The development of lying in young children

Abstract

A child’s understanding of the mind emerges long before language and entails the exchange of perspectives with others. Previous research suggests that the ability to implant false perspectives (i.e., to lie) emerges only later in ontogeny. However, it remains a topic of debate whether conventional lying tasks are adequate and valid measures for a child’s understanding and ability to manipulate the minds of others. Therefore, this dissertation aims to investigate the motivational, social, and cognitive foundations of spontaneous lying by children, as well as how lying develops within interactional flows. In Study 1, I present a new interactive paradigm for measuring spontaneous lying in 3-year-old children. Study further investigates the role of motivational, and social-cognitive factors as well as the ability to talk about lying explicitly. Study 2 expands on spontaneous lying in 2-year-olds. Study 3 explores whether children spontaneously adapt their lies to the recipient’s epistemic state. Finally, Study 4 focuses on how children lie in order to manage their reputation among peers. Findings of Study 1 reveal that 3-year-olds lie for the benefit of another person but still struggle to speak about their lies explicitly. Spontaneous lying is related to false-belief understanding. Moreover, Study 2 suggests that selective lying is present at 3 but not at 2 years of age. Findings from Study 3 further suggest that at age 4, children adapt their lying to the epistemic states of others. As evident from Study 4, children begin to lie for reputational purposes from 5 years of age. I conclude that the spontaneous usage of perspective exchange and perspective contrasting is likely a seed of early Theory of Mind that emerges as a constructed product of social interaction.