining to public security and order,” \(^95\) however, this
was a rather vague phrasing that allowed for broad interpretation.

\(^{89}\) For a discussion of the creation of the law, see Schönwälder, “‘Ist nur Liberalisierung
Fortschritt?’” pages 127-144. For example, in the early 1960s the federal Minister of the Interior
Schröder warned of the danger of communist agents being active in Germany (page 136).
\(^{90}\) Otto Kimminich, Der Aufenthalt von Ausländern in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Kimminich points out that this is the central point of criticism of the law. Kimminich also asserts
that we have to recognize the arbitrary character of the term “Belange (concerns/interests) der BRD”
and the broad administrative discretion that was granted to the aliens department. For an elaboration
of ample interpretations of the term “Belange der Bundesrepublik” that includes contemporaneous
criticism, see pages 49-58.
\(^{91}\) In so far as the law raised criticism, it also found stout supporters. Some observers hailed it as the
“most liberal in the world.” However, Kimminich points out that the supporters of the law hardly
ever addressed the criticism raised by many of their compatriots (Kimminich, Der Aufenthalt, page
21ff).
\(^{92}\) Kimminich, Der Aufenthalt, pages 18-21; Triadafilopoulos, Shifting Boundaries, page 162f.
\(^{93}\) BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 471, ZAF Memorandum, 10 Januar 1963.
\(^{94}\) BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1908, Resolution des Zentralverbandes ausländischer
Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland e.V. beschlossen auf der 5ten Generalversammlung
\(^{95}\) Schönwälder, “‘Ist nur Liberalisierung Fortschritt?’” page 141, particularly footnote 9.
All those homeless foreigners who had not yet acquired German citizenship during the 1960s were affected by this new law, and these were quite a few since acquisition of citizenship was not widespread among the group. The German authorities always stressed that there was no pressure to acquire citizenship. However, this declaration was a rather thin disguise for the fact that reservations about permitting foreigners to take German citizenship persisted throughout the 1950s and 60s. Although the German authorities (BMI) were technically required to take the ‘special fate’ of homeless foreigners into consideration in the context of naturalization, caution was widely exercised, initially because the authorities wanted to see whether a “cultural and societal integration” had taken place before granting homeless foreigners German citizenship. And homeless foreigners did not legally have a right to citizenship. The decisive factor in granting citizenship was the question of whether it was in the interest of the German state. Another requirement was that the homeless foreigner had had to spend ten years in Germany and they had to be healthy and “of sound character” (Charakterlich einwandfrei). Furthermore, homeless foreigners had to prove that they could take care of themselves as well as their families (or alternatively, a statement was required insuring that the homeless foreigners would be taken care of by another person).

The widely exercised caution had a deep impact, as the naturalization statistics illustrate. Since the mid-1950s, representatives of homeless foreigners had criticized the slow naturalization process, the strong bureaucracy involved and the

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96 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 471, Entwurf, Verordnung über die Gleichstellung anderer ausländischer Flüchtlinge mit heimatlosen Ausländern, 3 Oktober 1966, page 2.
97 BA B 150 3531 Heft 1, Auszugswiese Abschrift aus unserem Schreiben vom. 9.4.1952 - IV 1 e - 8508 - Tgb.-Nr. 5237/51 Dr. v H/Ba an das Referat II 1a. gez. Riedel.
98 BA B 150 3531 Heft 1, Dr. v. Fritsch (BMI) an den Bundesminister für Vertriebene, 20 Juli 1962, page 1. It was one stipulation that the naturalization of a homeless foreigner must not endanger the foreign politics of the FRG (BA B 150 3531 Heft 1, Richtlinie für die Behandlung von Ermessenseinbürgerungen, 29 Juli 1958, page 9).
100 BA B 150 3531 Heft 1, Richtlinie für die Behandlung von Ermessenseinbürgerungen, 29 Juli 1958, page 2f.
high costs. Indeed, by the end of 1967, out of 155,000 homeless foreigners, only 21,500 had obtained German citizenship. No official statistics are available specifically for the Ukrainian case; however, Zelenets’kyi of CRUEG estimated in 1978 that out of approximately 22,000 Ukrainians in Germany, 10% had taken German citizenship. This tendency could also be detected among the Ukrainians interviewed for this project in Munich. Out of 9 interviewees, one had taken citizenship during the 1960s, seven between 1974 and 1994 and one was still stateless. Just like the case of the Foreigners Law, the interests of the FRG were at the center of naturalization, and the issue depended on the ‘good will’ of the German authorities. It should be noted that homeless foreigners were not the only ones whose status was insecure in postwar Germany. An examination of the Sinti experience showed that the status of these people who had held German citizenship prior to the takeover of the Nazi regime and who had often lost their papers in the concentration camps, was again questioned and in some cases even revoked during the 1950s.

3. Ukrainian Community Life in Germany

The turbulent years of the early 1960s and the attention to the Stashynskyi trial from both the Ukrainian as well as the international community should not divert attention from the fact that, overall, the Ukrainian community in Germany continued to struggle. Despite some hopeful signs at the turn of the decade, it did not manage to recover from its pitiful organizational state.

3.1. The Promise of the 1960s – Temporary Recovery of the Community

Whereas the 1950s were a period for Ukrainian organizations in Germany that was characterized by decline and crisis, the 1960s are generally labeled a decade of

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102 BA B 150 3531 Heft 1, Dr Nahm an Ministerialrat Dr. Bode, 18 Mai 1955; BA B 150 3531 Heft 1, Riedel an den Bundesminister des Innern, 3 Juni 1955.
103 This is the number given for 1966 (BA B 150 3531 Heft 2, Gesetz über die Rechtsstellung heimatloser Ausländer im Bundesgebiet (Haus1G) vom 25. April 1951 (BGBI I S. 269) (Abschrift rumgeschickt am 23. Dez 1966), page 1). However, other statistics estimate the number of homeless foreigners in Germany at 200,000 in 1964 and 180,000 in 1966 (Otto Kimminich, Asylrecht (Berlin: Luchterhand, 1968), page 26).
104 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1910, Peter Paul Nahm: Status und Behandlung der heimatlosen Ausländer (Radio Vaticano 12 Februar 1968), page 3.
105 Zelenets’kyi, Na hromads’ki Nyvi, page 94.
106 Gilad Margalit, “German Citizenship Policy and Sinti Identity Politics,” in Challenging Ethnic Citizenship, ed. Daniel Levy et al., 107-120, pages 110-111. (Often authorities based their decision to revoke citizenship on research which had been conducted during the Nazi era).
consolidation and growth. Once the basic needs of homeless foreigners were met, community leaders of different organizations addressed the never-ending task of reviving lifeless branches and establishing new ones wherever Ukrainians were still left in Germany. Initially, organizations such as the OUZh embarked upon their new assignment with some success. Between 1959 and 1961, OUZh founded 14 branches and 3 representations that were not restricted to the traditional regions in the South of Germany, but also ventured north into cities such as Braunschweig or Hannover Bucholz. During the early 1960s, representatives of CRUEG traveled all over Germany to intensify contacts with smaller communities and initiated three major conferences of Ukrainians in Germany (1962 in Stuttgart, 1965 and 1967 in Königstein) which were hailed major achievements of the community. Around this time, both OUZh and CRUEG were further able to initiate a number of Saturday schools to ensure the fulfillment of one of their main mandates – the education of the youth. OUZh, together with the educational branch of CRUEG, counted 36 Saturday schools with 588 pupils and 10 kindergartens with 103 children in the country in 1961. Apart from the educational sector, a considerable amount of attention was directed to the organization of cultural and religious holidays, most often coordinated with the local churches. Furthermore, despite improvements of the economic situation for many homeless foreigners, numerous Ukrainians were still in need of charitable support provided by organizations such as OUZh. As a rule, all these efforts were possible because outside support continued. Although the late 1950s had seen a drop in donations from abroad, the community in Germany was not entirely forgotten by the wider diaspora. And community leaders tried to boost the flow of donations from North America through visits to the US and Canada, where they informed their brethren through talks and radio speeches about the miserable situation of Ukrainians in

108 “U zmahanni,” page 68f.
110 Zelenets’kyi, Na hromads’kii Nyvi, page 51. Altogether 217 pupils and 66 kindergarten children were enrolled in OUZh institutions (“U zmahanni,” pages 68-70).
111 See for example: BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1905, VI b/61 - 8063 dc 21/64, Vorsprache von Frau Bojko, Präsidentin der deutschen Sektion, 27 Januar 1964 , page 1. See also: Zelenets’kyi, Na hromads’kii Nyvi, page 56.
In addition, increased German assistance ensured the continuation of summer camps, Saturday schools, and community activities.113

However, an intensification of community life would not have been thinkable without the influence of the church. In general, the church was seen as the major source of support and comfort and as one of the most influential sectors in the diaspora.114 Most of Ukrainian community life in Germany revolved around the church and its activities, especially in the context of commemorations of holidays or the education of the youth,115 because “many of the…traditions and folklore have their main roots in religion.”116 Furthermore, the church was often the only Ukrainian institution that existed in smaller communities. Once Ukrainians lived in established settlements, it was easier for the church to find rooms for their Saturday schools and kindergartens, even if the community did not have a Ukrainian church of its own.117 But the improved living conditions were only one factor in the stabilization of church life. During the 1960s, Ukrainian Catholics – who were subsidized by the German Catholic Church118 – saw many changes on the institutional level in Germany. As early as 1957, and with financial support from Rome, Ukrainian Catholics were able to obtain a building in Munich (Schönbergstrasse) which was the seat of the Vicariat-General of the Apostolic Visitatorancy of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Europe (Generalvikariat des Apostolischen Visitators der Ukrainisch Katholischen Kirche in Westeuropa). The mansion was not only home to the church’s journal
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\textit{Khrystyians’kyi Holos} but could also be used for cultural gatherings.\textsuperscript{119} In accordance with instructions by Pope Johannes XXIII, Ukrainians in Germany received their own Eparchy in 1959. The Catholic Eparchy for Ukrainians in Germany was led by Platon Kornyliak, a Ukrainian priest from Philadelphia, who was elevated to bishop in July 1959 and installed in his position as eparch in Germany on 20 September 1959.\textsuperscript{120} For the next 36 years, Ukrainians in Germany had a high-ranking representative who took a deep interest in community matters and communicated the needs and wishes of the group to the German authorities.\textsuperscript{121} The recovery of the Ukrainian Catholic Church took place not only on the higher institutional level through the creation of the eparchy, but also on lower levels, where some communities received their own church buildings during this period, such as Neu-Ulm in 1958 or Düsseldorf-Wersten in 1970.\textsuperscript{122} During the 1960s, approximately 20 Ukrainian Catholic parishes with 26 priests existed in Germany; and the clergy had greatly benefited from an influx of younger Ukrainian priests from Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{123}

In general, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) had more problems than its Catholic counterpart to initiate activities in Germany. In 1958, fifteen priests cared for 6,000 believers throughout Germany; and, except for

\textsuperscript{119} Wojtowicz, \textit{Geschichte}, page 73.
\textsuperscript{120} Platon Kornyliak (Kornyljak), \textit{Ukrainische Katholische Bischofskirche Maria Schutz-St. Andreas München} (Munich: 1989), page 11.
\textsuperscript{121} Apart from academic institutions, the eparchy was the one Ukrainian institution that communicated regularly with the government in regards to youth camps or general cultural activities. See for example: BA B 106 28191, Verwendungsnachweise zum Bewilligungsbescheid des Bundesministerium für Vertriebene usw. von der Apostolischen Exarchie, Betrifft: Durchführung der Feriensommerlager der katholischen nichtorganisierten ukrainischen Jugend im Jahre 1969; BA B 106 28191, File: Apostolische Exarchie, II5. 8766g/69, Brief von Kornyljak an BMVt, 19 Dezember 1968; BA B 106 28191, File: Apostolische Exarchie, Allgem. Akte, 8766g, Brief von Platon Kornyljak, Apostolischer Exarch, an das BMVt, Kai Uwe Hassel, 11 Dezember 1967; for more correspondence see BA B 106 28191. In fact, Dr. Wolfrum, a member of staff of the BMVt, praised the close contacts that the ministry kept with bishop Kornyliak (BA B 106 28191, File: Apostolische Exarchie, Allgem. Akte, 8766g, Dr. Wolfrum an das Referat K1 im Hause, 14 Januar 1970, Betrifft die Exarchie der Ukrainer katholisch-unierten Bekenntnisses, page 1). Henrike Anders stressed that the youth was particularly important to the eparch (Anders, \textit{Ukrainisch-katholische Gemeinden}, page 100f).
\textsuperscript{122} Bilyi, \textit{Ukrains’ ki khory}, page 69; Henrike Anders, \textit{Ukrainisch-katholische Gemeinden}, page 106ff. (However, the church in Berlin was not only geared toward Ukrainians, but also toward other national groups). Düsseldorf Wersten received its first Ukrainian church in 1970 (BA B 106 28191, File: Apostolische Exarchie, Allgem. Akte, 8766g, \textit{Rheinische Post}, 2 May 1970, Kirche für Ukrainer).
\textsuperscript{123} Maruniak, \textit{Tom II}, pages 69-71.
Frankfurt, there was no orthodox church in Germany that Ukrainians could have used. Eleven years later, after the death of their Metropolitan Nikanora in 1969, the UAOC came under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Mystyslava, the hierarch of the Ukrainian Orthodox church in the United States. The example of the AOUC hints at a fact of Ukrainian life in Germany that even the initial upsurge of activities could not mask: cultural life for homeless foreigners in Germany was slowly dying, along with its community members.

### 3.2. “The Community Dies Out” – The Reality of the 1960s

During the 1960s, a trend crystallized that had already appeared on the horizon during the 1950s – the community was literally dying out. Those who had already been classified as old during the mass emigration process in the late 1940s passed on; one of the indicators for this trend was the fact that the Ukrainian community received its first plot (No. 430) at the Munich Forest Cemetery (Waldfriedhof) in 1967. Of course, Ukrainians had been buried at the Forest Cemetery prior to 1967; Stepan Bandera and Lev Rebet are the two most prominent examples. However, after 1967, Ukrainians started to form a visible presence in the cemetery’s population. Therefore it is not astonishing that the majority of traces of Ukrainian life in Munich – as the centre of Ukrainian activities in Germany – can be found primarily in the cemetery. Many famous Ukrainians are buried in Munich: political leaders such as Lev Rebet, Stepan Bandera, or Iaroslav Stetsko, artists such as Ivan Bahrianyi (Ukrainian writer and political activist (UNRada)) or Ostap Bobykevych (Ukrainian composer), academics such as Prof. P. Kurinnyi (UFU Professor and President of UVAN Germany) or Volodymyr Derzhavyn (UFU Professor, Member of Shevchenko Society). Their graves and the adjacent memorial plaques are ample evidence of a diaspora presence that at one point had been impressive and active, but had never become rooted in Germany. This fact was further mirrored on the organizational level, as the following section shows.

Despite signs of consolidation and continuing efforts by the leadership, the Ukrainian community in Germany was never able to fully resume its life and activities. Throughout the 1960s, community organizations battled with shortage of

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rooms, a horrific financial situation, and a fluctuating leadership. Furthermore, membership was rapidly declining, a trend most vividly expressed in organizational statistics provided by Volodymyr Maruniak. Comparing the literary and artistic association in Germany in 1947 and 1965, Maruniak lists that libraries had diminished from 44 to 4; out of 34 drama ensembles there was only 1 left; the community had only 5 choirs in 1965 (whereas it had boasted 49 in 1947); out of 22 orchestras only 1 still functioned, and only 3 out of the former 11 dance ensembles had survived. Altogether, of the 70 community organizations that had existed in 1948, only 13 were still functioning in 1962. The arts – music, writing and fine arts – had suffered because the majority of outlets such as journals or exhibitions had left Germany together with the mass wave of emigration. Furthermore, there was almost no audience present that could have appreciated the efforts that were being made. In this context it is not astonishing that the literary sector, which was somewhat active, focused its resources on the translation of western European classics into Ukrainian.

A few selected statistics from other areas can further illustrate the pitiful state of the Ukrainian community in Germany. Professional associations had suffered tremendous membership loss; for example, within ten years the Association of Ukrainian Journalists (Spilka Ukrains’kykh Zhurnalistiv, SUZh) had dropped by 28 members to only 52 in 1965. The educational sector is another crucial indicator for the condition of a community, because schools and kindergartens were usually seen as the most important institutions to preserve and transmit heritage. The rapid decline in numbers can be illustrated when comparing schools and kindergartens in the early to mid-1960s. In 1963, OUZh had 10 schools with 179 children as well as 4 kindergartens with 52 children under their auspices; CRUEG listed 19 schools, unfortunately without supplying any numbers of

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126 Zelenets’kyi, Na hromads’kii Nyvi, page 50f; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1905, VI h/61 - 8063 dc 21/64, Elsler: Zur Unterredung vom 27.1.1964 mit Frau Bojko, Präsidentin der deutschen Sektion; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1905, Brief vom ukrainischen Frauenverband an das Ministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, 27 Februar 1964, page 2f.  
128 Maruniak, Tom II, pages 38–42.  
129 Maruniak, Tom II, page 64. Journalism – especially political journalism – was one area that someway blossomed in Germany even after the wave of mass migration had left, because there were so many Ukrainian political organizations located in the country.
students. By 1965, there were altogether only 20 Saturday schools and three kindergartens left in Germany, serving 237 pupils and 31 children. In some cities the number of school children had been halved within two years time: Augsburg had had 14 students in 1963 and only 6 in 1965; and Munich city had gone down from 44 students to 27 students in just two years.\footnote{Maruniak, \textit{Tom II}, pages 27-29.} Festivities such as Independence Day or commemorations for Taras Shevchenko also saw a drop of in numbers of visitors. For example, whereas the community in Munich had been able to fill the Sophiensaal (a hall in the city) during the 1950s, they had to give up this venue during the 1960s because of a lack of participants.\footnote{For examples from the 1950s, see: \textit{Shliakh Peremohy}, 29 January 1956, page 1, Den’ derzhavnosty v Miunkheni; \textit{Shliakh Peremohy}, 18 May 1958, page 5, TsPUEN maie novi uspikhy. Community members remembered that the hall was crowded during the early to mid-1950s; however, later in the decade it was not a problem to find a seat and eventually the venue had to be abandoned for something smaller (Interviews 30, 28, and 27).}

Although Ukrainian community life continued to exist in places such as Hamburg-Neugraben, Hannover, or Neu-Ulm (often, however, with less and less activity),\footnote{See for example: Anders, \textit{Ukrainisch-katholische Gemeinden}, pages 118-147. A micro-study of the smaller communities and their relationship to Munich and organizations such as CRUEG still has to be done.} many organizations faced serious challenges during the 1960s. To counter the general decline, they often focused their remaining resources and energy on Munich as a last resort and the most hopeful candidate for revival. OUZh, for example, pointed out that there were not enough means available to organize the women in northern Germany and therefore focused its attention down south. Munich was the city where most of the general meetings, holiday celebrations, and conferences took place. Specific courses such as Easter egg painting, traditional Ukrainian handicrafts or “Ukrainian Studies” (for women who had married Ukrainian men) could be generated in Munich.\footnote{BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1905, VI b/61 - 8063 dc 21/64, Vorsprache von Frau Bojko, Präsidentin der deutschen Sektion, 27 Januar 1964, page 1 (There were only two branches of the organization left in north-western Germany); “U zmahanni”, pages 71-73; Lenyk, “Miunkhen pul’suie novym zhyttiam,” in \textit{Ukrainsti na Chuzhyni}, pages 55-56 (November 1964).} The academic institutions, whose activities will be discussed in part 4, also provided activities for the community in Munich simply because they were located in the city.\footnote{The UTHI, for example, organized a course for Ukrainian workers in Munich in the late 1960s (BA B 106 28187, Tätigkeitsbericht des Ukrainischen Technisch-Wirtschaftlichen Instituts für das Jahr 1969 (Jendyk, 17 Februar 1970)).} Some
organizations, such as the Central Union of Ukrainian Students, had only one branch left in Germany which was located in Munich.\textsuperscript{135} Ukrainian Catholic life also had a strong presence in the Bavarian capital because the Ukrainian bishop in Germany had his seat there. Nonetheless, the approximately 400 parishioners (Stand 1967) were still forced to celebrate their masses in other churches that were not prepared for the orthodox rite since they did not have an iconostases—a fact that was widely criticized by community leaders when corresponding with the government.\textsuperscript{136} On the whole, the fact that even Munich, hitherto the centre of Ukrainian life in Germany, experienced severe problems during the mid-60s, for example in recruiting children for their Saturday schools,\textsuperscript{137} illustrates the rapid decline in community affairs.

The drop in membership and organizational activities, especially in the educational sector, generated alarm among community leaders who were concerned that the community was in danger of “denationalization.”\textsuperscript{138} The common fear that especially younger members would “drown in the foreign sea” was further fuelled by the state of the Ukrainian language in the country. By the late 1960s, Ukrainian representatives in Germany were concerned by the fact that the Ukrainian youth was often no longer capable of speaking Ukrainian,\textsuperscript{139} and only Ukrainian institutions such as summer camps were believed to be able to counter the trend towards “antisocial behaviour.”\textsuperscript{140} Plast, as one of the most important youth

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Joukovsky, “Der Zentralverband,” page 308.
\item Maruniak, \textit{Tom II}, pages 27-29.
\item \textit{Freie Presse Korrespondenz} 8 (3) (1959), page 7, Die Ukrainer in der Diaspora (from Khrystiianksyi Holos, August 1959).
\item BA B 106 28187, Wolodymyr Janiw: Rolle und Aufgabe der Ukrainischen Freien Universität in der Gegenwart, Sonderdruck aus: \textit{Mitteilungen} 5 (1968), page 62.
\end{thebibliography}
organizations in the diaspora and coordinator of countless summer camps, took rather severe measures to counteract denationalization of its members. In 1967/68, the leadership in Germany decided to introduce mandatory language tests for all children who wanted to participate in the Plast summer camps. Only those children who were fluent in Ukrainian were allowed to join, because “if one child does not know the language, then all of them speak German,” one of the leaders rationalized.\footnote{Interview 28. See also interviews 30, 27.} This decision was good for the organization as it redirected its focus and was able to recruit more Ukrainian-speaking children into its programs. However, these children were not necessarily from Germany, but from countries such as France or England.\footnote{Interview 28.} Although Plast itself saw this move as a success and a means to stabilize their future activities, it was not necessarily beneficial for the community in Germany.

\section*{3.3. Explanations for the State of Ukrainian Affairs in Germany}

Confronted with low levels of activity and widespread apathy throughout the 1960s, community leaders felt compelled to search for explanations. Volodymyr Ianiv, the principal of the Ukrainian Free University since April 1968,\footnote{BA B 106 28187, Appelius: Vermerk; Betrifft Ukrainische Freie Universität, 31 Juli 1968, page 1.} tried to explain the problems the Ukrainian community in Germany faced at the end of the decade in a lecture series held for teachers of the Ukrainian Saturday schools. Referring to the four pillars of the education and upbringing of the youth – the family, the Church, the school, and the community – Ianiv pointed out that, in his opinion, the school was the only active force left in Germany because families were often nationally mixed\footnote{No comprehensive study exists concerning the ratio of mixed marriages. Maruniak provides an example from the British zone where during the mid-50s 234 out of 925 families were listed as ‘mixed’ (Maruniak, \textit{Tom II}, page 13).} or overburdened by a heavy work schedule. In addition, many parents who were not well educated had no knowledge of Ukrainian traditions to pass on to their children. The priests, who would usually take on such a task, often had no time to devote to the children, and an active community had virtually disappeared.\footnote{Volodymyr Ianiv, “Ukrains’ka Vdacha i nash vykhovnyi ideal,” in \textit{Pedahohichni Problemy}, 1-17, page 1f.} A similar line of reasoning was repeated by other
institutions in Germany. OUZh attributed the widespread indifference towards Ukrainian affairs (especially among parents) to the low level of education among the former forced laborers. Internally, CRUEG blamed the state of the community on the bleak financial situation of the organizations and a general feeling of apathy within the community. A CRUEG report stated that the high level of indifference was partially caused by ‘Bolshevik agents’ who spread hostile propaganda throughout the settlements, but weak cooperation between the central body of CRUEG and its local cells was also held responsible. Furthermore, some of the organization’s structures, such as Saturday schools, had been destroyed through the transition from the camps to the settlements, and the emigration of its most active members resulted in a lack of qualified personnel. Indeed, emigration of Ukrainians from Germany continued during the 1960s. Although this exodus was rather sporadic, it continued to drain the existing community of its leaders, artists, and teachers. Musicians such as Mykhailo Duda emigrated to the US in 1960, after having tried, unsuccessfully, with the help of North Rhine-Westphalia’s social ministry to put together a choir in the camp Augustdorf. Those teachers who were left in Germany were often poorly qualified and had difficulties motivating the parents and students, especially once donations from abroad plummeted. Even if Ukrainians were interested in maintaining their cultural heritage, it was almost impossible because the community was so scattered. Many Ukrainians would have had to cover long distances in order to reach the closest church or community centre.

And there was not much hope for a better future. Although Ianiv praised the school as the one active force left in the Ukrainian community, the actual statistics belied his optimism. There is no data available for 1969, the year of Ianiv’s speech, but a comparison between 1965 and 1975 can serve as an example for the decline

146 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1905, Brief vom ukrainischen Frauenverband an das Ministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, 27 Februar 1964, page 1f.
148 Maruniak, *Tom II*, pages 27-29, 39 (for correspondence with Duda see BA B 106 25041). OUZh, for example, feared that fewer children would come to their Saturday schools if the school lunch was to be cancelled (due to financial constraints) (BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1905, VI b/61 - 8063 dc 21/64, Vorsprache von Frau Bojko, Präsidentin der deutschen Sektion, 27 Januar 1964, page 2).
of the Saturday schools in Germany. In 1965, 3 kindergartens (31 children) and 20 schools (237 pupils) existed in Germany; by 1975, there was no kindergarten left and only 5 schools with 60 students operated in the country.\textsuperscript{150} Ianiv himself addressed the demographic problem in his progress report to the BMVt in 1969, because it affected not only the Saturday schools, but also the academic institutions. Searching for an explanation, the head of UFU remarked that “those younger Ukrainians living in Europe, who would qualify for university studies, could not ensure the continuation of UFU. The demographic basis is too small and they are too scattered…our youth has attended foreign high schools and does not have sufficient skills to take on Ukrainian studies or language.”\textsuperscript{151} This quote draws our attention to another sector important for Ukrainian life in Germany – the academic institutions and their struggle for survival.

4. The Academic Institutions and the Issue of German Sponsorship

Ukrainians in the diaspora often praised the academic sector as one of the best organized and most important segments of community life.\textsuperscript{152} However, when the prominent Ukrainian academic institutions that were located in Germany – the Ukrainian Free University (UFU), the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute (UTHI) and the German branch of the Shevchenko Society (NTSh) – were literally fighting for survival at the turn of the decade, it was not the North American diaspora – which only sporadically provided material support – but the German government that stepped in and essentially saved the learned societies. And this came from a government that initially had not been interested in creating “minority politics” or fighting the “natural forces of assimilation.” What enticed both the federal as well as the Bavarian state government during the 1960s to boost their support for homeless foreigners, and why did they focus their support on the academic sphere? Once more, answers to these questions have to be explored in the broader context of BMVt matters. During the 1960s, international pressure played a

\textsuperscript{150} Maruniak, \textit{Tom II}, page 25.
\textsuperscript{151} BA B 106 28188, 8766c/70, Tätigkeitsbericht der Ukrainischen Freien Universität für das Jahr 1969, page 2.
\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Freie Presse Korrespondenz} 8 (3) 1959, page 7, Die Ukrainer in der Diapsora (from Khrystianskyi Holos, August 1959).
less important role than internal German interests in the support of Ukrainian academic institutions.

4.1. The Academic Sphere and the Formation of the AAUS

As elaborated in Chapter 6, once the wave of mass migration had departed from Germany in the late 1940s, the Ukrainian community that was left in the country was drained of its most active and talented members. The majority of the clubs and associations that had enriched camp life during the 1940s either seized to exist or was transferred to the new countries of settlement. However, this was not true for two sectors: the political parties and organizations kept their main base in Germany throughout the 1950s and 60s, and the prestigious academic institutions of the diaspora also continued to operate from within Germany – however, not without problems, as a short outline of their development illustrates.

4.1.1. The Ukrainian Free University (UFU)

Up until the Second World War, the Ukrainian Free University had held a unique position in the western world – it had been the only university-type institution that was entirely Ukrainian. Attempts to create a Ukrainian university had been made since the mid-19th century in both Eastern and Western Ukraine, but they had been unsuccessful. Therefore the establishment of a university in exile seemed to be the only viable solution to ensure the academic development of Ukrainian studies. The Ukrainian Free University was founded in January of 1921 in Vienna, and, according to its supporters, became “a symbol and embodiment of free research during a time when it was suppressed in Ukraine.” Already in the year of its establishment the university was transferred to Prague, which promised better conditions as a strong centre of Ukrainian diaspora activities during the 1920s and 30s. Furthermore, the Czechoslovakian government not only recognized UFU as

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155 For an overview of Ukrainian life in Prague, see Blanka Jeřábková, “Die Ukrainer in Prag zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen,” in Jahrbuch der Ukrainekunde 19 (1982), 297-307. Many other Ukrainian organizations had their headquarters in Prague during the interwar period. For the example of the Central Union of Ukrainian Students, see “Der Zentralverband,” page 303f. Frank Golczewski states that there were 20,000 Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia in 1921 (Golczewski, “Ukrainische Emigration,” page 233).
a non-state university, but also granted the Ukrainian institution of higher learning vital financial support. In this supportive environment UFU experienced the peak of its teaching days during the 1920s, when the university could boast up to 700 enrolled students. Although the number of students sank dramatically in the 1930s (in 1938, UFU had 88 registered students), the institution continued its academic endeavors with some support by the Czechoslovakian government. During the German occupation UFU was able to keep its independence, but it had to accept a German curator. At the end of the war, the majority of the staff and students made their way to Bavaria – just in time, because once the Red Army advanced into Czechoslovakia, the UFU archives that were left behind were destroyed, the university shut down, and the remaining members of staff were arrested. However, the evacuation of the university did not mean the end of its activities. On the contrary, UFU was established in Bavaria in 1945 and enjoyed a flourishing academic life throughout the DP period, in which it received support from both UNRRA and the IRO.156 In September 1950, the university was officially acknowledged by the Bavarian Ministry of Education and thus received the right to grant academic diplomas in Germany.157 However, the transition into the German economy was a time full of crises for the institution.

During the 1950s, UFU constantly struggled for its existence in Germany. The majority of prospective students as well as a large number of staff had immigrated to the US, Canada or Australia; and UFU was forced to adapt its programs and tasks to this new reality. Nonetheless, after the war its representatives continued to see UFU as the sole Ukrainian university-in-exile. Maruniak asserts that it was one of UFU’s biggest misconceptions to think that it would remain the only major academic institution that could teach Ukrainian studies abroad. This conviction prevented extensive reforms, reforms that would have been necessary in light of the dwindling student body. Teaching could only take place during summer classes, and even then UFU had to attract students from abroad – a rather difficult

task because of competition with Ukrainian studies at North American universities and later the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute.\textsuperscript{158} Due to the demographic shift and depleted funds, UFU was forced to operate as a research institution that saw its tasks in informing the world about Ukraine, educating the next generation of scholars, and creating teaching materials for a future independent Ukraine.\textsuperscript{159} Although the Ukrainian Free University struggled with its new situation in Germany during the 1950s and 60s, it was still in a stronger position than other Ukrainian academic institutes.

4.1.2. The Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute (UTHI)

Another prestigious institution of higher learning was the UTHI. Founded in 1932 in Podebrady, Czechoslovakia, as a section of the Ukrainian Husbandry Academy, it mostly taught correspondence courses in the areas of agriculture, economy, and engineering and published textbooks in these areas. At the end of the war many employees of the institution fled to Germany, where they quickly resumed teaching in Regensburg (Ganghofersiedlung) and Munich. Between 1945 and 1952, the UTHI witnessed a boom of activity with more than 1,200 students enrolled in their courses, which were partially funded by UNRRA and IRO.\textsuperscript{160} However, despite this initial burst of academic activity, the institute constantly had to fight external problems; acquiring a home base proved to be particularly difficult once the wave of mass migration had left. In January 1950, UTHI was transferred to the Ludendorffkaserne in Neu-Ulm, but already in December 1950 these premises had to be vacated. For a short while, the university operated in Augsburg-Kriegshaber before moving to Munich, where they occupied basement rooms in a local adult education centre.\textsuperscript{161} The school year 1951/52 was conducted in a makeshift way on

\textsuperscript{158} Maruniak, \textit{Tom II}, pages 32-34.
\textsuperscript{159} Until Ukraine became independent, this material was to be used in the diaspora (BA B 106 28187, Wolodymyr Janiw: “Rolle und Aufgabe der Ukrainischen Freien Universität in der Gegenwart,” Sonderdruck aus \textit{Mitteilungen} 5 (1968), 58-74, pages 58-64; BA B 106 25041, Folder 8719, UFU Fragebogen, 29 Mai 1969, page 1).
\textsuperscript{160} The majority of students were enrolled during the first five years (BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 2241, 30 Jähriges Jubiläum der Ukrainischen Technischen Hochschule im Ausland, Sonderdruck aus \textit{Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart} 3 (1952), pages 1-4 (General correspondence concerning the institute can be found in folder 2241).
\textsuperscript{161} BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 2241, V/8 8063 de 55 29711, Maurer, Betrifft Ukrainische Technische Hochschule München, 10 September 1952.
the premises of the League of Political Prisoners. Like other Ukrainian institutions in Germany, the UTHI struggled with declining numbers of students and lecturers and an imbalanced student-professor ratio. In September 1952, the UTHI listed 36 professors, 10 assistants, and 21 people employed in its laboratories and the administration, but only 66 students who were taking classes and 272 students who were enrolled in correspondence classes. In addition to these problems, the UTHI’s financial situation was even bleaker than that of UFU. By the end of the 1950s, the UTHI had essentially stopped functioning, a fate that had also befallen the Shevchenko Scientific Society.

4.1.3. The Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh), German Branch

The Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh) can look back on a long tradition of scholarly activity. Founded in 1873 in L’viv with the aim of promoting literature, the Shevchenko Society initially focused on publishing activities. In 1893, it was restructured and continued its work in the area of Ukrainian arts and science as the Shevchenko Scientific Society, over time establishing a library, a bookstore and a museum in L’viv. Under the tutelage of M. Hrushevskyi, NTSh developed into an important institution that attracted many Ukrainian scholars in the pre-WWI period. The First World War brought all of NTSh’s activities to a halt; and even after its revival in Poland, it did not reach the same heights it had had at the turn of the century due to government restrictions and a desperate financial situation. Nonetheless, NTSh expanded its library, engaged in scholarly activities, and resumed its publications. Under the Soviet occupation (1939-1941), NTSh was dissolved; and between 1939 and 1944 most members of the society fled to the West where the association was revived in 1947 in Munich. With many émigré scholars located on German soil, NTSh could attract numerous new members and thus improved its activities during the late 1940s. With the wave of mass migration, branches of NTSh were founded in the United States, Canada and Australia; and the executive centre of NTSh with the library and archives was relocated in

162 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 2241, Sawyckyj, Pro-Rektor, an das Bayerische Staatsministerium der Finanzen. 5 November 1952.
163 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 2241, Pelenskyj, Direktor des UTWI, an das Bayerische Staatsministerium des Innern, 18 September 1952.
164 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 2241, BMVt (Wussow) an das Bayerische Staatsministerium des Innern, 17 Januar 1953.
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Sarcelles, France. The branch in Munich was doomed to wither away and would have probably ceased to exist if it had not been for the establishment of the Association for the Advancement of Ukrainian Studies (AAUS).

4.1.4. The Association for the Advancement of Ukrainian Studies (AAUS)

During the 1950s, it had seemed unrealistic or even impossible to unite institutions such as UFU and the UTHI under one umbrella organization because their character was considered to be too different. However, when the situation of the three major Ukrainian academic institutions deteriorated and requests for funding to the federal and state government increased, the federal Ministry of Expellees as well as the Bavarian Ministry of Education and the Bavarian Ministry of Labor suggested in the summer of 1962 that UFU, UTHI, and NTSh should join under one umbrella organization to facilitate German sponsorship. In November of 1962, the Association for the Advancement of Ukrainian Studies was founded, an association that represented the three learned societies while leaving each of them as an independent institution. The AAUS was headed by an executive that included the principals of the three Ukrainian institutions. The executive was backed by the learned council, a committee that was composed of two thirds Ukrainian scholars and one third German scholars. The third part of the association was the board of trustees that brought together representatives from the federal as well as the Bavarian government and the Ukrainian head of the learned council. The board of trustees was responsible for securing funds and insuring that the association’s activities complied with its initial aims and goals. The member institutions had to send annual reports to the federal and state governments to record their progress and outline planned activities for the following fiscal year.

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166 BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 2241, Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Unterricht an das Bayerische Staatsministerium des Innern, no date given.
168 Satzung der Arbeits- und Förderungs gemeinschaft der ukrainischen Wissenschaften e.V; BA B 106 28187, Geschäftsordnung des Kuratoriums der Arbeits- und Förderungsgemeinschaft der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften e.V. (It is interesting in this context that decisions of great financial consequence could not be made against the vote of the BMVt representative, page 3). For a concise overview of the founding of the AAUS with a list of its members see Rostyslav Jendyk, “Entstehung, Eröffnung und Tätigkeit des Hauses der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften,” in Mitteilungen 1 (1965), 9-12.
On May 24, 1963, the AAUS and its member organizations were able to move into the new “House of Ukrainian Studies” (*Haus der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften*) located in the Laplacestrasse 24 in Munich. The inaugural celebration featured speeches by German as well as Ukrainian envoys and an exhibition of the publications distributed by UFU, UTHI and NTSh during the past 25 years. The Ukrainian side – here represented through the head of the AAUS, Rostyslav Iendyk (Rostyslaw Jendyk) – hailed the inauguration of the AAUS as a great achievement and a sign of hope for all Ukrainian scholars in exile. Johannes Maurer, member of staff of the Bavarian State Refugee Administration and longtime expert on homeless foreigners’ issues in Germany, outlined the motivation of the federal and state governments in taking this step of direct support and long term commitment. In his laudatory speech, Maurer praised the Ukrainians’ dedication to their academic institutions and the preservation of their culture despite crisis and hardship. In his view, the host country had the duty to support these endeavors because they were beneficial not only to the Ukrainian people, but to all mankind. The AAUS served as a tool to secure funding for the continuation of academic studies that could find an outlet in talks and seminars held at the House of Ukrainian Studies. And the academic sector was not the only area where Ukrainians could procure German funding, as following section shows.

### 4.2. Motivation for Support of Ukrainian Academic and Other Institutions

According to a Ukrainian observer, during the 1960s Germany developed into one of the most generous countries with regard to financial support for cultural and academic activities of (homeless) foreigners. And Ukrainians – as one of the

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171 Johannes Maurer, “Förderung ukrainischer Wissenschaften im Exil,” *Mitteilungen* 1 (1965), 7-8. Some interviewees also stressed that they ‘discovered’ UFU during the 1960s through the talks held at the House of Ukrainian Studies (see for example interview 30).

largest groups of homeless foreigners \footnote{Ukrainians in Germany had 25,000 members, only exceeded by Hungarians (32,000 members) and Poles (49,000) (BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1908, Die Heimatlosen Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland e.V., Die Lage der h. Ausländer, page 2).} – benefited in particular from this trend. The Bavarian government asserted in 1966 that the Ukrainian community in Germany received a large portion (roughly 300,000 DM) of the funds that were allocated towards homeless foreigners. The majority of this money was directed towards the academic sector, \footnote{BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1908, Lüder an das Bayerische Staatsministerium für Arbeit und Soziale Fürsorge, 8 Juli 1966.} a trend that could also be observed on the federal level.\footnote{See, for example, for 1963: BA B 106 25098, Aufstellung über Beihilfen im Rechnungsjahr 1963 aus Kapitel 2602, Titel 603, an Volkgruppen, übernationale Verbände und Kirchengruppen.} Here the newly founded AAUS was of particular importance, because it offered the institutions involved an opportunity to obtain financial support and keep their activities afloat. The funding that was procured from the federal and state government was substantial and crucial for the survival of the institutions. For example, in 1965, the AAUS received 137,500 DM from the federal government, 22,500 DM from the Bavarian state, and 3,000 DM from North Rhine-Westphalia to operate the three learned societies. Their own contributions for the same time period were rather low, for instance, the Ukrainian Free University only put in 10,548.50 DM.\footnote{BA B 106 28187, Brief von Dr. Wolfrum an Michael Sosnowski, WCFU, Executive Director, Winnipeg, 20 August 1969, page 1.} Although the academic institutions received the bulk of financial support, some money was also set aside for the church, Saturday schools, summer camps, and general charitable projects.\footnote{BA B 106 28191, Wolfrum an das Bundespräsinalamt z. H. von Herrn Regierungsdirektor Dr. Spath, 25 August 1969, page 2. For example, the Sioz Ukrains’kyh Voiennykh Invalidiv (SUVI) received 157,000 DM between 1960 and 1966 (Maruniak, \textit{Tom II}, page 81).} One of the federal rules guiding the financial support stipulated that only representative groups, not splinter groups, could be supported; in addition, the authorities had to keep the number of organizations to a minimum.\footnote{BA B 106 25042, File: Schulen der heimatlosen Ausländer und Kinderheime (8719a), Ergebnis Protokoll der Besprechung am 28 Mai 1963 im BMVt in Bonn mit Vertretern der Landesflüchtlingsverwaltungen über Fragen der ausländischen Flüchtlinge, 18 Juni 1963, page 2.} Outside the academic sector, the Bavarian as well as the federal governments tried to keep their options open and did not commit to any long term plans, preferring to fund one-time events such as conferences,
commemorative celebrations, or summer camps. As community leaders (such as Kornyliak) observed, the German subsidies could not fill the void that cutbacks of American funding had left.

When evaluating the reasons for German government support of homeless foreigners, different factors have to be taken into consideration. Sympathy with the Ukrainian cause and “solidarity with the spirit of freedom” were motives especially cited by the Free State of Bavaria. Furthermore, it was also important that the three institutions joined under the AAUS were very prestigious and respected in the wider diaspora. Undeniably, Germany’s standing in the international community

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182 Even today many Ukrainians still consider UFU to be “the most important centre of intellectual life of the Ukrainian emigration in Germany and Western Europe” (Petro Kardash, and Sergii Kot, Ukraintsi v Sviti (Kiev, Melbourne: Fortuna, 1995), page 271. Volodymyr Ianiv stressed that only
and the “respect for the foreign heritage (Volkstum),” which were already stressed during the 1950s, continued to be factors in the equation. The federal and state side saw the support for the homeless foreigners as a sign that Germany had broken with its Nazi past and as a good example for the world “how one could ease the preservation of national, language, cultural and religious features of members of other people”\(^{183}\). However, sympathy and international standing were only one driving force that inspired the support of homeless foreigners.

### 4.3. Support for Ukrainian Institutions in the Context of Eastern Studies

The German expellee question continued to play a role in government actions and was of importance for their support of homeless foreigners, although the two subjects were never directly linked. During the postwar period, the BMVt focused much of its energy and resources on the fate of the expellees, and here financial support and reintegration measures in Germany were only part of the agenda. One crucial goal was to return to the regions that had come under Polish administration, an objective that was justified through the argument that each people had a right to homeland. Until this return could actually be achieved, the maintenance of an identity that incorporated the eastern heritage of the expellees became important, and it was perpetuated through Eastern Studies (Ostkunde) in schools and universities. The BMVt stressed that Eastern Studies held an importance for the German education system that could not be overestimated; the ministry therefore invested large sums in the program.\(^{184}\)

Initially, Eastern Studies focused on former German territories in the East, their history and cultural particularities, and on German contributions in Eastern Europe in general. However, already in the mid-50s, the BMVt and the respective State Refugee Administrations (which were predominantly responsible for Eastern Studies)\(^{185}\) started to realize that the topic encompassed not only Germans, but also

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\(^{183}\) BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1910, Peter Paul Nahm: Status und Behandlung der heimatlosen Ausländer (Radio Vaticano, 12 Februar 1968), page 4ff.

\(^{184}\) Rolf Meinhardt, *Deutsche Ostkunde: Ein Beitrag zur Pädagogik des Kalten Krieges 1945-1968* (Oldenburg: M1 Verlag, 1978), pages 288-305, quote from page 288 (the general spending process was eased due to the fact that it was not monitored by the Parliament).

\(^{185}\) In some states the Ministry of Education was responsible for Eastern Studies (Meinhardt, *Deutsche Ostkunde*, page 313).
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the Soviet Union, its satellite states, and their national particularities.\textsuperscript{186} Nonetheless, by the early 1960s, Eastern Studies were still not coordinated between the federal and state levels and focused primarily on the expellee question.\textsuperscript{187} A methodical coordination started in 1963,\textsuperscript{188} and the federal government discovered the broader political importance of Eastern Studies. In guidelines that were distributed to all State Refugee Administrations, the federal government explained why one had to stay informed about the East:

"Those regimes and parties, but not the peoples governed by the USSR form, to a large extent, an ideological, economic and military unit. Therefore we have to consider and address the peoples separately. For this purpose we must gain an in-depth knowledge of the characteristics, history and culture of the peoples of East Central Europe up to the time of Sovietization and their intellectual, economic and political development since. This has to be accompanied by a deepening of the knowledge of East Germany, the German contribution in East-central Europe and the common destiny of Germans and Slavs."\textsuperscript{189}

The idea was to move away from the sole focus on German contribution and history in the east towards a deeper knowledge of the east in general, concentrating on the different peoples that made up the Soviet Union. This new direction in Eastern Studies necessitated a growing pool of specialists – specialists who spoke Slavic languages and who could research in the respective areas. Of course, this kind of specialist could only be found at

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item BA B 106 27337, Stellungnahme der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Landesflüchtlingsverwaltungen zu dem Beschluss der Ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder vom 13. und 14. Dezember 1956 betreffend die Empfehlungen zur Ostkunde, pages 2-5. Many expellee organizations had stressed the importance of German contribution and had influenced respective government decrees; often students were not only meant to gain knowledge about the east, but also an appreciation (Meinhardt, \textit{Deutsche Ostkunde}, page 317f).
\item BA B 106 27337, Niederschrift der Sitzung des Kulturausschusses der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Landesflüchtlingsverwaltungen in Stuttgart, 9/10 Mai 1960, pages 3-10.
\item Meinhardt, \textit{Deutsche Ostkunde}, page 312f.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
institutions of higher learning; and in this context the support of the AAUS
does not come as a surprise. Furthermore, the early 60s were a period in
Germany when general reforms in the educational sector started\textsuperscript{190} - a fact
that also coincided with the establishment of the AAUS.

The developments in Eastern Studies were also in line with previous
German interest in the education of an elite among homeless foreigners that
focused in particular on the Gymnasien (preparatory schools for
Universities) of the Latvians, Lithuanians, Hungarians and Ridna Shkola.\textsuperscript{191}
These institutions were meant to provide an education that took the
respective ethnic background into consideration, focusing in particular on
language skills. The goal was to raise an intelligentsia that would one day
be able to return to their respective homelands.\textsuperscript{192} Apart from these
motivational factors, the question remains as to whether the German
government saw the sponsorship of the Ukrainian academic institutions as
the only way to gain some influence on a community that was otherwise
beyond their reach, as, for example, the Stashynskyi trial had shown.\textsuperscript{193}
However, to answer this question is beyond the scope of this study.

4.4. The Opening of the (Academic) Community

Due to the financial support provided by the German government, the 1960s saw an
opening up of the Ukrainian community, a representation of its activities to a wider
audience, and more interaction between the German government and Ukrainian
representatives. This opening took place mostly in the realm of academia.

According to Prokopchuk, the bleak financial circumstances forced UFU to

\textsuperscript{190} Schildt, “Materieller Wohlstand,” page 38f.
\textsuperscript{191} BA B 106 28191, File: Apostolische Exarchie, Allgem. Akte, 8766g, Brief von Dorn an den
Apostolischen Exarchen für katholische Ukrainer, 10 Juli 1970, page 2. For example, financial
support for summer camps was reduced in 1970 to concentrate one’s efforts more on the
Gymnasien (high schools that prepared students for university).
\textsuperscript{192} BA B 106 25042, Lüder an das Referat III1 im Hause, 10 Mai 1963. Bericht: Die jugendlichen
nichtdeutschen Flüchtlinge. For correspondence see folder BA B 106 25042. (Early on, the Bavarian
side had made it clear that it did not have an interest in sponsoring a Ukrainian public school
(Volksschule), but that the matter was different in context of a Gymnasium, because such an
institution could secure new recruits for UFU or UTWI (BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung
1856, Maurer: Stellungnahme des Sachgebietes 8b, 24 November 1952). UFU itself stressed that the
lack of a Ukrainian preparatory Gymnasium further endangered the future of UFU (Ianiv, “20 Jahre im
Dienste,” page 252)).
\textsuperscript{193} In this context, the political orientation of the learned societies would also be of interest.
However, this is a subject for further research.
broaden its connections with other academic institutions, which put informing the academic world about problems in Eastern Europe at the top of the agenda.\textsuperscript{194} In this context, UFU cooperated with different German universities to launch lecture series and publications in which it could present the university and Ukrainian Studies in general.\textsuperscript{195} The formation of the AAUS brought all three learned societies into even closer contact with their German counterparts\textsuperscript{196} and offered them an opportunity to present themselves to a wider Ukrainian (to a certain degree even German) audience through talks and exhibitions in the House of Ukrainian Studies.\textsuperscript{197} The talks covered a broad range of topics dealing with Germany, the Ukrainian Diaspora, and Ukraine itself.\textsuperscript{198} Apart from the AAUS, the German-Ukrainian Society and the Association of the Free Press also organized a number of talks and exhibitions that were geared toward a broader audience.\textsuperscript{199} UFU also

\textsuperscript{194} Prokopchuk, \textit{Ukrainer in München}, 23.
\textsuperscript{195} Together with the Seminar for Slavic and Baltic Philology of the University of Munich, UFU published the papers held at the community meeting commemorating the 100\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the death of Shevchenko (Ianiv, “Preface,” 5. BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1905, Technische Hochschule Stuttgart und die UFU laden ein zu Vortragszyklus, 30. und 31. Januar 1964 in Stuttgart). For cooperation between UFU and the University of Stuttgart in future years, see also: BA B 106 28187, Tätigkeitsbericht der Ukrainischen Freien Universität für das Jahr 1970, page 4; BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1905, Gastvorlesungen. For other examples of UFU outside cooperation, see Prokopchuk, \textit{Ukrainer in München}, 23ff.
\textsuperscript{196} The learned council of the AAUS contained both German and Ukrainian representatives.
\textsuperscript{197} BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1905, UFU: Einladung an Bayerische Staatsministerium für Arbeit und Fürsorge (Juni 1964); BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1905, Einladung zum Vortrag von Herrn Dr. K. Siehs, Einladung an das Bayerische Staatsministerium für Arbeit und Fürsorge (Juli 1964); Ausstellungskatalog: Ausstellung der Veröffentlichungen der Šewčenko-Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, der Ukrainischen Freien Universität und des Ukrainischen Technisch-Wirtschaftlichen Instituts im Exil 1945-1963 anläßlich der Eröffnung des Hauses der ukrainischen Wissenschaften in München; BA B 106 28187, Bericht des Vorsitzenden der Arbeits- und Förderungsgemeinschaft der ukrainischen Wissenschaften e.V., München, zur Mitgliederversammlung am 29. April 1967, page 4 (in 1966, 37 public talks were held in the “House of Ukrainian Studies,” altogether reaching 1,320 people); BA B 106 28187, Öffentliche Vorträge im Haus der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften im Jahre 1968; BA B 106 28189, 8766c/70, Öffentliche Vorträge im Haus der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften im Jahre 1969 (altogether 26 talks and rounds of discussions listed).
\textsuperscript{198} For example, interested community members could learn more about “The fight of Ukrainians and their right to exist as a people and state” (BA B 106 28187, Bericht des Vorsitzenden der Arbeits- und Förderungsgemeinschaft der ukrainischen Wissenschaften e.V., München, zur Mitgliederversammlung am 29. April 1967, page 4), about the “Social Insurance for Workers in Germany,” the “Social problems of Ukrainians in Germany,” or the “Demographics of Ukraine during recent decades” (BA B 106 28189 8766c/70, Öffentliche Vorträge im Haus der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften im Jahre 1969).
\textsuperscript{199} BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1908, Deutsch Ukrainische Gesellschaft an das Bayerische Staatsministerium für Arbeit, 22 April 1966. The AFP also realized that a closer connection with the German press should be pursued and in 1964, the association arranged – under the auspices of the Bavarian Ministry of Labor and Social Care – an exhibition of the exile press and
made an effort to publish more academic works in German, and the publication of the AAUS journal *Mitteilungen* can serve as one example of this trend.\(^{200}\) During the 1960s, the AFP also realized the importance of the German language in order to reach their aim of informing the west about what was happening in the east.\(^{201}\)

Apart from the learned societies, the education sector also came into closer contact with the German authorities during the 1960s, as financial support from the US and Canada flowing to Ukrainian Saturday Schools in Germany came to an end in 1963. Once it ran out, the municipal governments in northern Germany took responsibility for Ukrainian teachers in that region, whereas the federal government distributed money through CRUEG to the communities and their schools in southern Germany. Maruniak points out that because of this transition, teachers were forced to acquire pedagogic qualifications and had to help students with subjects that were part of a German curriculum.\(^{202}\) In addition to schools, youth summer camps were another important feature of the Ukrainian community. Once these camps were partially sponsored by the German government (already in the early 1960s), they welcomed representatives from the federal as well as the state administration who toured the summer camps and gave speeches in which they praised German hospitality that made it possible for the ethnic groups to preserve their heritage. Over time, the summer camps grew completely dependent on German support.\(^{203}\)

\(^{200}\) BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1905, UFU: Vorausblick auf die wissenschaftliche Tätigkeit der Ukrainischen Freien Universität im Jahre 1964, 15 November 1963, page 4; Volodymyr Ianiv, “Die Tätigkeit der Ukrainischen Freien Universität auf kulturell-künstlerischem Gebiet,” *Jahrbuch der Ukrainekunde* 23 (1986), 245-257, page 253. Ianiv stressed that UFU was determined to publish more in German “to be able to offer the interested German circles, especially the students, better material for their work” (Ianiv, “Preface,” page 5).

\(^{201}\) BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1908, Die Freie Presse und ihre Bedeutung, page 4.

\(^{202}\) Maruniak, *Tom II*, page 27.

The organized community was generally more open during the 1960s; however, for some of its members it was still not enough. Gregor Prokopchuk, one of the few prominent members of the interwar migration, observed in 1968 that the Ukrainian national idea was not well understood outside of Ukrainian circles. Ukrainians often blamed this situation on the shrewd propaganda of their enemies. However, according to Prokopchuk, Ukrainians were also partially to blame, because they did not capitalize on every opportunity to inform the world about Ukrainian issues and to forge friendships with people who were sensitive to the Ukrainian cause. Of course, settling down in the country had been one of the major tasks in the 1950s. Nonetheless, in the eyes of Prokopchuk, the Ukrainian community had kept too much to itself. As Prokopchuk astutely observed, despite a slight opening towards the German society, the Ukrainian community in the country was still very detached and removed. At the same time, they had grown entirely dependent on outside German support. This became particularly obvious once the (federal) support started to run out.

4.5. The End of the 1960s – the End of Financial Support?

The federal elections in 1969 brought major changes to Germany, changes that would also have an impact on the lives of homeless foreigners in the country. Although the CDU emerged from the election as strongest party with 46.1% of the votes, the SPD (42.7%) became the governing party, because the Liberals (FDP, 5.8%) opted for a coalition with the Social Democrats. The two parties were a good match at the end of the decade because they had similar ideas with regard to Germany’s foreign policy. Whereas the CDU governments before them had sought an integration in the West and had not recognized the Oder-Neisse frontier, the new chancellor Brandt (SPD), along with his deputy and Minister of Foreign Affairs Walter Scheel (FDP), aimed at a conciliation with the East; this approach fit into the overall international policy of détente. Abdication of force and recognition of the existing borders were at the core of the treaties with Moscow, Warsaw, and Prague, all of which materialized over the next three years. However, the German government only acknowledged that these borders were inviolable, not irreversible,

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204 Gregor Prokopchuk, Deutsch-Ukrainische Gesellschaft, 1918-1968 (Munich: Verlag Ukraine, 1968), pages 33-34.
thereby maintaining the FRG’s long term goal, the reunification of Germany.

Germany’s Ostpolitik of the late 1960s and early 1970s contributed to an easing of the country’s relationship with the east without removing the country from its western integration. Although this new orientation raised criticism in Germany, especially within the opposition, it was a successful endeavor and one of the greatest triumphs of the SPD/FDP government.205 The shifting priorities of the newly elected government were also reflected in their approach to domestic affairs. In November of 1969, the Ministry of Expellees ceased to exist as an independent ministry and was incorporated into the Ministry of the Interior as the expellee branch (Abteilung für Vertriebene). Although it continued to look after expellees and homeless foreigners, the move was a definitive indicator that the new government did not ascribe as much value to the state of affairs of these groups as the previous governments had done.206 And for homeless foreigners, this meant major financial cutbacks for their organizations as an examination of the Ukrainian case shows.

Even before the change of government, the Ministry of Expellees had started to back down from financially supporting major projects. As early as 1968, the ministry stressed in its correspondence with Ukrainian applicants that it did not have the financial means to start greater new projects such as a cultural center for Ukrainians in Bielefeld or a Ukrainian Catholic Church in Munich.207 During 1969, traditional projects such as Ukrainian summer camps were still funded, but the ministry ensured that the respective states as well as the parents of the children

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205 For further information regarding Germany’s Ostpolitik, see Edgar Wolfrum, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2005), pages 357-416; Frank Fischer, „Im deutschen Interesse”. Die Ostpolitik der SPD von 1969 bis 1989 (Husum: Matthiesen Verlag, 2001), pages 29-48.

206 In this context one has to keep in mind that the major problems such as housing and job placement had been solved by the late 1960s.

207 BA B 106 28191, File: Apostolische Exarchie, Allgem. Akte, 8766g, Brief von Platon Kornyljak, Apostolischer Exarch, an das BMVt, Kai-Uwe Hassel, 11 Dezember 1967; BA B 106 28191, File: Apostolische Exarchie, Allgem. Akte, 8766g, Brief des Katholischen Büros Bonn, Kommissariat der Deutschen Bischöfe an Kai-Uwe Hassel, 20 Dezember 1967; BA B 106 28191, File: Apostolische Exarchie, Allgemeine Akte, 8766g, Brief von Hassel an das Katholische Büro Bonn, 30 Januar 1968; BA B 106 28191, File: Apostolische Exarchie, Allgem. Akte, 8766g, Dr. Wolfrum an das Referat K1 im Hause, betrifft die Exarchie der Ukrainer katholisch-unierten Bekenntnisses, 14 Januar 1970, page 1f. The argument was that this was a church related issue, so the individual parishes had to pay for such projects.
contributed their share.\textsuperscript{208} In 1970, cutbacks in funding for summer camps were introduced, and the federal authorities argued that a focus on the schools was a better use of resources.\textsuperscript{209} However, there wasn’t even enough money to raise the teachers’ or ministers’ salaries,\textsuperscript{210} and summer camps and Saturday schools were not the only institutions to suffer. The AAUS – until that time greatest beneficiary of federal support – was informed in 1971 that a large portion of the money allocated to homeless foreigners and their institutions for that year had been blocked. The ministry promised the AAUS to inform them if some of the money was to be freed during the second half of the year. However, it was unlikely that there would be more funding available in 1972, and the ministry encouraged the organizations to be economical.\textsuperscript{211} The Ukrainian Eparchy was also informed that it would have to tap into other sources of funding if it wanted to continue activities such as summer camps.\textsuperscript{212} Although the Bavarian government was generally more open towards continuing the support for homeless foreigners,\textsuperscript{213} slight cutbacks were also introduced on the state level.\textsuperscript{214}

The federal government employed different lines of argumentation to justify these cutbacks. It is reasonable to assume that supporting a group of homeless foreigners that openly spread anti-Soviet propaganda was seen as rather cumbersome, since the German government was increasingly interested in

\textsuperscript{208} BA B 106 28191, File: Apostolische Exarchie, II5. 8766g/69, Brief von Wolfrum an die Apostolische Exarchie, 12 Februar 1969.


\textsuperscript{210} BA B 106 28191, File: Apostolische Exarchie, Allgem. Akte, 8766g, Dr. Wolfrum an das Referat K1 im Hause, betrifft die Exarchie der Ukrainer katholisch-unierten Bekenntnisses, 14 Januar 1970, page 2.

\textsuperscript{211} BA B 106 28187, Wolfrum an die Arbeits- und Fördergemeinschaft der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften, 23 März 1971.


\textsuperscript{213} BA B 106 28189, 8766c/71, Dr. Maurer, Bayerisches Staatsministerium, an das Bundesministerium des Innern, Abteilung Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen, 21 Oktober 1971.

\textsuperscript{214} However, the cutbacks were not as drastic as the federal ones. For example, Bavaria paid the AAUS 90,000 instead 100,000 in 1972 (BA B 106 28189, 8766c/1972, Brief von Dr. Wolfrum an die Arbeitsgemeinschaft, 13 September 1972).
improving relations with the Soviet Union. Even the previous grand coalition (CDU/SPD) had stressed that funding could be cut any time because of the budgetary position and/or political reasons.\textsuperscript{215} However, by the end of the 1960s some BMVt representatives also started to doubt the success and effectiveness of the ministry’s measures. The developments in the Ukrainian academic sector, for example, were overall unsatisfactory. In 1968, of 69 participants auditing courses at the UFU, only 17 were homeless foreigners from the FRG. And out of 14 students, only 3 were between 20 and 30 years of age, all others were older than 50. Since the federal authorities had allotted 30,000 DM just for teaching purpose, officials were not happy with these statistics. They made Prof. Ianiv, the new rector of UFU, aware that the learned societies had to find financial sources of their own, because the federal support would not last indefinitely. Interestingly enough, Prof. Ianiv blamed the “lack of organizational skills of his fellow countrymen” and stated that he would address this issue during his next trip to North America.\textsuperscript{216} Apparently, the community in Germany was not even considered a viable option. Nonetheless, soliciting Ukrainian funds was not an easy task, and Dr. Wolfrum remarked on another occasion that he had to conclude “from the small level of Ukrainian allocations” that Ukrainians in the free world had only a marginal interest in the learned societies in Germany. Indeed, Dr. Wolfrum further pointed out that Ukrainians in the US, Canada, or Rome were far more successful in collecting


\textsuperscript{216} BA B 106 28187, Appelius: Vermerk, Betrifft Ukrainische Freie Universität, 31 Juli 1968, pages 1-5. Indeed, this trend would continue over the next years. In 1969, UFU had 118 students (16 of them in correspondence courses); in 1970, UFU had 61 students (14 of them in correspondence classes). In 1971, out of 97 students (25 of them in correspondence classes), only 9 were from Germany (BA B 106 28188, Folder 8766c Band IV, UFU: Unterlagen für die Sitzungen des Kuratoriums und des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats der Arbeits- und Förderungsgemeinschaft der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften e.V. am 9. November 1972 (Statistische Zusammenstellungen für die Sitzung des Kuratoriums der Arbeits- und Förderungsgemeinschaft der Ukrainischen Wissenschaft, 9 November 1972), page 2). For more criticism of insufficient activities of both UTHI and UFU, see: BA B 106 28187, Betrifft Arbeits- und Fördergemeinschaft der ukrainischen Wissenschaften und Ukrainisches Technisch-Wirtschaftliches Institut, Gespräch des Referenten im Beisein von Appelius, 14 August 1968, 1.
funds for their institutions. Insufficient output and lack of their own resources were also cited in later years as reasons for the cutbacks.

The cutbacks introduced by the federal government hit the Ukrainian community hard. Throughout the 1960s, many of their organizations in Germany had grown quite dependent on outside, non-Ukrainian support. For example, by the late 1960s/early 1970s, UFU could only exist due to federal funding, and once this source dried up, long-term planning was almost impossible for the institution. Furthermore, in 1970 the AAUS actually experienced difficulties in making payments on rental facilities and scholarships due to a lack of funding. In light of this, the cutbacks were perceived as “catastrophic” and community leaders tried to counteract this step initiated by the federal government. In order to persuade the authorities of the importance of the institutions and the necessity of continuing the funding, the leaders implemented a line of arguments that had worked during the 1950s – in their correspondence with the German government they frequently stressed that Germany could gain a better standing in the world community by actively supporting the advancement of Ukrainian studies. Iaroslav Stetsko, for example, made it clear that the Ukrainian Free University could serve as evidence that “today’s Germany thinks and acts differently than Hitler Germany,” thereby warning the authorities not to underestimate this positive effect.

Almost threateningly, the head of ABN referred to the size of the Ukrainian community in Canada (600,000) and the US (1.5 million), stressing that “we have some Ministers of Parliament in Canada,…for example the former Minister of Labor Michael Starr is a nationally conscious Ukrainian…The weakening of the

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217 BA B 106 28187, Brief von Dr. Wolfrum an Michael Sosnowski, WCFU, Executive Director, Winnipeg, 20 August 1969, pages 2-3, quote from page 2.
220 BA B 106 28188, 8766c Band IV, Schreiben von Janiw an Ministerialdirektor Dr. Liebrecht, 15 September 1971, page 1f. Ianiv stressed in this letter that the university had tried to procure one third of the needed budget and that these efforts had had a negative effect on the overall achievements.
221 BA B 106 28189, 8766c/71, Jahresbericht des Vorsitzenden der Arbeits-und Förderungsgemeinschaft der ukrainischen Wissenschaften e.V. Prof. Dr. R. Jendyk, für das Jahr 1970, pages 1-4.
222 BA B 106 28189, 8766c/70, Jahresbericht des Vorsitzenden des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats für das Jahr 1969.
Ukrainian academic center in Germany will, of course, have a negative bearing of the Ukrainian-American public.” Representatives of the AAUS also emphasized to the German authorities that the existing institutions and their future support were important for Germany’s reputation as a “refuge of freedom and shelter for emigrants.” Other Ukrainian representatives also stressed the strong connections to the wider diaspora and the positive light that German support could generate. And indeed, the learned societies kept close contacts with their alumni and professors who were scattered all over the world. Many of these academics were still thankful for the education which they had received in Germany during the DP period and maintained an interest in what happened to their alma mater. Although the statement that Germany could gain better international standing through support of homeless foreigners was the dominant line of reasoning, some Ukrainian representatives did not shy away from reminding the German state and federal authorities that their people once had been “deported” to Germany and that there was a large portion of forced labourers among the Ukrainians listed as homeless foreigners in Germany.

However, neither international standing nor sense of duty could move the federal government to boost its support for homeless foreigners. Apparently, in the eyes of the authorities the homeless foreigners had lost their importance as a “valuable example.” In this context it is important to consider that the German

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224 BA B 106 28187, Betrifft Arbeits- und Fördergemeinschaft der ukrainischen Wissenschaften und Ukrainisches Technisch-Wirtschaftliches Institut, 14 August 1968 (talk with Jendyk).
227 BA B 106 28191, File: Apostolische Exarchie, Allgem. Akte, 8766g, Brief von Dionysius Kopcansky, Seelsorger für die Katholischen Ukrainer byzantinischen Ritus, an den Bundesarbeits- und Sozialminister der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 3 Dezember 1967, Betrifft finanzielle Beihilfe zum Bau eines Gemeindezentrums, page 1f. For an early example, see: BayHStA Landesflüchtlingsverwaltung 1905, Brief vom ukrainischen Frauenverband an das Ministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, 27 Februar 1964.
government no longer necessarily needed the homeless foreigners to prove to the world that they had learned from their Nazi past. By the mid-1960s, the guest workers could serve as examples of Germany’s ‘openness’ towards foreigners. First of all, they were a numerically large group and therefore more visible. Second, the German authorities still thought that the guest workers would return to their countries of origin in the near future and hence could serve as messengers. As Ulrich Herbert and Karin Hunn have shown, political representatives as well as journalists were very much interested in using the case of the guest workers to cast themselves in a good light in the eyes of the international community.228

5. Conclusion and Outlook

5.1. Conclusion

Contrary to commonly held assumptions, the homeless foreigners did not completely vanish during the 1960s; indeed, the decade was important for Ukrainians in Germany. The highly publicized murder of Bandera and the subsequent trial of his murderer, Stashynskyi, reaffirmed the notion of many Ukrainians that they were an important, and solely political, group. The narrative of the political émigré continued to be the dominant factor influencing identity formation for the group in Germany, perpetuated by the legally insecure status that the group of homeless foreigners faced in the country. On a community level, Ukrainians experienced an increase of their organizations and activities during the early part of the decade. New branches of OUZh and CRUEG were founded throughout the country, which again stimulated new Saturday schools and summer camps. However, this expansion did not last very long. By the mid-1960s, many of the newly established branches crumbled, and at the end of the decade, the only “institution” that saw a major increase was the Ukrainian plot in the Munich cemetery.

The Ukrainian learned societies fared slightly better during the 1960s. The German federal and state authorities took a growing interest in the institutions – partially spurred by their growing focus on Eastern Studies in general – and joined them under the Association for the Advancement of Ukrainian Studies to make a

sponsorship program easier. As a consequence, the UFU, UTWI and Shevchenko Society did not only get sorely needed financial support, but also came into closer contact with the German authorities and other German academic institutions. This led to an opening of the community, expressed through talks and exhibition taking place at the House of Ukrainian Studies in Munich. Nonetheless, the three institutions did not perform to the full contentedness of the authorities. UFU, for example, could not attract many Ukrainian students from the FRG and appealed mostly to Ukrainians from North America. Furthermore, all three institutions had difficulties contributing financial input of their own. At the end of the 1960s, with regards to the weak performance of the AAUS and in light of a new foreign policy, the federal government started to cut down their financial support. Community leaders tried to convince the authorities to continue their financial assistance by arguing that this would contribute to Germany’s good standing in the world. On occasion, Ukrainian representatives also reminded the government of the origin of the group. However, none of these arguments could alter the federal government’s stand on the subject.

5.2. Outlook

Although the federal government started to decrease (but not cease) its support for the homeless foreigners’ institutions during the early 1970s, the Ukrainian community in Germany, especially in Munich, experienced a slight expansion during this decade. According to an official statement by the AAUS, the initial scale of federal support was not maintained “probably also due to influences of the…‘policy of détente.’” However, according to Ianiv, by this time, the Ukrainian institutions had established themselves and were able to solicit more donations, for example from the Ukrainian public.229 And the Bavarian state continued its support of Ukrainian institutions (not surprisingly so, as the Bavarian state was governed by the CSU which had displayed strong opposition to the federal Ostpolitik).

Furthermore, Ukrainians in Germany also benefited from Cardinal Slipyi’s interference with and interest in Ukrainian community life in Germany. Slipyi did not only lobby directly with the German authorities, but also visited Germany

himself to get an insight into the situation of Ukrainians in the country. With Slipyi’s help the Ukrainian community managed to obtain a building for the AAUS in Munich in 1974 where the UFU, UWTI and Shevchenko Society found a new home. Since the new house offered more room to teach, the institutions’ activities also increased, penetrating different fields. In 1975, for example, a professor for art history was employed, and more exhibitions were held. Apart from the Ukrainian Free University, Slipyi showed considerable interest in the affairs of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Germany, especially in the parish in Munich. With Slipyi’s help and support, the parish received a church and a parish hall in the city. Nonetheless, the new building still did not have many outward signs of the orthodox rite in order to avoid “disturbing the character” of the newly erected, predominantly German settlement. In contrast to church life, Munich as a political centre (the one important position that Germany had for Ukrainians in the Diaspora) started to unravel in the late 1960s. UNRada and Ukrainian political parties in general had started to disintegrate already after the mass emigration in 1950, and the killings of prominent members such as Bandera and Rebet reinforced this trend in the early 1960s. For example, in 1967, UNRada held the sixth session in Munich, after that the Council was relocated abroad. With the decline in the political sphere Ukrainians had lost the one aspect that had set the community in Germany apart. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Germany has received a new wave of Ukrainian immigrants, seasonal laborers, and students. However, their settlement in the country, as well as the established

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230 For example, Slipyi communicated with the German government on behalf of the Ukrainian community in Germany in order to lobby for steps such as the erection of a Ukrainian Catholic Church in Munich (see for example: BA B 106 28191, File: Apostolische Exarchie, Allgem. Akte, 8766g, Vermerk von Selbach an Gruppe II/1, Referat I/3, Wv 22.9., Vermerk vom 15 September 1969; BA B 106 28191, File: Apostolische Exarchie, Allgem. Akte, 8766g, Memorandum von Slipyj an den Bundeskanzler Kiesinger).


235 Maruniak, “Ukrainians,“ page 264f.
community’s reaction to the independence of Ukraine and the new immigrants have yet to be studied.
Chapter 9: Comparison and Conclusion

1. Introduction

And so our journey comes to an end. We have seen how Ukrainian DPs managed their lives in the UNRRA and IRO camps of the 1940s, how much they relished the opportunity to express their heritage, and how they fought to gain international acceptance as a group. We followed their Canadians counterparts’ attempts to consolidate the nationalist community during the 1940s, their struggle to juggle old-world loyalties and new-world allegiances, and their preparations and lobbying efforts in support of the DPs. We witnessed the settlement of the third wave in Canada, their interaction with nationalist and communist Ukrainian Canadians, and the wider community’s participation in the multiculturalism debate of the 1960s. In Germany, we observed the difficult transition from displaced persons to homeless foreigners and the Ukrainians’ attempt to find their place in the country. We caught a glimpse of their struggle to establish an active community life and their dependency on German financial support. Now it is time to put these observations into a wider theoretical context to facilitate a comparison.

Within the framework of definitions established in the introduction, Ukrainians who came to Canada with the first two waves between 1891 and the 1920s can be categorized as immigrants. Those who came to Germany prior to World War II were either refugees, political exiles, former prisoners of war, seasonal laborers, or students. Officially, no immigration program existed in Germany that could have regulated the influx or acculturation process of these de-facto migrants. During the Second World War, Ukrainians from Poland and the Soviet Union came to Germany either as forced laborers, concentration camp inmates, or refugees fleeing the advance of the Red Army. Once the war was over, they were categorized as displaced persons – people who had left their country of origin under involuntary circumstances and now found themselves outside the borders of their homeland. Although the Allied authorities persuaded or even forced the majority of the 10,000,000 displaced persons located in West Germany and Austria to return to their country of origin, one million of them successfully resisted the repatriation drive. Among them were 200,000 Ukrainians who were
looking for a new home. Those members of the group who remained in Germany stayed on as political refugees, subsumed under the category of homeless foreigners, a definition devised by the German authorities to cloak their Nazi past. Those Ukrainians who came to Canada between 1947 and 1952 were de facto immigrants; they were recruited because of their youth, strength, and employability as part of a planned selective program. However, this official status as immigrants should not divert attention from the fact that mentally and emotionally many of them still saw themselves as part of a refuge wave. Having clarified the question of official status, this chapter assesses whether Ukrainians in Canada and Germany during the postwar period can also be categorized as a diaspora group. Through this evaluation we will determine the similarities and differences between the groups’ respective experiences in the two countries. Part two examines the Ukrainian diaspora experience from three perspectives: the broader context, the external, and the internal. Part three asks whether we must distinguish between an active and a passive diaspora group. Part four outlines the opportunities for further research that arise from this work, and part five summarizes the most important aspects of the Ukrainian experience in Canada and Germany.

2. Comparison in the Context of Diaspora Theories

This chapter compares the experience of Ukrainians in Canada and Germany in the context of diaspora theories and from three perspectives. The context perspective deals with aspects such as size of the group, settlement pattern, and the respective country’s attitude and policies towards foreigners in general and Ukrainians in particular; the external perspective evaluates the relationship between the government and Ukrainians; the internal perspective deals with developments and priorities within the Ukrainian community itself. Aspects mentioned in these categories are predominantly derived from Tölölyan’s and Safran’s diaspora theories and will be identified as such.

2.1. Context Perspective

The context perspective is broad and addresses aspects which the immigrant – in this case the individual Ukrainian – was not always able to control. Geographical dispersal, also referred to as mobility, is one of them, often hailed as the most
Comparison and Conclusion

important feature of a diaspora group.¹ As elaborated in chapter 1, Ukrainians saw their share of dispersion during the 20th century. Between 1891 and the Second World War, Ukrainians migrated to Canada in two major waves that formed vital and compact communities in the Prairie regions. Descendants of the first wave began to migrate to Ontario, especially Toronto, in the early 20th century, followed by more of their kinsmen during the interwar period. Once the third wave was able to emigrate in the late 1940s, they, too, were scattered all over the globe. The group that ended up in Canada settled predominantly in Ontario and made Toronto its new center. However, they were also able to generate significant influence in other cities such as Windsor, St. Catharines, Thunder Bay, and Winnipeg, where they augmented existing communities. Thus, Ukrainians in Canada sustained and developed several centers of community life and activity in the postwar period; and Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Toronto stand out as the most important ones.

Despite an international Ukrainian migration process that started in the 19th century, Ukrainian life in Germany prior to the Second World War was rather scarce. Only with the influx of forced laborers and prisoners of war did a numerically noteworthy community develop. In 1945, more than 2,000,000 Ukrainians found themselves on German soil. Although only 200,000 of them averted repatriation, there were still enough Ukrainians left to form Ukrainian-exclusive camps such as Mittenwald, Lyssenko, or Regensburg that could generate many cultural and political activities. Once the bustling DP camp period came to an end in the late 1940s, the remaining Ukrainians were scattered across the country with a high concentration in Bavaria. However, many of the Ukrainian communities that still existed after mass migration were very small, and in comparison to Canada, Germany had only one true center of Ukrainian life – Munich. The Bavarian capital was not only the hub of Ukrainian political life in the diaspora, but also home to supranational anti-Soviet institutions such as Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, or the Institute for the Study of the USSR. Indeed, the context of the Ukrainian experience in Germany was very politically charged.

The unequal geographical distribution draws our attention to another aspect that can either thwart or facilitate community life in the diaspora, namely the sheer

¹ Tölölyan, “Rethinking,” page 21f.
size of the group. Tölölyan points out that the proportion of immigrants relative to the indigenous population is an important factor for a diaspora group,\(^2\) and here Ukrainians in Canada were at an advantage compared to their counterparts in Germany. Although the absolute numbers of the third wave in both countries do not differ greatly – roughly 35,000 emigrated from the DP camps to Canada and 25,000 stayed in Germany after the Second World War – the former displaced persons encountered different conditions in the two receiving countries. In Canada Ukrainians joined an existing community of more than 350,000 members, so that they formed a visible presence of 2.8% of the overall population by 1951. This is a significant proportion, especially when compared to the 0.04% that Ukrainians made up in Germany at the same time. Due to the size of the group, Ukrainians in Canada had actual communities living in cities such as Toronto, Thunder Bay, St. Catharines, or Winnipeg that were able to sustain a variety of churches, youth organizations, newspapers, and cultural institutions. In contrast, Ukrainians in Germany experienced a long transition period from the homeless foreigners’ camps to the German settlements which scattered the community all over the country. There were not many communities left outside of Munich that could boast a sizeable Ukrainian membership during the 1950s and 60s. As an elaboration of the internal perspective will show, the size of the group determined what kind of activity it was able to generate.

Apart from the distribution and size of the diaspora community, the overall economic opportunities that the host countries offered played a significant role during the settlement process. Ukrainians in the displaced persons’ camps did not have many opportunities to work, which left them with time to spare. Since the international community took care of the DPs’ material wellbeing, the community could devote most of its time to cultural and educational efforts. However, once the emigration scheme got into gear, the displaced persons competed for a variety of jobs abroad. Those who were not chosen for the wave of migrants that left Germany between 1947 and 1951 often continued to harbor hopes to emigrate well into the 1950s, thereby delaying a transition into the German economy. Their participation in the German economic upswing which commenced in the 1950s was

\(^2\) Tölölyan, “Rethinking,” page 21f.
further hampered through the expellee problem and the continuing influx of
German refugees who also needed jobs and housing. Furthermore, the German
government and social workers saw those who were ‘left behind’ in Germany as
the product of a process of ‘negative selection’. Although the anti-DP attitude of
the German public and government fed into this interpretation, it was true that
many of these homeless foreigners were either too young, too old, or too sick to
work. For many of those Ukrainians who managed a successful integration into the
German economy, the transition process took a long time because the camps were
only slowly abolished. In contrast to Germany, Canada emerged out of the war
quite strong and its economy made a smooth transition from wartime-heights to
postwar normality. In a climate of business and ethnic pressure in the country, the
Canadian government decided to create an immigration program to support the
continuing economic upswing. Consequently, Canada was able to fulfill obligations
toward the International Refugee Organization while at the same time addressing
an essential problem at home. Those Ukrainians who immigrated to Canada were
part of a de-facto labor migration. Most of them had been chosen on the basis of
their physical sturdiness and/or their intellectual acumen. After having fulfilled
their contracts as lumberjacks, miners, or domestics, the majority soon found work
in their previous professional fields, thereby benefiting from their own abilities and
the Canadian economic expansion. The fact that they were self-sufficient spurred
the settlement process; and many of the newcomers were soon economically secure
and successful in Canada.

Besides economic opportunities, Tölöyan asserts that “the host country’s
legal, political, administrative and cultural-ideological apparatus for addressing
immigration” is an important factor in the formation of a diaspora community. In
Canada, the government and society were aware that the country needed
immigrants to sustain its standard of living in the postwar period. The existing
Ukrainian community had been a strong advocate for additional immigration and
thus helped to sensitize the Canadian government and public to the issue.
Therefore, those Ukrainians who were chosen to come to the country were seen as

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3 Tölöyan, “Rethinking,” page 20f. Cohen also points out that “the possibility of a distinctive
creative, enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism” is one of the basic principles
of a diaspora group (Cohen, *Global Diasporas*, page 26).
a valuable contribution and were mostly welcomed. Furthermore, after the war the
Canadian government itself developed a stronger interest in addressing immigrant
communities and their acculturation process. Through informative literature and
radio programs about the country as well as language and citizenship classes, the
government tried to bring Canada closer to the newcomers. Articles and
advertisement campaigns in newspapers such as *Homin Ukrainy* were also meant to
address the immigrants and their problems. In Germany, on the other hand, the
government did not decide independently to admit homeless foreigners into its
midst. Hence the way in which Germany dealt with the group was dictated by
outside forces and did not reflect the actual attitude toward foreigners in the
country. As part of a ‘negative selection’, Ukrainians were mostly unwanted in
Germany. However, outside agencies such as the United Nations or the allied
authorities insisted that Germany had to address the issue of former displaced
persons in order to gain sovereignty. This outside pressure spurred the creation of
the Homeless Foreigners Act and affected areas such as cultural support, the
abolition of camps, or informative literature. However, the latter was confined to
explaining the homeless foreigners’ legal status in the country and did not try to
bring Germany closer to the group. Furthermore, no articles by the German
government were found in *Homin Ukrainy*’s counterpart, *Shliakh Peremohy*. From
the start, Canada’s cultural-ideological apparatus was more receptive toward
immigrants than Germany’s and presented Ukrainians with a better chance to
identify with the country, a trend that continued beyond the immediate period of
settlement.

When addressing a question such as identity formation, one has to be aware
of the multi-layered nature of identity. There is group and individual identity, as
well as ethnic or sexual identity, just to name a few aspects. Furthermore,
“processes of identity formation never occur outside socio-political and cultural
contexts. They are no mere reflection of a free play of independent actors – they
always require an opposite, the ‘other’ on to which the image of the ‘self’ is
projected.” And members of a diaspora group are faced with many ‘others,’ for
example the nation-state in which they live, diaspora communities in other states,
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and the ‘true’ homeland. It is imperative to ask whether Ukrainians identified with the host country as part of their group identity, and different parameters have to be taken into consideration to answer this question. One indicator could be the creation of a particular Ukrainian-Canadian or Ukrainian-German identity that built on identification with the history of the host country. Safran points out that an immigrant group is more likely to identify with hostland patterns the more institutionalized it is. In this respect, Ukrainians in Canada were already at an advantage due to their strong institutional base, an aspect that will be elaborated in section 2.3. Furthermore, the Canadian multiculturalism debate of the 1960s presented Ukrainians with a chance to assess their position in and contribution to the country. Although the narrative of Ukrainians as a stateless group whose homeland had to be liberated was maintained during this decade, it was coupled with another narrative: the Ukrainians’ pioneering achievements and their military contribution during the Second World War served as bases for identification with the country in order to ensure survival of the group’s heritage while improving their position in the country. Apart from submissions to the B&B Commissions and scholarly publications, events such as the Centennial in 1967, the Expo in Montreal in the same year, or the 75th anniversary of Ukrainian settlement in 1966 offered the group opportunities to celebrate their pioneering past in the country and identify themselves as contributors to Canada’s history. In Germany, there was no larger discourse that would have allowed homeless foreigners to identify with and feel part of the country. Many Ukrainians ‘drowned in the foreign sea’ as their leaders bemoaned, meaning they died of old age or had no opportunity to openly live out their Ukrainian heritage because there was no Ukrainian community where they lived. And the organized Ukrainian community in Germany perceived itself solely as political émigrés, as a stateless group that fought for the resurrection of its homeland. Identification with the history of Germany was further impossible because the Second World War served as a cut-off date; and cooperation between Ukrainians and German governments prior to the Second World War was hardly ever mentioned. Once their financial support through the federal government was in

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jeopardy during the 1960s, some Ukrainian representatives in the country reminded
the authorities that they were dealing with a group of former forced laborers,
thereby indicating that the troublesome roots of the group might have been set aside
in the immediate post-war period to stress the Ukrainian repugnance of the Soviet
Union; but they were never forgotten. Due to its burdensome history\(^6\) and its
attitude towards foreigners, Germany, unlike Canada, did not offer a broader
discourse that would have made a combination of Ukrainian and German identity
possible. Hence, the Ukrainian experience in Germany was one-dimensional, in
contrast to the Ukrainian experience in Canada which was multi-dimensional.

Identification with the country also depends on the political participation
and representation of the group in the country. In Canada, the most important step
in this direction was the formation of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, which was
founded in response to government intervention and served as an acknowledged
representative and link to the government. Government envoys such as Watson
Kirkconnell or George Simpson sympathized with Ukrainians in Canada and their
anti-communist stand and supported Ukrainian-Canadian claims and activities. In
addition to Anglo-Canadian sympathizers, Ukrainian-Canadian politicians such as
Michael Starr, the Minister of Labor under Diefenbaker, or the Ukrainian-Canadian
Senator Paul Yuzyk were examples showing that Ukrainians had gained a wider
acceptance since the Second World War. Although Ukrainians had an umbrella
organization in Germany that was comparable to the UCC, the CRUEG did not
have much contact with or influence on the German government. Although some
government officials such as Johannes Maurer in the Bavarian government or
public figures such as Paul Rohrbach were sympathetic to the plight of the
homeless foreigners and Ukrainians in particular, Ukrainians had no representatives
of their own in the German government. Another important aspect for identification
with the country is the level of participation in the public sphere. In Canada,
Ukrainians were very active on a Ukrainian-Canadian and a wider Canadian level.
Many members of the third wave also got involved in Canadian affairs through the

\(^6\) Indeed, “unlike Canada, Germans can hardly evoke national identity without including the past,
without remembering Auschwitz. With two world wars started in the name of German nationalism,
the nation is burdened forever with its history” (Adam, “German and Canadian Nationalism,” page
198).
participation in Ukrainian-Canadian events, such as the celebration of 60 years of Ukrainian settlement in 1951. Furthermore, especially during the multiculturalism discussion Ukrainian associations cooperated with other non-political groups such as the Ethnic Press Federation to gain a broader voice. In Germany, Ukrainians were only active in a context of political refugee activities and cooperated with associations such as the AFP or the ZAF. Whereas Ukrainians in Canada acted both on their background as political refugees (cooperation in context of Ukraine’s liberation) and immigrants, Ukrainians in Germany acted only as political refugees.

A diaspora group’s identification with the host country can further be expressed through acquisition of citizenship, and although more research is needed in this area, preliminary findings in the Ukrainian case are very illustrative. Inclusion or exclusion from citizenship depend on the host country’s attitude, and the German and Canadian government had inherently different approaches toward the subject. Canada was, and still is, a paradigm of a *jus soli* country that considers all its immigrants future citizens and therefore facilitates naturalization, bestowing citizenship upon anybody born on the country’s territory. During the course of the 20th century, the Ukrainian community became increasingly indigenous to the country, meaning that the majority of its members were born Canadian citizens. Furthermore, during the 1950s, the Canadian Citizenship Branch (in cooperation with voluntary agencies such as the Citizenship Council) encouraged the newcomers through advertising campaigns to obtain Canadian citizenship as quickly as possible. The success of these measures was mirrored in the Ukrainian case. Among the interviewees, it was implicit to have taken citizenship; therefore it was generally not even considered an issue. The situation for the German contingent was quite different. During the 1950s and 60s, Germany continued to follow a *jus sanguinis* approach that defined citizenship by blood ties, a method

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7 That would involve substantive naturalization statistics.
9 Triadafilopoulos, Shifting Boundaries, page 2.
10 Darcovych illustrates this point by comparing data from 1931 to that of 1971. In 1931, 57% of all Ukrainians were Canadian born, compared to 81.7% in 1971 (Darcovych, “The ‘Statistical Compendium,’” page 9).
11 The German *Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz* of 1913 built on the “principle of descent” (*jus sanguinis*) and was meant to guarantee the “maintenance of German citizenship among the
that made it rather difficult and costly for foreigners to acquire citizenship – even for those homeless foreigners who were hypothetically in a preferred position. Although the “special fate” of homeless foreigners theoretically had to be taken into consideration when it came to naturalization, members of the group did not have an inherent right to become citizens. And there was no real campaign to promote the acquisition of citizenship among this group. Therefore it is not astonishing that the German government observed low levels of naturalization during the 1960s, and the preliminary data available for the Ukrainian case confirm this tendency. Zelenets’kyi estimated in 1978 that 10% of all Ukrainians in Germany had taken German citizenship. And out of nine German interviewees, only one took citizenship during the time period of this study. One had not obtained citizenship as of 2004, and the rest had undergone naturalization between 1974 and 1994. These preliminary findings suggest that a Ukrainian-Canadian identity was accepted in Canada, whereas there was no such thing as a Ukrainian-German identity promoted in Germany. Due to Germany’s approach to citizenship, the category of “German” was not as easily accessible to Ukrainians as the category “Canadian”. Donna Gabaccia’s research concerning the Italian diaspora supports these findings. According to Gabaccia, a hyphenated, plural (for example Italian-American) identity developed in the former British settler colonies, whereas Italians in countries such as Switzerland or Germany created unitary national identities. However, although a Ukrainian-German group identity was not promoted or developed, this does not necessarily mean that individuals did not develop a specific Ukrainian-German identity. However, to answer this question goes beyond the scope of this study.

2.2. External Perspective

Although size and distribution are important factors for a diaspora group, they are largely material and demographic characteristics. However, “like the nation, the

German diaspora overseas, while at the same time limiting the ability of non-German foreigners to attain German citizenship in all but exceptional cases” (Triadafilopoulos, Shifting Boundaries, page 92). In the postwar period, Germany continued to follow the *jus sanguinis* approach and the German *Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz* of 1913. As Triadafilopoulos points out, “descent-based citizenship helped maintain the notion of a unified nation that persisted in spite of the country’s partition into separate, ideologically antagonistic states” (Triadafilopoulos, Shifting Boundaries, page 146f, quote from page 147).

12 Gabaccia, *Italy’s Many Diasporas*, page 177.
diaspora is not just an organized but also an imagined community.”\textsuperscript{13} In this context the question of homeland acquired particular meaning for Ukrainians, because they saw Ukraine not only on the verge of, but in constant crisis. That was due to the fact that they were a “stateless” diaspora, a group whose “homeland…[was] governed by another nation.”\textsuperscript{14} Adding to the problem was the fact that after 1945 all Ukrainian territories were part of the Soviet Union, therefore making it even more of an issue for the diaspora. According to Tölölyan’s diaspora theory, one of the key features to identify a diaspora group is the interest in and lobbying on behalf of the homeland in order to raise awareness in the host country.\textsuperscript{15} This study divides lobbying into three stages – first, being able to organize community members and voice concerns; second, being heard; and third, achieving an actual result, for example a change of policy. An analysis of lobbying can not only offer us insight into the group’s concerns, but also expose its relationship with the host country, because lobbying always needs an addressee.

Throughout the 30 years covered by this study, Ukrainians in Germany and Canada had different opportunities to develop and implement lobbying. In the immediate postwar period, lobbying the German government was neither possible nor deemed necessary because UNRRA and the Allied authorities took care of the displaced persons. Since they were not recognized as a separate nationality, the Ukrainian lobbying efforts aimed at international recognition and halting the repatriation campaign. The latter was achieved over time, partially due to the deteriorating relationship between the western Allies and the Soviet Union, but also because of the stout opposition displayed by many displaced persons. Once the bulk of DPs had left the country to start a new life abroad, contact between the German government and Ukrainians did not blossom because of the group’s orientation towards the wider diaspora.\textsuperscript{16} Many Ukrainians still fantasized about emigrating to North America well into the 1950s, a hope that was spurred by the continuing financial aid for Ukrainian institutions in Germany from abroad. In

\textsuperscript{13} Tölölyan, “Rethinking,” page 23.
\textsuperscript{14} Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, page 23.
\textsuperscript{15} Tölölyan, “Rethinking,” pages 16-19, 25.
\textsuperscript{16} However, more research is needed to determine whether Ukrainian organizations submitted briefs on behalf of Ukraine’s independence to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the 1950s.
addition, the German government was apprehensive about financially supporting cultural activities of homeless foreigners because it wanted to avoid any kind of “minority politics.” During the 1960s, Ukrainians came into closer contact with the German government because the community relied heavily on federal funding to sustain its organizations in the country. However, unlike the multiculturalism discussion in Canada, this did not entail identification with the country, but rather a reminder that support of homeless foreigners could help Germany’s standing on the international stage. Occasionally, representatives also reminded government authorities of Ukrainians’ history as forced laborers (especially once federal funding was in jeopardy). Indeed, the Second World War served as a cut-off date for any identity formation, and Ukrainians never referred to Ukrainian-German cooperation in the past, probably because it was tied to the notion of collaboration. Despite contacts with the government, the Ukrainian community hardly ever reached the first stage of lobbying, let alone the third stage.

Ukrainians in Canada had a variety of opportunities to develop and make use of lobbying. During the Second World War, the Ukrainian-Canadian community, represented through the newly founded Ukrainian Canadian Committee, discovered lobbying as an effective way of communicating its concerns about Ukraine’s independence and the fate of the displaced persons to the government. In so doing, Ukrainian Canadians laid the foundation for post-war lobbying efforts that concerned Ukraine’s independence as well as Ukrainian status in Canada. Since the UCC was a brainchild of the Canadian government, Ukrainians had an officially recognized spokesperson and therefore easier access to government officials. Over the course of twenty five years, Ukrainians matured into a confident group that effectively conveyed its position to the government. And the government paid attention to Ukrainian statements, at least in certain areas. Although foreign affairs issues such as Ukraine’s independence were never truly addressed, Canadian issues such as DP immigration or multiculturalism – topics

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17 In Luciuk’s interpretation, Canadian officials (Department of External Affairs) duped Ukrainian-Canadian delegations by presenting themselves sympathetic to their cause, but never committing to anything (Luciuk, Searching, pages 254-263). Luciuk also shows himself indignant about the fact that the Canadian government would not accept the liberation of Ukraine as an “objective of Canadian policy” (Luciuk, Searching, page 271f). Government officials often presented themselves sympathetically to the Ukrainian claims, but insisted that the freedom of submerged people had to
very close to the hearts of many Ukrainians – were at the top of the government’s agenda and offered Ukrainians an opportunity to voice their opinions. Although historians generally agree that the opening of Canada’s gates in the late 1940s can be attributed to the economic upswing in the country and pressures from the business sector rather than ethnic lobbying, the result was still important for community at large. Ukrainian Canadians received an influx of new, active immigrants and gained more self-confidence, thereby setting the stage for their strong participation in the multiculturalism discussion. Their involvement in the debate not only solidified their position in the country, but brought the narrative of Ukrainians as pioneers to the forefront. Although the motivational factors for participating in the discussion still need more research, arguments put forward indicate that Ukrainians in Canada were not only concerned about the situation in the homeland, but were also eager to secure future funding and a position as equal citizens in Canada. Only in the context of Canadian issues (such as multiculturalism) were Ukrainians successful in reaching the third stage of lobbying – an actual change of policy. However, this does not mean that the policy which was implemented in 1971 was a direct response to Ukrainian claims. Rather, Ukrainians were one of many factors contributing to the formulation of the policy.

2.3. Internal Perspective

A diaspora community relies heavily on cultural and/or political institutions that its members either transferred from the homeland or founded after dispersal.\(^{18}\) By 1951, Ukrainians in Canada could look back on 60 years of migration to the country, a time period that had witnessed a substantial growth of the community’s institutions. Prior to the arrival of the third wave, the Ukrainian-Canadian community had a network of churches and cultural and political organizations in the country that catered to a variety of needs. Although the third wave brought a new political orientation and with it new organizations – such as the League for the Liberation of Ukraine – to the country, its members still had to cooperate with the

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\(^{18}\) Tölölyan, “Rethinking,” page 20f.
existing community in order to settle in the country. The existing community had not only established institutions such as the UCC, which the League joined in 1959, they also presented a sizeable group within the country. Due to the mass of Ukrainians already living in Canada (approximately 350,000 in 1951) and the long-standing institutions that came with them, Ukrainians were able to finance their community life and specific projects from within the community during the 1950s and 60s. The two postwar decades were particularly eventful and active for Ukrainians in the country, who further expanded their networks of schools, youth organizations, churches, choirs and dance groups.

In Germany, the institutional distribution was quite different from Canada. Since there had been no large-scale Ukrainian migration to the country prior to the Second World War, not many cultural institutions existed in the country. A few churches and the Ukrainian Scientific Institute were notable exceptions of the interwar period. And although Ukrainians had had ties to the German government (which, for example, funded educational projects and institutions), it was not part of a broader mandate. The majority of the postwar Ukrainian institutions in the country had their roots in the DP period. Between 1945 and 1948, a variety of Ukrainian cultural, political, and educational institutions and organizations existed on German soil. In the often Ukrainian-exclusive camps, the community was able to act out, in some cases even discover, their Ukrainian heritage. Although DP camp life had been one of the most active episodes of Ukrainian life outside Ukraine, its members were not able to maintain this trend beyond the 1940s. Technically, many prestigious institutions such as UFU, the UTHI, and all the political parties kept their base in Germany. Nonetheless, their survival was in constant danger due to the mass exodus of young and active Ukrainians. Ukrainians in Germany were unable to independently sustain their institutional life and relied on a mix of diaspora, government, and church support. As a result of this dependency and the declining numbers of the community, Ukrainians in Germany constantly struggled for survival.

The differences between the community in Canada and that in Germany also became visible in the implementation of the envisioned tasks of a diaspora group. The aims of the activities of the nationalist community focused on the idea
of “fighting the Soviet Union”. The idea was that Ukraine was oppressed by Russian (i.e. Communist) domination and that Ukrainians in the diaspora had to fight communism in order to contribute to Ukraine’s liberation. This idea was particularly pronounced in the third wave, but could also be found (in weaker form) in the established community in Canada. However, actual physical confrontations between Ukrainian nationalists and communists hardly ever took place. Although the early 1950s saw violent clashes between these two groups in Canada, they were rather the exception than the rule because the pro-communist camp had lost most of its influence by the late 1950s. Ukrainians were also not the only group in Canada that experienced conflicts between these diametrically opposed groups; Latvians or Poles can serve as other examples. Since there was no base of Ukrainian communists in Germany, the case was different for the group in that country; direct clashes were not possible, although the community was also very anti-communist. The proximity of the Iron Curtain and the political murders that took place in the late 1950s weighed heavily on many Ukrainians in the country. Germany was often perceived as a battleground in a future Third World War, and this feeling was further reinforced through the presence of homeless foreigners and their institutions in Germany, especially in Munich.

Since an actual ‘fight’ with pro-communist elements was feasible neither in Canada nor in Germany, other means to fight communism and contribute to the liberation of Ukraine had to be found. In this context, the ‘fight’ takes on different dimensions and involved four categories of activity: spreading the truth, commemorating important historical events, anti-Soviet demonstrations, and the preservation of heritage. The task of ‘spreading the truth about Ukraine’ entailed informing the world that Ukrainians in Soviet Ukraine were victims of suppression and that their language was being Russified. This activity can be seen in both countries because newspapers were widespread in Canada as well as Germany. Demands were often made from within the community that informing the western world entailed implementing improvements to the academic sphere. Academic institutions such as UVAN or the Shevchenko Society were very active in Canada. 

19 In fact, newspapers were the only sector that was active in Germany once the wave of mass emigration had left the country. Many of these newspapers were geared toward an audience not only in Germany, but spread throughout the entire world.
and the integration of Ukrainian Studies into several Canadian universities opened up the topic to a broader audience. In Germany, UFU (in cooperation with the Shevchenko Society and the UTWI) was the most active academic force in this field; however, it was a force that constantly had to fight for funding, experienced recruitment difficulties, and identified with the wider diaspora rather than the German context.

Furthermore, ‘spreading the truth’ meant informing the general public both on an academic level as well as through general newspapers about important historical events such as the treaty of Pereiaslav. And the community not only informed others about such events, it also commemorated them themselves. After the Second World War, Ukrainians in Canada celebrated historical dates such as January 22 (the Day of Independence) and also honored famous members of the group – Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko, or Taras Chuprynka, for example – on a broad scale. In order to draw the government’s attention to Ukrainian issues, local authorities and representatives of the provincial and federal government were invited to participate in these events. Ukrainians in Germany also commemorated important religious or historical events; however, due to the size of the community (less than 25,000), these commemorations were rather small and often the only community activity (apart from church services). In Canada commemorations of historically important events were often combined with anti-Soviet demonstrations and manifestations. Since the community in Canada was large, these protests and presentations could take on greater dimensions, for example rallying thousands of people in cities such as Toronto. There were hardly any big demonstrations in Germany, and Ukrainians had to combine their forces with other groups (for example through the ABN or the AFP) to generate any considerable activity.

Another aspect of fighting the Soviet Union was the general preservation of Ukrainian heritage. Ukrainians in Canada and Germany argued that their kinsmen in the homeland were being Russified and unable to openly practice their language and religion or to generally express their Ukrainian heritage. Therefore, Ukrainians in the diaspora community concentrated on the youth and on Saturday schools, summer camps, and youth organizations such as Plast and SUM to instill Ukrainian heritage. It was important to the organized community that their children would
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carry on the Ukrainian heritage through the knowledge of the language, history, and geography of Ukraine as well as of general Ukrainian customs and traditions. The importance of this aspect was seen in both countries; but again, only the community in Canada was able to support widespread activities that went beyond the mere commemorations of great Ukrainians or Ukrainian holidays: Saturday schools, choirs, youth activities, summer camps, jamborees, Ukrainian studies courses (in organizations and universities) as well as a network of newspapers were evidence of an active community life. In Germany, different organizations made an effort to generate community activities such as Saturday schools or youth camps, choirs and dance groups, but membership statistics of the late 1960s clearly demonstrate that these were not really part of the community life, because there was actually no active community life left. Due to its size, the community in Germany experienced the challenges of a diaspora existence – shrinking numbers, the loss of language, the defiance of the youth – earlier than their counterparts in Canada. Although the numbers in Germany were disheartening, the development of an agenda was still important for both communities. The focus on the liberation of Ukraine coupled with the general idea of preserving one’s identity for the sake of Ukraine became “the affirmation of a collective subject,”20 thereby fulfilling another important characteristic of Tölölyan’s diaspora theory.

As part of this “collective subject,” Ukrainians in the diaspora defined the abovementioned tasks for the diaspora and developed an idea of what a “true Ukrainian” was all about. And this “true Ukrainian” was, of course, an idealized type. Nonetheless, it is important to reiterate the most important aspects. The displaced persons in the camps in Germany had to define themselves in a hostile environment, because the international community did not accept them as a separate nationality and the Soviet authorities wanted them repatriated. Nonetheless, camp life also had positive aspects for the group, because – paradoxically enough – for the first time ever, Ukrainians were also able to openly express their heritage. In order to demonstrate their Ukrainian background to the authorities and to enjoy their cultural heritage, Ukrainians infused all levels of camp life with Ukrainian aspects – such as the schools, entertainment, or politics. It

20 Tölölyan, “Rethinking,” page 23f.
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has to be kept in mind that this was only possible because the authorities – and here in particular UNRRA – provided a milieu in which these activities could be pursued. During the camp period, a discourse developed that would influence the further development of the group in the diaspora. Because camp life allowed it and because repatriation threatened their existence, it became important to speak Ukrainian, to pass one’s heritage on to the children through schooling, youth organizations, and summer camps. ‘Ukrainianess’ was further expressed through strong anti-Soviet attitude, through dedication to Ukraine’s liberation, and through strong community involvement. This idealized version of Ukrainians could also be found in the established community in Canada. During their postwar lobbying campaign on behalf of the displaced persons, the established Ukrainian-Canadian community portrayed their brethren abroad as western-minded, religious, hard-working, and democratic – in a nutshell, as ideal future Canadian citizens, thereby also casting light on how the community perceived itself in the country. The ‘Canadian virtues’ of the community – the pioneering experience and the hard work during the settlement process – came to the forefront during the multiculturalism discussion, coupling the narrative of the political refugee with that of a settler in Canada. In Germany, only the narrative of the political refugee which had been developed in the camps existed, because the German government did not offer any opportunity for another kind of identification.

3. Ukrainians – Active or Passive Diaspora Group?

The comparison between the Ukrainian experience in Canada and Germany in the context of diaspora theories raises the question whether we need to make a distinction between an active and a passive diaspora group. An active diaspora would be a group that could actually put the theoretical goals of the group into practice. In the Ukrainian case these theoretical goals involve the ideal of an independent Ukraine, the task of the diaspora to spread the ‘truth’ about Ukraine, to fight Russian imperialism (an aspect that is open to interpretation and included features such as preservation of heritage and language as well as anti-Soviet demonstrations). The theoretical goals were the same is both countries, which is not surprising, because the third wave had the same background and the existing community in Canada had already displayed an interest in the homeland and
lobbying efforts before and during the Second World War. In Canada, this common interest in homeland – no matter how different in scope – offered a basis for future cooperation between the newcomers and the established community as their common efforts in anti-Soviet demonstrations, for example, have shown. This observation, however, is not intended to dispute the existence of clashes between the established community and the third wave – it simply adds a different perspective.

An active diaspora group has the ability to actually carry out the tasks (such as lobbying) it sets for itself and continue them as the years go by. In the context of continuity and change, we can find differences between Canada and Germany which are influenced by aspects such as size of the group and the attitude and policies of the host country. Whereas the community in Canada reached its peak after the Second World War – during a time when the group was one of the largest in the country and used its size and historical role to gain influence during the multiculturalism discussion – the group in Germany literally faded away and was unable to generate any significant activity in the diaspora. This study confirms Safran’s hypothesis that critical mass matters in maintaining a diaspora’s institutions.21 In addition, critical mass is needed to turn a passive diaspora group that fulfills the theoretical criteria into an active diaspora group. However, the host country’s attitude has to be taken into consideration as well. Ukrainians in Canada lived in a country that was open to newcomers and offered them plenty of opportunity to articulate and carry out their goals and aspirations. Although Ukrainians in Germany also enjoyed freedom of speech, their activities pertained more to the country’s foreign policy and were therefore more heavily scrutinized.

4. Further Research
Since Ukrainians in Canada after the Second World War deserve more attention and since their counterparts in Germany are virtually a neglected field of study, this work opens up a range of questions that require further research.

- In the Canadian context, an evaluation of community newspapers during the 1960s could give insights into internal reactions to the multiculturalism discussion, potentially uncovering reasons why Ukrainians became

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involved in the debate (reasons that would go beyond concern about their position in the country and their fear of second-class citizenship).

- In Germany, an in-depth study of Ukrainian political activities would be of value to German as well as Ukrainian history, and community newspapers such as Shliakh Peremohy and Ukraïns’kyi Samostiinyk could serve as an excellent source.

- Although this study gives an insight into the early settlement process in both countries, a micro-study of the first ten years could address an array of intriguing questions. What role did women play during this period? Traditionally, Ukrainians saw women as the keepers of heritage. How did this perception influence their activities in the respective countries and what kind of an influence did the host country have on this perception? What measures were taken at home to interest the youth in Ukrainian issues? What influence did economic and social status have on the third wave’s view of the existing community?

- In order to situate the Ukrainian experience in a broader context, a comparison to another group such as the Lithuanians or Latvians or an examination of the homeless foreigners in general would be beneficial. Contrasting the Ukrainian experience with that of another ethnic group could also address the question as to whether critical mass or the host country’s attitude plays a greater role in the formation of a diaspora group.

- Although Ukrainian Canadian and Ukrainian American cooperation is mentioned in this study, a thorough account of the postwar period is needed to fill the void and shed light on cooperation prior and after the formation of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians.

Both Satzewich’s and this study have substantiated the importance of homeland for the diaspora. However, more research is needed to expose the range of ideas and visions that existed about a future liberated Ukraine. An in-depth comparison of different newspapers, for example Homin Ukrainy and Novyi Shliakh, could shed light on this question. Interviews and publications examined for this study already suggest the preliminary conclusion that many Ukrainians in the diaspora saw
Ukraine’s problems as imposed by Moscow. The underlying idea was that Ukraine’s problems would cease to exist once the country was liberated. Many Ukrainians in the diaspora had high hopes for a free Ukraine; in a way, the non-existence of an independent homeland gave them a purpose, a sense of direction and duty. So what happened to the community after 1991? What did independence mean to the diaspora? Can we still define Ukrainians as a diaspora group in the post-Soviet era? The period after 1991 is important because the diaspora-homeland relationship had changed. Preliminary research on the Canadian case suggests that independence sparked a wave of enthusiasm in the diaspora, coupled with an outburst of activity geared towards the homeland. However, this enthusiasm waned in the mid-90s and gave way to disillusionment. Many community members were unhappy with democratic progress in Ukraine, because in their opinion there were still too many Communists in power. In addition, the community was disappointed with the fourth wave of immigrants that came to the country during the 1990s. In the eyes of the community, these newcomers were not as dedicated to the homeland as their predecessors had been. And once Ukrainians in Canada realized that their unremitting focus on Ukraine and its affairs actually threatened the future of the community in North America, its leaders redirected the focus of activities towards Canada. Further research is needed to confirm these first findings, and this study can serve as a basis to analyze the community’s attitude toward the fourth wave in more depth. A comparable examination is also needed for the German case.

Although independence did not spark a return movement within the diaspora, for many of its members it still presented the first real chance to visit the homeland as tourists. Ukrainians, who had lived in the diaspora for decades convinced that they had to preserve Ukrainian culture, language, and heritage for Ukraine, were finally able to return ‘home.’ Were there ever attempts to bring the culture ‘back’ to Ukraine? An indicator for such a trend is the large number of dance and choir groups from North America that traveled above all through western

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Ukraine in the post-independence period. How did Ukrainians in Ukraine react to such an attempt to showcase Ukrainian culture? How did Ukrainians from North-America respond to the realities of post-Soviet Ukraine, and did these journeys influence a change in their agenda?

5. Conclusion
For the time period of this study, Ukrainians can be called a diaspora group because they fulfilled the main criteria of a diaspora existence. They were scattered across the globe and determined to maintain their heritage outside the borders of Ukraine. Furthermore, they employed lobbying on behalf of the homeland and developed a collective subject in the diaspora, namely the independence of Ukraine. However, this study has also shown that the attitude of the host country and the size of the group influence whether a diaspora group turns out to be active or passive. Although critical mass stands out as one of the most important issues, the subject is complex and can not be reduced entirely to this aspect. Recapping the particularities in both countries once more, it becomes obvious that different factors were intertwined and interacted.

The group of Ukrainians in Germany consisted mostly of old, very young, or sick people, it was very small and had no roots in the country, all facts that hampered institutional development. Furthermore, its members were part of a ‘negative selection’ and not welcomed by the host society. And the strong Ukrainian anti-Soviet attitude and ensuing political activities could also lead to strained relations with the German government, especially once the latter became more interested in its Ostpolitik during the early 1970s. The origin of the group as forced laborers and the government’s disinterest in drawing the community closer into German society further prevented an identification with the country. In contrast, by 1951 Ukrainians in Canada looked back on 60 years of settlement in the country that had resulted in a numerically strong group and an extensive network of Ukrainian institutions and organizations. Already during the Second World War, Ukrainian Canadians discovered lobbying as a way of communicating their concerns to the government, a trend that they continued in the postwar period. All those Ukrainians who immigrated to the country were part of a labor migration. They were young, active, and capable of finding work in their fields, thereby
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quickly becoming self-sufficient. The attitude of the Canadian government, the history of Ukrainian settlement in the country, and the developing multiculturalism discussion of the 1960s allowed for an incorporation of Ukrainian as well as Canadian features into their overall discourse, thereby making an identification with the country possible and easing their activities in the country. Both aspects of critical mass as well as government policy worked in favor of the group in Canada and hampered the group in Germany. The process of building a new home abroad turned out to be more complicated for Ukrainians in Germany than for Ukrainians in Canada.
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**Interviews**

All interviews were conducted by the author. Unless otherwise indicated, the interviews are in possession of the author. The interviews are identified by number in order to protect the identity of the interviewees

**Interviews in Toronto**

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Interview 2, October 11, 2000, interview in possession of Dr. Roberto Perin.

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