|Titel:||China's Maritime Coercive Diplomacy in the South China Sea since 2011||Sprache:||Englisch||Autor*in:||Nguyen Dang, Lan Anh||Schlagwörter:||maritime coercive diplomacy; South China Sea; maritime disputes||GND-Schlagwörter:||China <Motiv>GND||Erscheinungsdatum:||2022||Tag der mündlichen Prüfung:||2022-01-18||Zusammenfassung:||
Over the past decade, China has increasingly employed maritime coercive diplomacy to pursue its objectives in the maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Relying on sea-based forces, primarily paramilitary forces, China has gradually changed the status quo in the South China Sea in its favour. Despite its superior power, however, China has not achieved all its policy goals by getting small Southeast Asian claimants to comply with its demands.
This dissertation examines China's use of maritime coercive diplomacy in the South China Sea since 2011. It explores major contextual and tactical factors influencing the outcome of China's use of maritime coercive diplomacy in a comparative case study covering the 2011 cable-cutting incidents, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal stand-off, the Second Thomas Shoal tensions in 2013–2014, the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig crisis, the Spratly Islands land reclamation in 2013–2015 and the militarisation in the South China Sea since 2016.
This study demonstrates that the shift in the regional balance of power and the increase in material capabilities, particularly maritime law enforcement forces, have created favourable overarching conditions for China's use of maritime coercive diplomacy in the South China Sea since 2011. Analysing five factors (asymmetry of power, asymmetry of motivation, the strength of U.S. deterrence, the domestic factor, and the clarity of compliance terms), this dissertation demonstrates that the combination of asymmetry of motivation in favour of small target countries and strong deterrent signals from the U.S. limits China's effective use of maritime coercive diplomacy. However, when the U.S. reaction and deterrence are slow and weak, China has made its coercive efforts successful in the form of faits accomplis relying on its rapidly growing material power and military capabilities. The domestic factors of public opinion and bureaucratic pluralism have had a limited effect on the implementation and the outcome of China's maritime coercive diplomacy as well as Southeast Asian rival claimants' policies during the crises. Lastly, China's unclear terms of compliance and settlement constrain the possibilities for productive bargaining with its rivals.
|Enthalten in den Sammlungen:||Elektronische Dissertationen und Habilitationen|
geprüft am 17.05.2022
geprüft am 17.05.2022