Institutions, Development and Living the Good Life in Ecuador: A Political-Economy Analysis of Policy Making Under the Buen Vivir Development Paradigm

Abstract

This study employs a political-economy perspective on the link between the new institutional setting emerged under the paradigm of Buen Vivir (good living) and the improved development indicators in Ecuador. Existing research provides strong empirical evidence for institutions-development correlations. However, the mechanisms of how political institutions affect public policy outcome, such as development, remain uncertain. The approach of Spiller and Tommasi deems the capability of institutions to facilitate intertemporal transactions important for producing high quality public policy. Drawing on the SP model, positive political theory and the theory of repeated games, this mixed-methods case study aims on revealing the institutional incentives and constrains aligning actors in Ecuador to more cooperative policy making. Comparing the institutional settings of 1998 and 2008, I argue that the microfoundations of policy making created in 2008 foster more long-term cooperation among political actors and facilitate high quality public politics, while the subsequent amending of the constitution impaired the system of checks and balances with negative impact for policy-making capacities.